Arya Ganendra, Neva Dian Permana, Muhammad Faiz, H. B. J. Clifford
Decentralized Finance (DeFi) proposes a paradigm shift towards a democratized financial ecosystem governed by its users. This vision of decentralization is predicated on the distribution of governance tokens. However, the verity of this claim lacks rigorous empirical validation, raising concerns about a potential "decentralization illusion." This study quantitatively investigates the concentration of governance power within leading DeFi protocols to empirically test this narrative. We employed a multi-faceted quantitative triangulation framework using on-chain data from three archetypal DeFi protocols, selected to represent the core sectors of the ecosystem: a lending market (ProtoLend), a decentralized exchange (ProtoSwap), and a yield aggregator (ProtoYield). Our methodology integrates: (1) Empirical Network Analysis based on on-chain voting power delegation to map the topology of influence; (2) Economic Inequality Metrics, including the Gini Coefficient and Lorenz Curve Analysis, to quantify the distribution of governance tokens; and (3) Systemic Risk Assessment via the Nakamoto Coefficient to determine the minimum number of colluding actors required for a 51% governance attack. The empirical network analysis revealed a distinct core-periphery topology across all protocols, indicative of highly centralized influence structures. This was substantiated by extreme economic inequality, with Gini coefficients of 0.91 for ProtoLend, 0.95 for ProtoSwap, and 0.89 for ProtoYield. Lorenz curves visually confirmed that a minuscule fraction of holders controls the vast majority of voting power. The Nakamoto coefficients were critically low, calculated at 8 for ProtoLend, 5 for ProtoSwap, and 11 for ProtoYield, exposing profound vulnerabilities to collusion and capture. In conclusion, our findings provide robust, triangulated evidence of a pervasive "decentralization illusion" within DeFi. Governance power is not distributed but is instead highly concentrated, replicating the plutocratic power dynamics of traditional finance. This concentration poses significant systemic risks and fundamentally challenges the core value proposition of the DeFi ecosystem.
This research note calls for an alternative approach to understanding âinnovativeness,â particularly in arenas like Decentralized Finance (DeFi) where participant perceptions clash with mainstream evaluations, often leading to their dismissal. When conventional metrics fail to capture the perceived value and groundbreaking nature asserted from within these communities, there is a pressing need to explore their distinct âcosmologiesâ or internal logics. This paper argues for the importance of investigating these alternative meaning systems â how value and innovation are defined and experienced by participants â rather than solely relying on external measures. It posits that a deeper engagement with the ânative point of viewâ in such ârejected arenasâ can yield crucial insights, not only for understanding these specific phenomena but also for challenging and enriching our broader conceptions of innovation. This note serves as a call to researchers to undertake such explorations.
Abstract Spainâs system of governance is characterized by a complex web of vertical and horizontal intergovernmental relationships, reflecting its unique historical evolution from centralized authoritarianism to decentralized democracy. The continuous evolution of this framework aims to balance regional autonomy with national and European unity, ensuring effective governance in a diverse political landscape. Horizontal coordination refers to the cooperation between different levels of government, sectors, and organizations to achieve coherent policy outcomes. This approach is crucial in managing the complex administrative structure, which includes autonomous communities with significant powers. Effective horizontal coordination ensures consistent policy implementation, reduces redundancy, and promotes innovation through shared resources and knowledge. Experience with horizontal coordination highlights the importance of clear communication channels, joint decision-making processes, and the integration of different perspectives. However, regional disparities and political tensions can hamper these efforts, requiring continuous dialogue and adaptability of coordination mechanisms.
Dion Bongaerts, Thomas Lambert, Daniel Liebau, Peter Roosenboom
We investigate the drivers of vote delegation in Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs), using the Uniswap governance DAO as a laboratory. We show that parties with fewer self-owned votes and those affiliated with the controlling venture capital firm, Andreesen Horowitz (a16z), receive more vote delegations. These patterns suggest that while the Uniswap ecosystem values decentralization, a16z may engage in window-dressing around it. Moreover, we find that an active and successful track record in submitting improvement proposals, especially in the final stage, leads to more vote delegations, indicating that delegation in DAOs is at least partly reputation- or merit-based. Combined, our findings provide new insights into how governance and decentralization operate in DeFi.
Socialist Yugoslavia was a one-party state that extensively cultivated citizen and worker participation in decision-making at their place of residence and their place of work. From the early 1970s, Yugoslav authorities made radical steps toward the decentralization of power through the transfer of jurisdiction from the federal level to the republics and from the republics to municipalities. The Yugoslav doctrine of self-managing socialism also entailed the âsocializationâ of the state through the transfer of functions from state institutions to self-managed communities and organizations, which mostly occurred at the level of municipalities. This chapter gives an overview of how Yugoslav self-management was designed at the municipal level; it is an examination of the institutional setup of local communities, an institution that aimed to promote direct citizen engagement in decision-making at the local level. Through a meticulous analysis of official thinking on self-management at the municipal level, this chapter outlines how municipal governance was conceptualized and implemented through the enactment of the 1974 Constitution. By drawing on a combination of primary sources, secondary literature and expert interviews, the chapter also gives an overview of how local communities operated in late socialism. Special attention is given to the role of sociopolitical organizations in the work of local communities and the extent to which they acted as catalysts or impediments to the articulation and fulfillment of the needs and interests expressed by citizens in local communities. Finally, the interactions between local communities, municipalities and city authorities are examined through a case study focusing on the introduction of the voluntary contribution financing mechanism in Belgrade in the 1980s. This case study gives valuable insight into the extent to which local communities allowed citizens to shape decision-making at the level of the city and raises further questions regarding the extent to which the Yugoslav self-managing system met the proclaimed goals of direct socialist democracy.
Ăngel SazâCarranza, Martino Maggetti, Kutsal Yesilkagit, David Coen
Abstract Several recent studies have pointed to the increasing relevance of relatively informal, non-treaty-based global governance bodies (GGBs). Yet, a systematic fine-grained assessment of these bodies and their implications for global governance are still pending. To what extent, do non-treaty-based GGBs constitute a truly novel type of governance body, distinct from traditional treaty-based international organizations (IOs)? How do the distinctive features of GGBs affect their role in global governance? To what extent are GGBâs patterns of emergence and development specific to policy sectors? This article tackles these questions, drawing on an original dataset on GGBs in five distinct policy areas (banking and finance, energy, global health, Internet, and migration policy). We combine a micro-organizational perspective with a meso-level network approach to unpack the main features of non-treaty-based GGBs vis-Ă -vis, traditional IOs. Our results provide support to the general expectation that non-treaty-based GGBs offer distinctive opportunities for global governance with respect to traditional IOs. However, importantly, this relationship is not dichotomous. We find that GGBs exist on a continuum of fit-to-purpose designs ranging from hard, formal, and intergovernmental models to a soft, informal, and multistakeholder-based form of governance. Lastly, we also find notable variations across policy areas, where global health stands out given its decentralized network structure.
NiccolĂČ Bertuzzi, Federica Cittadino, Giada Giacomini, Alice Meier
Climate change represents a global problem and a challenge with manifold responses, which requires coordinated action at different levels. In this context, subnational governments play a significant â yet still understudied â role in the fight against climate change; they exercise powers in policy sectors that may have an impact on climate mitigation and adaptation objectives, such as transport, energy and water, and spatial planning. The research project âClimate change integration in the multilevel governance of Italy and Austriaâ (Research SĂŒdtirol/Alto Adige 2019) compares the Italian and Austrian legal systems with a particular focus on how climate change policy integration (CPI) is realized in the Autonomous Province of Bolzano and Trento in Italy and LĂ€nder Tyrol and Vorarlberg in Austria. The project hypothesizes that five factors play a particularly significant role in realizing CPI, namely coordination, participation, information, leadership and funding. In this contribution, we will focus on the dimension of coordination. Also in light of the different decentralization arrangements in Italy and Austria, coordination in the study areas analysed unfolds differently concerning both the type and the employed instruments of coordination, although certain common tendencies can also be observed. Drawing from the results of the empirical research (interviews) conducted in the study areas, this article argues that coordination is affected by the federal vs regional organization of the State only when it comes to vertical coordination. Furthermore, since climate change in not a unitary policy field, improving horizontal coordination among policy fields seems to be more crucial than improving vertical coordination.
2021 marked the official start of a post-Brexit era for the European Union (EU) since the United Kingdom (UK) had only fully withdrawn when the transition period lapsed on 31 December 2020. The transition period prevented the EU and the UK from falling off a cliff before a mutual Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) was to be ratified and implemented into UK law by Parliament before 1 January 2021. This cumbersome process marked the pinnacle of a three-decades long period of European integration which saw the political architecture of the EU gradually shift from a system characterized by integration to one that is more succinctly marked by differentiation. Using Brexit and the Covid-19 pandemic as cases in point, we argue that differentiation has become the system property of the EU's institutional polyarchic architecture. While differentiation has sometimes been conceived as being mostly temporary in nature, we may think of a differentiation of the EU's political order as a permanent and systemic property. Differentiation is both an empirical and a theoretical phenomenon. Empirically, it has been on the rise ever since the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. As Euroscepticism progressively became more mainstream, disintegrative tendencies feature more prominently in Europe's political order (BĂĄtora and Fossum, 2020; GĂ€nzle et al., 2020). Membership withdrawals or centrifugal moves away from the EU, such as Brexit or Switzerland calling off negotiations on a partnership agreement in 2021, have therefore been coined conceptually as differentiated disintegration (Schimmelfennig, 2018). Similarly, reverse processes of âde-differentiationâ, such as the Danish people's decision in May 2022 to revert the former opt-out in EU defence (Politico, 2022), have occurred, too. Prior to the landmark process of Brexit, European integration generally followed the âever closer unionâ model â as famously stated in the preamble to the Treaty of Rome of 1957. Even so, European integration was never truly uniform but shaped by mechanisms of differentiated integration (Leuffen et al., 2022). In addition to policy-centred vertical differentiation (that is, the variation in the level of centralization across policies), such as most prominently in Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the EU has encountered various forms of horizontal differentiation. This includes an internal dimension with EU countries opting out from certain policies both de jure and de facto (Hofelich, 2022), as exemplified by Denmark and Sweden's non-adoption of the common currency as well as an external dimension with non-EU countries, such as Norway and Switzerland, opting into selected policies (Leuffen et al., 2022). Today, the EU can therefore be considered as an institutionally polyarchic architecture of concentric circles with a core of club members surrounded by countries that have managed to negotiate opt-outs from specific policy areas; countries willing to join; and various neighbourhood agreements involving both European and non-European countries (for example, Gstöhl and Lannon, 2018). Studies of European differentiation have underlined that it is paramount to conceive of differentiation as a comprehensive phenomenon that is not tied to specific directions of either integration or disintegration (GĂ€nzle et al., 2020; Leruth et al., 2022; Olsen, 2007). Yet, while differentiation was initially considered as a temporary phenomenon (through the concept of âmulti-speed Europeâ), we nowadays witness the emergence of permanent forms of differentiated political order(s) within the EU, for instance through the form of opt-outs from the Eurozone. This study suggests that forms of macro-level differentiated political order in the EU may lead to transformations at the meso-level, which in turn may affect the institutional robustness of the EU. Ultimately, differentiation may serve as a vehicle for the long-term sustainability and institutional robustness of the EU. This argument is supported by studies showing that the survival of international organizations (IOs) is associated with the size of their executive capacity (Debre and Dijkstra, 2020). This also suggests how institutional features of IOs may assume a paramount role of robust global governance. It is also necessary to emphasize the attractiveness of studying the robustness of a differentiated European political system in turbulent times (Ansell et al., 2017). Clearly, the robustness of institutions may be taken for granted during periods of stability (Olsen, 2007). During periods of turbulence or crisis, however, established institutions may become subject to contestation, requests for reform, and objects of scholarly studies. Rather than leading to fragmentation and dissolution of institutions, we maintain that manifestations of differentiation foster resilience of the political order of the EU. After a concise conceptualization of differentiation, we examine how the EU has dealt with both internal and external differentiation at the meso-level using Brexit and Covid-19 as cases in point. Second, in our view, differentiation is and will continue to be prominent in the years to come, hence we sketch out an institutionalist research agenda which suggests how macro-level differentiation â for example, with respect to polity-level differentiation â may lead to meso-level institutional responses. Finally, we close by discussing implications for the post-Brexit and post-pandemic future of differentiation. As a strategy of integration, the roots of differentiation can be traced back to a report produced under the direction of Leo Tindemans (1975), which laid the conceptual foundations of a âmulti-speed Europeâ (Stubb, 1996). Yet, scholarly debates on differentiated integration only started in the early 1990s â against the backdrop of the legally enshrined British and Danish opt-outs in terms of currency union and defence for example. With subsequent discussions on further constitutionalizing forms of differentiated integration, the enhanced cooperation mechanism was introduced in the Treaty of Amsterdam. Considering these developments, Stubb (1996, p. 283) defined differentiated integration as âthe general mode of integration strategies which try to reconcile heterogeneity within the European Unionâ in terms of time, space, and matter. From a theoretical perspective, other scholars also focused on the scope and limits of differentiated integration in the EU (for example, de Neve, 2007; Holzinger and Schimmelfennig, 2012; Leruth and Lord, 2015; Schimmelfennig et al., 2015; Sitter and Andersen, 2006). The financial and economic turmoil of 2007â2008, subsequently followed by socio-economic and political unrests of many kinds, brought the EU into a new multi-faceted poly-crisis (Riddervold et al., 2021). The future of European integration became increasingly questioned, as domestic Eurosceptic actors pushed for reducing the scope of core EU powers, opt-outs or even withdrawing from the Union as a whole. Brexit eventually opened a new chapter in the study of differentiation (Leruth et al., 2019). Some of the recent literature on crisis, disintegration and differentiation in Europe also combines explanations based on collective actors' costâbenefit calculations â such as the promotion of equality of opportunity among EU members (Jones, 2018) and institutionalist explanations focusing on how crises are channeled through and mediated by pre-existing institutional frameworks and resources (for example, BĂĄtora and Fossum, 2020). Brexit thus largely reinvigorated differentiation as a central focus of research in EU studies. In contrast to previous iterations of differentiation â which were exclusively used to qualify forms and grades of integration â the term has now come to be applied in instances of both integration and disintegration. Both growth and reduction of the level, scope and membership of IOs remain unequal and therefore differentiated. Differentiation applies to the institutional, policy and territorial dimensions of such processes. With regards to the institutional dimension, differentiation is relevant for grasping the settlement of both emergent organizations and organized systems. Institutions and organized systems are temporary sets of rules and procedures, demography, locations, beliefs and norms. Different approaches to differentiation are particularly helpful in conceptualizing the settlement of emergent political orders such as the EU that involve multiple tiers of authoritative decision-making. The EU has been depicted in a two-pronged way both as âa conceptual battleground and an institutional building siteâ (Olsen, 2010, p. 81) with a varied mix of organizational forms, governance patterns and ideas about legitimate forms and speeds of integration. Institutional differentiation was eventually understood as ânew institutional spheres [that] have split off from older ones and developed their own identitiesâ (Olsen, 2010, p. 142). From an institutional theory perspective, differentiation ultimately ensures a form of interdependence that ties institutional spheres together. In such a highly dynamic process of institutionalization, de-institutionalization and re-institutionalization, European integration is constantly being reconfigured. Varieties of organizational structures and institutional norms in the EU contribute to institutional change within EU member states. It has been observed that both intergovernmental, supranational as well as non-majoritarian institutions tend to encourage patterns of institutional differentiation. Egeberg and Trondal (2017) demonstrate that EU agencies have become vehicles for integrating regulatory bodies also from non-EU member states. In addition, they document an acceleration in the creation of new decentralized agencies over time not only in terms of numbers but also in terms of powers and quality. The âagencificationâ of both EU (non)member-states and the EU administrations serve as an institutional infrastructure for differentiated administrative integration (Trondal, 2014) through a differentiated inclusion of administrative bodies from member and non-member states in EU governance. Central agencies in Switzerland, EEA/EFTA countries, candidate and neighbouring countries are offered access to EU decentralized agencies' management boards, leading the latter to become privileged fora for external differentiated integration (Lavenex, 2022). During the Covid-19 pandemic, EEA countries coordinated their response strategies with the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC). Since agency officials generally enjoy a considerable degree of independence from their states' central administration, and that their involvement in EU networks is thus relatively insulated from political intervention form their governments, they are highly sensitive to governance processes at different levels of government (Egeberg and Trondal, 2009). The result is a differentiated and semi-autonomous polycentric patchwork of memberships and associations in EU administrative networks. In March 2020, the global Covid-19 pandemic eventually hit Europe; it affected most policy domains of the EU and substantially put solidarity amongst member states to a test. Although the EU has only limited competence on public health, which remains largely under the control of member states (European Court of Auditors, 2021), the EU was criticized for its lack of coordination, for not acting immediately concerning medical equipment for Italy and not reintroducing internal borders (Wolff and Ladi, 2020). The EU's immediate health policy responses mostly rested on the use of pre-existing resources and institutions: the ECDC, the health emergencies system, the Joint Procurement Program (JPP) and the RescEU civil protection mechanism. The initial EU response to the crisis was differentiated partly because the ECDC was dwarfed by the many national agencies it was supposed to coordinate, the lack of an independent budget line, and its sole support by an administrative agency with no independent legal basis (Consumers, Health, Agriculture and Food Executive Agency, CHAFEA). As a result, member states responded quite differently to the crisis, largely reflecting different government systems, governance traditions, policy styles, attention structures and pre-existing crisis routines within each country (Askim and Bergström, 2021; Zahariadis et al., 2021). On the issue of fiscal support to struggling EU member states, an existing political division lingering from the Eurozone crisis between so-called âfrugalâ Northern countries and the Southern member states reemerged, yet with one crucial difference: Germany appeared to have changed its stance on the matter (Schulz and Henökl, 2020). This resulted in the approval of the unprecedented âŹ750 billion NextGeneration EU recovery plan. With a view to violations of the rule of law in Poland and Hungary, the recovery plan included access clauses tied to the fundamental principles of the EU via the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation, which acted as preventative mechanisms against further democratic backsliding in both countries, thereby implying that differentiation cannot be applied when it comes to these core values. Legal challenges were unsuccessfully launched by the governments of both countries, yet there were still major concerns over the inaction of European institutions to tackle democratic backsliding in Poland and Hungary. However, the Commission's decision to endorse Poland's recovery and resilience plan in June 2022 was met with strong skepticism, given the government's refusal to loosen control over the judicial system (The Guardian, 2022). Existing patterns of territorial differentiation led to institutional differentiation among national health agencies. Health agencies in Norway and Sweden, for example, activated different strategies first to combat the virus nationally and second in their adoption of advice and services from the ECDC. Contrary to the general observation of tight agency networks among the Nordic countries (Schrama et al., 2020; Stie and Trondal, 2020), the Norwegian and the Swedish health agencies adopted opposite strategies in both regards, for example regarding the implementation of lockdowns and with regards to their referral to the ECDC. Reflecting different domestic institutional designs and past choices, the Norwegian and Swedish governments differed in how they framed and managed the crisis â as a healthcare crisis (in Norway) and a public health crisis (in Sweden; Askim and Bergström, 2021). This observation moreover reflected general patterns of EU differentiation, in which administrative differentiation of the EU contributed to provide institutional architectures for meso-level differentiation (Leruth et al., 2022). One effect was that a non-EU member state (Norway) coordinated Covid-19 responses vis-Ă -vis the EU more extensively than an EU member state (Sweden). Subsequent internal differentiation occurred once vaccines were deemed safe by peer-reviewed studies: as the EU and the European Medicines Agency were criticized for initially slow-paced decisions to approve vaccines and organizing an effective rollout program, some countries such as Hungary and Slovakia relied on non-European Medicines Agency-approved vaccines such as the Russian Sputnik V (Politico, 2021). Brexit is a second illustrative case providing on how administrative networks in the EU resources for meso-level institutional differentiation. polity-level transformations as with the produced by Brexit, actors their in EU administrative while at the time some variation to institutional and 2021). The scope of meso-level in terms of policy differentiation in the way the post-Brexit EU policy Although the has not yet produced disintegration in one of the most of UK public policy et al., 2022), the institutional and the new agreement (for example, access to and of a strong degree of regulatory and institutional This may even for the to more to the EU in the may be In the process of Brexit has the independence agenda in and the to long-term of the EU may provide further for the and other to for further The implementation of the on has on the agenda in 2021. the of the and thereby a on the of the further in the implementation of the in the of and health, and with Northern on 2021. while Brexit an unprecedented process of differentiated disintegration in the European it also the of the United Kingdom that lead to its own disintegration. In the UK on the with the EU, which further lead to between both and have at the both from the empirical and the of differentiation as a system property of the EU, we that there is a research agenda on differentiation that may be is a general of literature on institutional capacity which to how institutions and systems to and and which may studies of differentiation in the EU et al., 2020; 2021). Studies also provide on how different institutional institutions to to change (for example, and Although institutional are a conceived of as to organizational change and et al., et al., p. institutional theory may be used as a theory of differentiated governance responses. an institutional EU to the of European not with how but how be 2010, p. certain such as institutional resilience and robustness of the EU, be of The role of organizations and organizational however, is in the that institutional has largely the study of long-term and (for example, we as a to differentiation that for March and Olsen, March and famously that long-term of tend to be characterized by to in which tend to be applied to new to a in with an and as in they have not Yet, and of the EU and its institutional system, as with most institutions and is by many the of existing organizational institutional and and limited capacity to and a of previous that at time (for example, sometimes are sometimes characterized by the of that have taken and Olsen, p. or that processes involve and based on of and Olsen, The long-term of differentiated political such as the EU, has been observed to into (BĂĄtora and Fossum, 2020). It thus be that the of a differentiated EU political order is not as a result of processes but subject to the of an institutional not that a political order in an and of the EU, each of which is may be by and may to form a of that therefore on intervention and change through the of organizational an institutional how decision processes and to a of organizational routines that may be and for are past in rules and in the organizational of a government (Olsen, 2017). are thus to and differentiation, some organizational more than â for example, â the organizational structures of the EU, the attention or the architecture of EU is also This that polity-level (that is, the macro-level of the are to the of to actors at the level of institutions (that is, the meso-level of EU institutions and organizational is on the that organizational may how institutions such as the EU and It that organizational are not an of and but in and processes by and and attention certain and certain more than and 2009). are given for it has been that the and effect of on and on studies of the European (for example, and Egeberg and Trondal, Trondal, 2006). Second, to other that in the policy is more subject to change and may thus be an (Egeberg and Trondal, and 2009). organizational therefore from the of EU thus conceive of as a which that of differentiation may be institutionally This implications that may be for in the EU. It may for example be that the institutional of a the of institutional at for institutional of the EU as a differentiated and we argue that the polity-level robustness of the EU is associated with of meso-level institutional differentiation, for instance among EU agencies and administrative networks In other the growth of EU agencies over time has the EU's internal robustness and opportunity to both member and countries in terms of administrative governance. has that the EU has in the of past such as and Brexit, by through established institutions, and Differentiation may as a for the Union to through While the of differentiation has been used and across these cases demonstrate p. quite most and even is not in with The years may the to which differentiation eventually to further the EU in the of future crises continue to a process a differentiated or are we to witness that may the process an The in initially discussions over the creation of new such as political which of a the of political a new dimension to debates over the of differentiation in the time, the Russian in since has a process of in as the Danish in of the defence opt-out in a on 1 June studies on differentiation examine mechanisms that may the emergence of and of differentiation. In we on studies to how differentiated EU for and crisis management et have established that crisis governance in the and within certain policy domains may long-term institutional long-term implications of crisis governance calling for further scholarly across policy and time as well as challenges to the EU's democratic crisis management tend to have that is as observed in the Covid-19 crisis that within one policy â such as public health â may in other policy or across systems 2021). the EU's crisis responses may have long-term and democratic implications and in when the EU to crisis through differentiated institutional and policy the EU's democratic may in the long since crisis responses tend to executive institutions and contribute to the of government decision This central institutions and institutions in processes are from crisis responses and at EU level may therefore a systemic executive and with long-term challenges not met with the support of and et al., 2021).
Southern European countries have always been a problem in the varieties of capitalism (VoC) framework. In particular, the Old Southern Fours (OSFs), together with France and Turkey, have been characterized by a hybrid type of capitalism. According to Hall and Soskice (2001, 21), âthey may constitute another type of capitalism, sometimes described as 'Mediterranean', marked by a large agrarian sector and recent histories of extensive state intervention that have left them with specific kinds of capacities for nonmarket coordination in the sphere of corporate finance but more liberal arrangements in the sphere of labor relationsâ. Thus, these four countries appear to be different from liberal market economies (LMEs), in which there is arm's-length interaction among market actors and the State behaves as a distant regulator, and coordinated market economies (CMEs), in which the State matters greatly since it plays the role of active promoter. In the four Mediterranean countries, the State is considered to play an active interventionist role to compensate for the weaknesses of institutional arrangements/complementarities. As a result, the State is a significant driver of the development of capitalism. \nThus, economies embodying this third type of capitalism have been variously called mixed market economies (MMEs) (Molina & Rhodes, 2008; Featherstone, 2008; Hopkin and Blyth, 2012; Paraskevopoulos 2017) or state-influenced market economies (SMEs) (Schmidt 2007). This hybrid type of capitalism is characterized by a high level of âstatismâ in the political economy due to the weaknesses of institutional conditions. At the same time, the high grade of statism does not guarantee effective policies that compensate for institutional weaknesses. From this point of view, then, statism has not been capable of ensuring some form of coordination to ensure the needed institutional complementarities. The State has been particularly weak in guaranteeing three pivotal drivers when the quality of government is assessed: (i) government effectiveness; (ii) bureaucratic efficiency; and (iii) regulatory quality (Rothstein, 2012; Rothstein and Teorell, 2008). It could be said, then, that the hybrid type of capitalism is characterized by a paradox: the need for active statism in the presence of a weak state is clearly represented by the inefficient and often ineffective performance of the related public administration. Thus, exactly where there is the need for dense and deep intervention by the State, the State has been as weak, ineffective, inefficient, and often characterized by particularistic, rather than universalistic, actions. As is well known, a full Weberian state did not develop before the beginning of the democratization process, and this fact has been the cause of porosity and a lack of resistance with respect to the invasion of new democratic political eÌlites (Morlino 1998). Thus, as described by some seminal studies (Sotiropoulos, 2004; Kickert, 2007 and 2011; Ongaro, 2010a), in Southern Europe, the State has been characterized by recurrent evidence of (i) centralism; (ii) political control over bureaucracy; (iii) lack of reputable administrative elites; (iv) party patronage and clientelism in personnel recruitment (including a conservative role played by public sector unions); (v) legalism rooted in the Napoleonic tradition, complemented by informal shadow governance structures; (vi) uneven distribution of resources; (vii) institutional fragmentation; and (viii) insufficient mechanisms for policy coordination (Barzelay and Gallego, 2010). These common characteristics had driven us to emphasize the trajectories and the results of the common efforts toward pursuing administrative reforms as very similar. However, as we will see, not necessarily similar conditions of departure lead to common results. \nIt is not a case, for example, that even if they are very similar with respect to the role of the State and the characteristics of public administration (as well other social, cultural and economic aspects), the OSFs also experienced relevant differences in the timing of democratization and in their political systems and decentralization. Thus, we could expect that some differences should have developed over time in the role and characteristics of the State and its contribution to expediting the modernization and development of these countries. \nFurthermore, inefficient state action is a common problem that has often appeared in the policy and political agendas of these countries. The idea that the State, its bureaucracy and the features of policy making should be reformed has always been very high on the agendas of all four countries. Thus, these countriesâ public administrations have been targets of repeated attempts at reform. For instance, since 2010, all four countries have shared the commonality of external pressures promoting State reforms in light of fiscal crises (Ongaro, 2010a). While regarding Greece, this fact has been documented by a steep path of provisions enacted by the central government to adjust the public sector to financial needs (Featherstone, 2015:301), similar evidence is not available for all remaining three. However, in general, the prevalent and diffused poor performing that induced the fiscal crisis is well displayed by financial indicators and the subsequent recommendations provided by the EU and the World Bank. As a result, reforms have been adopted in light of different contingencies and with different intensities but are uniformly associated with financial indicators (e.g., the spread). \nThese attempts at reform have obviously tried to remove the obstacles to a more strongly performing role for the State in the related socioeconomic systems and thus to render it more coherent and congruent with respect to the need for systemic coordination. Overall, the comparative literature has substantially agreed on the OSFs not only having a common Napoleonic tradition but also having modernized in very similar ways with very similar results (Sotiropoulos 2004; Ongaro 2010b; Kickert 2011). Thus, the contribution of public administrations to the socioeconomic development of these countries and to the transformation of the forms of national capitalism have been very poor or negative. However, is this statement completely true? Have these countries developed similar administrative reforms with similar timing and similar targets? Have these four states changed in very similar ways in terms of centralization/decentralization and roles in public policies? Are the national bureaucracies so politicized that they impede the effective neutrality/proactivity of state intervention? Finally, are the results of the diachronic evolution of the four states truly as similar as argued by the literature? \nAs we will show in this chapter, the response to these questions will not confirm, unlike the literature that has underlined and emphasized the similarities among the OSFs, that they underwent different trajectories of administrative reform that have produced different outcomes in terms of improvement of the state policy capacities. Portugal emerges to have developed a very deliberate and effective trajectory that has allowed the country to significantly improve its State policy capacity. Spain has reached some improvement despite institutional resilience and conflictual intergovernmental relations, while Italy has not been capable of improving its weak policy capacity due to the schizophrenic oscillation of the reforms (Italy). Finally, Greece has not been capable at all of improving its original very weak State policy capacity due to a substantial lack of real attempts to improve administration performance.
There is a distinct lack of democratic governance in our contemporary era.In this paper I develop a mechanism to overcome this democratic deficit.'The Cryptostate' is an amalgamation of primordial democratic theory and recent technological advancements.By combining democratic principles with distributed ledger technology, we can create a decentralized, transparent, governance framework in which various groups-societies, ethnicities, or nations-can communicate, coordinate, and enfranchise all affected members.Never before in human history has it been technologically feasible to create such an entity.In this article, I demonstrate that not only can such a state exist, but that in the face of our ongoing technological and global upheaval, it must.
France undergoes a decentralization process since the early 1980s. French local administrations experienced significant transformations during this process, embracing three action periods. The decentralization acts enacted in 1982 mark disengagement with administrative uniformity. The second period of decentralization starting the first years of 2000s witnessed important constitutional modifications. Regional administrations gained Constitutional recognition, local referendum has been established, the amendments concerning right to petition, experimentation, local finance and local autonomy has been passed. The third phase of decentralization started since 2010s. The reorganization of metropolitan governance, the transfer of competence to inter-communal cooperation structures concerning urban planification, roles assigned to regions in economic development and employment (economical issues, apprenticeship, European aides and aides destined to private sector), territorial solidarity and reinforcement of democracy were the main themes of this phase. The present article tries to analyze the foremost futures of French decentralization and to underline the main discussions emerged during the ongoing third phase of decentralization process concerning future of departments, regional administration and newly created metropolitan cities. In the last part of the article, the probable inïŹuences of French reforms on Turkey are discussed taking into account that Turkey has taken this country as a model in its administrative organization.
The collaborative relationship between Shiga Prefecture and the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) to create the International Lake Environment Committee (ILEC) was Japanâs earliest experience of sub-national participation in international cooperation with counterparts from the developing world and international organizations. The ILEC is an international nongovernmental standing committee, which has been hosted by Shigaâs prefectural government since 1986. One of its key missions is to support environmentally sound lake management activities, which UNEP promotes in developing countries. The objective of this chapter is to examine the local governmentâs autonomous capacity to mobilize resources across institutional boundaries of polity and independently participate in transnational environmental governance. From a state-centric view, a sub-national level of participation at the international level can only be feasible if it is an active part of national policy. In the case of the Shiga prefectural governmentâs initiative for international lake-environmental cooperation, however, as Table 5.1 indicates, sub-national actors came to see themselves as direct players in the absence of national policy. The chapter examines under what conditions and in what ways such a sub-national level of participation takes place by conducting a case study of Shigaâs collaboration with UNEP over lake-environment risk reduction. It reveals the formation process of transnational governance networks involving a sub-national government that is not operating on behalf of the national government. Shigaâs cooperation with UNEP was primarily driven by the ad hoc, bottom-up political mobilization of sub-national actors. In general, without institutionalized channels for subnational governments to participate in the international level, sub-national governments need to mobilize resources on such an ad hoc basis and pioneering sub-national actors need to be capable of effectively engaging in the formation process of transnational governance in unfamiliar territory. This chapter is about the management story of Lake Biwa in Shiga prefecture. The lake is completely located within Shiga prefecture, situated across most municipalities in the prefecture, with its surface area of 674.4 square kilometers occupying one-sixth of the prefectureâs total area. In the environmental policy area of Japanese history, as environmental impacts were manifested locally and adaptive capacity determined by local conditions, municipal governments became the ïŹrst movers. Given the geographical setting of the lake, however, the initiatives for environmental policy were taking place at the prefectural level. The Shiga prefectural government reached out for international environmental cooperation on behalf of voters who found it impossible to ignore the severity of lake pollution and whose concern with it prevailed over pro-development policies in electoral processes. While the worsening eutrophication of the rivers and lakes became known as a worldwide problem, local knowledge and experience in Japan was not sufïŹcient to cope with the Lake Biwaâs environmental stresses. This led the prefectural Environmental Bureau to develop a lake environment policy network with overseas counterparts, which provided them with the process of learning about lake environments.1 These actors transnationally engaged in policy innovation and coordination by diffusing ideas and inïŹuencing the policy measures adopted in other countries.2 In the process of policy networking, the under-funded and overloaded UNEP3 began to work with Shiga prefecture to meet the need to decentralize environmental governance functions, in order to pave the way for future environmental problem-solving.4
Key points The year 2014 witnessed the advent of new and strengthened collective action clauses (CACs) in foreign law sovereign bonds. These new clauses hold the promise to significantly strengthen the orderliness and predictability of the contractual market-based framework for the sovereign debt-restructuring process. This article looks at how these new CACs came about. The new CACs were borne from a process undertaken by an informal âSovereign Debt Roundtableâ grouping that was convened, chaired and strategically led by US Treasury staff over more than one-and-a-half years. The inclusiveness of the Roundtable, the deliberative process, which was followed and the leadership and backing of the official community were integral to bringing about the private sector and success. The Roundtableâs deliberations built heavily upon earlier Treasury work to advance CACs, in particular during the 2002â2004 period. But the new clauses go further than the bond-by-bond clauses that were the focus from 2002 to 2004, as they allow in certain defined conditions the votes of different bond issues to be aggregated into a single up or down vote on the issuersâ restructuring proposal. In this regard, the new clauses reflect the continuity in the US approach under the Bush and Obama Administrations to promoting an orderly and predictable sovereign debt-restructuring process based upon the contractual framework, in addition to US opposition to statutory approaches. But they also represent innovation under the Obama Administration in advancing and buttressing the US approach. ⊠in order to strengthen the orderliness and predictability of the sovereign debt restructuring process, we welcome the international work on strengthened collective action and pari passu clauses. We call for their inclusion in international sovereign bonds and encourage the international community and private sector to actively promote their use. G20 Leadersâ Communique; Brisbane, Australia; 16 November 2014 We welcome Mexicoâs leadership with its successful issuance of a bond with new and innovative collective actions clauses under New York law. These new clauses will strengthen the sovereign debt restructuring process, and we encourage other nations to follow suit. Secretary of the Treasury Jacob Lew, 19 November 2014 We look forward to upcoming discussions around the International Capital Market Associationâs (ICMA) proposal on possible means to reinforce collective action clauses in sovereign bonds⊠G20 Finance Ministers; Cairns, Australia; 21 September 2014 ⊠ICMA recently published revised collective action clauses for sovereign debt that permit more orderly workouts and lower the chance of spillovers. These clauses ⊠now allow for aggregation across many different debt issues, avoiding the need to vote on each loan one by one. John B. Taylor, Wall Street Journal, 9 July 2015 The late autumn of 2014 witnessed the advent of new and strengthened collective action clauses (CACs) in foreign law sovereign bonds. These new clauses hold the promise to significantly strengthen the orderliness and predictability of the contractual market-based framework for the sovereign debt-restructuring process. They were born from a process that was convened, chaired and strategically led by Treasury staff over more than one to one-and-a-half years. 1 The group working on the new clauses included issuing country representatives, inter alia from Mexico, Uruguay, Brazil and Turkey; leading UK and US sovereign debt legal experts; an array of market participants and academics; other official actors, including from France, the UK and Germany; and the IMF. In particular, this informal âSovereign Debt Roundtableâ grouping also included Mexicoâs debt manager and representatives from the London-based International Capital Markets Association (ICMA), an association representing some 500 firms from the international financial community, among others. The inclusiveness of the Roundtable, the deliberative process, which was followed and the leadership and backing of the official community were integral to bringing along the private sector and success. The Roundtableâs deliberations built heavily upon earlier Treasury work to advance CACs, in particular during the 2002â2004 period. But the new clauses go further than the bond-by-bond clauses that were the focus from 2002 to 2004, as they allow, in certain defined conditions, the votes of different bond issuers to be aggregated into a single up or down vote on the issuersâ restructuring proposal. In this regard, the new clauses reflect the continuity in the US approach under the Bush and Obama Administrations to promoting an orderly and predictable sovereign debt-restructuring process based upon the contractual framework, in addition to US opposition to statutory approaches. But they also represent innovation under the Obama Administration in advancing and buttressing the US approach. The US Treasury, in a speech by the then Under Secretary John B Taylor, outlined its support for the decentralized, market-oriented contractual approach to sovereign debt restructuring in 2002. 2 Around that time, a G-10 working group, chaired by Randal K Quarles, then Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs, and including leading sovereign debt lawyers, began work on developing CACs for inclusion in foreign law sovereign bonds. 3 In 2003, building on the âQuarles Reportâ, Mexico launched the first CACs pursuant to New York law. Mexicoâs issuance solved the first mover problem, there was no observable pricing impact, and CACs overnight became the norm in the New York market. 4 Importantly, though, the CACs applied only to each individual bond. During this period, the IMF advocated a statutory approach to sovereign debt restructuring. The Fund in essence reasoned that in a domestic setting, all unsecured creditors were bound into the restructuring deal through the bankruptcy process. Since there was no analogous international mechanism to bind similarly placed creditors into the restructuring through a single vote, there was a gap in the global financial architecture that should be filled through the creation of a âSovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanismâ (SDRM). 5 Treasury was sceptical that the SDRM could be made to work in practice. There were concerns about politicization of the mechanism. There were questions about the possible impact on official debt. There was no appetite for pursuing an international agreement that could result in a supranational body having the authority to supplant core US sovereign decision making or judicial authority. There was the basic judgement that there would be little Congressional support for any amendment to the IMF Articles needed to implement SDRM. In contrast, the advent of CACs offered the promise that the contractual framework could be used to better mimic domestic bankruptcy proceedings and bind creditors. In 2012, two important developments occurred, raising questions about the continued viability of the contractual framework to promote the orderliness and predictability of the sovereign debt-restructuring process and giving rise in some quarters to renewed calls for re-consideration of SDRM or statutory approaches more generally. These developments, left unaddressed, also had important implications for New Yorkâs continued role as a major financial centre for the issuance of foreign law bonds. Long-standing debates about the meaning of the â pari passu â clause in sovereign law bonds were underscored in judicial rulings. Many sovereign debt lawyers had long felt that the pari passu clause simply meant that the legal ranking of an instrument was equal (and not subordinate) to a borrowerâs other debt instruments. Others, for over a decade through a novel interpretation of the clause, contended borrowers could be compelled to pay all of their obligations on a ratable basis. With US federal court rulings in New York supporting the latter interpretation, clearly the meaning of the â pari passu â clause could no longer be considered settled. 6 Importantly, these legal challenges were not arising in the context of just one country; rather, there had been a substantial increase in creditor litigation over the past two decades impacting countries across the globe. 7 While bond-by-bond CACs had become the market practice in New York since 2003, the limits of this âper seriesâ approach became clear in the case of the Greek debt exchange. Of the 36 bond issuances governed by English law that included CACs and could partake in the debt exchange, only 17 were successfully restructured using CACs, accounting for 30 of the total value of Greek debt governed by foreign law. 8 In early 2013, against the background of these emerging questions about the ability of the contractual framework to continue delivering orderly and predictable outcomes, as well as renewed interest in statutory approaches, especially in the United Nations, Treasury staff convened a roundtable of governmental and private sector experts and interested parties to discuss potential changes to clauses in sovereign bond contracts. The effort was premised on the US retaining its long-standing reservations about statutory approaches, and instead examining what changes in the â pari passu clauseâ and in âbond aggregationâ could strengthen and impart renewed vigour to the contractual framework. Equally, the effort was premised on seeking pragmatic, targeted and concrete results, but not engaging in a meta-debate about broad strategic or conceptual approaches. At the outset, Treasury staff made clear that the USA did not support work on statutory approaches. For their part, the IMF representatives also made clear that the Fund had no intention of pursuing work on statutory approaches and it would be regardless infeasible to do so without the full support of the institutionâs Executive Board, including major shareholders. At a kick-off meeting in April 2013, on the margins of the IMF/World Bank Spring Meetings, the Roundtable launched into a discussion of the evolution of the sovereign debt-restructuring process over the prior decade, recent â pari passu â litigation and its implications and how âaggregation clausesâ could be used to help overcome some of the problems posed by bond-by-bond voting and increased creditor litigation. Private sector participants discussed how recent court â pari passu â rulings could complicate the sovereign debt-restructuring process and how â pari passu â language had taken on many disparate forms in contracts over the years. They were concerned about the consequences of the âratable paymentsâ interpretation of the pari passu clause for the majority of creditors. With respect to aggregation features, there was a lengthy discussion of the Greek restructuring, and a view that the Greek foreign law bond restructuring was far less successful, because of the bond-by-bond collective action feature, than the Greek domestic law-governed bond restructuring. Some participants advocated developing ideas on aggregation across foreign law sovereign bonds so that there could be one vote to modify an entire series of bonds. However, it was also underscored that developing aggregation features could have important implications for inter-creditor equity considerations. Against this background, a number of key points were agreed at the meeting, in turn charting the path forward for the Roundtable: Modifications to contractual clauses should be developed to address the emerging issues that had complicated the sovereign debt-restructuring process. Clarity was needed on pari passu clauses to dispel confusion and provide legal certainty. The clause should be seen as an âequal rankingâ clause; the âratable paymentsâ interpretation of the clause was not the intended meaning. Aggregation features in bonds, especially aimed at allowing one vote to modify a series of foreign law bonds, could represent a useful innovation to enhance the restructuring process, provided that strong safeguards were also incorporated to protect the rights of all creditors. At a second meeting in October 2013, again on the margins of the semi-annual IMF/World Bank meetings, the Roundtable reconvened to continue its discussions on pari passu clauses and aggregation. The group reviewed an options paper on the â pari passu clauseâ. 9 In the end, the Roundtable reached several conclusions on the pari passu clause and narrowed down consideration to two of the options, both of which were seen as offering a plausible path forward: There was concern that the clause had resulted in significant litigation over the past decade, complicating the sovereign debt-restructuring process, and that the likelihood was for continued increases in creditor litigation in coming years. Several lawyers in the Roundtable in particular felt that given the confusion raised by the clause over the years and its uncertain meaning, the pari passu clause should be simply eliminated from bond contracts. However, others questioned whether market participants would readily accept elimination of the clause, and thus proposed retaining a rewritten version that disavowed the ratable payments interpretation of the clause. They pointed to market inertia as well as noted that retaining such a modified version of the clause would still protect against the risk of involuntary legal subordination. Participants agreed that the Roundtable needed to come to a consensus on pari passu to provide a basis for market acceptability for a first mover. The discussions on aggregation, in contrast, entered more of an exploratory realm. The Roundtable agreed that a key policy goal of constructing an aggregation framework was to reduce the scope for obtaining blocking positions, provide the sovereign with greater flexibility and at the same time protect against possible abuse or oppression of the minority by sovereigns. While there was wide acceptance of the concept of aggregation in principle, it was also recognized that to achieve these goals, there were numerous design details to be worked out with consequential legal ramifications and an enormous bearing on market acceptability. In wrapping up the second meeting, the Roundtable agreed to further pursue the one-limb option and its requisite features and come to a conclusion on the future of the pari passu clause. The IMF also expressed interest in pursuing further work on the contractual framework, using the Roundtableâs work as a foundation to inform its activities. An initial discussion focused on whether to use a âone limbâ aggregated voting structure, or a âtwo limbâ structure with an aggregated and a per series vote. Several European officials supported a âtwo limbâ structure as this approach had already been enshrined in the ESM treaty, developed and adopted within the euro-area. The rest of the Roundtable wished to explore whether a suitable âone limbâ framework could be developed, and felt an appropriate aggregation clause could further reduce incentives for creditor litigation. 10 One participant offered the insight that an important feature of a one-limb aggregation structure was that it would lessen the chances that a creditorâthat might wish to vote against the proposal, but be willing to accept it should the requisite majority decide to do soâwould âaccidentallyâ be kept out of the restructuring. The Roundtable began to delve into the kinds of protections that would be essential to protect against abuse of the minority. Most significantly, the Roundtable agreed that there should be a high voting threshold for one-limb aggregation, and that all participants in an aggregated vote should be treated the same. Participants also agreed that the scope of aggregated debt should be confined to foreign law sovereign bonds, and thus differ from the European CAC framework, which did not differentiate between foreign and domestic law bonds. In discussions in early 2014, including conference calls, and at a third meeting in April, the Roundtable reviewed a model aggregation clause 11 and bore down on achieving concrete results. In wrapping up this meeting, the Roundtable also welcomed ICMAâs proposal to develop model pari passu and aggregation language and conduct a public consultation. 12 To address the question of which pari passu option to pursue and given the view that eliminating the clause might not be seen as acceptable by all market participants, the Roundtable agreed to back model pari passu language that disavowed the ratable payments interpretation. The Roundtable further agreed that aggregation, allowing for a single cross-series vote with strong safeguards, along with a bond-by-bond restructuring option, would help promote the orderliness and predictability of the sovereign debt-restructuring process. With respect to safeguards, it was agreed that: âvoting thresholdsâ should be set at a level which an aggregated cross-series modification vote could only succeed with the support of a large super-majority (ultimately 75 per cent of the eligible outstanding principal); single-limb aggregation would be limited to âbonds governed by foreign lawâ (outside of the euro-area, which retained its two-limb structure for foreign and domestic bonds); âuniform applicabilityâ would provide for an identical offer requirement for any cross-series vote; ârobust disenfranchisement provisionsâ would exclude bonds controlled by the issuer from the vote; and âenhanced transparency and information disclosureâ would be required such that the issuer would need to disclose its overall restructuring plan, including its proposed treatment of other groups of creditors and claims, as part of its offer. In subsequent months, ICMAâs model clauses became the new market standard. The IMF staff proposed to prepare a staff paper for the IMF Executive Board to endorse the key features of the model pari passu and aggregation language. 13 The third and last meeting of the Roundtable was by no means the end of the process. It was critical to develop a strong legal and market consensus behind the new clauses in order for a âfirst moverâ to move without facing market turbulence. Roundtable participants dedicated themselves to this task over the course of the remainder of the an initial and ICMA of proposed model clauses was provided to Roundtable participants for to market participants and their While the of the ICMA model clauses were the same for both the New York and were required to to the of each market. In the of information about the new clauses and their were with leading sovereign debt legal in both New York and Treasury staff also with market In particular, staff with representatives in a series of with of the New emerging market and and also reached out to several London-based Roundtable participants also with debt in potential emerging market sovereign bond issuing especially that had not in the working The IMF an role as The were by IMF staff in a series of and discussions with public debt the basis of a paper in large part by the of the the IMF Board also in the of 2014 the use of modified pari passu clauses in new international sovereign bonds so as to enhance legal and across The Board noted the broad support of for CACs with aggregation features, and in particular considered the limbâ clause with appropriate safeguards along the of forward in the model ICMA clauses as a significant to the sovereign debt-restructuring process. In addition to the IMF the of the market-based contractual framework also the strong of the official The of the G20 Finance and Bank meeting in Cairns, in as well as the G20 Leadersâ in in both the strengthened 16 Most significantly, countries began to sovereign bonds with the new clauses. In particular, Mexico in around the time of the the first public offering with the strengthened CACs under New York in bonds strong and in the in the same leadership as in 2003, the issuance with new CACs the first mover and no pricing impact Mexicoâs issuance was by the of its Finance debt in the Around this time, many other countries from of the followed in was the first mover at the global leading the in the market. While the advent of the new CACs a major it not a and work to be to strengthen the contractual framework. The inclusion of new CACs in bonds will address the future of sovereign but it will not address the large outstanding noted by the that and it will 10 years for per cent to This process could be by Some market participants to be possible The of the new CACs so far been strong in the New York which a in which have more of an and been strong but not as but especially for the market. 17 Several issuers have it to thus over or raising in several than the more work and of a new global But in time, such countries will use new the new clauses. already this continue in some quarters about whether the of a restructuring should be through the required use of a structure, including one in which the to a and pay its This was not by the Roundtable, which was focused from the on in two pari passu and Some country representatives, especially at the United Nations, continue to for of a statutory the statutory approach little support in the IMF and and been by the USA and the key in which over of foreign law bond issuance of the new CACs the of the contractual framework and again work on statutory approaches to be needed or in financial policy The recent of CACs through the of the meaning of the pari passu clause and the advent of single-limb aggregation with strong creditor protections a of the of the international financial time and work needed for the new CACs to their full potential in the orderliness and predictability of the sovereign debt-restructuring process. in a of time, the strengthened CACs already a part of the international financial and have the of the contractual framework, the foundation for which was in the early US Treasury staff and a international in which all up their to of new
The paper discusses the importance of the subsidiarity principle to the regulation of the global processes. It also analyzes the role of the subsidiary principle as a fundamental principle of the European Union legal framework in the perception of the identity of the civilizations as well as its influence on political-legal systems. Not only does the paper emphasize the importance of this principle to the European identity, but it also discloses the role of the idea of the subsidiarity, which was played in legal and social consciousness of the communities attributed to the Western and Eastern civilizations. The principle of subsidiarity is used here as a tool to disclose the identity of the civilisations and differences among them. Simultaneously, its positive role is highlighted in the global communityâs solution of different kinds of conflicts (ideological, economic, religious or cultural) that arise among nations, countries or different civilisations. This article is aimed to demonstrante that reception of the principle of subsidiarity and itâs institutionalization in the European Union and national legal frameworks are not accidental. The tools of legislative regulation based on this principle prevent global system from disregarding cultural differences. At the same time, it does not allow local identity to destroy the world unity. Thus, unified social systems can perfectly coexist with national, regional and local units, the latter ones maintaining their organizational structure and cultural traditions. Subsidiarity idea combining opposites makes sense as a principle of creating this diversity in unity, which ensures the integrity of autonomous structures making up the whole, preserving national, regional and cultural specificities of countries and people around the globe. The support of these processes provides the public with the opportunity to discover effective forms for the realization of self-organization and implementation of their needs and developing appropriate social structures and legal institutions regulating their activity. Through the examination of the concept of subsidiarity and aspects of its practical application in organizations, the article discusses the polarities of the different structure and management forms of the institutionalization of the principle of subsidiarity in the countries and its effect in the formation of the governance levels in the state, showing how balance of powers is achieved based on the subsidiarity principle, creating an effective mechanism of function distribution (determination of exclusive competencies) and their implementation (institutional interaction, their operational control). In structuring the institutional systems of the organization of the state, the subsidiarity concept is complemented with the elements of the management system decentralization, democratization, federalism and regional and local self-governments.
EU administrative law has some specific characters when compared with national administrative law. This is particularly so because of the weak democratic legitimacy of EU rules. EU administrative law however shares a number of developments with national legal orders, such as a general trend to strengthen the judicial review of individual measures, and this especially so when fundamental rights are at stake. When compared with some national legal orders, dialogue seems to be still in an early phase. This is a shame because the political circle linking the decision makers to the People through representative democracy is weak and benefits could had by supplementing it by more closely involving the civil society and the stakeholders. The little in terms of developments we have, however, is enough to confirm the role of law and courts in this different perspective as the tools «to police conditions of access to decision-making networks. A powerful incentive to dialogue for European institutions could however come â in sectors like competition policy â from a possible shift from a French administrative law presumption of legality pattern to a US adversarial adjudication model, the latter substantially imposing on EU institution a burden of proof where before was a duty to give reasons. Taken down from the high throne where traditional continental administrative law has placed it, it makes sense for the Commission to double its efforts to come at some sort of agreements with the undertaking concerned.
The Croatian âdecentralization packageâ from mid-2001 has shown how multiple pressures for shifting power to the local level may actually result in relative failure. The central government has ceded the control in particular policy sectors by shifting responsibilities for certain educational, welfare and health services to the counties and municipalities. However, the decentralization initiative was excessively marked as very limited and strongly labeled by the vertical policy dimension, expressing the dominance of top-down incentives of the central government in comparison to bottom-up initiatives stemming from the local government units. The 2001 decentralized package did not substantially increase the portion of local governments finance in total public finance, showing a failure to provide local government units with stronger fiscal capacity. The central government bodies also did not take into account the alternative proposals made by various policy actors ranging from academic institutions, researchers in NGOs, and associations of local government organizations. All these things have contributed to a relatively negligible influence of the horizontal policy dimension on the decentralization outcome. The whole process can therefore be described as centrally controlled decentralization, or decentralization from above.
Botnia S.A./MetsĂ€-Botnia Oy's construction of the Orion pulp mill in Uruguay raised concerns regarding violations of national, regional, and international law with regard to social and environmental protection. On 18 April 2006, the Center for Human Rights and Environment (CEDHA), an Argentinean non-governmental organisation, submitted to Finland's National Contact Point (NCP) a âspecific instanceâ regarding the possible non-compliance of Botnia S.A. (a Finnish enterprise) with the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (OECD Guidelines for MNEs, Guidelines) when building the envisaged pulp mill in Uruguay. According to the Center for Human Rights and Environment, Botnia S.A. violated the OECD Guidelines for MNEs especially with respect to Chapter II âGeneral Policiesâ, Chapter III âDisclosureâ, Chapter V âEnvironmentâ and Chapter VI âBriberyâ. Specific instances concerned with related issues were filed by the Center for Human Rights and Environment with the Swedish and Norwegian NCPs against Nordea, a leading financial services group of the Nordic and Baltic Sea area, for possible financing of Botnia S.A.'s pulp mill project and against the Finnish state bank Finnvera for providing export guarantees to Botnia S.A. Other fora that have in the meantime become involved in the issue are the International Court of Justice and member institutions of the World Bank Group, the International Finance Corporation and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency.