Drawing on feminist scholarship on money and finance and Âgeographical scholarship on everyday life and masculinities, this article examines the promises and futures that investment in and use of cryptocurrency represents for men in the UK. We explore the financial practices, logics and decision-making of ordinary crypto-users and examine how engagement with cryptocurrency shapes how these men understand themselves, their futures, and their place in the broader world. Through focus group and interview data we explore how research participants explain their rationale and motivations for their financial practices, including examining menâs perceptions of and relations to cryptocurrency, and how these shape and are shaped by the intimacies and moralities of everyday life. Based on our findings, we conceptualise crypto-masculinities as a historically and socially specific financial practice and gendered expression of the relations of (digital) money and finance. This article remedies the limited geographical attention that has been paid thus far to cryptocurrency âusersâ, and offers novel insights into the embodied dimensions of cryptocurrency use, including how cryptocurrency is experienced and lived.
Purpose This study investigates how endorser type (AI-driven virtual vs. human influencers) interacts with product type (NFT vs. physical goods) to shape brand engagement through parasocial relationships. It introduces the concept of digital congruence, examining when fully digital influencers are more effective than their human counterparts in the context of digitally native products. Design/methodology/approach Across three online experiments (Study 1: N = 403; Study 2: N = 663; Study 3: N = 359), this research tests a moderated mediation framework. Study 1 examines the mediating role of parasocial relationships in the influencerâengagement link. Studies 2 and 3 introduce NFT presence as a moderator to evaluate how digital congruence alters consumer response across cultures (UK and China). Findings Human influencers generally elicit stronger parasocial relationships and brand engagement when promoting physical products. However, virtual influencers outperform human endorsers in NFT contexts, driven by enhanced digital congruence. Parasocial relationships mediate the influence of endorser type on engagement, and this mediation is moderated by the presence of NFTs. Practical implications Marketers should align influencer type with product ontology. For traditional goods, human influencers are preferable; for NFTs and other digital assets, virtual influencers yield superior engagement outcomes. Digital congruence enhances parasocial bonds and should be strategically leveraged in Web3 campaigns. Originality/value This research bridges congruence theory and parasocial relationship theory to propose digital congruence as a novel construct. It is the first to empirically demonstrate that alignment between a fully digital endorser and a fully digital product (NFT) enhances psychological resonance and marketing effectiveness.
Digital Marketing and Social Media
Gender, Feminism, and Media
Consumer Behavior in Brand Consumption and Identification
This chapter surveys portrayals of money within US speculative fiction. While they may take us to alien planets or alternate universes, such works also serve to remind us how strange âordinaryâ money already is. Speculative fiction has often sought to reimagine money in some more rational or explainable form. These thought experiments often propose money based on some purportedly stable and incontrovertible value, such as labor, time, energy, or motion. There is a second and somewhat distinct tendency, which envisions reputation-based currencies and other âstoried moneys,â often capable of reflecting diverse incommensurable values. Then there are portrayals of large fortunes that, whether or not they come with overt speculative elements such as magic or futuristic technologies, can also take on an aura of the fantastic. In particular, large fortunes become storied money to the extent that they reflect and enact their ownersâ personal characteristics, relationships, and histories. Speculative fiction also often blurs with speculative practices, from Josiah Warrenâs Time Store in the 1820s to the Technocracy movement of the 1930s to contemporary cryptocurrency, Non-Fungible Tokens, and blockchain finance. This porous boundary invites the question: might money itself be understood as a kind of speculative fiction?
The association between madness and the oppression of women is a trope of narratives focusing on women which can support a sexist or a feminist perspective âwomenâs psychological distress being either a proof of their inferiority or a result of their systematic oppression. Contemporary representations of female characters suffering from mental distress build on this tradition and play with it as they question the gender norms that tend to produce personality disorders. Such representations are also shaped by the society that produced them and, in this case, the emergence of âtherapy cultureâ (FĂźredi 2004) may have political consequences for the meaning conveyed by the shows. Comparing Ally McBeal (Fox, 1997-2002) and Crazy Ex-Girlfriend (The CW, 2015-2019) allows for an analysis that covers two decades and major social and economic evolutions to adopt a social and historical perspective on the representation of female characters suffering from mental health issues in US TV series. This chapter aims at comparing the two shows to see how the treatment of mental distress in female characters points to gender dynamics and how it can contribute to challenging the norm. It argues that there are broader issues of identity and social norms at stake in the representation of mental distress in female heroines.
Purpose Given the rise of sport non-fungible tokens (NFTs) and sponsorships from cryptocurrency companies in the sport industry during the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, this paper aims to critically frame the partnerships between cryptocurrency and sport by exploring the reception of fan tokens amongst supporters of three English Premier League clubs: Manchester City, Everton and Crystal Palace. Design/methodology/approach Drawing upon the emerging critical scholarship on cryptocurrency and the political economy of professional football, this study uses digital ethnography in an attempt to understand the major themes emanating from the online forum discussions amongst fans in response to the issuance of fan tokens by the aforementioned three clubs, among other types of partnerships with crypto companies. Findings The supportersâ critical deliberations revolved around the contradictions of fan tokens (as a means for supposed âfan engagementâ or for financial speculation) and the utility of cryptocurrency for the public. These reactions in turn showcase a larger tension underlying the financially unstable professional football industry: the contest between the owners and the fan bases over the exchange value (for profit) and use value (for community) of the clubs. Originality/value This paper is one of the first studies to adopt a critical framework to examine the emerging partnerships between sports and cryptocurrency companies during the COVID-19 pandemic. It also provides one of the first in-depth analyses of the critical receptions of sport NFTs amongst sport fans. While contributing to the literature on fan activism/protest in the context of the commercialization and commodification of sport, the paper also raises new questions on the responsible use of cryptocurrency/NFT in sport.
People within the cryptocurrency world come together on imageboards and forums to tell stories about the highly volatile and uncertain world they inhabit. Although they engage with a highly technical digital money form, the stories they share online could be more productively analysed as digital folklore. Through ethnography primarily conducted via 4chan and Reddit, I highlight three types of stories, loosely grouped together within the categories of âdespairâ, âcomedyâ and âcourageâ. Drawing parallels to folk and fairy tales, I explore how ânetizensâ use these stories to engage with the uncertainty that characterizes cryptocurrencies. Consequently, I highlight how stories come to make the online cryptocurrency world more inhabitable, as well as allowing people to subvert and resist âeconomic reasonâ. By foregrounding storytelling, I highlight the fluid, intersubjective and collective actions that help to sustain a volatile and uncertain market that is favourable for those who take to online message boards.
How do feminist activists take over our feeds? And can we really escape the shadows of networked visibility? In a series of five case studies, this text and video-based _Perspective applies the method of visual research to analyze and cross-pollinate visual formulas and platform strategies of Pussy Riotâs and LASTESISâ networked performances. What started as a social media revolution in 2012 has now spread into the realm of cryptocurrencies and Web3 advances. Formerly situated feminist protests become more and more decentralized and ubiquitoryâand so do their audiences. Nonetheless, catering to the demands of networked imagery also entails perpetuating its hegemonic, exploitative, and violent nature, which is ultimately at the hands of the viewerâs and researcherâs interaction.
In the year that George Ritzer publishes the ninth edition of The McDonaldization of Society, moving his famous theory firmly Into the Digital Age, critical educator Petar JandriÄ and sociologist Sarah Hayes invited George to a dialogue on the digital transformation of McDonaldization and its critical application to Higher Education. In this article, George first traces for us the origins of his theory that has endured for four decades. A key dimension of McDonaldization is the âiron cageâ of control, via rationalization. Once contained within physical sites of bricks and mortar, now, we encounter a âvelvet cageâ in sites of digital consumption, at the hands of non-human technologies, that threaten human labor and autonomy. Whilst the concept of the McUniversity is not without some critique, this interview provides compelling reasons to open new dialogue about McDonaldization in augmented settings such as Higher Education. With the rise of prosuming machines such as blockchain and bitcoin, that can both produce and consume without intervention from human âprosumersâ, universities cannot afford to ignore the challenges of prosumer capitalism, which George concludes, will explode into unprecedented and unpredictable directions in the years to come.
Bitcoin is difficult to categorize and indeed has been associated with 112 different labels in the British media (e.g., âprivate money,â âcommodityâ) â most of which poorly describe bitcoin. Specifically, our analyses of 674 media articles, focusing on the relationship between labeling and categorization, identify classification inconsistencies at three levels: within clusters of labels, between labels and categories, and between category attributes. These inconsistencies hamper categorization based on attribute similarity, audience goals, and causal models, respectively. We identify four factors that nurture this categorical anarchy and conclude with a call for research on the socioeconomic revolution heralded by blockchain technology.
The perspectives of this book stake out but a small, sturdy base camp from\nwhich to explore sexual appeals in advertising and marketing. As much as\none fifth of advertising uses such appeals (Lin, 1998; Reichert, Lambiase,\nMorgan, Carstarphen, & Zavoina, 1999; Walker, 2000)/ but sexualized persuasion in the Western landscape looms larger than that because it surrounds us in films, music videos, television programming, Web content,\nmagazine and book covers, and beyond. Among all this visual "sex noise/"\nthe most common metaphor for sex is a woman/s body, although men/s\nbodies are being commodified as well, as Barbara Stern reminds us in this\nvolume. These appeals to sexual impulses are nothing neWt of course; Aristotle discussed them to help speakers connect with particular audiences in\nThe Rhetoric. Young men, he said, "are prone to desires and inclined to do\nwhatever they desire. Of the desires of the body they are most inclined to\npursue that relating to sex, and they are powerless against this" (1991 translation/ p. 165). Aristotle/s ideas, of course, are deliberate stereotypes, but\nthat they hold true more than 2/300 years later is proof of their power.
From a historical perspective, the multiverse is just one more step in our progress from geocentric to heliocentric to galactocentric to cosmocentric worldview. Indeed, several lessons of relevance to the multiverse debate can be gleaned from considering the history of this progression. To the ancient Greeks, the heavenly spheres were the unchanging domain of the divine and therefore outside science by definition. It required Tycho de Brahe's observation of a supernova in 1572 and the realization that its apparent position did not change as the Earth moved around the Sun to dash that view. Because this contradicted the Aristotelian view that the heavens cannot change, the claim was at first received sceptically. Frustrated by those who had eyes but would not see, Brahe wrote: âO crassa ingenia. O coecos coeli spectators.â (Oh thick wits. Oh blind watchers of the sky.) Lesson 1: Theoretical prejudice should not blind one to the evidence. Of course, we will never see the other universes themselves â in that sense we are necessarily blind, so this point might seem irrelevant to the multiverse. However, I would claim that the analogue of Tycho's supernova is the fine-tunings. Long after Galileo had speculated that the Milky Way consists of stars like the Sun and Newton had shown the laws of Nature could be extended beyond the solar system, there was still a prejudice that the investigation of this region was beyond the domain of science. In 1842 August Comte said of the study of stars: âNever, by any means, will we be able to study their chemical compositions. The field of positive philosophy lies entirely within the Solar System, the study of the universe being inaccessible in any possible science.â Comte had not foreseen the advent of spectroscopy, which identified absorption features in stellar spectra with chemical elements. Lesson 2: New observational developments are hard to anticipate. Perhaps we will find extra dimensions at the Large Hadron Collider or even create baby universes in the laboratory one day. Cosmology attained the status of a proper science in 1915, when the advent of general relativity gave it a secure mathematical basis. Nevertheless, for a further decade there was resistance to the idea that science could be extended beyond our galaxy. Indeed many astronomers refused to believe that there was anything beyond. Although Kant had speculated as early as 1755 that some nebulae are âisland universesâ similar to the Milky Way, most astronomers continued to adopt a galactocentric view until the 1920s. Indeed, the most popular model of the galaxy at the start of the 20th century â Kapteyn's Universe â even had the Sun at its centre! The controversy came to a head in 1920 when Heber Curtis defended the island universe theory in a famous debate with Harlow Shapley. The issue was finally resolved in 1924, when Edwin Hubble measured the distance to M31 using Cepheid variable stars. In many ways this parallels the current debate about whether anything exists beyond our horizon. Lesson 3: More conservative cosmologists might prefer to maintain the cosmocentric view but perhaps the tide of history is against them. The evidence for other universes can never be as decisive as that for extragalactic nebulae but the transformation of worldview required may be just as necessary. A few years later Hubble obtained radial velocities and distance estimates for several dozen nearby galaxies, thereby discovering that all galaxies are moving away from us with a speed proportional to their distance. The most natural interpretation of this is that space itself is expanding, as indeed had been predicted by Alexander Friedmann in 1920 on the basis of general relativity. Einstein rejected this model at the time because he believed the universe (i.e. the Milky Way) was static and he even introduced an extra repulsive term into his equations â the cosmological constant â to allow this possibility. After Hubble's discovery, he described this as his âbiggest blunderâ. Lesson 4: One should not necessarily reject theoretical predictions because they have no observational support. In fact, Einstein continued to uphold the static model even after the evidence was against it â he only accepted the Friedmann model in 1931, several years after Hubble published his data â so knowing how much weight to attach to theory and observation can be tricky. Let me now address George's specific issues. There are plausibly galaxies just beyond the visual horizon, where we cannot see them, so we can extend this argument, step by step, to way beyond the horizon and infer there are many different universes that we cannot see. Even though we can never prove what happens outside our visual horizon, the standard FRW model has been well tested within it, so there is surely some probabilistic sense in which one can extrapolate models at least some way beyond it. Also the smooth dependence of the CMB fluctuations on angular separation (whatever the source of those fluctuations) gives no reason to suppose that anything strange happens just beyond the horizon. George himself seems to accept this, which illustrates the problem of regarding speculations as non-scientific just because they involve the unobservable. Admittedly one's confidence in any proposed model must decrease as one extrapolates ever further beyond the horizon, but one should beware of using Rees's slippery slope argument in reverse: we cannot extrapolate to scales much larger than the horizon, so we should not extrapolate to scales only slightly outside it. The problem comes when one makes the jump from the Level I to Level II multiverse (which is where George's argument that the FRW solution extends everywhere must fail). In fact, the inflationary scenario does provide an answer to this. For if the amplitude of the density fluctuations increases slightly with scale (as appears to be the case), one can predict the scale at which the FRW approximation breaks down. Current data suggest that this happens at around 10100 horizon scales. The existence of a multiverse is implied by inflation, which is verified by the CMB anisotropy observations. In particular, known physics leads to chaotic inflation and this implies a multiverse. There are two distinct issues here: does one believe in inflation and does inflation lead to a multiverse? Inflation is attractive because it resolves several cosmological conundra. Quantum fluctuations of the scalar field can also generate the small density perturbations that eventually give rise to galaxies and large-scale structure and it is impressive that the predicted dependence of the CMB fluctuations on angular separation is almost exactly as observed by the WMAP satellite (Spergel et al. 2003). Of course, the evidence for inflation is not conclusive â there is still no evidence for any scalar field in Nature!â but the Level I multiverse is still a good bet. As regards the second issue, I agree with George that the evidence for the sort of chaotic inflation that leads to a Level II multiverse is more equivocal, and certainly one cannot infer this from the form of the CMB anisotropies. There are now around 100 models of inflation and, while Linde (1990) claims that the existence of other domains with different coupling constants is generic, this is debatable. The multiverse idea is testable, because it can be disproved if we determine there are closed spatial sections in the universe (for example, if the curvature is positive). This is really a straw man argument because we have seen that inflation is only one of several multiverse proposals â for example, quantum cosmology models give closed spatial sections â and not all inflationary models require that the spatial sections be open anyway. However, George is surely right to stress the importance of looking for circles in the CMB. The idea of small universes is not mainstream but it has the advantage that it can be tested. The existence of a multiverse is the only physical explanation for the fine-tuning of parameters that leads to our existence. In the absence of direct evidence for other universes, I regard the anthropic fine-tunings as the best indirect evidence. (A multiverse in which the constants were the same everywhere would have no explanatory value.) I agree with George that the fine-tunings do not constitute proof, but they still carry weight. One can argue about how impressive the fine-tunings are (could we really exclude life if the constants changed a lot?), but I still think the number and precision of the tunings is remarkable. Nearly 30 years ago I wrote a review with Martin Rees about these fine-tunings (Carr and Rees 1979). In the intervening period a few of them have gone away (e.g. inflation may explain the value of the cosmological density parameter) but most of them have got stronger. Without a multiverse one may be forced to adopt a non-physical explanation like a fine-tuner, which is why Neil Manson (2003) claims that âthe multiverse is the last resort of the desperate atheistâ. This is not necessarily true â Paul Davies (2006) advocates a âthird wayâ in which the laws of Nature evolve in a single universe in such a way that life can arise â but if you reject the multiverse, you certainly lower the scientific status of the anthropic arguments. I agree with George's argument against physical infinities. However, we do not need an infinity to validate the anthropic principle â just a large number. The existence of a multiverse is implied by a probability argument: the universe is no more special than it need be to create life. In particular, the small value of the cosmological constant shows that other universes exist. George argues that multiverse theories are not useful because they cannot be disproved: if all possibilities exist somewhere, then they can explain all conceivable observations. However, the fact that we only observe one sample of the multiverse still allows the proposal to be refuted at a given confidence level. Statistical predictions still qualify as science and that is why Rees has stressed the importance of calculating the probability distribution for various parameters across the universes. Indeed, a core difference between the Bayesian and frequentist views is the former's willingness to make inferences from single, and possibly unrepeatable, pieces of data. George rejects the Î argument but there is no doubt that this has been very influential in attracting many physicists to the multiverse cause. It used to be thought that Î was exactly zero and it was then plausible that there might be some physical (non-anthropic) explanation for this. However, the fact that Î is non-zero but very tiny is a profound mystery that completely changes the situation. Critics say that we cannot know what distribution for Î is predicted across the multiverse and that is correct. It may be simplistic to assume that the distribution is uniform, but postulating that there is a spike in precisely the observed region is just as improbable as what we are trying to explain. Even if one does not accept inflation, multi-verses are predicted by many theories of particle physics. It is still legitimate to invoke the existence of other universes for which there can be no direct evidence if one has a theory (like M-theory) that predicts this. It is not necessary to check all predictions of the theory for it to be considered scientific (e.g. we cannot probe inside black holes and we cannot see quarks but we still regard these as subjects for scientific discourse); it is only necessary to test some of them. Does M-theory qualify in this respect? George claims no; it does not come under the purview of science because our confidence in it is based on faith and aesthetic considerations (mathematical beauty etc) rather than experimental data. Certainly he is not alone in this attitude. For example, Woit (2006) and Smolin (2007) dismiss M-theory as mathematics rather than physics because it has not made contact with observations after 20 years. However, I feel this rejection is premature. It may take 200 years to solve the equations of M-theory and test them, but the definition of what constitutes a scientific question should not depend on how difficult it is. The nature of science changes, so what is illegitimate science today may be legitimate tomorrow. The fundamental issue in the dispute between myself and George concerns which features of science are to be regarded as sacrosanct. Experimentation used to be regarded as sacrosanct but by that criterion all of astronomy would be excluded since one cannot experiment with stars and galaxies. Fortunately, one can still make observations and â since there are billions of these objects â Nature effectively performs experiments for us. Cosmologists are in worse shape because there is only one universe to observe and speculations about processes at very early and very late times have to be viewed as ultra-speculative. For this reason, more conservative physicists regard even relatively standard cosmological speculations as trespassing into metaphysics. George places a lot of emphasis on falsifiability, but not everybody in the philosophy of science agrees with Popper on this and it is surely dangerous to impose a philosophical prescription that prevents scientists changing the border of their field. As Susskind cautions, it would be a pity to miss out on some fundamental truth because of an over-restrictive definition of science. Of course, one needs some degree of falsifiability, but the question is, how much? It is certainly not fair to put M-theory in the same class as astrology. On the other hand, I share George's scepticism of the Level IV multiverse, which corresponds to universes governed by different mathematical structures. The view that any mathematically possible universe must exist somewhere seems untestable in a deeper sense than Levels I to III. The notion of a multiverse entails a new perspective of the nature of science and it is not surprising that this causes intellectual discomfort. But this situation has often occurred before and one should not be surprised if it happens again. The Cosmic Uroborus in figure 2 shows that the history of physics might be regarded as the extension of knowledge into ever smaller and ever larger scales. The ideas encountered at the two frontiers have often been viewed as part of philosophy rather than science, so in a sense the debate is nothing new. However, there is another sense in which the current situation is very special. This is because â for the first time â the boundaries at the largest and smallest scales have connected, as indicated by the top of the Cosmic Uroborus, so the two science/philosophy frontiers have merged. Does this merging represent the completion of science or merely the sort of transformation in the perceived nature of science that accompanies every paradigm shift? This is a contentious issue and clearly we do not yet know the answer. I accept that there may eventually be a limit to the sort of questions that science can address; George and I merely disagree on whether we have reached that limit with the multiverse. In any case, we are surely behoven to try to take science as far as possible. I will end with a comment by Steven Weinberg (2007) in his contribution to Universe or Multiverse?: âWe usually mark advances in the history of science by what we learn about Nature, but at certain critical moments the most important thing is what we discover about science itself. These discoveries lead to changes in how we score our work, in what we consider to be an acceptable theory.â
The very nature of the scientific enterprise is at stake in the multiverse debate. Its advocates propose weakening the nature of scientific proof in order to claim that the multiverse hypothesis provides a scientific explanation. This is a dangerous tactic. Two central scientific virtues are testability and explanatory power. In the cosmological context, these are often in conflict with each other and there has been an increasing tendency in theoretical physics and cosmology to say it does not matter whether a proposal is testable: if it fits into our other theories in a convincing way, with great explanatory power, then testing is superfluous. The extreme case is the multiverse proposal, where no direct observational test of the hypothesis is possible. Despite this, many articles and books dogmatically proclaim that the multiverse is an established scientific fact. In this context one must re-evaluate what the core of science is: can one maintain one has a genuine scientific theory when direct and indeed indirect tests of the theory are impossible? If one claims this, one is altering the meaning of science. One should be very careful before so doing. There are many other theories waiting in the wings, hoping for a weakening of what is meant by âscienceâ. Those proposing this weakening in the case of cosmology should be aware of the flood of alternative scientific theories whose advocates will then state that they too can claim the mantle of scientific respectability. The key observational point is that the domains considered are beyond the visual horizon and are therefore unobservable. You cannot receive signals of any kind from beyond the horizon, as there has not been time for messages to reach us from there since the universe began. Hence no object out there is detectable by any kind of astronomical observation. To see this clearly one should look at the space-time diagrams of our past light cone (figure 5). The assumption made in justifying the multiverse is that we can extrapolate to 10100 times the horizon distance or even more (the word âinfinityâ is casually used in these writings). The extraordinary pretentiousness of this attempt should be clear. This shows the space-time diagrams of our past light cone in both the usual form (a) and conformal form (b), in which one expands the spatial distances in order to see the causal structure. The light cones are then at Âą45°, making clear the observational and causal limits; any observation beyond the visual horizon is impossible. The Hubble distance is where galaxies recede at the speed of light (v=c). The redshift measures the expansion factor and goes to infinity at the horizon itself. (c) shows more clearly the vast extrapolation envisaged in justifications of the multiverse. Note that there is a distinction betweeen the visual horizon and the event horizon. The latter relates to causality in the far distant future and is irrelevant to present-day observations, but becomes relevant if the universe accelerates. (Mark Whittle, University of Virginia) The often claimed existence of physical infinities in the multiverse context â of either universes or spatial sections of universes (Vilenkin 2006) â is dubious. What has been forgotten here is that infinity is an unattainable state rather than a large number â its character is totally different from any finite number and it is a mathematical rather than physical entity. According to David Hilbert (1964): âThe infinite is nowhere to be found in reality, no matter what experiences, observations, and knowledge are appealed to.â Even if there were an infinite number of galaxies, and we could see them all (which we could not), we could not count them in a finite time. So there is no way the existence of an infinity can ever be proven correct by observation or any other test. The concept of physical infinities is not a scientific one if science involves testability by either observation or experiment. The claim of infinites in the multiverse context emphasizes how tenuously scientific that idea is. It is a huge act of hubris to extrapolate from one small domain to infinity when infinity is never attainable. Seven different kinds of justification have been proposed for the existence of a multiverse and I will now consider these in turn. There are plausibly galaxies just beyond the visual horizon, where we cannot see them, so we can extend this argument, step by step, to way beyond the horizon and infer there are many different universes that we cannot see. This is the âslippery slopeâ argument and Rees (2001) uses it to defend both Level I and Level II multiverses. The argument is fine as regards extrapolation in the vicinity of the visual horizon, but the assumption that it can be continued to very distant domains or other universes is an untestable major extrapolation, which assumes a continuity that may or may not be true. If each link in a chain of evidence is well understood and tenable, then indirect evidence such as this carries nearly as much weight as direct evidence. But not all the links in the chain are tenable. If employed to its logical conclusion it seems a priori to lead to the old idea of spatial homogeneity extending forever (âThe Cosmological Principleâ) rather than the multiverse of chaotic cosmology with domain walls separating different phases. For if the universe within the horizon is almost exactly Friedmann-Robertson-Walker (FRW) â a statistically spatially homogenous and isotropic space-time â it is plausible that it is also FRW just outside the horizon, and a simple extrapolation suggests that it is spatially homogeneous without limit. But supporters of chaotic inflation claim that there are completely different domains out there with different values of the constants, so which is the case? You can say what you like and nobody can prove it right or wrong. The existence of a multiverse is implied by inflation, which is verified by the Cosmic Microwave Background anisotropy observations. In particular, known physics leads to chaotic inflation and this implies a multiverse. A multiverse is implied by some forms of inflation but not others. Inflation is not yet a well defined theory and chaotic inflation is just one variant of it. For example, inflation in a small closed universe fits all the observations, without requiring a multiverse. In any case, the key physics involved in chaotic inflation (Coleman-de Luccia tunnelling) is extrapolated from known and tested physics to quite different regimes; that extrapolation is unverified and indeed unverifiable. The physics is hypothetical rather than tested. We are being told that what we have is âknown physics â multiverseâ. But the real situation is âknown physics â hypothetical physics â multiverseâ and the first step involves a major extrapolation which may or may not be correct. The multiverse idea is testable, because it can be disproved if we determine there are closed spatial sections in the universe (for example, if the curvature is positive). The claim is that only negatively curved FRW models can exist in a multiverse based on chaotic inflation, either because Coleman-de Luccia tunnelling only gives negative curvature or because a closed spatial section necessarily implies a single universe. But the first argument is disputed (there are already papers suggesting that tunnelling to positively curved universes is possible) and the second argument would not apply if we lived in a high-density lump imbedded in a low-density universe (i.e. the extrapolation of positive curvature to very large scales may not be valid). Neither argument is conclusive. Certainly observational confirmation of negatively curved space sections would not constitute proof of a multiverse, for that can occur in a single universe. However, chaotic inflation versions of the multiverse can be disproved if we observationally prove that we live in a universe with closed spatial sections that are so small that we have already seen round the universe. We can test this possibility by searching for identical circles in the CMB, together with low anisotropy power at large angular scales (which is indeed observed). This is an important test as it would disprove the chaotic inflation variety of multiverse. But not seeing the circles would not prove a multiverse exists: their non-detection is a necessary but not sufficient condition for multiverses. The existence of a multiverse is the only physical explanation for the fine-tuning of parameters that leads to our existence. The multiverse is a reasonable theoretical explanation of the fine-tunings, but this does not help in observationally confirming the hypothesis. The issue here is, which is more important in cosmology: theory (explanation) or observations (tests against reality)? The essential proposal is that one should downgrade observational testing in favour of theory â a dangerous road to take. In any case, the major problem with this proposal is that it can explain anything at all, because in a multiverse with an infinite or extremely large variety of universe properties â for example, the 10500 possibilities allowed by the landscape of string theory â virtually anything can happen. In that case, the hypothesis does not predict any specific testable fact. The existence of universes with giraffes is certainly predicted by many multiverse proposals, but universes where giraffes do not exist are also predicted. Observing a giraffe neither confirms nor disproves the multiverse. The existence of a multiverse is implied by a probability argument: the universe is no more special than it need be to create life. In particular, the small value of the cosmological constant shows that other universes exist. But the statistical argument invoked here only applies if a multiverse exists; it is simply inapplicable (because the probability distribution has no meaning) if there is no multiverse, so it cannot prove a multiverse exists. It is a calculation that assumes the answer (that a multiverse exists) before it begins. If we only have one object to observe, we can make many observations of that object, but it is still only one object (one universe), and you cannot do statistical tests on its nature. This is a consistency test if there is indeed a multiverse, but it says nothing if there is not. It is not a sufficient condition for its existence. The argument that the actual value of Î is extremely different from the ânaturalâ one predicted by theoretical physics (120 orders of magnitude smaller!) makes very clear the nature of the multiverse project: it is an attempt to make the extremely improbable appear probable. Even if one does not accept inflation, multiverses are predicted by many theories of particle physics. One example of this is the string landscape of M-theory, but that is a hypothetical proposal with no solid evidence in its favour. Indeed, even many string theorists are sceptical about the landscape, despite the enthusiasm with which some propose it. A major problem arises when one has a theory where no verification is possible. It is not necessary to check all the predictions of a theory for it to be considered scientific â one can check some predictions to help the theory gain credence, but that does not prove the theory because it has to be the only one that makes the prediction for it to carry weight; it cannot be conclusive unless no other explanation is possible Let me illustrate with an example. I can propose that there are leopards hidden in the mountains of Scotland. They are very shy, so they hide away and no-one ever sees them. But you can tell they are there because sheep vanish without trace every year. I can put together an exciting research project that will look at statistics of lost sheep in Scotland for the past 50 years, and hence prove the existence of these rare mountain leopards. This seems to me to be analogous to the argument for proof of the existence of a multiverse through any specific property (e.g. the smallness of Î) that might possibly exist somewhere in the landscape. This may be something that is predicted by some multiverse theory, but it hardly proves it true. I am all for the exercise of applying known physics in more extreme conditions: do it and see what happens. But admit that it is an untested extrapolation and that different extrapolations are possible. You can extrapolate different aspects of known physics to the unknown and different predictions will result. For example, if one extrapolates classical physics to the quantum domain, the answers will be wrong. But in that case you can show this is so by experimental tests. That is what is missing in the multiverse case: you can make the extrapolation but cannot then determine if it is right or not. The nature of science changes, so what is illegitimate science today may be legitimate tomorrow. This is true, but the foundations must be respected if one is to preserve the core features of science that have led to its phenomenal success: that is the feedback from reality to theory provided by experiment and observational testing. One abandons that at one's peril. For example, today's philosophical definition of science excludes astrology, despite all the claimed theory and data supporting it. But now astrologers can take hope from the arguments of string theorists and multiverse enthusiasts: with the weakened kinds of criteria proposed, astrology too will soon be a strong candidate for recognition as a genuine science. The Popperazi (a derogatory term used by Susskind for those who believe testing scientific theories is an indispensible aspect of science) will no longer be able to deny astrology its place as a proper scientific theory. Is that what we really want? At the very least, we must be given a clear statement as to what broader definition of the nature of science is being proposed, and in particular what criteria of testing will be taken to be adequate (Ellis 2006); this then needs to be assessed in relation to cases such as astrology and âintelligent designâ, as well as multiverses and string theory, in order to see what its implications are. The multiverse idea is provable neither by observation, nor as an implication of well established physics. It may be true, but it cannot be shown to be true. It does have great explanatory power â it provides an empirically based rationalization for fine tuning, developed from known physical principles â but one must distinguish between explanation and prediction. Successful scientific theories make predictions that can be tested. The multiverse theory cannot make any testable predictions because it can explain anything at all. Even though multiverse proposals are good empirically based philosophical proposals for the nature of what exists, they are not strictly within the domain of science. There is nothing wrong with empirically based philosophical explanation â indeed it is of great value provided it is labelled for what it is â but I suggest that cosmologists should be very careful not to make methodological proposals that erode the essential nature of science in their enthusiasm to support specific theories. For if they do so, there will very likely be unintended consequences in other areas where the boundaries of science are in dispute. Let me state it more strongly: it is dangerous to weaken the grounds of scientific proof in order to include multiverses under the mantle of âtested scienceâ. It is a retrograde step towards the claim that we can establish the nature of the universe by pure thought without having to confirm our theories by observational or experimental tests. This abandons the key principle that has led to the extraordinary success of science. The claim that multiverses exist is a belief rather than an established scientific fact. It is a reasonable belief with strong explanatory nature, but a belief nonetheless. The appropriate statement we can make is not âmultiverses existâ or âmultiverses have been proved to existâ or even âmultiverses can be proved to existâ, but rather âmultiverses are a useful explanatory hypothesisâ. We should not state more. Martin Gardner (2003) puts it this way: âThere is not the slightest shred of reliable evidence that there is any universe other than the one we are in. No multiverse theory has so far provided a prediction that can be tested. As far as we can tell, universes are not as plentiful as even two blackberries.â
As a parent of a teenage daughter and as a teacher of adolescents, I try to stay in touch with their entertainment world. I listen to their music, go to some of the âteenâ movies, read adolescent novels, and watch television targeted to the teen audience. Two years ago, my daughter invited me to watch her favorite television program with her. Initially, I would simply enjoy sitting with her and sneaking in some conversation during the commercials. Since that time, I am surprised and a little embarrassed to discover that I frequently find myself sitting alone watching this program while my daughter busies herself with other activities. I'm hooked. That program is Buffy, The Vampire Slayer starring Sarah Michelle Gellar as Buffy Summers. The series, which premiered on March 10, 1997, is a spin-off from the 1992 movie of the same name. Although the movie was not a box-office hit, it developed a loyal following of viewers who kept video rentals and sales active. The scriptwriter for the movie version of Buffy, Joss Whedon, also serves as creative executiveâwriter, producer, and directorâfor the television series (Genge). Although the show airs on the upstart network, WB, and is targeted at adolescents, it has received a significant amount of attention in entertainment and mainstream media. Buffy has been described as âthe very best horror has to offerâ (Genge xv); with âpowerful] ludic elements [in] symbolism and languageâ (Wilcox 23); offering âtransgressive possibilities for reimagining gendered relations and modernist American ideologiesâ (Owen 25) in âbrainy, goodhearted, gloriously expressive TV poetryâ (Carson 37) with âdelightfully campy dialogueâ (Genge xiv) centering around a slight, blonde, ex-cheerleader who âkicks vampire butt.â The framing narrative is about a young woman who inherited special skills as a vampire-slayer, and each episode sees her face assorted demonic forces challenging her and threatening humanity. The first three seasons were set in Sunnydale High School; the present season has moved to the campus of the college in the same town. Buffy has an assortment of friends and foes who are regulars or semi-regulars in the series. Her âWatcherâ (or guardian) is Giles (played by Anthony Stewart Head) who has been charged with the duties of training and assisting the Slayer. Her best friend, Willow (played by Alyson Hannigan), displays exceptional computer skills and dabbles in witchcraft. Two other friends, Xander (Nicholas Brendon) and Oz (Seth Green), round out Buffy's inner circle who get entangled in demonic battles. Another character, Cordelia (Charisma Carpenter) has left the series to join Angel in a spin-off show. Cordelia plays a shallow, narcissistic young woman who epitomizes the homecoming queen popularity of traditionally mainstream adolescent experiences. The show has generated an active following. My daughter has bookmarked several web pages that serve as electronic equivalents of fan clubs. These pages include episode summaries, electronic bulletin boards, current news regarding future episodes, personal information about the stars and Joss Whedon, lyrics and artists of the music heard in the show, and links to other related sites. Several of the sites solicit and receive stories and songs written by viewers that stay true to the characters, plots, and themes of the show. Recently two sites ceased including transcripts and sound recordings from the shows after executives (and probably their legal affairs department) contacted them from 20th Century-Fox. Fans are being urged to write letters of protest. In addition to the web pages, there are several chat line sites where fans can engage in a conversation about the show. My daughter's email receives an average of eight to ten messages a week from the chat line to which she subscribes. In addition to the large adolescent following, clearly, something about this show has touched a chord in older viewers as well, witness the critical reviews cited above. The adult magazine George revealed Buffy as second in a list of â20 Most Fascinating Women in Politics.â To apply the term âpostmodernâ (or any other term) to contemporary society can be problematic. The complexity and vastness of our society defies simple one-word categorization. Postmodernism, as defined by M. H. Abrams extended the contratraditional movements in arts and literature of the modern age to the breaking point where modern works were deemed as conventional and âhigh artâ was devalued in favor of popular art forms. Some postmodernist works celebrated the â'meaninglessness' of existence and the underlying 'void,' or 'nothingness' on which any supposed security is conceived to be precariously suspendedâ (120). Susan Bordo proposes various origins of the âpostmodern age.â Some posit that the postmodern era developed as a reaction to the breakdown of the Enlightenment notions of humanism, rational thought, and beliefs in Truth and Objectivity. Some cite the failure of a cohesive hegemony of Western culture as the beginning of postmoderninity. Some discuss the âinformation explosionâ as evidence of the new era. And some, including Bordo, point to the runaway consumer capitalism of our present culture as the most visible proof of a postmodern society. The term âpostmodernismâ is used in discussions about literature and the arts in much the same way âpoststructuralismâ frames conversations about linguistics and literary theory. Poststructuralists discuss meaning, or meaninglessness, by exposing âthe naively representational theory of languageâ (Eagleton 124). Because we are all powerless over the universal influence of language, our agency or our free will is lessened; in a sense, we are de-centered within the circle of our experiences. These structures of language have presented society in terms of binary opposites, of opposing dualities. Poststructuralists reveal these oppositions within a text or any other cultural artifact and neutralize them by deconstructing the binary altogether. This process, outlined by Jacques Derrida, suggests that a deconstructive reader (or viewer) will look for evidence of grammatical or linguistic oppositionsârich/poor, strong/weak, right/left, man/womanâthat conform to culturally accepted hierarchical relationships which privilege the first term (or signifier) in the duality while subordinating the second. After exposing the opposition, the hierarchy is inverted by privileging the second term resulting in a new vision of the relationshipâpoor/rich, weak/strong, left/right, and woman/man. The final step argues for the futility and meaninglessness of structuring binary oppositions in general by exposing them as ideological and cultural contexts that limit and marginalize us. The writers of Buffy play with discourse of cultural patterns in a way that deconstructs many of the dualities of contemporary society. A recent episode (November 23, 1999) is set on Thanksgiving, a cultural tradition rife with ideology. Buffy wants to re-enact a traditional Thanksgiving celebration with her âfamily of friends.â (Like many adolescent narratives, parents figure little in the action (Donelson and Nilsen). Buffy's father lives in another city and has only been seen in a few episodes. Her mother, Joyce (played by Kristine Sutherland), was oblivious to Buffy's secret slayer identity until the last episode of the second season.) Willow voices the cynical postmodern summation of the hypocrisy of celebrating the genocide of an indigenous culture. Nevertheless, Buffy convinces Willow, Xander, and Anya (played by Emma Caulfield)âXander's demon girlfriend who grants spurned women retribution towards menâto come to a âreal Thanksgiving dinnerâ at Giles' home. When Giles asks why the dinner has to be at his house, Buffy replies, âYou're the patriarch; you have to toast the festivities or it's all meaningless.â Giles notes that it's more a matter of leaving him with the mess to which Buffy agrees. Later as the plot develops, avenging spirits of slaughtered native Americans begin to attack and kill. Willow is reluctant to help devise a plan to kill the spirits due to her nationalistic guilt. Into the mix enters another recurring character called Spike (played by James Marsters), although an enemy of Buffy's, he has come to her for help because he has been implanted (neutered) so that he can no longer âperformâ as a vampire. He speaks with a British accent and adds commentary to the discussion about the avenging spirits. He scoffs at the guilt feelings expressed by Willow and speaks with the imperialistic voice of the ânatural orderâ and âmight makes rightâ in Western colonialism. Within this single episode, Buffy has offered ironic commentary and parody of cultural icons such as nationalistic holidays, patriarchal customs, masculine libido, and colonial expansionism. For poststructuralist feminists, the duality of male/female becomes the most troublesome and its inversion and subsequent neutralization is the object of a collective activity. Feminists seek means to subvert the patriarchal nature of Western society. Feminists, like Luce Irigaray in âThe Power of Discourse and the Subordination of the Feminine,â re-write the psychoanalytic assumptions of Sigmund Freud and Jacques Lacan to demonstrate that gender roles are male/female from the of the out that the has been conceived as a with other sees the as and and This of gender from of the gender roles as the of cultural and linguistic are not with or masculine we to them in with the culture of argues that from the nature of these proposes a that these the parody of traditional gender roles by as seen in of women not becomes are no longer as and which a of being of to in that of can in Although much of her discussion of with the roles in Buffy a to traditional gendered roles within the more and much of mainstream culture. the gender we all have new for and These new be in like Buffy has and traditionally to The two recurring in the show, Giles and Xander, are Giles is and Xander is about his in to the and action of the Buffy's is as âthe most and of all the a the consumer of and These roles the of roles traditionally seen in action evidence of As a of the episode, Angel to Sunnydale because of a vision that Buffy was in he his to Giles not not to her although he is of some Buffy makes the final that in a episode on show, Buffy to to she his by a demon as he on the This is an of of the plot in episode in the first season with the the to the In this episode, a out other traditional gender roles to the point of the by and parents of adolescent of the of in voices this in a of three adolescent with am with the of of and is or that to in these stories and in the literature at young on to point out that although have that young women stories with there is a of such stories in and A of from the chat line on my daughter's Buffy the that young In the most used to Buffy's most is her to butt.â Buffy simply a tradition of or she a in young are in The first that are and has been written about the relationships in to of the of in the and each to their and are only the of a and Although there be many of in the or stories of many most Western have been and with on the in the action of the to the and of the and to contemporary many of the stories that adolescent literature of These stories to young because the of that the within the of the world. most of these stories with them more to young are to young that our young for or The High series, and adult written by writers like are to adolescent from to many about this in is that read stories where the in and due to a and it be stories that the in the in who a that the reader their and parents and for to them why have to find it for Another that in is the of to their of the High series. these within the the of each as by the As would their gender on their of the in the âThe with and and with and that the narrative of these for a where and are where from action and The to cultural is not to in a with that with of and in at about her with adolescent and the of a culture that to their their and their free will in to be and be and to a in the in 1992 that over about their feelings as and of would to be while of the were Although the of age who would have to be the who were to these more of in their on their television and in their would more in the and possibilities of being suggests that can as on a by first the of her and she attack her she a her The so much a a or as a being at the of the figure to such are or rational also in the is also an on of society would to also its or of of and of The a or to herself from so that the can be developed in Buffy A average teen who inherited the skills to and who to in a that is on of the for a of the many of demonic most of the of including Buffy's mother, of and for Buffy's vampire father and Buffy inherited special and skills that her from her the of the second Buffy Sunnydale an episode that is described as the in the patterns of action that is an or The that most of this or of this are a about the of the culture for the very little about the nature of the The of these patterns are to be culturally in the same way as the of their to This about a it's another of on the This about A that has a woman as would lives as we would that women are and is and I and and I'm of that women by them After that in which the is the of traditional literature and that is not simply the of her she is the of the for I would that Buffy the same for our young television This is by a of the electronic conversation of Buffy fans on chat I of my daughter's Buffy chat line to to related to Buffy's as a A was as a very for young I can many that to her to that have to me in show as as to and the of that can shows that you have to more My discussion of has on Buffy is of the an of to the and only visible of and come with and more for The and and the Although these to more a of the have offered young and stories with many in the a psychoanalytic in her and to the we to with is by the way that the of patriarchal society has Her revealed in the narrative to the action while the also the of at another as an figure and the of with the as This is in where the of as for the of the and the patriarchal of contemporary society. And she vision of threatening woman as to the of women is the of the as the evidence on which is the for the of to the and the of the The of with the Buffy a point of for in the action of the Buffy, as the the The as and plot for her Although Buffy, as as all the other in the show, is and about the at in the of woman as and as active is in each is a of in the is as and her is a for American her face and are by the she and the there can be little that Buffy's agency the narrative and the (Owen the term apply to Giles and Xander, it would be for And the most of Buffy in of is the of woman as Although of the or with and about the and writers of the show have a psychoanalytic to the show, the of Buffy with a some to such a with the narrative as Buffy's are the point to the The have a for is you an am me the and the and the makes it the I was in a woman who was and who not only have a with that were of to A is with her mother, Although Joyce and Buffy enjoy from the first and second of the American little is about the of in American culture. to the Joyce is of and in the series. Buffy's and are not from the of of are her as a The series plays at as it is it to be seen play can relations of this society over adolescent in all of from them in to that the average to that are way me a to my I it's that these are TV shows their parents or older to the is that it's so at with the that the of in for my Buffy episode would with her a In a television shows would of from the critical of an and and would be to in of their television in the of these most of all watch television to be first and A program with the best of critical will not the of it on that entertainment our will the of the and to something for which we can some Buffy as the best of the like with in an age where television to be more and more Buffy to about young As a television like any to the audience. television from the In other we to the narrative and Buffy to young (and some and the The and are because ironic commentary on the of the and the of cultural to adolescent while to the of mainstream The symbolism of the Buffy and by the average is not on its young it also them over the with The also a of linguistic that to for its to the language of Buffy's mother, with other with a demonic to the out and of witchcraft. The (played by who to on and a for or After from the Giles and Buffy about to to be Giles' of on in of the on the parents who are more in their to out witchcraft. Giles to Buffy's about a mother, (played by who of active demon and Willow from who be in the Buffy and her about the of Later she her with her Buffy sees her at The to the with Buffy and Willow to a and their about to the until Buffy Buffy's and Giles is by his duties as the to Buffy's as a Buffy's father to to Sunnydale for a traditional he show. The episode also the Angel and Buffy to in her Buffy's friends to try to help her find out her. Buffy about In a Buffy and he the first he her. Later a Buffy a demon in of her When the by reveal the to Buffy, her on the Giles his in the to Buffy, in the he his duties and is by the Buffy about the a has some are on the are The three for any Slayer are and my The to you you it As as the teacher she be a so To read makes popular is not a it's a are vampire that he was at the it would be like some and can get you by a can be it can also be a in that That set the of who little The will or the and a are for and not and like the you you to you way the of to an something and not to it âYou're an I be this like of a little a a to the The go on and on and on and have to the movie of same the not a so it an a of the two pages of teen that is to The web pages fans an to a more to the show. the episode summaries, their or about and information on the and creative and with other fans about the show fans of Buffy and other television a to the show and to each are about Buffy that many and some find The executives of the of the season episode over that the set in the was much of a of the The show has been for its in a general sense, as fan the following to this in her that with you all of Buffy The news has more the show have in it not the show is is that the can have Although not as as we this Buffy as a show about a young woman who the of with and by her of friends, and by the and of is not on the it can have such as another Slayer a This character the of other and Buffy's retribution for her Another of the show is that Sunnydale to be Although these some it would be to a more culturally in a town. as we have and come in also come in cultural and all and by and to from in Western from no as Luce Irigaray suggests from with as by cultural a herself in our cultural she be to of all In a television show premiered that as to its influence in the cultural of I was years The on same age as my as the first popular and television series to the influence of years ago, some cited as a new representational for the in the same way that some for some cited of the show in the same way that we in of women as to traditional roles of and Buffy of young women as to traditional roles of in the of active young were by the of her âfamily of and friends.â Buffy is by her âfamily of as we have little in the of these are of their inner include of In of its I was by the possibilities of in I that many young women be by the and possibilities of Buffy Summers. years have these two television we will be this same conversation years will we have to this to find adolescent and adult we a point where we the and possibilities of to culture or a of in popular discussion of such as and can that many of the on television are for commercials. 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B. Balamurugan, T. Poongodi, M. R. Manu, S. Karthikeyan ¡ 5 authors
The moving image archive of the US Agency for International Development (USAID) includes a copy of the film The Double Day (1975), cataloged in the series Moving Images Relating to International Development Programs and Activities, 1979â1991, a collection of more than eight hundred titles âcreated to provide information on assistance programs supported by the Agency for International Development (AID).â1 Yet, The Double Day does not, in fact, directly depict or engage with any specific development or aid initiative. Instead, the filmâdirected by US-based Brazilian filmmaker Helena Solberg as part of the International Womenâs Film Project collective and described as âthe first Latin American feminist documentaryââexamines the gendered dynamics of paid and unpaid labor through the testimonies of women from Argentina, Bolivia, Venezuela, and Mexico.2 Its presence in the USAID archive is likely a consequence of its funding history, having received support from the Inter-American Foundation, a USAID-affiliated entity; the development agencies of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden; the United Nations Development Program; and US philanthropist Calvin Cafritz.3These transnational funding structures not only enabled the filmâs production but also determined its archival destination, which renders legible its place within the history of international development.4 The Double Dayâs institutional trajectory reflects the shifting configurations of aid, gender, and media during a historic moment when women were being repositioned at the center of what Arturo Escobar has described as developmentâs âregimes of visuality.â5 Especially relevant to The Double Dayâs production and exhibition was the international institutional framework of Women in Development (WID). Emerging in the early 1970s and culminating in United Nationsâ proclamation of 1975 as International Womenâs Year, WID emphasized womenâs participation in the global economy as both an index and mechanism of development. Indeed, The Double Day premiered at the World Conference of the International Womenâs Year, held in Mexico City.6 Within this context, the film forms part of a broader trajectory of media use by international organizations that intensified during the 1970sâas best exemplified by Media Habitat, a collection of 236 documentary films commissioned by the United Nations to represent urban and rural development initiatives for the 1976 Habitat Conference on Human Settlements in Vancouver. As a policy-shaping initiative, Media Habitat primarily featured films from the Global South intended not only to illustrate but also to help codify standardized audiovisual markers of âunderdevelopmentâ that determined access to the emerging global economic order and to international aid.7Framed in relation to these international institutions and their operations, The Double Day could similarly be considered âdevelopment mediaââexemplifying the type of nonfiction media produced and distributed outside of the commercial film circuits whose aspects and subcategories have been variously described in scholarship as nontheatrical, useful, sponsored, institutional, industrial, educational, or nonprofessional/amateur.8 Scholars working in this area have emphasized the institutional contexts of such mediaâs production and exhibition infrastructures as shaping its instrumentalized effects. From a feminist perspective, such an approach is crucial to grappling with the broader question of how âgender impacts [these worksâ] shape, content, and trajectories.â9 Yet we also argue that, taken in isolation, the institutional and infrastructural contexts are insufficient to account for the complex relationship between media and development, potentially not only limiting our understanding of the reach and impact of development but also distorting our interpretive conclusions. For example, to categorize The Double Day as âdevelopment mediaâ is to overlook the filmâs place within Solbergâs directorial oeuvre, as well as within the histories of both transnational womenâs filmmaking and radical Latin American documentary cinema to which it simultaneously belongs. Such exclusive framing is especially limiting given that women globally were disproportionately engaged in nonfiction production throughout the twentieth centuryâsometimes by political choice but more often due to structural exclusions from fiction filmmaking. Even in nonfiction historiography, however, institutional media has remained particularly marginal, reinforcing hierarchies that separate such works from the aesthetic and authorial frameworks through which film history has been constructed.10 This marginalization not only tends to erase womenâs contributions but also presumes a âweakâ or derivative authorship, rendering these films unworthy of the interpretive attention needed to apprehend their aesthetic and political complexity.11 The same dynamic is likely to structure assumptions about âdevelopment mediaâ as well.Categorizing The Double Day exclusively within this category would further prompt us to assume top-down institutional analyses that have been characteristic of both institutional media methodologies and the scholarship on development at large. This, in turn, would risk obscuring this filmâs radical Marxist approach to womenâs labor as well as its concrete contribution to activism and its attendant grassroot structures. In Mexico City, The Double Day became a catalyst for feminist solidarity in practice when one of the filmâs protagonists, Bolivian activist and trade unionist Domitila Barrios de Chungara, was invited to participate in the Tribune of Non-Governmental Organizations held alongside the official UN conference.12 There, Barrios de Chungara challenged Western feminist priorities by reframing the debate around labor, class, and imperialism, helping to articulate a shared Third World feminist agenda that significantly departed from the developmentalist vision of the United Nations and USAID.13 Seen through the lens of activist media, The Double Day helped forge transnational solidarity networks by enabling information exchange across the diverse voices that shaped its makingâfrom the women featured in the film to the activists who circulated itârevealing a considerably more dynamic interplay between institutional and grassroots or contingent media practices.Moreover, the filmâs Latin American contextâreflected in Solbergâs formation in Brazil as the only woman in Cinema Novo, its focus on women from across the region, and its premiere and key reception in Mexico Cityârequires grappling with the regional specificities of the very notion of development in its multiple iterations.14 Far from being an epistemological and political framework imposed solely by the Global North, both the practices of development and the theoretical foundations of developmentalism (understood as a broad and polysemic set of discourses) were shaped through the active participation of Latin American economists.15 Within this iteration, underdevelopment, as a constitutive notion of developmentalism, became central to a distinctly critical strand, which by the late 1960s became known as the dependency theory.16 This same approach is reflected in some of the best-known Latin American radical film manifestos of the time, arising precisely from the same milieus to which Solberg belonged.17These various considerations of the filmâs history illustrate the methodological challenges confronting feminist scholars seeking to assess the impact of development on media projects, theories, and practices. To disregard the developmentalist context of such works by emphasizing their political aesthetics and affects risks reproducing a romanticized narrative of heroic resistance (albeit from a feminist perspective). Yet to engage exclusively with their institutional and material infrastructures risks naturalizing developmentalismâs political and epistemological foundations at the expense of the goals and beliefs of the many women who participated in these projects. The contradictions and ambivalences that animate such histories call for feminist frameworks capable of holding both institutional complicity and radical possibility in view.This challenge resonates with ongoing debates about the politics of the archive and what Allyson Field has termed âthe practice of informed speculation.â18 As she reminds us, feminist, queer, and decolonial methodologies have long taught us to âpress at the limitsâ of the archive to âinoculate our scholarship against our evidenceâs afflictions.â19 The concern that the evidence we draw on in our analysis reproduces the very structures and blind spots of the dominant ideology and therefore shapes and delimits our interpretation becomes particularly urgent when engaging the developmentalist media corpus. Informed speculation offers an alternative by inviting the experimental, creative, and speculative rewriting of history, mobilizing the archive âin a project that runs counter to the original purpose, or the imperative to preserve, or the conditions that led to erasure.â20 Yet, as Field cautions, such speculative gestures must remain grounded in a deep and âintimate familiarity with the archiveâ that we are working with and against. Building on this imperative, we suggest that the developmentalist archive, in particular, demands expansion and critical reconsideration in ways that unsettle the very disciplinary frameworks through which it has been studied as well as the larger institutional contexts for such knowledge production.Our focus on The Double Day in the opening of this introduction thus foregrounds the entanglements of institutional and grassroots forces, local and international contexts, structural and interpersonal relations, and creative and economic factors that have shaped not only this film but the broader ecosystem of development media projectsâand their preservationâover time. Addressing such a constellation involves transgressing methodologically entrenched divisions between political economy and aesthetics, between material infrastructures and affective regimes; reckoning with divergent periodizations across film history and world economics; and situating these within the local specificities of womenâs movements and international institutional programs. It also demands attentiveness to the coexistence of multiple, and sometimes competing, understandings of developmentâeach historically, geographically, and ideologically situated.We imagine this special issue as an opening toward a critical dialogue, not only about how such an approach might be enacted in practice but also about the far-reaching ways development paradigms have shaped both our objects of study and the contours of the field itself. The decision to center institutionally sponsored films across all the essays in this issue is deliberate and enables us to highlight institutional critique as a vital methodological imperative within our analytical framework. Created within the frameworks of international organizations, state agencies, or NGOs, these filmsâ histories make legible the institutional logics that underwrite their production. Yet our critique does not stop at these specific entities. Rather, we argue for a broader interrogation of the political conditions and institutional infrastructures that shape media and knowledge production more generally. This includes contemporary corporations embedded in the digital platform economy, from streaming services to the rapid expansion of AI. Equally critical is a reflexive examination of academia itself, where departments of economics, political science, and centers for development have played a formative role in producing and legitimizing developmentalist theories and policy frameworks. While the humanities and arts have at times offered critical alternatives, they have also frequently mirrored and reinforced many of the same developmentalist assumptions. A feminist analysis of the nexus between development and media must therefore unsettle not only dominant archives but also the institutional and disciplinary foundations of our own scholarly practices.As scholars, we share the complex position of navigating the same tensions between institutional complicity and emancipatory aspiration as many of the media-makers whose work we study. Mirroring our subjects is also the transnational, collective mode of this special issueâs own production as it emerges from an ongoing informal working group we have sustained over several years. While relying on institutional and disciplinary affordancesâsuch as university funding for conferences or access to academic publishing platformsâwe have been working toward creating a community that exceeds, and often resists, the prevailing logics of our academic institutions. Our aim has been to create a space for shared inquiry and mutual support that pushes back against disciplinary siloing and technocratic neoliberal assessment modes of both labor and knowledge productionâand this certainly extends to our experience collaborating with the journal editors throughout the publication process. Our goal has been to examine both the persistence and variability of developmentalism, understood as what Gustavo Esteva calls a âpowerful but fragile semantic constellation,â as a conceptual formation that has historically inspired, legitimized, and mobilized media projects across Asia, Africa, and Latin America.21 And gendered biopolitics, from population control to gender mainstreaming, have remained integral to development policies and media practices, recurring across formats from institutional newsreels to film festivals.We share the conviction that, far beyond the history of nonfiction institutional media, development (as both a broad ideological project and a network of material and institutional practices) and developmentalism (as a set of discourses and theoretical models associated with development) have exerted a far-reaching influence on film and media cultures at large. As such, they must be treated as a major force in shaping global film and media systems and also the many ongoing assumptions behind their critical discourses. The discipline of communication studies was founded on modernization theory governed by Cold War goals of dissemination of Western liberal democracy around the world, while âan area studies framework allowed compartmentalizing Western and non-Western outcomes of technologies that were always claimed to be universal.â22 Despite critique from postcolonial and critical race studies, many of these frameworks have remained foundational for media theory.23 In historical scholarship, as we increasingly move beyond âmodernityâ as a dominant conceptual anchor, engaging with practices and discourses of development opens more precise analytical pathways. These film and mediaâs entanglements with the logics of and economic and the associated with as well as their conceptual underdevelopment, and impact in as diverse as and of media aesthetic and paradigms in film and film and funding are developmentalist assumptions to the they to underwrite the narrative and logics of and global media from the structure of the film to the cultures of argue that a examination of the historical entanglements between film and developmentalist aesthetics, modes of as well as infrastructures and critical the and that our contemporary media is a of the historical contours of development as a field of inquiry embedded within a of some of the methodologies by the featured in this special a of this complex history, to the larger at in media, development, and gender all its development a it as an of be with practices as divergent as and in In as we work on this the of the of the USAID the ideological that have the history of international the and of this on the global its a from development as a global practice and as an institutional and which over the has as a with its own media Yet or does not erase the historical impact of these the contradictions they have reflected and over the as the of development several crucial to the economic theories of development initiatives to and through the of the development an international policy framework at from the Global to the of the Global the by the political role of and the of the International the on was challenged by dependency theory and at development as global structural the neoliberal of the the Programs by the and World imposed and as conditions for and forms of assistance became known as the major markers for international development development has moving beyond economic to such as the Human Development and the Development and from international organizations such as the United Nations to a broader network of These frameworks increasingly of and liberal of and with what in many ways to various while the of the to developmentâs epistemological more scholarship has toward a of its and material the field has to a of and critical by and scholars, which development as a dynamic of conceptual and political to these the studies in this special issue call for sustained analysis in place of In we draw from a of and that in of of gender and to this special issue engage that and from Mexico to contemporary specific local historical of global distinctly feminist methodologies as well as attention to studies that this issue a in the global history of development on and documentary work in Mexico how early women infrastructures as of while US films an early of state and transnational on a outside the Global as the of developmentalist both the and markers of development media, its to the and Latin central grounded in archival also womenâs in transnational and the methodological of archives on study of the series to a a digital media not by but by women not as but as subjects and within circuits of neoliberal and the aesthetics and of how developmentâs has models of to contemporary neoliberal paradigms of and analysis how digital and gender and practices, discourses on and their of these essays the of some of the historical of developmentalist as the question of the role of the state within such on a notion of economic as a and the dominant of development that the state as the for and through infrastructural projects. This understanding of development was shared across both of the as well as in the Third The United and the increasingly mobilized international in the of the modes of international at the postcolonial of policy and ideological These programs were at the expansion of their and of while with the and decolonial of The conceptual between modernization and development that the Cold in of and hierarchies of that long and As an of postcolonial their role as of international aid concern about the of Western development projects. In alternative across the Global South that to structural between and through policies of and In many they were further the global structures. In Latin for example, this approach was through organizations such as the United Nations for Latin and the both developmentalist projects and their have taken many forms historically, and they have and they have been to a of projects, and postcolonial and development has been and in ways and with frequently political While many of these alternative frameworks the embedded in dominant Western they often technocratic and assumptions. gender and gender as for the of to be shaped by This becomes particularly in the media that of development where women frequently a crucial associated with and women were as both the subjects and of their participation in the and labor often as the index of In this study of from the 1970s how women were as of this as these about womenâs urban and recurring and of a within the own of and critique that official examination of archives and enables a feminist interrogation of their mobilizing a of the in the of contribution to this issue similarly the of a dynamic within as well as across ideological the of womenâs and the media of the and as active in labor and as integral to the technocratic women became of as their labor remained a of and analysis and archival with attention to the specific of and It also transnational that as a and affective a nexus of and practices through which gender, media, and developmentalism one film not as a but as part of the of alongside and work a broader concern of this special media as a of developmentalist projects. The debates the World and which international such as the United Nations and a critical historical for such primarily by postcolonial and of the for the of media and communication infrastructures in as to counter Western The a between and economic how systems of media and reinforced global hierarchies of and in an agenda that supported and alternative media infrastructures across postcolonial contexts, the framework gender as an analytical This âgender in the 1970s by of the Women in Development in relation to The Double its political critique of with its broader to center women in development policy through and This was also in of media, which was shaped by its international reach and audiovisual production and and and Yet, as WID institutional it also to the and of the womenâs development programs often by in These were by a of studies, and on and the to of womenâs presence and through the of their economic and In this on the filmmaker this history directly by the and of for women by the WID framework during the with and agencies the of and against Women in at the of the neoliberal turn, when institutional media often the only to access and support to projects. The an by this dynamic as of the from the Global South are to engage with the developmentalist assumptions funding models that their similarly the as a in developmentalist media history by the of and centers on the Film a between of and the attention toward the and labor by and work was foundational the of and the of audiovisual aid, as both a of development projects and a critical for their the in this issue argue for a with media, gender, and developmentalism as an field of that is and shaped by feminist and methodologies and that challenge the entanglements between academic knowledge production and and technocratic development And while methodological these dynamics at the structural the of feminist in media and cinema by this the very a