I Nyoman Teja Kusuma, Ika Devy Pramudiana, Nihayatus Sholichah
The enactment of Law Number 1 of 2022 concerning Financial Relations between the Central and Regional Governments (HKPD Law) introduced a pivotal shift in Indonesia’s fiscal decentralization through the Motor Vehicle Tax (PKB) "opsen" (option) mechanism. This study analyzes the impact of HKPD Law implementation on local revenue (PAD) strengthening in Probolinggo City and Regency. Utilizing a qualitative comparative case study approach, the research evaluates administrative readiness and policy impacts derived from Ministry of Finance Regulation (PMK) Number 3 of 2024. The findings reveal an asymmetrical transition, where fiscal effectiveness is highly contingent on digital infrastructure maturity and geographical constraints. Probolinggo City demonstrates successful host-to-host system integration, ensuring daily liquidity and bureaucratic efficiency. Conversely, Probolinggo Regency faces "geospatial gaps," characterized by transaction data delays and high collection costs in remote areas. This study identifies a lack of target alignment between provincial and local governments and emphasizes the necessity of "budget tagging" for road infrastructure to enhance the social contract with taxpayers. This research contributes to fiscal decentralization theory by proposing a "geographic coefficient" model for operational cost distribution in developing regions.
Background: Indonesia’s simultaneous regional elections (Pilkada serentak) constitute a key component of post-Reformasi decentralization. While designed to strengthen democratic local governance, recent fiscal rationalization policies have increased central control over election financing, raising concerns about their impact on substantive democratic representation. Objectives: This study examines whether fiscal rationalization in Pilkada implementation supports or undermines constitutional principles of democratic, participatory, and accountable local government. It analyzes the constitutional framework of Pilkada, identifies key fiscal rationalization mechanisms, and evaluates their effects on local political representation. Methods: A qualitative normative empirical approach was employed. Normative analysis examined the 1945 Constitution, electoral and regional governance laws, fiscal decentralization regulations, and Constitutional Court decisions. Empirical analysis was conducted through comparative case studies of regional election budget management. Results: Four major mechanisms were identified: NPHD budget revisions, APBD burden-shifting, compressed electoral timelines, and intensified central fiscal steering under Law No. 1 of 2022. These mechanisms reduced electoral capacity, limited voter-candidate engagement, and disproportionately affected less-resourced regions. Although elections formally complied with constitutional requirements, substantive representation was weakened, creating a persistent gap between procedural legality and democratic quality. Conclusion: Fiscal rationalization has strengthened formal compliance but constrained substantive democratic representation. Greater fiscal stability and regional autonomy are needed to ensure competitive, equitable, and accountable local elections. Keywords: fiscal rationalization; Pilkada serentak; constitutional compliance; democratic representation; decentralization.
Legal certainty is a fundamental prerequisite for implementing decentralized governance, particularly to ensure protection for the apparatus in developing public service innovations. However, regulatory fragmentation often leads to overlapping authority and administrative uncertainty at the local level. This research aims to examine the legal certainty construction of innovation through a vertical synchronization test of Regulation Number 20 of 2021, and to evaluate its sociological implications on the fluctuation of regional innovation performance. This research employs a normative legal method calibrated with policy evaluation through statutory and conceptual approaches, and analyzes Regional Innovation Index data for the 2020 to 2025 period. The analysis results indicate that the Regent Regulation suffered multilayered substantive defects over time. In the initial formulation phase, the budget deprivation threat sanction for innovations deemed unsuccessful contradicted the apparatus protection principle under Law Number 23 of 2014. Furthermore, the local government has been found to have committed legislative omission by failing to amend the Regent Regulation to accommodate the updates to the institutionalization obligation and affirmative financing guarantees mandated following the promulgation of Ministerial Regulation Number 91 of 2021 and Governor Regulation Number 3 of 2022. Factual evidence confirms that this static and defective legal formulation triggered a climate of bureaucratic fear, resulting in a drastic decline in the regional innovation score in the first year of the regulation’s implementation and subsequent stagnation. In conclusion, punitive innovation regulations that are unresponsive to hierarchical updates have degraded the essence of regional autonomy and created a governance paradox. Therefore, the revocation of the administrative sanction clause and the execution of the institutionalization amendment must be executed to restore a safe authorizing environment for experimental legislation.
Levina Khulaidah, Syifa Rhamadani, Fadjar Tri Sakti
This study aims to analyze the financial performance of the Bandung City Government during the 2020–2024 period from a fiscal decentralization perspective. The research employs a descriptive quantitative method using secondary data obtained from the Directorate General of Fiscal Balance (DJPK) of the Ministry of Finance. The analysis applies seven regional financial ratios, namely the degree of fiscal decentralization, regional financial independence, fiscal dependency, effectiveness of Local Own-Source Revenue (PAD), expenditure efficiency, expenditure harmony (operational and capital expenditures), and growth ratio. The results indicate that the financial performance of the Bandung City Government has shown improvement, as reflected in the increasing levels of fiscal decentralization and financial independence. However, fiscal dependency remains relatively high, the effectiveness of PAD has not been optimal, and expenditure efficiency is still classified as less efficient. The expenditure structure is dominated by operational spending, while capital expenditure allocation remains relatively low. In addition, regional revenue growth during the study period is considered low and unstable. Therefore, optimizing PAD, improving expenditure efficiency, and restructuring the budget composition are necessary to support sustainable fiscal decentralization. Keywords: Fiscal decentralization, Regional financial performance, Bandung city, Local owns source revenue, Regional financial rations
This paper takes issue with the regulation of the central government's financial balancing funds to regional governments in the context of regional autonomy which was just passed under Law 1/2022. The research method used is normative legal research, a method with the aim of dissecting all laws and regulations to find solutions to juridical problems. The results of the research show that Law 1/2022 has provided guidelines for local governments in managing regional finances. This regulation provides a basis for the Central Government to transfer funds to Regional Governments in the form of General Allocation Funds (DAU), Special Allocation Funds (DAK), Special Autonomy Funds, Privileges Funds, and Village Funds. There are still problems with the synergy of laws and regulations, especially with regard to the rigid percentages for calculating transfers of these funds to each regional government with special autonomy. However, on the other hand, the use of special autonomy funds and privilege funds is measurable because the management of these funds must refer to the national development plan and have performance targets.
 Keywords: State Finance, Fiscal Decentralization, Financial Relations Act
 
 Ringkasan
 Tulisan ini mengambil permasalahan tentang pengaturan dana perimbangan keuangan pemerintah pusat kepada pemerintah daerah dalam rangka otonomi daerah yang baru saja disahkan berdasarkan UU 1/2022. Metode penelitian yang digunakan yaitu penelitian hukum normatif suatu metode dengan tujuan membedah segala peraturan perundang-undang untuk menemukan solusi atas persoalan yuridis. Hasil penelitian menunjukan UU 1/2022 telah memberikan pedoman bagi pemerintah daerah dalam melakukan pengelolaan keuangan daerah. Peraturan ini memberikan dasar bagi Pemerintah Pusat untuk melakukan transfer dana kepada Pemerintah Daerah berupa Dana Alokasi Umum (DAU), Dana Alokasi Khusus (DAK), Dana Otonomi Khusus, Dana Keistimewaan, dan Dana Desa. Masih terdapat permasalahan sinergis peraturan perundang-undangan khususnya berkaitan dengan presentase rigid penghitungan transfer dana tersebut ke tiap pemerintahan daerah dengan otonomi khusus. Namun disisi lain penggunanaan dana otonomi khusus dan dana keistimewaan menjadi terukur oleh sebab pengelolaan dana-dana tersebut wajib mengacu pada rencana pembangunan nasional dan memiliki target kinerja.
 Kata Kunci: Keuangan Negara, Desentralisasi Fiskal, Undang-Undang Hubungan Keuangan
Deconcentration is an important element in the administration of the state. Its existence is not only in administrative law order, but also in Constitutional law because - like decentralization - it concerns the foundations and organization of the state. If decentralization gave birth to local government (autonomous region), then deconcentration gave birth to local state government (administrative area). These administrative areas are headed by what is known theoretically as a Prefector. For the Indonesian context, the prefector is held by the governor in such a way that the governor has a dual position, namely as the head of the autonomous region of the province as well as the prefector. The laws governing local government in Indonesia use the term representative of the center in the regions for the designation of prefector. Since the reformation until now, the administration of government from the center to the regions seems to have marginalized deconcentration as the governance structure. There was a strong impression during the reform era that looked at deconcentration as if were the antithesis of democracy. The impression was so strong that deconcentration and administrative areas were no longer included in the post-amendment 1945 Constitution. The deconcentrative authority possessed by the governor to revoke Regency/City Regional Regulations (Perda) that are contrary to higher laws, public interests, and decency, was annulled by the constitutional court in its decision in 2016. Furthermore, budgeting and regulation and formation the apparatus that assists the governor as the central representative in the regions appears to be running slowly. In this way the question arises: is the implementation of deconcentration effective by the governor as the representative of the central government in the regions? To answer this question, research was carried out on the implementation of the deconcentration. The results of the research show that the implementation of the deconcentration has not been effective due to various limitations: limited tools, limited rules, and limited authority
After the amendment, Regulation Number 25 of 1999 concerning Financial Balance between the Center and the Regions, but after the amendment of Regulation Number 33 of 2004 concerning Financial Balance between the Center and the Regions, the allocation of asset adjustments has moved to the dispersion of some normal assets in the area . The issue studied is where regional finance can increase and find sources of income which are expected to complement its independence as a result of the implementation of decentralization guidelines as adopted by the 1945 Constitution. The exploration technique used is essential literature studies, selected regulations and materials. tertiary legal materials, and the examination carried out is subjective standardization. With the issuance of the regulation on Fiscal Balance between the Center and the Regions after the amendment, it shows very large results for the implementation of provincial independence, considering that regional supporting sources are generally not solely based on PAD (Regional Revenue) results, but the regions also have different sources of initial funding from the regions, formerly only enjoyed by the central government.
 Keywords: Policy, Regional Finance, Post Reform
The current situation of the Covid-19 pandemic is currently increasing public concern about the community. The government has especially recommended Stay at Home and the implementation of PSBB in various regions. One of the concerns is when the election of regional leaders to the general chairman. Even though there is already a safeguard regulation, this is not considered safe in the current Covid-19 pandemic. The solution in this research is the use of a blockchain-based E-voting system to help tackle election unrest during Covid-19. Where e-voting with blockchain technology can be carried out anywhere through the device without the need to be present in the voting booth, reducing data fraud, accurate and decentralized voting results that can be accessed by the public in real-time. The use of cryptographic protocols is applied for data transfer between system components as well as valid system security. This research method uses SUS trial analysis in a significant system of the Covid-19 pandemic situation. The implication that the SUS Score analysis shows 90 shows an acceptable E-voting system, meaning that the community can accept it because it brings positive and significant impacts such as effectiveness and efficiency.
The method used in this research is comparative method using quantitative. The data source used is secondary data. The results shows that the comparison between efficiency and effectivity from district / city in West Borneo Province in 2006 – 2010 has declining trend and interrelated. While local fiscal capability which is measured from government finance performance shows that its dependence is still high enough because the contribution of fund balance is still above 50%. Base on the estimation result which is regressed by using EGLS method, it is obtained the result shows that two variables from local finance performance are not significant which are PAD effectivity ratio (REPAD) and local finance dependency ratio (RKetKD), where the estimation result also shows the existence of negative relation but significant to degree of decentralization ratio (RDD). The financial performance of local government still shows dependence on the central government, therefore it must be learn to be independent.
The Republic of Indonesia as a unitary state adheres to the principle of decentralization in government administration, by providing opportunities and flexibility to the regions. This research journal uses two problem formulations, namely whether the Special Region of Yogyakarta is part of the asymmetrical decentralization perspective studied from Law Number 13 of 2012. This type of research is nomartive legal research.Theoretically,asymmetric decentralization is actually relatively new in Indonesia than the development of regional autonomy and decentralization theories which only prioritize the transfer of authority from the center to the regions. Asymmetric decentralization doesn’t only talk about the delegation of authority, but also how authority, finance, supervision and institutions are contextually decentralized. Based on the description above, it can be concluded that the authority determined in Law Number 13 of 2012 concerning the Privileges of the Special Region of Yogyakarta is one of the provoncial-level autonomous regions in Indonesia. Special Region of Yogyakarta and it’s status as Special Region in accordance with Article 5 paragraph 2 letter a, Article 9, and Article 16.
The decentralized system of the Indonesian government to give jobs to the region to carry out development in the area in response to the various regional development policy. Offend public policy perspective the role of government and stakeholders. The focus of the stakeholders in this research is student organizations. This study aims to investigate the model student political movement in advocating for policies in the autonomous region in the province of North Sumatera. The method of investigation used to answer research questions using a mixed methods design sequential exploratory through collaboration grounded theory approach and surveys. Data gathering using depth interview and survey techniques used to test the hypothesis that emerged from the research results at the earliest. The study population is groups of student movement organizations in the province of North Sumatra with a set of samples of the four groups of organizations active student movement at the University of Sumatera Utara. The findings of this study describe a group of student movement organizations in conducting policy advocacy stages tend stalled at the stage of political socialization in advocating policies and limitations in order to maximize the level of policy advocacy in the parliament lobby.
"Trash, Cities, and Politics" describes Indonesia's ADIPURA, an environmental program begun in the mid 1980s to focus on waste management, cleanliness and sanitation, and green spaces. The paper discusses the program within the larger context of Indonesia's urbanization and its environmental consequences, from the time of the New Order up to today's decentralization era. The essay describes ADIPURA's continuity and evolution, with respect to central and local governments, law enforcement, financing, and community and private sector participation. It also provides specific data from more than 300 cities, and presents statistics to reveal trends and disconnects and to examine the program's successes and failures. For example, the study found that the program's incentives are inadequate, given Indonesia's regional autonomy and decentralization; that government ministers' credibility may be too weak to encourage municipalities' participation and compliance; and that the program comprises an unmanageable number of targets and is excessively expensive to administer, especially the inspections. The study concludes that ADIPURA is potentially useful to clean up cities, but needs to be overhauled, modernized, and coordinated with other government policies, and further transformed to eliminate actual and potential corruption and manipulation.
Radical decentralization reform works or does not work for reducing communal conflict is still debatable. This study examines the linkage between decentralization policy and communal conflict in Indonesia. Two measurement of decentralization: administrative decentralization, and fiscal decentralization is examined. Data come from the Village National Census (Podes) 2003-2014 (N=301.974). Results of twolevel logit regression show that fiscal decentralization not significantly associated with reducing communal conflict. The findings suggest that decentralization work for reducing communal conflict through better capacity of local bureaucrats rather than through financing capacity in delivering public services and district proliferation policy
Raden Ricky Pratidiningrat, Jurnal Mahasiswa S Hukum Untan
ABSTRACT This thesis discusses the function of law enforcement in the era of regional autonomy under Article 2 of Law No. 2 of 2002 on the Indonesian National Police in the city of Pontianak. The method used in this study is a socio-juridical approach. From the results of this thesis can be concluded as the reform efforts to improve the livelihood of Governance and Development in the form of a change from centralized to decentralized, intended as the acceleration process of achieving national objectives, namely the creation of a just and prosperous society. Decentralization means the delegation of powers to the Autonomous Region of Central Government to run the government as well as regional development sendiri.Desentralisasi been, because in this system enable even better democracy and provide space and access freely to the community to participate in all areas of governance and development. So the implementation of governance and development are not solely based on the government or the state, the public will play a part and give kontribusinya.Selain positive things that have been able to be achieved by the Reformation, as mentioned above, it also followed a negative impact mainly concerns the behavior of the public. At this time changing people's behavior caused the reforms implemented so quickly, involving almost the whole order of life, also result in changes in the existing social order. From the changing social order that ultimately affect people's behavior to change as well as a reaction to the changes that occur. Behavior change is actually a social phenomenon that can arise at any time and by any cause, and it will become a problem when such behavior is contrary to the norms and values, which in turn it will hamper the implementation of the process of government and development itself. Democracy is translated as freedom of action of individuals who freely and participation addressed by coercion-coercion will. Police as the formal institution according their main duty, highly demanded to carry out its function and role to be able to present the situation of security and public order conducive thus enabling governance and development can work well. Efforts to make it happen, given the limited resources available, the police not only through law enforcement (Low Enforcement), but also followed by efforts that are prevention, namely Pre-emptive and Preventive. Law enforcement purpose to force obey and follow the existing norms and values, is being implemented with the aim of prevention grow and develop deterrence from within the community. So dominant sendiri.Pelaksanaan public order law enforcement and public security in accordance with Law # 2 of 2002 on the Police, can not be implemented fully or substantially total impossibility of enforcement because the law can reach out to its destination (order, order and justice) for their influence and intervention in its implementation. Here the role of police discretion to decide cases of criminal cases handled by police. Discretion granted by operational officers in the field directly on the spot and without asking for directions or decisions of his superiors an Individual discretion. Discretion based or guided by the policies of the leadership in the police organization is bureaucratic discretion. Keywords: Function, Law Enforcement, Police, Regional Autonomy . ABSTRAK Tesis ini membahas fungsi penegakan hukum di era otonomi daerah berdasarkan Pasal 2 Undang-Undang No 2 Tahun 2002 Tentang Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia Di Kota Pontianak. Metode pendekatan yang digunakan dalam penelitian ini adalah pendekatan yuridis-sosiologis. Dari hasil penelitian tesis ini diperoleh kesimpulan Reformasi sebagai upaya memperbaiki tata kehidupan Pemerintahan maupun Pembangunan dengan wujud perubahan dari Sentralistik menjadi Desentralistik, dimaksudkan sebagai akselerasi proses pencapaian tujuan Nasional, yaitu terwujudnya masyarakat adil dan makmur. Desentralisasi berarti pelimpahan kekuasaan Pemerintahan Pusat kepada Daerah Otonomi untuk menjalankan pemerintahan maupun pembangunan daerahnya sendiri.Desentralisasi dipilih, sebab pada sistem ini memungkinkan terlaksananya demokrasi yang lebih baik dan memberikan ruang maupun akses secara leluasa kepada masyarakat untuk berpartisipasi dalam segala bidang pemerintahan maupun pembangunan. Jadi pemerintahan dan pembangunan pelaksanaannya tidak hanya disandarkan pada pemerintahan atau negara saja, masyarakat akan banyak berperan dan memberikan kontribusinya.Selain hal-hal positif yang telah mampu dicapai oleh Reformasi sebagaimana disebutkan diatas, ternyata juga diikuti akibat negatif terutama menyangkut perilaku dari masyarakat. Pada saat ini perilaku masyarakat berubah disebabkan reformasi yang terlaksana begitu cepat, menyangkut hampir pada seluruh tatanan kehidupan, mengakibatkan berubahnya pula tatanan sosial yang ada. Dari berubahnya tatanan sosial itu akhirnya mempengaruhi perilaku masyarakat untuk berubah pula sebagai reaksi atas perubahan yang terjadi. Perubahan perilaku sebenarnya merupakan fenomena sosial yang dapat timbul kapanpun serta oleh sebab apapun juga, dan akan menjadi permasalahan manakala tingkah laku tersebut bertentangan dengan norma dan nilai yang berlaku, yang pada gilirannya justru akan menghambat pelaksanaan proses pemerintahan maupun pembangunan itu sendiri. Demokrasi diterjemahkan sebagai kebebasan bertindak individu yang sebebas-bebasnya dan partisipasi disikapi dengan pemaksaan-pemaksaan kehendak. Polri sebagai Lembaga formal sesuai tugas pokoknya, sangat dituntut mampu melaksanakan fungsi dan perannya untuk dapat menyajikan situasi keamanan dan ketertiban masyarakat yang kondusif sehingga memungkinkan pemerintahan serta pembangunan dapat berjalan dengan baik. Upaya mewujudkannya, mengingat keterbatasan sumber daya yang ada maka Polri tidak hanya melalui penegakan hukum (Low Enforcement) saja, tetapi juga diikuti dengan upaya-upaya yang bersifat prevensi, yaitu Pre-emtif dan Preventif. Penegakan hukum tujuannya untuk memaksa mentaati dan mengikuti norma maupun nilai yang ada, sedang prevensi dilaksanakan dengan tujuan menumbuh-kembangkan daya tangkal dari dalam diri masyarakat. Jadi yang dominan masyarakat sendiri.Pelaksanaan penegakan hukum ketertiban dan keamanan masyarakat sesuai Undang-undang No.2 Tahun 2002 tentang Kepolisian, tidak dapat dilaksanakan secara sepenuhnya atau total enforcement karena secara substansial ketidakmungkinan hukum dapat menjangkau sampai pada tujuannya (ketertiban, keteraturan dan keadilan) karena adanya pengaruh dan intervensi dalam implementasinya. Disini diskresi kepolisian berperan untuk memutuskan kasus perkara pidana yang ditangani oleh kepolisian. Diskresi yang diputuskan oleh petugas operasional di lapangan secara langsung pada saat itu juga dan tanpa meminta petunjuk atau keputusan dari atasannya merupakan Diskresi Individual. Diskresi yang berdasarkan atau berpedoman pada kebijaksanaan-kebijaksanaan pimpinan dalam organisasi kepolisian adalah Diskresi Birokrasi. Kata Kunci: Fungsi ,Penegakan Hukum, Polri, Era Otonomi Daerah.
This article attempts to capture the power developed in an area aftermath of reformation era in 1998 marked by implementing autonomous region or decentralized. Power in The New Order Regime, that was The Centralistic changed with the emergence of the local political elite that affirming their power by various sources of capital. By having a more open space for local figures to snatch the seat of power at the local level in the county, political competition then became closer in social community base level. Those who have a culture of social capital, networks and other social networking might be easier to perform. No exception figure of “Kiai” head of Islamiccommunity originating from habitus religious activities and education in boarding school and other community social activities. In Bangkalan regency Habitus-based Political Elite Kiai boils down to descendants of the BaniKholildiasporic in various organizations either initiating Community-Social Organizations, political parties and legislative Institutions and Executive. The method used in this research is descriptive-qualitative structure of Agency Bourdieu's approach with data mining using in-depth interviews and technical documentation. The end result of this thesis was to see that the political and Dynastic Politics Breeds successfully built by RKH Fuad Amin during his leadership in two periods, ten years later continued by the winning of his son MakmunIbnuFuad with a majority of votes 93,47 percent. After his main rival who is also a descendant of BaniKholil, namely KH Imam BuchoriKholil failed to follow the contestation elections directly. In contestation elections in Bangkalan Regency, the ability of the group or Political Actor in using sources of capital and symbolic power in a society is still very effective in managing their Paternalistic room practices.In the analysis of Structure-Agency Bourdieu's perspective, social space and social groups who control it are the products of a historical struggle continuously updated for contested or won as well as establish dominance in power.
Haeruddin Haeruddin, Agus Suryono, Mujibur Rahman Khairul Muluk, Tjahjanulin Domai
The regional administration in the context of regional autonomy brought significant changes to the centralization system of local governance turned into a decentralized system. This normative phenomenon is creating administrative boundaries and functional area for each local government as an autonomous region. While empirical phenomena in the administration of public services across the region hindered administrative problems and functional boundaries of each local government, as a solution to overcome these problems required cooperation among local governments. Researchers adopting the concept of cooperation between local government approach (Smith) consisting of; 1). Legal and political approaches; 2). Inter-Organizational Politics; and 3). Political Community, to be used as a tool dialogue and analysis of the research findings. This study used a qualitative approach to research instruments; people, events and documents. Data collection techniques are interview, observation and documentation. Data analysis techniques are grounded theory. Our study focus on: 1). The processed for determining the object of cooperation; 2). Implementation of cooperation in water resources management; 3). Factors that influence the management of water resources. The results showed that 1). The process of determining the object of cooperation has met the principles of law and administration, reduce regional ego; 2). Implementation of the cooperation is not only a formality but prefers the value of togetherness, efficiency and effectiveness of service provision for drinking water has been established well characterized by the distribution of drinking water services in the three local government in Malang; 3). The most influential factor is the regional head support, coordination and less harmonized local ego; 4). Cooperation model that built up is joint service agreement in written agreements and intergovernmental agreement model (government to government = G to G).
Abstract The election of Head of region as the democracy mechanism to the head of region that the application is based on the Law Number 23 2004 about Regional Government is still found some problems, such as the application of the head of region election gives the burden the government finance plan so that it’s not really efficient and effective, and also the head of region election results the unharmonious head and the vice head of the region (about 93.84% all over Indonesia). So that for the consequence as the lawful country, Indonesia has to revise that problem that needs to administer the law to become the ideal law in regulating the head of region election. The ideal law regulation will become the basic to the application of the head of region election with the better result as the effort to accomplish the purpose of autonomy region in boosting the society welfare of the autonomy region’s people as the implementation of people’s sovereignty through the process of political decentralization to the autonomy region. Keywords: Ideal Law, People’s welfare, People’s Sovereignty. Abstrak Pemilukada sebagai suatu mekanisme demokrasi untuk pengisian jabatan kepala daerah yang penyelenggaraannya didasari Undang-Undang Nomor 32 Tahun 2004 tentang Pemerintahan Daerah dalam penerapannya masih dijumpai berbagai persoalan, diantaranya; pelaksanaan pemilukada cukup membebani anggaran pemerintah sehingga dirasa tidak efisen dan efektif, juga pemilukada justru menghasilkan pasangan kepala daerah yang tidak harmonis (93,84 % se Indonesia). Oleh karena itu sebagai konsekuensi Indonesia negara hukum, maka untuk memperbaiki berbagai persoalan tersebut, perlu dilakukan penataan hukum menuju hukum ideal dalam pengaturan pemilukada. Pengaturan hukum ideal akan menjadi dasar untuk penyelenggaraan pemilukada dengan hasil yang lebih baik sebagai upaya untuk mewujudkan tujuan otonomi daerah dalam meningkatkan kesejahteraan masyarakat daerah otonom sekaligus perwujudan kedaulatan rakyat melalui proses desentralisasi politik kepada daerah otonom. Kata kunci: Hukum ideal, Kesejahteraan rakyat, kedaulatan rakyat.
Jakarta—Muhammad Nazaruddin, a bright 32-year-old, was an up and coming national politician destined for high office, perhaps even president. He was one of the new political tigers that won office as the result of Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s election victory in 2004. By 2010, Nazaruddin was already treasurer of the ruling Democratic Party and a member of the House of Representatives Budget Committee, which oversees government projects.Nazaruddin’s downfall came last May when local newspapers reported he received bribes totalling 25 billion rupiahs ($2.8 million) for a construction contract to build athletes’ housing at the Jakarta 2011 Southeast Asian Games. In late September, two members of the project consortium were convicted of involvement in the bribery scandal and were sentenced to only two and two-and-a-half years in prison and a fine of Rp 200 million ($22,300). “If that’s all they get, there won’t be any deterrent effect,” says Indonesia Corruption Watch chairman Danang Widoyoko.Shortly after these charges first surfaced, the Corruption Eradication Commission (kpk) formally accused Nazaruddin of accepting bribes involving the project. Subsequent charges included two cases that totalled Rp 2.3 trillion ($256.5 million) in bribes. In August, Nazaruddin’s lawyer revealed a letter from his client suggesting he’d keep mum about crimes committed by the Democrats if Yudhoyono would guarantee his family’s safety, leading to the obvious, if unproven, conclusion that the party’s leaders are culpable in as-of-yet-undisclosed offenses. Then in September 2010, the chief of the Constitutional Court alleged Nazaruddin had offered an unsolicited payment of $120,000 to the court’s secretary-general. Nazaruddin resigned hastily, launching a series of stinging attacks accusing high-ranking government figures, including the Sports Minister Andi Mallarangeng and the secretary of the Democratic Party’s ethics committee, Amir Syamsuddin, of crooked deals. After implicating powerful former associates, he fled to neighboring Singapore for what he claimed was a medical appointment. However, he never bothered to return—at least not for three months. That is when Indonesian authorities discovered him, living under an assumed name in Cartagena, a plush Caribbean beach resort in Colombia. The Indonesian government sent a specially chartered executive plane at a cost of Rp 4 billion ($468,000) to collect him. That too provoked a few raised eyebrows, until the kpk pointed out that a previous whistle-blower who returned on a commercial flight had been poisoned.“Corruption in Indonesia is just like Coca-Cola,” says Widoyoko. And indeed the problem has permeated far beyond the billion rupiah bribes that prop up the already rich and powerful. It has become a deeply embedded feature of Indonesian society and everyday life. Corruption is sapping the growth and undermining the foundations of the world’s third largest democracy.In the time of Indonesia’s long-time leader, Suharto, life was a lot simpler for the foreign investor. Suharto ran a one-stop shop. You paid your money to one person, and everything was arranged. Today, in the wake of regional power-sharing, you not only have to bribe officials at the federal level, but also at regional and local levels. This complicates matters. Today, a foreign investor often needs a professional team based in Jakarta and in the appropriate provinces to figure out all the people who need to be paid off.Corruption has trickled down to every aspect of life. It’s routine for authorities to pull over drivers—whether or not a motoring offence has actually occurred—and ask for Rp 50,000 ($5.64) to avoid being taken to court. Agung, a Jakarta property developer, explains, “You are told you have been speeding, or there is something wrong with your car. You are then asked for ‘some money for a friend.’ This is a code phrase that the officer is demanding a bribe for some sort of alleged motoring offense.”Truck drivers and transportation firms make regular payments to police, officials at weigh stations, even local thugs at checkpoints to allow their overloaded trucks to pass. Few of these tolls ever make their way into government coffers, so it’s no surprise to find major roads routinely dotted with large potholes. Hauling cargo from Jakarta to Surabaya requires payment of at least Rp 450,000 ($50) in illegal levies to officials at 14 different weigh stations along this 400-mile route, according to Indonesia’s Food and Beverage Industries Association. Truck drivers claim they must overload their trucks to cover the illegal levies. These overweight vehicles further churn up the already decaying roads. In the Indramayu region alone, there are more than 50 miles of failed roads in need of repair, and no plans to repair them. The Iskandar Agus Bandji Cirebon chapter of the Organization of Land Transportation Owners says truck owners must change their tires every two to three months instead of the normal six months because of the poor state of the roads.Indonesians resent the vicious cycle of corruption that’s become so deeply embedded in their lives. It is a constant topic of conversation, a media fixture, and the focus of countless conferences. “Indonesians have a love-hate relationship with corruption,” says Agung. Many hate paying the bribes on a daily basis to get things done, he says, “but given that public officials take home barely $200 a month in salaries, it’s hardly surprising they look for ways to supplement their incomes.”In the past, politicians have talked about halting corruption, but in the end, it has always been just that—talk. Despite years of anti-corruption rhetoric, the scale of the problem is only growing. The most recent Corruption Perception Index prepared by Transparency International ranks Indonesia as more corrupt than Egypt, Brazil, India, and China. A survey released in October found 91 percent of Indonesians believe corruption is widespread, up from 86 percent five years ago. Many Indonesian executives agree with Agung that “corruption is becoming more bureaucratic at all levels of society.” Ironically, Indonesia’s efforts to improve democracy and accountability after Suharto by building strong regional governments have only made matters worse.In 1999, Time magazine estimated that Suharto amassed a fortune of $15 billion between 1967 and 1998 in cash, shares, property, jewelery, and art. Many businesses included one of Suharto’s children on their board to protect investments from rivals and threats from low-level civil servants. Few want to return to the days of Suharto’s New Order regime when the military massacred hundreds of thousands in the 1960 s, then brutally repressed regional uprisings in Aceh and East Timor from the 1970 s to the 1990 s. Yet, the Suharto system centralized the collection of bribes and established mechanisms to halt deviations from the agreed upon pattern of corruption. People who bought “permits” received guarantees that they were getting the whole package and would not face any more requests for bribes. Corruption under Suharto was compatible with high growth and inflicted minimal damage on economic development. While Suharto was president, Indonesia’s economy boomed, with over three decades of 7 percent per annum growth. The president’s wife, Tien Suharto, was widely known as Madam Ten Percent for the level of payoffs expected for approval of major contracts or development projects. At the time, Indonesia and India were about equally corrupt, according to Ari Kuncoro at Inside Indonesia magazine, but Indonesia’s economic performance was healthier. Only three groups—Suharto’s extended family, top members of the military elite, and leaders of Indonesia’s Chinese conglomerates—dominated corruption.Bribery in post-Suharto Indonesia is different. Corruption is no longer monopolized by a select few. Indonesia launched its regional decentralization program in 2001. Instead of a strong centralized state, the country’s government fragmented into a host of power centers. With this power shift, centralized corruption has been replaced by a haphazard bribe collection system. The Indonesian Chamber of Commerce (Kadin) has complained that decentralization produces additional regulations in the form of taxes, levies, and permits, which drive up corruption at the local government level. The phenomenon is called “overgrazing the commons,” because officials from all levels of government prey on the same economic activities. Today, everyone from ministers to assemblymen to local police officers demand payoffs.During this summer’s Ramadan, local officials took little time off from collecting their take. For a new passport or driver’s license, the quickest way to avoid endless queues at local government offices is to pay an intermediary. It normally costs Rp 175,000 ($20) to obtain a new driver’s license, but the application and processing is time consuming. Instead, the standard bribe for obtaining an instant driving license is Rp 500,000. For migrant workers seeking a new passport, the process routinely takes eight days, but slipping a bribe of Rp 600,000 to an intermediary means a passport can be obtained instantly.Sundah, who lives in Denpasar, Bali, decided he was going to try to snag a driver’s license by going through official procedures without paying a bribe. “I took the written test three times, and each time they failed me,” he says. “I was a couple of points short each time, but when I asked to see the test papers initially, the officials refused. The others in my exam room told me that if I just paid an extra $20, I would get my license.” In the end, Sundah managed to get his license when the police realized he was not going to pay them a dime. “Finally I asked to see the exam paper, and I spotted the question: ‘What would you do if you hit someone in an accident?’” he chuckles. “I got the question wrong, because the correct answer, according to the official exam paper, was to run away.”Effectively, this all but institutionalized system is an express fee for expedited processing—standard practice in most western nations. In Indonesia, however, instead of the government as the beneficiary, these payments go into the pockets of individuals. People have increasingly become both resigned to such fee structures and lured into efforts to see how they, too, might profit.It’s not just passing a small bribe to a public official that’s routine. Corruption has spread to the private sector. Today, Indonesia is home to more than 60,000 millionaires and 20 billionaires (in dollar terms)—figures that have doubled in the past two years, according the Indonesia’s Ministry of Finance. The financial sector is sizzling with deals—and scandals—from a bribery case involving a former governor of the Bank Indonesia that has implicated dozens of politicians, to Citibank, where an employee is charged with skimming millions from her customers. Such cases highlight fears about endemic corruption within Indonesia’s financial sector.Churchill Mining, a publicly traded London-based firm, announced in May 2008 that it had found 150 million tons of coal in Indonesian Borneo. This turned out to be a vast underestimate. The firm now believes there are 2.8 billion tons, making it the seventh-largest undeveloped reserve in the world. Unfortunately for this British firm, other investors quickly became interested. The Nusantara Group, a conglomerate backed by Prabowo Subianto, a politician and Suharto’s son-in-law, had previously controlled mining in that area. Six companies affiliated with Nusantara held licenses for six blocks in the East Kutai district of East Kalimantan province but never explored for coal. After the six licenses expired between March 2006 and March 2007, the district government began offering the area to other mining firms. Churchill entered the picture by acquiring from the Ridlatama Group, an Indonesian company, a 75 percent stake in the four new licenses awarded for the same area.In July 2008, two months after Churchill revealed its discovery, the district chief of East Kutai suddenly extended the six expired licenses that had been held by Nusantara’s affiliates, ignoring the fact that Churchill’s local partner had already been awarded licenses for the same tracts. Churchill claims that it has since been the target of a campaign to drive it out of Borneo. In May 2010, a new district chief of East Kutai revoked the Churchill-Ridlatama licenses, leaving Nusantara-affiliated companies in sole control of the 2.8 billion-ton reserve. Local courts rejected Churchill’s complaints, though it has recently appealed to Indonesia’s Supreme Court. And in the process, Churchill Mining has launched a global public relations campaign alerting the financial world that Indonesia is not a trustworthy place to invest.From the point of view of private companies, corruption is like taxation. Both take money from private business, but the need to avoid detection and punishment makes corruption less efficient than taxation. A bribe is a contract that cannot be enforced in court, increasing the chances the bribe-giver will renege or the bribe-taker will suddenly demand a higher payment. Still, there are some practices many foreign observers (and even Indonesian commentators) would call “corruption” even though it’s totally legal in Indonesia.In Indonesia, like elsewhere, golf clubs exist not only as a place to play golf, they are equally a place to conduct business—organize deals, network, and bribe officials. It is a good place for an important official to win prestige jobs for his expensively educated children. It is also a good place to receive bribes. A top civil servant is invited to play a round of golf and discuss business. The official has conveniently forgotten his bag of golf clubs. His business friends lend him a set; they play a round of golf, with the prize being the golf clubs. The government official wins, and he decides to them at the golf professional since he has a of clubs at The paid by the is always the agreed as the bribe for the the official has made with the executives that This is not is it when a like Indonesia it has given some million to police and Indonesian military officers as a fee to their mining Many private however, these payments as bribery and the legal system is a vast of must be in the The state to the in a In 2010, police two in a for they had in were accused by police of the for without in Indonesia and being in of the for which had not been as a Many found such to the by the police given that for years many of had not been for the same In a Jakarta the to are more by a corrupt than companies to their and Such companies must a of their to Corruption when licenses have to be so businesses often without them since a firm need up to to be At least of all drivers in Jakarta have licenses, says a local one means drivers have not taken an official driving hardly a given the driving that on in For without a license, it means a police It would take at least at to the cost of obtaining an official license, the bribes to up the some for business in recent years, Indonesia’s and legal many foreign and companies to avoid the system It is not surprising that investors are often by to through because the system and The local business the and system as corrupt with many Ironically, many of these regulations have been in an to efforts to a the a Bank found that some percent of investments in Indonesia because of the high costs to corruption. The problem has become so that it Indonesia’s of becoming a India, Indonesia, and have which will make it increasingly for foreign investors to in Indonesia’s corrupt A from the found that a third of British and a of companies would avoid to avoid the of being at At least for the of this not Asian without anti-corruption regulations from in such payments to win business in Indonesians the of corruption has to do with its and Indonesia has of a of regional and at It is not surprising since the has been by of often members of the public as as of the Agung says when he is paying a he he is to a their to of For many up in such a the offering of a bribe is not as corruption but as of the way of life. In many local who have widely in the little between a politician to government contracts in Jakarta and a to change a in the it’s called widely that corruption has out of control in Indonesia because of the high costs of a of over million people some legal and in a regime with no established of by members and Rp billion million) paid in to all in Indonesia’s is hardly to run a professional political the vast of members pay no the small state to were by percent in and politicians try to from companies and state to the of or development through procedures have often been the of political in both and Indonesian Corruption Watch the political in the federal their financial in with the which that have their and to do so from further government Only three political Despite over many to the Corruption Watch as of the six had failed to be a to Indonesia’s as one of the world’s largest a political four have been in Indonesia since the of Suharto’s years of in an increasing of Indonesians question the of given the run of reported by the country’s by the rich not And the Indonesian government is too to make this corruption has not Indonesia’s percent growth since 2007, and there are other for as For the first time since Indonesia won its from the in and some from the political elite, the legal system to have a a surprising of people are being and official a official who by both and foreign companies or their amassed a small fortune of Rp billion was sentenced to years in prison in August, extended to He a to in the the Indonesian media and to their into the within the in the Indonesia’s anti-corruption has for and and of the country’s and corrupt police a to Jakarta last August, official the kpk was a it as and are their For a they have a The kpk has convicted 150 high-ranking including members of more than government four and a of high-ranking chief executive officers and according to its It has also received more than of percent a little too good in any legal system and there needs to be a look at how cases are in the first new drive to corruption has been by from investors to up the and from a new of Indonesian executives and politicians to the economy into the global The in their way of from the country’s economic growth and that in many of Indonesia, a lot of government have a about how to government money in an so need to them and them what practices are the in Indonesia, corruption even the to the is a of have made anti-corruption their The problem the leading anti-corruption up by officials to the of the needs to a of and to corruption. These down and increasing pay levels for civil and officials. have been in Indonesia without the state must become a more powerful and like the kpk have on a corruption, it is all but to build a or power without to pay bribes to win the and the and and the legal foreign investors often and they are in an Indonesian of they often take their business