Omojola Awogbemi, S. A. Aasa, Oluwaseun O. Martins, Anthony O. Onokwai
Abstract The worrisome economic, environmental, and energy security implications of the continuous use of fossil-based sources as road transport fuel have made Nigeria consider sustainable alternatives. With the country’s abundant natural gas reserves and growing climate commitments, compressed natural gas (CNG) presents a viable pathway for decarbonizing road transport, curbing urban air pollution, and ensuring energy security. The current study examines the adoption, deployment, and integration of CNG into Nigeria’s road transport ecosystem. The study reviews the CNG resources and infrastructure, impact and achievements, and highlights the challenges of CNG deployment as a road transport fuel, case studies from other jurisdictions, suggestions for improvement, and future research perspectives. Though reasonable grounds have been covered, overcoming the technological and infrastructure gaps, economic and financial inadequacy, health, environmental, and safety issues, ensuring social and stakeholder acceptance, and instituting appropriate policy and regulatory frameworks are fundamental to ensure scalability and energy security. Nigeria can leverage case studies from other jurisdictions to leapfrog and accelerate nationwide deployment, mitigate risks, and guarantee a low-carbon road transport future for Nigeria. More sensitization campaigns, investment and fiscal incentive models, price reduction strategies, and rapid upgrade of CNG infrastructure across the country to ensure wide acceptability, affordability, and nationwide deployment. Future research should integrate lifecycle and techno-economic analysis, smart metering, blockchain tracking, spatial modeling, macroeconomic impact, and process optimization to guide stakeholders in designing a resilient, inclusive, and scalable CNG transport framework for Nigeria.
I.V. Zablodska, Павло Андрійович Ляшенко, Тетяна Михайлівно Адаменко
Problem statement. The relevance of the study lies in the need to restore and modernize the electricity infrastructure of the affected territories in the context of war destruction, energy risks and the need to ensure sustainable socio-economic development of communities. Of particular importance are the issues of spatial planning, energy security, decentralization of energy systems and the introduction of modern technologies for the restoration of energy infrastructure. The purpose of the article is to form a scientifically grounded approach to the spatial development of electric power infrastructure in the affected areas. Methods used in the study: monographic analysis, systematization, generalization, visualization and clustering. The hypothesis of the study was the assumption that the spatial development of electric power infrastructure in the affected territories involves the organization of energy islands in the affected and de-occupied territories. Summary of the main material: it is substantiated that the restoration of a centralized model of Soviet-type generation based on thermal or nuclear capacities is strategically unpromising for the affected territories due to three interrelated restrictions: military vulnerability of large critical infrastructure facilities to repeated targeted strikes; investment unattractiveness for private capital due to high security risks; long implementation periods incompatible with urgent needs to restore power supply. A scientifically grounded approach to the spatial development of electric power infrastructure in the affected territories has been formed, which is reflected in the Concept of Energy Island Organization and defined as an operational model for the spatial development of electric power infrastructure in the affected and de-occupied territories. The originality and practical significance of the study lies in the definition of five logical levels: from the destruction of the centralized IPS and the emergence of an isolated state through the operational architecture of the island with distributed functions between the Initiator, DSO and TSO to a synthetic spatial solution capable of functioning autonomously without trunk connections to the unified power system. Conclusions. The spatial development of electric power infrastructure in the affected territories is not a technical task of restoring what was destroyed, but a strategic transition to a qualitatively new energy supply architecture. Further research consists in studying the conditions for the restoration of electricity infrastructure in the de-occupied territories and its development
An analysis of the ethical and intergenerational dimensions of contemporary energy-finance transitions by systematically mapping the scholarly intersection between crude oil price volatility and cryptocurrency markets is conducted in this study. Drawing on a comprehensive bibliometric and topic-modelling analysis of 4,147 Scopus-indexed publications published between 2014 and 2024, the research investigates how emerging digital financial systems interact with oil market instability and broader sustainability concerns. By integrating Latent Dirichlet Allocation topic modelling with co-citation and keyword network analysis, the study reveals evolving research themes related to energy financialization, decentralized finance, environmental externalities, and regulatory uncertainty. Beyond its technical contributions, the findings highlight critical ethical questions surrounding climate responsibility, distributive justice, and intergenerational equity, particularly in relation to energy-intensive cryptocurrency mining and speculative responses to oil price shocks. The paper advances the concept of moral imagination by demonstrating how financial and technological innovation can either reinforce unsustainable trajectories or support ethically grounded sustainability transitions. The results offer policy-relevant insights for regulators, investors, and institutions seeking to balance economic resilience with long-term environmental responsibility and justice for future generations.
Sustainable Development Goal 7 (SDG-7) seeks universal access to affordable, reliable, and modern energy by 2030, yet progress remains uneven and structurally constrained. Despite declining renewable energy costs, around 685 million people lack electricity and more than 2 billion depend on traditional biomass for cooking. This review moves beyond descriptive assessments by providing a systematic, decision-oriented synthesis of SDG-7 pathways. Using a replicable PRISMA-informed protocol, it integrates peer-reviewed studies and authoritative international datasets published between 2015 and 2025. Centralized, decentralized, and hybrid energy systems are evaluated in terms of technical maturity, affordability, governance feasibility, and socio-environmental impacts. A structured barrier-to-intervention framework identifies context-specific challenges, including intermittency, financing risk, institutional capacity, infrastructure gaps, and climatic and geopolitical exposure, alongside viable technological and policy responses. Comparative case studies from India, Sub-Saharan Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin America explain divergent outcomes of similar technologies across institutional and market contexts, and development pathways globally.
Kingsley Imandojemu, Aliyu Akorede Rufai, Felix Orole, Romanus Osabohien
ABSTRACT Balancing energy security, energy equity, and environmental sustainability has become increasingly challenging as economies pursue low‐carbon growth amid climate risk and persistent disparities in access to modern energy. Although entrepreneurship is widely recognized as a driver of innovation, its role in addressing the energy trilemma remains contested. This study examines whether, and under what conditions, entrepreneurship contributes to resolving the energy trilemma, using panel data for 64 countries from 2011 to 2022. Drawing on the World Energy Council's trilemma indices, World Bank entrepreneurship and macroeconomic indicators, and OECD‐DAC climate finance data, the analysis employs random‐effects models to capture both within‐ and between‐country variation. The results show that entrepreneurial activity is robustly associated with improved energy security and energy equity, alongside more modest gains in environmental sustainability. Innovation capacity strengthens these relationships, while foreign direct investment and climate finance exhibit uneven effects, tending to support system‐level and environmental outcomes more than inclusive access. Regulatory quality emerges as a critical enabling condition that significantly amplifies the positive impact of entrepreneurship across the energy trilemma. Overall, the findings provide cross‐country evidence that entrepreneurship functions as both an innovation conduit and a decentralizing force in energy transitions, underscoring the importance of predictable regulation and better‐targeted climate finance for access‐oriented clean energy solutions.
The rapid expansion of blockchain-based applications and decentralized fi nance (DeFi) has led to a substantial increase in demand for block space, resulting in pronounced volatility in transaction costs, commonly referred to as gas fees. Such volatility introduces significant budgetary and operational risks for a wide range of market participants, including protocol developers, arbitrageurs, mar ket makers, and institutional users. In this paper, we develop a comprehensive theoretical and computational framework for the valuation of derivatives written on Ethereum gas fees. We focus in particular on swaps based on average gas costs and European-style options on gas fee levels. Our approach yields tractable (semi-)analytical pricing formulas for these instruments, allowing for explicit de composition into hedgeable and non-hedgeable risk components. The proposed framework not only provides practical tools for managing transaction cost risk but also lays the foundation for the development of a new class of derivatives markets centered on blockchain base fees.
ABSTRACT Palestine's chronic energy insecurity, marked by high import dependency and structural fragmentation, poses major development challenges. In response, the Palestine Investment Fund (PIF) launched the Noor Palestine Solar Program, a public–private initiative aiming to install 200 Megawatts (MW) of solar capacity over 8 years, through utility parks and public‐school rooftops. This brief report draws on field‐based data to document the program's design, financing, and implementation. It highlights how the program mobilized concessional and private capital, navigated political and institutional constraints, and delivered measurable energy, fiscal, and educational outcomes. By late 2024, Noor had generated over 165 million kilowatt‐hours (kWh) of clean energy, saving nearly 70 million Israeli shekels (ILS) in imports. Key success factors included regulatory alignment, decentralized systems, blended finance, and flexible delivery. The program provides practical insights into how innovative energy infrastructure can be leveraged to strengthen service delivery and promote resilience and development in fragile settings.
Climate change, energy crises, military actions in the world, and unstable oil prices create enormous challenges for the world’s nations. The need to use less fossil fuels opens opportunities for new or somewhat neglected green technologies. To reform the energy sector, it is necessary to have a clear and measured strategy. This allows for the identification of the potential of renewable resources in each space, while finding sources of financing for the transformation. The use of renewable resources makes it possible to solve an actual problem of the developed world—as the population of cities grows, the economic vitality of regions drops significantly. By creating new energy production capacities in the regions, social exclusion is reduced, and the main resources of the regions are better used—land areas, farms, and biomass sources. Nowadays, mankind is experiencing the third significant transformation that converts from conventional fossil fuels to new energy. The future development will go along with the three major trends—resource-type carbon reduction, production technology intensification, and utilization method diversification [1]. Based on these directions of transformation, the main investment decisions will be made, which will promote the progress of the energy system. Humanity is so far the least advanced in carbon collection and burial technologies, but the development of other trends allows for tangible progress.
The foundations of successful European Union policies and current initiatives on the adaptation of the energy sector to climate change, aimed at transforming Europe into a climate-neutral continent by 2050, are considered. A comprehensive analytical approach is proposed, consisting of regulatory, political and institutional analysis and elements of content analysis of EU strategic documents in the field of climate and energy, in particular the European Green Deal (2019), the EU Climate Law (2021), the "Fit for 55" Package (2021), the RED II / RED III Directive, the Energy Efficiency Directives (EED). Analysis shows that to achieve climate neutrality in the EU, a reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by 55 % by 2030 (compared to the 1990 level) is envisaged; increasing the share of renewable energy sources − up to 42.5 % by 2030; increasing energy efficiency − reducing total energy consumption by 11.7 % by 2030. The EU has developed the main policy directions for adapting the energy sector to climate change, in particular: integrating adaptation into energy policy (planning) at all levels; development of sustainable energy infrastructure (modernization of networks, decentralization of energy, investment in "smart grids"); development of renewable energy sources; financing and support for research; cooperation at the national and regional levels; monitoring and vulnerability assessment. Analysis of EU legislation in the fields of climate and energy indicates the functioning of a complex system of interconnected regulatory acts, which shapes European energy policy within the framework of the European Green Deal. This is what should become the basis for Ukraine's formation of its green deal, which has recently initiated. Keywords: energy sector, climate change, risk, adaptation, public policy, European Union.
Cătălin Gheorghe, Oana Panazan, Hind Alnafisah, Ahmed Jeribi
This study investigates the asymmetric responses of AI and ESG Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) to geopolitical and financial uncertainty, with a focus on resilience across market regimes. The NASDAQ-100 and MSCI ESG Leaders indices are used as proxies for thematic ETFs, and their dynamic interlinkages are examined in relation to volatility indicators (VIX, GPR), alternative assets (Bitcoin, Ethereum, gold, oil, natural gas), and safe-haven currencies (CHF, JPY). A daily dataset spanning the 2016–2025 period is analyzed using Quantile-on-Quantile Regression (QQR) and Wavelet Coherence (WCO), enabling a granular assessment of nonlinear, regime-dependent behaviors across quantiles. Results reveal that ESG ETFs demonstrate stronger downside resilience under extreme uncertainty, maintaining stability even during periods of elevated geopolitical and financial risk. In contrast, AI-themed ETFs tend to outperform under moderate-risk conditions but exhibit greater vulnerability during systemic stress, reflecting differences in asset composition and investor risk perception. The findings contribute to the literature on ETF resilience and cross-asset contagion by highlighting differential behavior patterns under varying uncertainty regimes. Practical implications emerge for investors and policymakers seeking to enhance portfolio robustness through thematic diversification during market turbulence.
Bu çalışmada ortaya ilk çıkarılan on kripto para getiri ve işlem hacimleri ile birlikte varil başına Batı Teksas (WTI) ham petrol getirileri arasındaki ilişki test edilmiştir. Analiz için 29 Nisan 2013 – 04 Ağustos 2024 arası günlük veriler kullanılmıştır. Çalışmada ampirik olarak Granger ve Toda Yamamoto Nedensellik Analizi' nden yararlanılmıştır. Her iki analize göre WTI ile Bitcoin (BTC) arasında negatif tek yönlü ilişkiye rastlanmıştır. Granger nedensellik analizine göre WTI ile Ethereum (ETH) arasında, Toda Yamamoto nedensellik analizine göre ise WTI ile Filecoin (FIL) getirisi arasında negatif çift yönlü bir nedensellik ilişkisi olduğu sonucuna ulaşılmıştır. Elde edilen bulgular enerji fiyatlarında yaşanan dalgalanmaların küresel finansal istikrara etkilerini ortaya koymuştur. Enerji piyasalarındaki sürdürülebilirlik hedefleri ile blok zinciri teknolojisinin çevresel etkilerini en aza indirgemek için uluslararası regülasyonların geliştirilmesi ve bütüncül politikalar oluşturulması gerekmektedir. Bu öneriler kripto para birimlerinin, enerji piyasalarından kaynaklanan volatiliteye karşı daha dayanıklı hale getirilmesi için stratejik bir yol haritası sunmaktadır.
The article is devoted to the study of Nordic cooperation in the context of Ukraine's energy transition, green financing, and post-war reconstruction.The key aspects of financial assistance provided by Nordic institutions, including the Nordic Environment Finance Corporation (NEFCO), the Nordic Investment Bank (NIB), and the Nordic Climate Facility (NCF), are examined.The role of these organizations in supporting Ukraine's renewable energy sector, energy efficiency projects, and climate resilience initiatives is analyzed.The impact of green financing and public-private partnerships on Ukraine's economic recovery and integration into the European energy market is explored.It is determined that Nordic countries, as leaders in environmental sustainability, contribute significantly to Ukraine's sustainable development through financing and implementing green projects.The mechanisms of Nordic green financing, the allocation of grants and low-interest loans, and their impact on Ukraine's energy transformation are examined.Special attention is given to the challenges of implementing such projects, including regulatory barriers, governance structures, and financial sustainability issues.The RePower Ukraine Initiative is analyzed as a crucial effort by Nordic institutions and European partners to restore and modernize Ukraine's energy infrastructure with a focus on renewable energy sources.The decentralization of the power grid, smart energy solutions, and climate adaptation strategies are highlighted as key components of Ukraine's postwar green reconstruction.The role of Nordic expertise in improving waste management, reducing industrial pollution, and enhancing biodiversity conservation is also considered, emphasizing the broader environmental benefits of Nordic-Ukraine cooperation.It is established that despite the significant contributions of Nordic partners, challenges remain regarding governance, long-term sustainability, and the effective allocation of resources.The need to strengthen legal frameworks, improve coordination between Ukraine and Nordic donors, and ensure efficient management of financial aid is substantiated.It is concluded that Nordic cooperation plays a vital role in Ukraine's path toward energy independence, climate resilience, and integration into the European energy network.The recommendations focus on enhancing financial mechanisms, streamlining policy frameworks, and promoting innovation through public-private partnerships.By leveraging Nordic green financing and technical expertise, Ukraine can accelerate its transition to a low-carbon economy, strengthen its energy security, and contribute to global climate commitments.The findings of this research provide valuable insights for policymakers, investors, and organizations engaged in Ukraine's sustainable development and post-war recovery.
Open access
Global Energy Security and Policy
Environmental and Biological Research in Conflict Zones
Iraq is a compelling example of a state highly dependent on a singular source of rent, namely oil revenue. Since 2003, Iraq has also been characterized by a fractured, rivalrous elite without central control over organized violence. This formula represents a “rentier political marketplace” in which state funds for salaries and contracts are the essential lubricant of the political system. During 2014–2021, successive shocks to national oil revenues represented a partial and temporary, but traumatic, decarbonization of Iraq’s government and political finance. In turn, this triggered a series of governance and political reconfigurations including a nominal decentralization process and fracturing of sectarian power, followed by a nationwide civic movement demanding transformational change. This paper traces these changes and the abrupt return to business as usual when oil prices rebounded. In doing so, the paper further investigates the nexus between oil and democracy in Iraq and addresses the unanswered question of how Iraq can decarbonize and democratize in the future.
Finding suitable safe haven opportunities to protect emerging investments, such as cryptocurrencies, from external factors, such as Geopolitical risk, is a major concern for investors. Recognizing safe havens for these assets can help investors and traders manage risk, stabilize their portfolios, diversify their investments, and preserve capital against Geopolitical risk. To find the safe havens for cryptocurrencies regarding Geopolitical risk, this study proposes an approach to identifying the most suitable safe havens for cryptocurrencies highly affected by Geopolitical risk. First, the study identifies the cryptocurrencies that are more influenced by Geopolitical risk than others; by this, the assets that require hedging are discovered. Then, a new method, quantile-on-quantile regression, is employed to test the hedging ability of multiple assets from different markets. Once the outcomes of the quantile-on-quantile regression are cleared, the hedge effectiveness index by dynamic conditional correlation GARCH is calculated to validate the results. Both methods yield similar results, suggesting that the Forex market and stock indexes are the most suitable options as safe havens for cryptocurrencies. The study also finds that assets from the energy sector of the commodity market, such as Crude Oil and Natural Gas, are the weakest safe haven options.
On 25 January 2022, following a beginning to the year which had been affected by major political unrest resulting in the deaths of more than 230 people 1 , Kazakhstan was hit by a major power blackout. For around twelve hours, the entire southern regions of the country were left without power, as were Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, two neighboring countries with which the southern country shares the same electricity network. This event is the culmination of several months of over-consumption, power surges and localized outages on the Central Asian networks. In Kazakhstan, electricity consumption rose by 8% in 2021, according to Ministry of Energy 2 , the national electricity operator, compared with the 1-2% annual increase previously recorded. This explosion in consumption is said to have been driven by the widespread development of cryptocurrency mining, a digital activity that can be extremely energy-intensive when operated on a large scale.
Yang Junhua, Samuel Kwaku Agyei, Ahmed Bossman, Mariya Gubareva · 5 authors
To address ESG stock susceptibility to episodic shocks in financial markets, we use nonparametric quantile-based techniques applied to the 2014-2022 period. We (i) analyse the ability of traditional assets to predict ESG stocks returns, (ii) explore whether oil or gold serves as a safe haven for ESG stocks, and (iii) ascertain how ESG stocks respond to market sentiment, crypto-based uncertainty, and geopolitical risk (GPR). We find that gold, oil, market sentiment (tracked by the VIX), the implied volatility of crude oil (OVX) and GPR are significant predictors of ESG returns. None of gold or oil serves as a safe haven for ESG stocks, both acting just as diversifiers. In their turn, ESG could stocks hedge against the shocks from GPR and cryptocurrency-triggered market uncertainties in bearish states of the market. These findings are important for asset allocation and risk management, assisting investors in the already ongoing switch from ordinary to sustainable investments.
In 2022, the Russian invasion of Ukraine had a profound effect on EU energy and climate policies. The EU redesigned its approach to the geopolitics of energy security as it sought alternatives to Russian supplies with accelerated urgency. It upgraded its commitments to energy transition internally and through external actions too, whilst member states balanced these with the domestic politics of a cost-of-living crisis triggered by the war. The new era of geopolitical power had repercussions for the conceptual contours of EU approaches to energy and climate security, which were elevated to hard security issues. The article reviews the key developments in EU energy and climate policies in 2022 and notes three emerging and inter-related conceptual shifts in these: the securitization of the green transition, a more realpolitik approach to external climate actions and a rebalancing towards state intervention. The energy crisis that shook European politics in 2022 started before Russia's war against Ukraine. A function of post-Covid recovery, European, North American and Asian economies had begun to revive in 2021, which brought back industrial demand for process heat and electricity. Strong economic recovery in Asia drove up liquefied natural gas (LNG) prices and meant that lower quantities were available for other consumers (IEA, 2022). Moreover, EU carbon prices picked up, which incentivized a fuel switch from coal to gas (Reuters, 2021). Other factors, such as a hot summer, brought about marginal additional demand. On the supply side, outages at LNG export facilities left global LNG markets strained even further. Russia had higher-than-usual domestic demand (TASS, 2021), whilst also deliberately going slow on filling up storage capacity in Europe over the summer (IEA, 2022). By the beginning of the heating season 2021, filling levels in European gas storage stood at 74.6%, 20% lower than the preceding year, and Gazprom-run storages were at a mere 22% (European Commission, 2022d). This brought Europe into direct competition with Asian consumer markets for alternative LNG supplies. Energy markets were tight as Europe went into 2022. Russia's invasion and the ensuing gradual reduction of gas exports to Europe dramatically aggravated this situation. From July to September 2022, Russian pipeline gas exports to Europe reduced by some 74% compared with 2021. Yamal Europe, the pipeline through Belarus and landing in Poland, was down almost entirely, whilst transit through the Ukrainian pipeline system landing in Slovakia and Romania was reduced by 63% (European Commission, 2023e). Russian gas supply to Europe through Nord Stream came to a halt at the end of September 2022 as the pipeline through the Baltic Sea was sabotaged. By the end of 2022, gas exports had dwindled to marginal volumes. After many years of sending around 150 billion cubic metres to European consumer markets every year or a third of overall EU consumption, Russia ended its role as a prime supplier. Against the backdrop of a strained market situation, this amounted to a perfect storm. Gas prices at the TTF, the European benchmark for LNG, saw all-time highs of 319.98 EUR/MWh in August 2022 – some 15 times the pre-war levels. Because the European power market is indirectly tied to gas – thanks to gas setting the price as the marginal fuel, the so-called merit order principle – electricity markets were in upheaval as well. As per estimates of the European Commission, power benchmark prices in the third quarter of 2022 averaged 339 EUR/MWh, an increase of 222% compared with 2021 (European Commission, 2023d). An already high Eurozone inflation picked up even further, reaching 10% by the end of 2022 (Eurostat, 2023). Clearly, skyrocketing TTF prices ensured LNG cargos found their way into Europe and drove imports of LNG to record levels. Yet, the macroeconomic impact was significant as energy-intensive sectors such as chemicals, paper and steel decreased production, making longer term European industrial competitiveness a key policy concern (Bloomberg, 2022; Reuters, 2022c). What is more, high energy prices became a social issue as they affected vulnerable households the most. European policy responses centred around replacing natural gas with alternative fuels and decarbonizing the European energy and production system. This, on the one hand, meant bringing back fossil fuels, notably coal. Though demand increments remained smaller than feared, power sector CO2 emissions alone went up by almost 4% in 2022 (Ember, 2023). It also meant enhancing the supply of renewable energy and increasing production capacity. In May 2022, the Commission presented a comprehensive policy package dubbed REPowerEU, aimed at phasing out Russian fossil fuels in Europe's imports ‘well before 2030’ and at speeding up the clean energy transition. The REPowerEU plan rested on enhancing clean energy sources by raising renewables targets, eventually agreed to be 42.5% by 2030, accelerating the permitting processes for major renewable projects and building up a (green) hydrogen economy. Aimed at helping the decarbonization of industry, the EU prepared a Green Deal Industrial Plan that member states eventually signed off in early 2023. This aimed to support a faster transition to climate neutrality, inter alia through a Net Zero Industry Act (European Commission, 2023a, 2023c) supporting the build-up of clean tech production within Europe. The Plan envisaged the loosening of state aid to support industrial transformation by at the same time encouraging national governments to consider tax breaks in support of green net-zero technologies investments. A ban of fossil-fuel-based combustion engines by 2035 agreed in late 2022 (Reuters, 2023a), coupled with efforts to revise the Energy Performance of Buildings Directive (Council of the EU, 2022) sought structurally to alter demand patterns in mobility and heating. On the national level, governments also rushed to enhance clean energy targets. For example, the Netherlands announced plans to double capacity in offshore wind by 2030 (Reuters, 2022b). Germany upped its goal for renewables in the power mix to 80% by 2030 (Cleanergywire, 2022), whilst Italy entered the offshore wind business with determination, aiming to install 5.5 GW of offshore wind capacity by 2030 (WindPower Monthly, 2022). Greece introduced the country's first Offshore Wind Law and set a target of 2 GW of offshore wind capacity by 2030 (IEA, 2023). Portugal raised targets for renewable energy in its power mix by 20%, now aiming for 80% by 2026 (Reuters, 2022). In a 2022 energy security strategy, the United Kingdom promised ‘self-sufficient’ energy supply as a way of decarbonizing the electricity system by 2035 (HM Department for Business, 2022). Even coal-heavy Poland made determined efforts to increase the share of renewables in the mix, with 2022 marking a year of significant growth of the industry (Reuters, 2023b). Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Norway, the United Kingdom and Sweden agreed on developing 300 GW of offshore wind capacity by 2050, thus effectively making the North Sea a ‘green power plant’ (De Croo et al., 2023). The European Union collectively and national governments individually mobilized significant funds in reaction to the energy crisis. Much of this funding was meant to buffer high energy costs. By October 2022, energy subsidies earmarked or spent in support of industry and households had surpassed EUR 700 billion (Goldthau and Tagliapietra, 2022). Spending was uneven across Europe and reflected European governments' differing abilities to spend their way out of the crisis. The European Commission allowed green state aid to the tune of EUR 51 billion during the year (European Commission, 2023a). Germany announced plans to invest more than EUR 200 billion into industrial decarbonization (Reuters, 2022a), whereas other large economies such as France pledged additional spending on decarbonizing its economy, on top of EUR 30 billion of green recovery money announced earlier (Euractiv, 2022a). Portugal announced more than EUR 25 billion of public and private finance over 10 years (Reuters, 2022). On the European level, REPowerEU is to add EUR 210 billion in investment for, mainly, renewables, hydrogen and energy efficiency (S&P Global, 2022). Taken together, these measures are argued to having brought forward the EU energy transition by a decade (The Economist, 2023). In parallel to these profound adjustments to domestic energy policies, European governments also introduced a battery of new external commitments in 2022. In reaction to a ‘return of geopolitical energy security’ (Kuzemko et al., 2022), European policy-makers were quick to put in place policy measures aimed at ensuring supplies, lowering demand and keeping prices in check. The EU and member states signed dozens of new energy accords to increase oil and gas imports in 2022. A flurry of energy diplomatic efforts aimed to contract additional gas from producer countries, including Norway, Qatar and the United States. The EU signed a deal with Azerbaijan to double gas supplies, whilst talks about East Mediterranean gas involved a new accord with Egypt and Israel. Several governments negotiated their own supply agreements with countries like Algeria, Angola and Libya (ECFR, 2022a). The EU invested significant time during the year in introducing a cap on the price of gas imports, a measure that would previously have been anathema to the logic of external energy policy. It also moved forward with a common purchasing vehicle, the EU Energy Platform, to help drive down the price of imported gas; this measure had been discussed on and off over many years but without gaining momentum and yet now advanced, to start operation in 2023 (European Commission, 2023a, 2023b). Significantly, most of the new gas deals included clean energy commitments. The EU was able to argue that notwithstanding the turn to alternative gas supplies to offset the loss of Russian supplies in the immediate short term, the priority in 2022 was to strengthen external co-operation on renewables. This co-operation was aimed both at supporting energy transition in third countries and more directly at increasing renewables imports into Europe. The EU's new accord with Azerbaijan included a focus on green hydrogen exports from the country. The EU signed a major new energy deal to bring renewables from Georgia and the South Caucasus across the Black Sea to Romania. It signed new co-operation with Arab Gulf states on solar and hydrogen especially (Council of the European Union, 2022b). An EU–Morocco Green Partnership also promised co-operation on hydrogen supplies. Franco-Spanish agreement was reached on a new H2MED pipeline between Barcelona and Marseilles to help transport hydrogen from North Africa to European markets. The EU increased funding under the African Green Energy Initiative and, after several years of debate, launched plans for a Global European Hydrogen Facility (European Commission, 2022c). In similar vein, the EU worked up text for a new Critical Materials Act – which would eventually be agreed in early 2023 – aimed at securing better access to minerals crucial for energy transitions. Several agreements on critical mineral supplies from countries like Kazakhstan and Namibia advanced. After years of going through the Brussels institutions, the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism moved into a new implementation phase at the end of 2022 when the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union reached a provisional agreement; this was eventually approved by the European Parliament in April 2023. European global climate funding also increased in 2022 and there were several highly notable developments in this area of EU external action. After many years resisting, at the COP27 summit in Egypt in November 2022, European countries backed a new ‘loss and damage’ fund – finally agreeing to the kind of de facto climate compensation for which developing countries had long pushed. The EU channelled funding into new Just Energy Transition Partnerships with Indonesia, India, Senegal and Vietnam, based on an earlier EU–South Africa accord. Its 1-billion-euro contribution to the 20-billion Indonesian partnership was its biggest funding climate-funding initiative ever (European Commission, 2022b). Alongside the increased renewables investments and supply agreements, there were more directly political elements to the climate agenda too. As extreme weather events in 2022 made the impacts of climate change ever more tangible, the EU also introduced several new commitments in the sphere of so-called climate security. The EU's 2022 Strategic Compass and the 2021 Climate Defence Roadmap promised to make security deployments more climate sensitive, and they committed to making Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions less resource intensive and to building better early warnings for climate stresses to trigger more effective action. New council conclusions on climate security were agreed upon under the Czech presidency in late 2022 with upgraded commitments to embed climate issues at the core of mainstream foreign and security policy (Council of the European Union, 2022a; see also European External Action Service, 2022). In similar vein, France introduced a new Climate and Defence Strategy in April 2022 (Ministère des Armes, 2022). After a summer of extreme weather events, the Commission made a pitch for more extensive crisis management powers to deal with climate disasters. A European Parliament resolution urged the EU to step up progress in moulding defence and security policy around climate factors, triggering far-reaching debate on this topic (European Parliament, 2022). In light of extreme weather experienced during 2022, this area of policy moved up several gears and was now set to become an increasingly important aspect of EU security deliberations in future years. In sum, the year 2022 saw an unprecedented urgency, intensity and breadth of policy change in the area of energy and climate action. Within this intense range of policy developments, it is possible to detect three incipient changes to the EU's overarching approaches to energy security and ecological challenges. These represent potentially significant changes that have a bearing on longstanding conceptual frameworks and interpretations of EU energy and climate-change strategies. The three changes are, first, a securitization of renewables; second, a bolder renewables extractivism; and third, a more state-interventionist energy policy. These shifts are separate from but to some extent inter-related. With regard to the first, the energy crisis of 2022 is likely to leave its mark as the moment when energy transition becomes more explicitly securitized. Whereas policy responses to past energy crises centred on making the fossil energy system more robust to external shocks, for example, by way of establishing strategic petroleum reserves at OECD level in the wake of the 1970s oil crises (Kohl, 2010), the 2022 crisis had a different outcome (Bazilian and Goldthau, 2023). This time – notwithstanding sometimes patchy emergency measures – the policy answer was to enhance resilience through energy system decarbonization. Renewables moved to the heart of European security policy. In terms of policy discourse, this coincided with a fundamental shift in the policy framing of renewables. The Commission attested ‘renewable energy […] an overriding public interest’ (European Commission, 2022a, p. 11), thus justifying the comprehensive REPowerEU policy package and its profound impact on the European energy system. Germany's finance minister renewables (Euractiv, their contribution to on foreign such as similar were made by the to the effect that of and renewable was key to enhancing energy security Germany, 2022). this shift to renewables. et energy securitization is in would as a of the 2022 that policy had on security before the war. Yet, it is highly significant that it was renewables that were and were made to crisis policy including as as industrial policy In its the shift towards renewables and clean as a of the 2022 energy crisis changes the of energy security in EU policy. Energy security was by the and patterns oil and and a function of its at prices be the accelerated decarbonization with the to – – of fossil fuel for years to Yet, the for and clean energy supply in the effective between public funds and private as to the mobilized by turn into capacity build-up at within a short of time and thus the system. The but from a and to a on and (Bazilian and Goldthau, 2023). In a second, and the EU moved towards policies centred on renewable energy from third countries for export to European markets. This be a of renewables – an ecological of the longstanding of powers oil and gas from This reflected an approach more directly centred on EU geopolitical and less on the balanced of the global energy order as and from other countries dramatically in 2022 against this ever more EU argue that new green hydrogen projects now in developing states are and increasingly to the European energy than in with the of 2021). Even the EU that its climate actions in other countries are of and (Council of the European Union, in European policy is increasingly with of the EU's own supplies – with help for developing states to in a way towards ecological a more The EU's for access to developing critical mineral own energy and in 2022 an incipient in critical mineral third countries during the year that the EU was the European Green Deal in a way that was towards its own energy crisis (ECFR, 2022). This reflected a more realpolitik approach to – on the EU's longstanding in a that is and The way in which the EU its own targets in 2022 with other energy and climate or the for more effective global ecological action. The third conceptual and change in the EU energy policy to the role of state intervention. of market sought to European energy markets and enhance their the 2022 events saw the to a deliberately with policy (Goldthau and 2022). of the policy measures were to the crisis situation, such as the of European gas under costs. Yet, the Ukraine war the more political – or security – of in for gas supply at costs. the going forward a of the approach EU energy rebalancing political and economic even through state in and energy The is significant in the of the EU Energy (European Commission, and gas price cap dubbed (Council of the European Union, 2022b). with the to in green enhance the resilience of supply and to competition in the emerging global clean tech the way forward is likely to be by state than the EU's economic more In 2022, energy and ecological issues a more place in EU state against Russia's invasion of Ukraine in to energy security and climate too. a moment of such the to energy and climate policy commitments in 2022 a core of the European remained on energy and climate-change the war brought European governments in agreed support for accelerated and more far-reaching ecological transition With on the to from Russian energy supplies, support for energy transition notably in 2022. the commitments made in 2022 were be a long and the large of new European climate and ecological made during the year by most of these had been on the energy transition to is to the ecological in economic or too, the longer the war into 2023 and a focus on security the less there been for effective through on the external 2023). Yet, the year was one of change in the sphere of energy and by the way that the invasion of Ukraine and issues with which the EU had been for many years. This place of climate transition in to the 2022 invasion with earlier in the EU's with This ecological commitments a more place in European in of the impact of energy prices but also green issues had by now become more to the EU's and 2023). Moreover, there were in 2022 of change in the way the EU and energy and climate policies. The policy commitments were highly significant in their own but also a more energy and climate policies are more that across other of European In 2022, energy and climate issues became a issue of domestic politics and also a core of EU security and geopolitical is this but that the policy changes introduced in 2022 trigger The shift between the different – and their and geopolitical – that have been to EU energy and climate policies. These adjustments extensive in the years to as the events of 2022 out over In 2022, climate and security to more into with Yet, as EU and between energy security and ecological in 2022 and as they forward in their and it is possible that some of the strategic and of the invasion this was a year for energy and climate policy and one that to the of the EU's to a new geopolitical The would like to and for to an earlier of this funding and by
Open access
Global Energy Security and Policy
Environmental and Biological Research in Conflict Zones
This chapter deals with a topic that has been publicly debated in the North Macedonia in the last few years. The public utility companies are constantly in debt and with consistently poor quality of services. Hence, the main focus of the public debate is how to identify the causes of the persistent poor situation and how to overcome these problems facing the public utility systems. The primary aim of this chapter is to give an overview of the state in which public utility systems operate. Also, this chapter gives an overview of the importance of the institutional environment and decentralization and their impact on public utilities systems. At the end of the chapter, the sustainability of public utility companies and the financing of utility services and covering costs are presented.
Nguyễn Thị Thanh Huyền, Nguyen Hong Yen, Lê Thanh Hà
By identifying the connectedness of seven indicators from January 1, 2019, to June 13, 2022, we choose an extended joint connectedness approach to a vector autoregression model with time-varying parameter (TVP-VAR) to analyze interlinkages between Crypto Volatility (CV) and Energy Volatility (EV). Our findings show that the COVID-19 outbreak seems to have an impact on the dynamic connectedness of the whole system, which peaks at about 60% toward the end of 2019. According to net total directional connectedness over a quantile, throughout the 2020–2022 timeframe, natural gas and crude oil are net shock transmitters, while the CV, clean energy, solar energy, and green bonds consistently receive all other indicators. Specifically, pairwise connectedness indicates that the CV appears to be a net transmitter of shocks to all energy indicators before the COVID-19 outbreak but acts as a net receiver of shocks from clean energy, wind energy, and green bonds in late 2020. The CV mostly has spillover effects on green bonds. The primary net transmitter of shocks to the Crypto market is crude oil. Our findings are critical in helping investors and authorities design the most effective policies to lessen the vulnerabilities of these indicators and reduce the spread of risk or uncertainty.