Decentralised Autonomous Organisations (DAOs) raise fundamental questions for private law. While scholarly and regulatory attention has primarily focused on the legal status and governance of DAOs, comparatively little consideration has been given to how disputes involving these organisations should be resolved. This article examines the suitability of dispute resolution mechanisms for DAO-related disputes. Analysing the principal categories of disputes that have emerged in practice, the article critically evaluates blockchain-based dispute resolution mechanisms alongside traditional arbitration, in light of due process, enforceability, party autonomy, and the unique features of decentralised governance. It argues that neither purely code-based dispute resolution nor conventional litigation provides a satisfactory response to the complexity of DAO disputes. It concludes that arbitration, appropriately adapted to the technological and organisational realities of DAOs, offers the most promising framework for balancing decentralisation, legal certainty, and procedural fairness within the evolving Web3 ecosystem.
The rise of cryptocurrency has revolutionised value exchange and contractual execution in international trade. This article assesses whether existing legal and arbitral frameworks adequately ensure certainty, fairness, and enforceability in international cryptocurrency contracts. Employing doctrinal and comparative legal analysis, it examines the legal and regulatory framework of crypto-assets and smart contracts across jurisdictions in both the Global North (including the UK and the EU) and the Global Majority (such as India and Iran). Within some evaluations of regulatory approaches, such as UNIDROIT and MiCA, the research finds that while some jurisdictions in the Global North have made progress in establishing regulatory frameworks that recognise crypto-assets as property and promote the enforceability of smart contracts, they still face significant challenges. These obstacles are even more pronounced in Global Majority countries, where regulatory strategies tend to be prohibitive or fragmented. Decentralised innovations like Decentralised Finance (DeFi) and Decentralised Autonomous Organisations (DAOs) further complicate governance and cross-border recognition. The article also investigates the impact of international arbitration, particularly under the New York Convention and UNCITRAL Model Law. The findings reveal that, while these instruments support cross-border enforcement, they face challenges inherent to cryptocurrency, including issues with arbitration agreements, pseudonymity, public policy objections, and the volatility of damages. Blockchain’s decentralised structure further complicates the determination of an arbitral seat. Although crypto arbitration platforms are emerging as an innovative potential, their lack of connection to national legal systems renders them largely unenforceable. Integrating digital currencies into domestic legal frameworks may mitigate these concerns; however, effectiveness hinges on global acceptance, which remains fragmented across jurisdictions. In conclusion, the findings submitted that, despite notable progress, considerable gaps remain in both legal and arbitral frameworks concerning cryptocurrency. The key recommendations are to harmonise international legal and arbitral frameworks, establish more explicit rules for blockchain evidence, enhance privacy protections, and adopt hybrid arbitration methods that combine decentralised approaches with established practices. These measures aim to strengthen regulatory cooperation and ensure stability in cross-border cryptocurrency transactions.
This chapter examines the applicability of international investment law to emerging digital asset classes such as data packages, cryptocurrencies, and non-fungible tokens (NFTs). These assets, now mainstream investments, raise unique issues in terms of their protection under investment treaties. The chapter explores whether digital assets qualify as ’investments’ under traditional treaty definitions, and the application of the common protections offered under investment treaties to such assets. It assesses digital assets against criteria often applied by investment treaty tribunals to argue that digital assets can broadly be classified as investments. The chapter also analyses the key questions arising from the application of the fair and equitable treatment (FET) standard and protection against expropriation to digital assets, especially given the current relative lack of regulation in this area. Valuation complexities, including market volatility and the absence of benchmarks, are addressed, emphasising the need for close consideration of these issues in the context of investment treaty claims. Lastly, the chapter addresses structuring investments via corporate vehicles to enhance treaty protections and mitigate risks. It concludes that, while investment law can accommodate digital assets, careful structuring and awareness of treaty terms are vital for investor protection within an uncertain and ever-evolving regulatory environment.
Fragmented construction records prolong disputes and erode evidentiary confidence in international arbitration. This paper interrogates whether permissioned-blockchain ledgers can recalibrate that evidentiary calculus by embedding immutability, cryptographic authentication, and distributed consensus within project documentation. Methodologically, this study employs a doctrinal-comparative approach, examining the UNCITRAL model law, IBA rules on evidence (2020), and the FIDIC conditions of contract (2017), combined with a technical synthesis of permissioned blockchain architectures. The research demonstrates that blockchain-verified records satisfy admissibility, relevance, and weight thresholds while obviating conventional authentication burdens. Real-world pilots illustrate automated notice compliance and payment certification through smart contracts, revealing measurable reductions in cost and delay. A phased implementation framework details protocol selection, hybrid storage architecture, governance safeguards, and change-management strategies that mitigate interoperability, privacy, and stakeholder-alignment challenges. The findings characterize blockchain not as incremental digitization but as a jurisprudential inflection point capable of redistributing evidentiary risk and accelerating finality in construction arbitration. Consequently, industry adoption promises heightened transparency, equitable risk allocation, and globally harmonized dispute-resolution efficiency gains.
Abstract This chapter explores the application of the validity requirements of a choice of court agreement under the Hague Choice of Court Convention, Lugano Convention, and Brussels I Regulation in disputes involving decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs), analyzing the legal implications of a choice of court agreement for the DAO, its members, and third parties. When DAOs are involved in a state court dispute, their blockchain-based nature raises numerous legal questions, including issues related to their legal status and their capacity to enter into binding agreements, such as a choice of court agreement. This reiterates the influence of the international context in which DAOs operate on state court dispute resolution, and emphasizes the challenges of locating DAOs in the physical world, highlighting the limitations of state justice for disputes involving DAOs. This analysis underscores how a choice of court agreement introduces a degree of predictability regarding the forum for civil and commercial claims.
This chapter examines the jurisdiction and applicable law issues that arise in NFT-related contractual disputes under EU private international law rules, namely the Brussels I (recast) Regulation and the Rome I Regulation. It begins by analysing the key characteristics of distributed ledger technologies (DLTs) from a private international law perspective, including decentralisation, pseudonymity, and immutability. The analysis shows that these characteristics, in particular decentralisation and pseudonymity, pose challenges to the current territoriality-based PIL framework. The chapter then discusses how to determine the international nature of digital ledger transactions. It argues that NFT transactions often have objective international elements that do not require courts to presume internationality simply because the transactions utilize DLTs. The chapter then turns to jurisdiction and applicable law issues in NFT-related contractual disputes under the Brussels I (recast) and Rome I regulations. It examines the different types of contracts that may arise in the NFT ecosystem. The analysis demonstrates that NFT-related contractual disputes may not present a significant challenge for the application of EU private international law rules when the parties’ agreement includes jurisdiction and/or choice of law clauses. Where no such choices are made, however, the discrepancy between the decentralised, pseudonymous nature of digital ledgers and the territorial connecting factors in EU private international law rules will create difficulties for the courts. Courts may also face problems of characterisation when applying those PIL rules that cover specific kinds of contracts. As the chapter argues, these potential challenges highlight the need for a broad, flexible interpretation of the rules in light of the specific characteristics of DLTs and of digital assets (including NFTs). The chapter concludes by noting that such difficulties may eventually lead the EU legislature to introduce specific rules for DLTs that would cover digital assets including NFTs, but not before the first cases reach member-state courts or the CJEU.
NFTs are intrinsically dependent on blockchain technologies. Their main function is to represent underlying tangible or intangible assets and their value. NFTs have also been designed and developed to create new tradable items and to generate a new market. Trading NFTs is therefore one of the major objectives within this new market, mainly in marketplaces connected to the relevant blockchains. On blockchains, the usual tools to perform transactions are the so-called smart contracts. NFTs are programmed using smart contracts, and transactions on NFTs are generally performed through smart contracts. This electronic process confirms the authenticity of the NFT, timestamps the transaction, and keeps track of the NFT’s successive owners. NFTs’ eco-environment is therefore the world of digital technologies, first and foremost blockchain technologies (including their cryptocurrencies) and smart contracts. This chapter will provide a legal analysis of blockchain technologies, smart contracts and NFTs and how these different technologies relate to each other from a technical and a legal perspective. It will show how the growing importance of virtual environments and marketplaces makes it crucial to address the legal issues raised by transactions on NFTs. Indeed, while there can be many interesting economic opportunities and legal innovations around NFTs, there is still confusion about how the law should frame this new business. There are also certainly risks lying ahead.
This chapter explores the integration of Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) principles into legal and financial frameworks to promote sustainable development, focusing on Kerala, India. Drawing on qualitative insights and policy analysis, it examines Kerala's decentralized governance model, legal mandates, and financial strategies supporting ESG adoption. It highlights mechanisms such as green finance legislation, ESG-based credit ratings, and sustainable investment practices. Challenges such as non-standardized ESG metrics and risks of greenwashing are identified alongside opportunities for digital innovation and regulatory reform. The chapter contributes both theoretical depth and practical tools for subnational ESG implementation, offering guidance for policymakers, academics, and financial institutions.
Non-fungible tokens (NFTs) play a crucial role in supporting the decentralized applications of Web 3.0. Despite the enthusiasm of digital artists and NFT investors for minting and transacting NFTs, the NFT market faces persistent legal uncertainties, including issues related to fraud, money laundering, intellectual property (IP) infringement, and unfair competition. This chapter explores the evolving legal landscape surrounding NFTs, emphasizing the growing challenges and risks to NFT governance evident in the rising number of legal disputes. We provide an in-depth examination of the technological features of NFTs, highlighting potential sources of misunderstandings and conflicts among market participants. Additionally, we analyze the property and contractual characteristics of NFTs, aiming to untangle the complexities associated with their legal nature. Based on the technical and economic characteristics of NFTs, this chapter elucidates the illusory aspects of uniqueness and scarcity, underscoring the limitations of categorizing NFTs as conventional property. We then illustrate how misinterpretations of the technological and economic features of NFTs have resulted in problematic legal applications, particularly within IP law. Resolving these issues is essential for fully realizing and sustaining the economic value of NFTs in the evolving landscape of Web 3.0.
Digital finance has been with us for more than a decade. It is growing at a rapid rate, and the world is experiencing a significant transition in the access to new and diverse financial products that are being made available online. This chapter discusses the ensuing legal challenges of tokens, smart contracts and international commercial arbitration. It will demonstrate how there are a number of different tokens that have been developed across various sectors such as agriculture, real-estate and intellectual property amongst others. A potential dilemma that has emerged is how when applied to transnational transactions, the law pertaining to tokens is highly fragmented and still being developed. In addition, the emergence of smart contracts that are supported by blockchain technology can facilitate token transactions, which could be subject to arbitration. Problematic though, as a smart contract is subject to arbitration, the dispute resolution clause within the contract itself will require careful consideration. Also, the code supporting the blockchain technology itself will also be challenging because a practitioner will need to understand where and when the code was installed. For instance, was the code inserted in the state where arbitration has been agreed and what the arbitration clause and agreement provides. That said, the chapter has called for more research to better understand the interconnectedness between these new technology, financial products and the existing legal framework for transnational arbitration.
The decentralized exchange (DEX) leverages smart contracts to trade digital assets for users on the blockchain. Developers usually develop several smart contracts into one project, implementing complex logic functions and multiple transaction operations. However, the interaction among these contracts poses challenges for developers analyzing the state logic. Due to the complex state logic in DEX projects, many critical state derailment defects have emerged in recent years. In this article, we conduct the first systematic study of state derailment defects in DEX. We define five categories of state derailment defects and provide detailed analyses of them. Furthermore, we propose a novel deep learning-based framework StateGuardfor detecting state derailment defects in DEX smart contracts. It leverages a smart contract deconstructor to deconstruct the contract into an abstract syntax tree (AST), from which five categories of dependency features are extracted. Next, it implements a graph optimizer to process the structured data. At last, the optimized data is analyzed by graph convolutional networks to identify potential state derailment defects. We evaluated StateGuardthrough a dataset of 46 DEX projects containing 5671 smart contracts, and it achieved 94.25% F1-score. In addition, in a comparison experiment with state-of-the-art, StateGuardleads the F1-score by 6.29%. To further verify its practicality, we used StateGuardto audit real-world contracts and successfully authenticated multiple novel common vulnerabilities and exposures.
DAOs (Decentralized Autonomous Organizations) are fundamentally changing how companies are run in several key ways, through decentralized decision-making, social audibility, and limited liability principle. The following research examines the changes that DAOs bring to conventional corporate governance and analyses how they are being implemented worldwide. DAOs have advantages that include the decentralization of power, and the ability to improve the speed with which innovation occurs. However, they present obstacles that include legal uncertainty, problems of governance, and security vulnerabilities. This research comprehensively examines how DAOs could disrupt corporate processes such as decision-making, stakeholders’ interactions, and power relations. It then reviews the current legal and regulatory environment for DAOs across different legal systems and considers the notion of liability issues. The research also presents a checklist of strengths and weaknesses for DAOs in emerging markets based on considerations such as technology adaptation, regulatory definition, and community engagement. When the trends of socioeconomic impacts are unveiled, it will be possible for lawmakers, managers, and investors to adapt to new conditions and utilize the evolved concept of corporate governance through DAOs.
This chapter discusses various aspects of agency, autonomy, control, and decentralization in the context of different organizations and institutions, such as state bodies, semi-autonomous organizations, private law-based organizations, and commercial companies. The definition of an agency varies based on the type of organization, its legal status, and its relationship with other organizations. The chapter also explores different forms of decentralization, such as territorial decentralization and technical decentralization, and the challenges that arise with each. The concept of Latour's chain of translation is introduced to describe the transformation of ideas through intercessors. The passage concludes by discussing the importance of institutional arrangements, constitutional and legal demands, political culture, and public values in determining the meaning of agency and its relationship with other organizations.
Abstract An inevitable consequence of technological advancement is that it triggers regulatory challenges for law and policymakers. The regulation of digital assets has generated much debate in this regard. The central objective of this article is to examine the regulation of one particular type of digital asset, NFTs, through an international investment law lens. The international investment regime offers investors high levels of protection against breaches of obligations by host states for covered investments. The aim of the article is to determine whether NFTs can be considered as covered investments for the purposes of the application of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and treaties with investment provisions (TIPs), and further to examine whether that regime would provide an appropriate regulatory framework for investment in NFTs.
Artificial intelligence (AI) and distributed ledger (DLT), although technically diametrically opposed technologies, have many common features in international trade relations (MTO). The mentioned technologies are at the same time emerging technologies and disruptive technologies. On the other hand, MTO consists not only of entities, but also concrete business relationships, ie business operations. In this sense, AI and DLT are the subject of both international economic law and international trade law. Both technologies are viewed in the light of the digitalization of trade (economy) with the aim of automating it as much as possible. Automation is one of the key features that AI and DLT have in common. Preoccupied with AI and DLT, UNCITRAL, UNESCO, the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the European Union (EU) have made significant contributions to the regulation of these technologies, among which the EU has gone the farthest with the adoption of the ,,Artificial intelligence Act'' (P9_TA(2024)0138). Within the framework of their powers, the aforementioned entities offered areas of application of AI and DLT, but also provided specific normative solutions either in the form of "technology in trade" or in the form of "technology for trade". Therefore, these technologies are found in sources of international trade law of different hierarchies, but also in legal documents that will be the basis for creating new normative solutions in the future. This paper will focus on the international trade aspects of these technologies by analyzing the work of UNCITRAL, UNESCO, WTO and EU in order to show the basics but also the trends in the international trade relations of AI and DLT.
The rapid advancement of digitization and decentralization is heralding a new era in social and economic organization. As nation-states grapple with the impact of (post-)globalization and technological innovation, increasing attention is being paid to blockchain technology's potential to enable the emergence of new governance structures, such as decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) and network states. This chapter analyzes whether DAOs could provide a viable framework for addressing the needs of future societies while maintaining fundamental principles such as democratic processes and the rule of law.
Intellectual property protection is a right that must be granted by the state to the holder of a work and the increasing number of intellectual property rights problems such as theft of a work or indirect theft, for example, plagiarism, means that it is very necessary to protect every work produced. This research uses a literature review. This research aims to provide information on the results of analyses related to the protection of intellectual property which has caused many problems related to intellectual property. The results of this research show that the blockchain system must also be utilized by the Indonesian Government to become a central database for virtual intellectual property and public domain collections. Legal protection in Indonesia still needs to be strengthened on the law enforcement side to provide legal certainty for stakeholders so that public confidence arises in registering their intellectual property. Legal protection in Indonesia still needs to be strengthened on the law enforcement side to provide legal certainty for stakeholders so that public confidence arises in registering their intellectual property.
Merger regulation is a fundamental instrument by which competition authorities control the structure of an industry. Despite its relevance, the EU Treaties contain no rules on merger control. From the Commission’s first initiative to regulate concentrations at the EU level in 1966, it has taken more than 20 years of negotiations between the Member States and the European Commission to reach an agreement on EU legislation to control concentrations. The history of the European Merger Regulation reflects differing national views of the Member States and EU institutions on the necessity or the rejection of controlling concentrations and positions its legislative process and the various contradicting national interests of Member States against the apps and flows of EU integration throughout the 1960s, 70s, and 80s. At the core of this ‘protracted trench warfare’2 lied the delegation of enforcement powers to an already-powerful Commission, which the Member States initially opposed to. Capturing or delegating jurisdiction, hence, the distribution of administrative and enforcement authority between the national and EU authorities remained one of the most contentious issues during the bitterly fought negotiations. A similarly fierce and heated discussion on the distribution of administrative and enforcement powers across national authorities and the EU Commission has surfaced since the adoption of the European Commission Guidance on the referral mechanism under Article 22 in 20213 and the General Court’s judgment in Illumina/GRAIL4 and the Commission’s prohibition decision in 2022. Article 22 is a corrective mechanism of the Merger Regulation, which allows for one or more Member States to request the Commission to examine, for those Member States, any concentration that does not have an EU dimension but affects trade between Member States and threatens to significantly affect competition within the territory of the Member State or States making the request. This article assesses the distribution of enforcement powers across national authorities and the European Commission, in light of the Commission’s Guidance on the referral mechanisms under Article 22 in 2021 and the General Court’s judgment in Illumina/GRAIL1 and the Commission’s prohibition decision in 2022. The Article shows how the issue of delegation of enforcement powers between the Member States and the EU institutions has always been at the heart of the negotiation processes of the Merger Regulation, and though implemented through compromises, such as Article 22, this question may not have been entirely resolved. The article critically analyses two specific consequences of the way the Commission re-prioritised cases eligible for Article 22 referrals: the consequences of the Commission’s new policy for third parties and the principles of effective competition law enforcement including the principle of loyal cooperation and mutual trust. Born out of a political compromise, Article 22 of the European Merger Regulation has been characterised as a ‘late bi-product of the negotiations to create a merger control regime’ at the EU level and as ‘a mechanism riddled with gaps and uncertainties’. 5 After more than 20 years of low enforcement and largely decreased relevance of what has been initially nicknamed the ‘Dutch-clause’, these gaps and uncertainties are at the centre of extensive and heated debates about the way the Commission has announced to revigorate this enforcement mechanism. In this article, I first show how the issue of delegation of enforcement powers between the Member States and the EU institutions have always been at the heart of the (difficult) negotiation processes of the Merger Regulation, and though implemented through compromises, such as Article 22, this question may not have been entirely resolved. Second, I analyse the underlying rationale and development of the enforcement mechanism of Article 22 from the adoption of the first Merger Regulation in 1989 until the recently adopted Guidance of the Commission and the Court’s judgment in Illumina/GRAIL to provide a deeper interpretation of the referral mechanism laid down in Article 22 and to show the policy shift from discouraging to encouraging referrals. Third, I discuss two specific aspects of the new policy as enshrined in the 2021 Guidance and the mechanism currently underlying referrals under Article 22 EUMR that have so far been overlooked: the consequences of the radical re-prioritisation of referrals and the Commission’s policy under Article 22 for third parties and for the effective functioning of the (close) cooperation between the Commission and the NCAs. I argue that on the one hand, the Commission’s re-prioritisation of cases eligible for Article 22 referrals has re-written and largely eliminated procedural rights for third parties as established in the EU Merger Regulation. On the other hand, by re-activating the referral mechanism of Article 22, the Commission needs to reconsider the mechanism currently enshrined under Article 22. These procedures and mechanisms follow the enforcement logic and jurisdictional principles laid down in Regulation 1/2003, and accordingly, the same principles of effective enforcement including the General Court’s recent Sped-Pro6 ruling should to these the principle of loyal cooperation and mutual trust. The of merger control in the EU not a has been one with the between Member States and EU institutions at of the integration The regulation of has first been by the of in for the and the implemented by the of remained on merger control. In the years the the Member States national merger control In the in those years that and Member States or of of as a for national to the of and the of merger control rules in the Treaties the of the of as a law that out the and but not down a agreement to the European Commission to a merger and an authority within the jurisdictional of the EU The first of this its on the of in the the Commission its that merger should of the Commission’s as an of This the first of what the Commission as the between its competition authority and merger control. 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In the the article on Article 22, the Article of Regulation out for referral of a concentration from a Member State to the the referral request by one or more Member the that is the of that request the of concentration out in Article of that regulation the for a European dimension laid down in Article of that the concentration affect trade between Member the concentration to significantly affect competition within the territory of the Member State or States that the referral request. to the third a concentration this to the that it is to have on the of trade between Member to the a Member State or States in to on a is a that the may have a on competition and that it may in the of of such a but to the of a In the of Regulation the Commission to of the the Member In for to than it the Commission a Member State to a merger on a within a Member This with one for those that the remained The Article 22 Member States to the Commission to that the This in cases national competition merger such as the in this of or than those at the European level or national authorities from Article 22 a ‘late of the to the of an EU level merger control Article 22 out of a compromise, which such as the to the mechanism in to as an and hence, no to the way Article 22 in the adoption of the Regulation, most Member States have adopted national merger control and the for Article 22 has been enforcement under Article In of Article 22 has been a cases as of it has been that its to to and the Commission to that the of merger control as a and the the Commission, by making of its in and Article 22, a of discouraging referrals from to the In its the Commission has out that the for of Article 22 in its to the that most Member States adopted legislation on merger control the Commission the of Article but has to to for the that with the adoption of the new Merger Regulation in the of Article 22 the of on trade between Member States as a for one or more Member States to to request the Commission to a concentration that does not have an EU dimension and threatens to significantly affect competition within the territory of the Member making the Second, Article the the Commission the to one or Member States that a concentration the out in Article and the Commission may those Member to a referral through a In the the Commission in with and third parties the of powers between the Commission and national competition the Commission that the the and jurisdictional of merger control in the the of cases between the Commission and the Member and in most been effective in cases that have a relevance from those with a national in about the to the in light of the Commission’s of that of but to the the Commission similarly that no for In the Commission to on its of on of for in the and that have but to the or in the and hence, In the Commission adopted a Guidance which its policy discouraging Article 22 referrals. on to discuss the Guidance more a on the and referral request that the Commission in After an the Commission the between and the Commission Member States by an in with Article of the Regulation for A referral request by by the and to the of by under the EU Merger Regulation. The not the of the EU Merger Regulation, and not in any Member but the for referral under Article 22 of the EU Merger Regulation. The Commission that the affect trade within the and to significantly affect competition within the territory of the Member States that the referral request and that a referral is not in its the Commission decision the referral in by that the Commission not a referral request from an in a merger law but the does not the for that the Commission’s interpretation to the principle and the principles of and On the General these and an extensive of the and of Article 22 In its the the Guidance as a which the adoption of the Merger Regulation and hence, not to the interpretation of that regulation to the of the the that Article 22 of Regulation at making the referral more and effective in to that a concentration with by the authority to analyse its to effective of the principles of and the as as to the The General that from the the legislative and the of Article 22 of the Merger Regulation, as as from the Commission’s enforcement it that Article 22 is to referral may for a concentration that does not within the of the merger control rules of the Member State that its In the Court’s interpretation of Article 22, the Commission may a concentration that threatens significantly to affect competition within the territory of a Member State and affects trade between Member States, which not to any by the national authorities or by the Commission and hence, an that by the Member In that it is to at the EU in of Regulation Article 22 an effective corrective mechanism in the light of the principle of by the interests of the Member In light of that principle and in with of that Regulation, a with by the most by the principle of of should to competition authority in the is the more for with a to the specific of the as as the and to the should to the of any on competition from the the referral of cases of aspects of the of the principle of including the in a and the of with to to to or to a the Commission and Member States should in the to effective of competition in by the The General that in which concentrations are not but to the Member State not within the of that or no such within Article 22 Article of Regulation a Member of the of its national merger control to to the Commission concentrations that not the in Article of that Regulation, but that may have the General that referral mechanisms are an instrument to control in a on of its is not of concentrations that at the European mechanisms as by the in of Regulation a of the Commission that on it the to the of that which is to the control of concentrations significantly to effective competition in the The 2021 Guidance is an of the Commission’s administrative it policy to the General in Commission a in control competition in with to referrals under merger the that the Commission has as to or not to a to of the on the Commission and Member States a of in to cases within or to to with cases not within to Article 22. The Guidance these and procedural on the of Article 22. The Commission’s to the of Article 22 EUMR has been that the Commission is its a for Member States merger control legislation in to the of the in merger control more than years and that the Guidance is ‘a law that the Regulation or at the of the In the I discuss two specific aspects of the Guidance and the mechanism currently underlying referrals under Article 22 that have so far been I argue with the adoption of the the Commission has not significantly re-prioritised cases eligible for Article 22 referrals and its established policy on discouraging but it has re-written the procedural rights for third parties as established in the Merger Regulation. administrative authorities to with principles of EU law and principles of that of powers by administrative Second, by re-activating the referral mechanism of Article 22, the Commission should reconsider the enforcement currently enshrined under Article 22 This on the of and between the Commission and the to Article of the Merger Regulation. and between the Commission and the and between the are in the referral out in the Merger Regulation. and on the of to the Merger Regulation, a of in these procedures and mechanisms the of cooperation under Regulation and follow the enforcement logic and jurisdictional principles laid down in that Regulation. the of the of on trade between Member States and a cooperation between and the Commission under Article 22 is a of such the same principles of effective enforcement as established by the European and recently by the General in its ruling should to this such as the principle of loyal cooperation and mutual trust. In with the structure of these the EU have characterised the procedural rights of third a to to the This as a to in the administrative from the to as a of the of the The Commission’s enforcement is but not to the administrative procedures to and as laid down under Regulation In merger parties to to the Commission for and may the Commission’s and and the Commission may the procedural and of third parties in these procedures as in Regulation third parties have a in the to the Commission’s by of to for to Article of the Merger Regulation, and provide and for the of a may third parties for to discuss and specific issues to Article Regulation third parties a to to Article of the Commission’s Regulation third parties are or including and are to a such as the concentration or by and of the administrative or of the or the of Article that third parties may within a that has been by the to the by the third parties in the Commission may the to in a At the same as the has that procedural of third parties with that of the and of to in the first Article the by the concentration in the parties to the concentration for by the Commission, the specific laid down in those in to that rights of are in the of the administrative Article in to third since are to the of the the to by the Commission, that have so and have that have a for that the Commission in the of the in provide third parties that have a with a of the of in to to views on the Commission’s of the the Commission in the such third parties are to the of a a to to this does not the that have been to third parties are to for the of the to Regulation procedural rights of third parties are not as extensive as the rights to the in to rights of it is the in so far as show a third parties have a under Article of Regulation to have so these procedural rights are in with the procedures laid down under and provide procedural and rights to third the 2021 largely these procedural rights to and to to the of the and down to the to the Commission or the authorities of the Member States, and of a concentration in a for a referral under Article this does not any on the authorities of the Member States or on the Commission to any a by a third any by third parties in the referral is in of the and such a fundamental of and parties are not competition authorities in the functioning of The of third parties is on this of as provide that to an of the that the to issue a decision in with the of the the by the concentration in the parties to the concentration for by the Commission, in the of third parties not to have an in its the affect not always in a are to the of the which in a procedural with to as third parties under Article of the Regulation, the General in that that those may in does not the of its to The Commission Article of Regulation in which the of that in to cases in which a merger has on a the of the of Article of Regulation as of the Commission the interests of the and The that Article which has the same as Article taken in and other EU and Article of the of of the European that EU a level of in administrative procedures is an of and that the of the and the as a to third parties are the to the decision of the competition or that to the of the These procedural have been by the Guidance in the referral making for third parties to a to the Commission in an is to so as one of the of Article 22 is that the concentration affect trade between Member This is an jurisdictional in the enforcement of the Merger Regulation, as other mechanisms on the in Article in of the a concentration the of on trade between Member States laid down in Article 22 it is to have on the of trade between Member this is in the to the Commission’s on the on trade in and the referral mechanism on and between the Commission and the and cooperation and to the European for and under Regulation 1/2003, the and the Commission a of in under the Merger Regulation. At the same the referral mechanism of Article 22 on the of to The Commission Member States to to the Commission as the most authority to the but it to is the of the Member States to a to the This the Guidance cooperation between and the Commission, it a of to the to a to a to the Commission, third parties more than the Commission as a with the jurisdictional and enforcement cooperation of Regulation the question the same principles of effective enforcement as the underlying Regulation should to Article 22 referrals. those and in light of the enforcement of and and the principle of procedural and the to a of fundamental under EU Member States powers to the of and The principle of which is a of Regulation and Member States not to the of EU law in or that the rules which or not the effective of and The principle of a to in EU law competition and other authorities as in the competition to to that is by is an of political competition is Member States should from legislative or other that the of its The have on various the Member States have on the of the principle of which the of national enforcement so that Member States to the of EU law within the Second, of cooperation with the Commission and other which is on and and on the that Member States that enforcement but the of as a for The on the of mutual and in which other in making of and powers in to This has been by the General in competition law in its judgment the of law issues to taken a national competition authority is of competition law and third In its a principles of between the Commission and the the General that with the fundamental of Article to the competition law enforcement mechanisms under and In this the General for the first established a between in the of a Member State and the of its competition authority to and enforcement under EU law and a The General issues of of law as an of effective competition law enforcement and the principles between the Commission and under the enforcement of Regulation to its law in the of the European the General as in the of and the cooperation between the Commission, the competition authorities of the Member States, and the national for the of and is on the principles of mutual mutual and loyal of those of those authorities and that other authorities and law for more the fundamental rights by that to the General for the of which competition authority is the to a the Commission to with the of the of law as a to the the of the rights and the Commission’s are this judgment the Commission to its decision to at of to by national authorities by of law The judgment that the Commission of the of of law on and in this the a new that the Commission, a for of EU to that the national authorities are of the rights of the The judgment is it a of and between the and the Commission and cooperation on mutual mutual and with these principles underlying enforcement and cooperation under Regulation and the General Court’s judgment in and on the of the between the principles underlying Article 22 referrals and I argue that the Commission should of the of effective competition law enforcement and of law referrals are an to the Guidance in a way that referrals not on the and of to The of of with the of of authorities the the of cooperation between Member States and the Commission and that the should with by the This is more so the that the European Commission and have as the of as as rights to and in effective enforcement of competition law not is for competition within the but of effective as laid down in Article of the of to and in the competition This the a Member State from its merger control effective competition in the Member State and in the This is the same as in the years of the Merger Regulation, Member States no merger that the adoption of the This is the the and such the and of merger to control in a way that it does not in to competition in the and to effective of concentrations with a of on the structure of competition in the and to effective competition in the or in a of In in that of a merger control to gaps in the of against of competition in to that ‘a in has in recent years in the and under competition of of for in the of or this the Commission has its enforcement mechanism enshrined in Article 22 of the Merger Regulation. the Commission as an administrative to the of to with powers in to and and EU policy including competition are to and effective regulation and procedures with a of on the of the administrative as the and the European Commission in is policy these not but and administrative and and on of procedural and This article that third in administrative procedures is a of and that the of competition the procedural and procedural rights of third parties in the referral the powers of the Commission and of the This the Commission’s referral with the of in the of a of and procedural rules that the of third parties to the referral to those to in the rights of the of that that may have on should by administrative law as a to control the of the adoption of the 2021 Guidance of encouraging referrals from Member States under Article 22, which of merger control the Commission has not to for procedural but and views of Member States and the EU institutions on which in national national or at the of national and the of effective the and development of Article 22 and its this article that the of Article 22 referrals the cooperation mechanisms and its procedural as it has under the enforcement of Regulation 1/2003, cooperation is a fundamental of effective competition law the Commission should not the in and the new it to administrative but on the in Member States that the effective of competition in the The General Court’s recent judgment in is in the of effective referrals and and effective enforcement of competition between Member States and the The jurisdictional in merger control between the Commission and the Member States effective and Member States to the and and the and its such as an competition in the
Crypto-Assets: The impact on financial markets 1.The market for Crypto-Assets (including cryptocurrencies, as well as cryptography-based tokens) is growing rapidly.This is also affecting tax administrations, which must adapt to the growing role of Crypto-Assets.In particular, several characteristics of Crypto-Assets are likely to pose novel challenges in tax administrations' efforts to ensure taxpayer compliance. 2.Firstly, Crypto-Assets' reliance on cryptography and distributed ledger technology, in particular blockchain technology, means that they can be issued, recorded, transferred and stored in a decentralised manner, without the need to rely on traditional financial intermediaries or central administrators. 3.In addition, the Crypto-Asset market has given rise to a new set of intermediaries and other service providers, such as Crypto-Asset exchanges and wallet providers, which may currently only be subject to limited regulatory oversight.Crypto-Asset exchanges typically facilitate the purchase, sale and exchange of Crypto-Assets for other Crypto-Assets or Fiat Currencies.Wallet providers offer digital "wallets", which individuals can use to store their Crypto-Assets via authorisation through public and private keys.These services may either be provided in online (i.e."hot") wallets, or via service providers offering products allowing individuals to store their Crypto-Assets offline on downloaded (i.e."cold") wallets.Both types of products are relevant for tax authorities.