Blockchain Papers

Małgorzata Dancewicz-Pawlik

The article discusses certain aspects of blockchain-based art, including the ecology and economy of non-fungible tokens (NFTs), applying projects curated by Ruangrupa for documenta 15, such as Jalar, Dayra, Cheesecoin, and BeeCoin, created within the lumbung Economy. In light of earlier investigations into the ecology of NFTs, the main areas of concern now are the ways in which information about the environmental effects of NFTs presents itself, the monopolization of particular technological mechanisms, the perpetuation of cultural biases, and, from this angle, the belief of artists in the potential for change brought about by the new technology. Given the economic and ecological implications arising from the blockchain projects discussed in this article, I propose to use the notion of ecosophy defined by Félix Guattari as an approach for lumbung Economy interpretation.

Aliki Semertzi

When did an ecological sensibility arise in the Hague Academy courses? What legal instruments did their authors propose for its regulation, and how did such proposals reflect different strands of international legal thought? How did the rise of this ecological sensibility become interwoven with the economy and increasingly regulated through market-based mechanisms instead of more dirigiste, public interventions? It is with these questions that I approached the voluminous archive of the Hague Academy. I searched for courses that conveyed an ecological sensibility in their title, manifested in title words like ‘environment’, ‘climate’, ‘biodiversity’, ‘pollution’ and ‘resources’. I did so based on the presumption that such title words signal the respective author’s ecological focus. Consequently, I chose to leave aside the ‘general courses’ with their more panoramic outlook. With a bit of tweaking, I selected 14 courses for review, spread across the 100 years of the Academy’s existence, which I then divided into six historical periods. I attributed a theme to each period, as I saw such a theme emerging from the courses themselves, when their authors appeared to be in conversation with each other, using the same legal vocabulary, concepts and frameworks. Conversely, I saw historical breaks, and I arranged the courses accordingly when the legal language and the authors’ preoccupations shifted. The subsequent sections set out the result of these endeavours through a close engagement with its lecturers. In the late 1920s, an ecological sensibility, strictly speaking, hardly existed in international law. Yet there were concerns over the ‘conservation of the riches of the sea’ – riches understood as comprising fish, fur seals and whales. As Philip Jessup stressed in the first paragraph of his course, conservation was the ‘remedy to the excesses of exploitation’.1 What conservation meant was rational exploitation – rational as based on the latest scientific findings. Conservation measures (for example, maximum allowable catch per fish species, open and closed seasons, prohibition of certain fishing gear) were informed by the science of biology on the rates of fish reproduction and by that of oceanography, which mapped the migration routes of whales around the globe. The late 1920s was a time when marine sciences were burgeoning, and numerous international congresses were held on geography, hydrography and applied marine zoology – all enthusiastically recounted in Jessup’s course. As for the international law on the ‘conservation/exploitation problem’, for Jessup it was on a cusp. There was the ‘history’ of the 1882 and 1887 (Hague) North Sea Conventions, regulating fisheries and liquor traffic and granting ships of states parties police powers to search and visit private fishing vessels on the high seas.2 There were two ‘historical arbitrations’ that pointed to the future: (i) the 1893 Bering Sea Fur Seals arbitration, which foregrounded the conservation of fur seals as a marine species3 and (ii) the 1910 North Atlantic Coast Fisheries case,4 which delegated the regulation of conservation of highly profitable fisheries to a US-Canada mixed commission of scientific fishing experts.5 Regarding the work of the League of Nations (LoN) on conservation, Jessup was rather sceptical about its codification initiatives; he favoured the collaboration between the LoN’s Economic Committee and the Permanent Council for the International Exploration of the Sea (ICES), whose scientific experts recommended conservation measures based on data provided by the fishing industry. For Jessup, the conservation/exploitation problem was not a matter calling for the establishment of general common rules.6 Rather, satisfactory solutions would have to be found in tailored institutional arrangements with the participation of interested parties, like the LoN/ICES cooperation scheme or the several US-Canada mixed fishery commissions. Ecological sensibilities in the 1950s and 1960s, much like in the 1920s, remained primarily focused on the conservation of (marine) resources. What emerged was the intense competition between ‘old states’ and ‘newcomers’ – emerging from the early stages of decolonization or rising competitors like Japan. This competition was coupled with strong claims for the revision of international law, expressed in new legal concepts such as ‘special interests’ of coastal states, ‘fishery zones’ or the ‘benefit to mankind’. André Gros was concerned with the alarmingly growing number of coastal states that unilaterally enacted conservation legislation and declared it applicable in marine zones extending beyond territorial waters and well into the high seas – conservation legislation that was often coupled with granting preferential fishing rights to the coastal states’ nationals. For Gros, conservation meant organization: ‘[C]oopération international encadrée [… afin d’] endiguer la marée des législations nationales’ and to integrate in a single treaty the earlier (‘fragmentaires’) bilateral and regional fishery agreements.7 For Gros, at stake was the classical role of law to ensure free and equal access to marine resources by elaborating general rules applicable to all states. Gros saw this classical role under strain, especially when the constant invocation (‘en désespoir de cause’) of the term ‘special’ by coastal states (the ‘nouveau venus’, the ‘riverains revendicateurs’) led to strong claims for preferential treatment.8 To him, the 1958 Geneva Convention seemed a promising regulatory step forward by providing a common framework of general rules and by tying all competing claims and counterclaims to the ‘effective guarantee’ of a binding dispute settlement mechanism.9 Shigeru Oda counter-remarked to Gros’ hopes that, ‘for the past ten years, this Convention has been all but neglected in practice’ because it just ‘did not attempt to offer any solution to the real issue’ – namely, the ‘distribution and allocation’ of limited fishery resources.10 For Oda, conservation simply marked the need to regulate when ‘demand exceeds supply’.11 Earlier theories of the inexhaustibility of marine resources – upon which the freedom of fishing in the high seas was based – had proved to be wrong, and conservation now required appropriate criteria for the fair and equitable distribution of limited resources, informed by some form of economic thinking. In his course, Oda identified three alternative distributional schemes, all admittedly non-ideal: (i) free competition, access and exploitation under the ‘time-honored principle of the freedom of the high seas’; (ii) theories of international management as in a 1967 report by the United Nations (UN) Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), which would empower an international body to issue licences for high seas fishing and to collect rentals in return; (iii) schemes of ‘arbitrary distribution’ such as the ‘abstention formula’ in the 1952 USA-Canada-Japan North Pacific Fisheries Convention that required Japan as a ‘newcomer’ to abstain from fishing and to respect earlier bilateral conservation arrangements between the USA and Canada.12 For Oda, precisely the same dilemmas would arise when discussing the exploration of the mineral resources of the deep seabed. The new concept of the ‘benefit to mankind’ pointed to an ‘international control system’ – as opposed to the traditional ‘laisser-faire system’ for high seas fisheries of free exploitation without restriction except for the control of the flag state – but left unresolved how exploitation licences should be allocated.13 Eventually, Oda’s course was much more incisive in his analysis of the stakes involved in conservation than Gros’ course. It stressed that the 1950s–1960s concern with competition and revision was not a matter of doctrinal intricacies. Instead, each of the regulatory schemes had very real distributional effects, as reflected, for example, in the bargaining that preceded the recognition of new fishery zones in exchange for a narrow territorial sea. In the 1970s and 1980s, ecological sensibilities extended from fish conservation to the whole earth. The ‘environment’ emerged as a new concept, supplementing traditional earlier understandings focused on development and the exploitation of natural resources. These are dialectical decades, and the four courses selected for this period make up two dialectical pairs: the first on the environment and the second on natural resources. Richard Bilder’s and José Sette-Camara’s courses illustrate the dialectics of international modes of regulation of the environment. Bilder notes the ‘recent surge in ecological awareness’ that led to the new concept of international environmental law. However ‘amorphous’ and ‘undefined’ it was, it marks a new way of thinking about the environment as a ‘unique class of international problems, requiring distinct approaches and collaborative methods of solutions’.14 His course teems with factual examples: the US-Mexico Colorado river salinity dispute, the Finnish arsenic dumping incident in the South Atlantic Ocean, in and the Bilder the environmental in each problem that he divided by the approaches to their regulation to environmental from of from over of time of and be or traditional legal like be or For the environment for the and the of international a set of of dispute environmental factual dispute solutions and Jessup, Bilder to be the promising of regulation, providing a for of problem environmental and the of a and informed by and on a very different legal than legal rules and dispute In his course, notes the of environmental In to the legal regulation of the environment for be in with traditional international law. concepts like the in the International and the of and the concept of the as in the of the of As for the concept of this had to be approached through a of state and international law in to out there is a of international law such and he that the traditional legal of state are the of the whole of international measures In this instruments of legal regulation in than the International or the de International The for Economic and principle have become in but the that led to its in the on the that this is a principle of economy to the distribution of economic of measures and not a legal principle of Eventually, Sette-Camara’s course with Gros’ course in that regulatory instruments not coupled with an ‘effective for – such for the to environmental – are in the of Bilder had of and their from the traditional rules and in of The courses by and are by the the by the of the the on the of a International Economic and the legal of the over natural For these about a in the legal of natural resources, which now had to be from This from classical international law that resources by the out of and for the of states as of In the classical the access of to under was provided by the of the principle of as a of treaty and of the principle of open access in the concept of the freedom of the high The by that international law to become more concerned with the of resources and to reflect on how to in arrangements that would a fair and just distribution competing (i) and access to natural resources in and (ii) access to and by which was for the exploitation of their natural resources. competing claims were the of a international legal was now in international legal equitable in the law of the International of – in the of the – new of ‘international public to as in the treaty for or on the deep for ‘international public – Oda’s about the concept of to – did not a fair and just distribution of resources, that as well and an economic Instead, saw that provided a much of that be to legal arrangements of In this two proposals of distribution informed by he to the principle as the for of such a development for natural resources that into and in the in for the or of and informed by the schemes, like in with he a of extending approaches in and arrangements for a of resources be and to resources regulated under (for example, Economic then to a of access for based on equitable such as the of an the of a for resources or the of the for the of the 1970s about natural resources – and the of distribution and development – simply to the that this was a time of and under the very of international law The 1970s the dialectics of preferential and of open access was sceptical of the of classical rules to and of how and equitable were by for an and Instead, he found in a much more of of how international law access to and distribution of by did not that a had with to the classical international law of resources on the of Rather, the territorial principle was – not – by the in had the international law and the over natural as like that the competing claims for access to resources were Permanent was not for economic some form of was required to the and Eventually, to up alternative of how such be and he as (i) between states with that provided for schemes, and like the on and fisheries or (ii) the between private under international and law (for example, the mineral of the of or the law of the the has its and by commissions. As for the regulation of international and the of based on natural or through arrangements between and were found in the Convention between the Economic and the and Pacific of states the a scheme to from ecological concerns did not in and of The ‘environment’ emerged as to and were of environmental their for When how the increasingly regulated through economic and Oda pointed out that conservation simply meant that a had to be regulated it was proved to be to criteria for and and to accordingly legal arrangements for the of limited resources. In this this of courses the of regulatory in the informed by strands of the as well as regulation and In the the dialectics of the 1970s and Ecological sensibilities in the Hague Academy courses are now of as the ‘environment’ and are regulated through economic of the of which the two courses of this period two distinct the international legal courses about environmental and over and dispute that the of international legal has from a to a a to the treaty an of that the of the treaty and whose be by any without of or international from to a that the of the with the of and economy in the very of his course, international economic law and international environmental law as of the same not very but and that the environment but be regulated through the and this that it is that for environmental this was a of the of the 1970s and in of the of the Convention on the of the Sea whose on the deep had to be by the to into and economic a growing on In this meant that for economic environmental had a to To when regulatory were to the of the Convention on were not to be provided by by the on and a of the of of by the a and providing to by or by the Convention for the a of a framework by an that and so as to with the scientific and economic in environmental In with that legal instruments for the regulation of the environment were from and rules and the of economic based on the that the be to to instruments in their and the of his course, a step and more on how the between and economy international law in that has had an on the general of international it has the of an international which applied to but that were in a or but on the of environmental problems, such as the treaty for the and It was this new concept that the of international legal of and that were more than and that a role to the or of each treaty these would of and and and for the of this of on the general of international law the of a of international legal that be to the earlier courses by Jessup and Bilder and their of as the more promising to regulate the conservation of resources and the environment. like his course by the of to the of and in international law in notes how legal instruments for the regulation of the environment to a by the up of treaty tailored to each environmental problem (for example, of the marine by and How to a treaty and its institutional and had to be of and two (i) the on and which the for a of to (for example, by state parties, data and an emerging of access to environmental by and to and (ii) instruments to of a (for example, and through the more traditional mechanisms of state and dispute his course primarily how much international environmental law had to a of treaty and schemes, like the the of the the the International for and course a much – to on international economic law – on the between and and that legal instruments for environmental regulation are coupled with a of economic and at from this the of the on natural resources have been in two The first concerns the of ‘resources’. The Convention on to to and resources, as well as to resources and notes that the the states of resources with a to access to resources access to resources or The second to how the earlier now is applied to environmental of the International is the first to a institutional that and the management of to not for but the of and Eventually, for the Convention on and the International to a environmental that the environment in a it to access to resources, of In the new to be by and the by the in the with their on and As is common in courses some historical on the from the dialectical of the to the between and economy that emerged in the how ecological sensibilities in international law, of doctrinal that had the courses by Bilder and into historical the dilemmas that had concerned and and the role of international law in regulating access to resources and their and course like a of international environmental law, the of historical state and general of the (for example, environmental with rights law, dispute and dispute settlement the of the the International for the of the Sea and the North analysis is an attempt to reflect on the of the new modes of legal regulation that are tailored to environmental than an of such modes the traditional of international law that on states, rules and international In legal with Gros and the of as a in to a of course new concepts and have the of law often for because legal that, and have become in the of resources. that the was in a of of environmental as to economic The concept of development this and in environmental that its are and of For this of thinking not a to the traditional of law. As that is a a of the of is not the is a with from the legal and the not the course is very from Bilder’s – or from Jessup’s – of the international as precisely the of new modes of regulation and it to from the of the to and to the search for and solutions to these and environmental certain doctrinal concerns with especially the has the of of international because of its development of treaty per environmental Yet he that the of and in regulating the environment through a of of and the of private and in environmental It is that a new of which on rather than using As the and the the of as a form of This legal to the three of his course resources and as a single all three the of to the – which he to as a legal problem – of how to ensure a just and fair this environmental are to schemes in of and be as For – a of the that with Oda, which was then up in a more exchange between and – the traditional of resources based on and was that beyond fish or deep some form of international As and the economy were so were resources under because of because were on the or the several or because their – such for the role of as there was the in the an ‘international for with the of the and the International the of ecological regulation with market-based economic instruments opposed to regulatory instruments under earlier for him, this the regulatory to leave the problem of access and distribution to with admittedly to the from course – and is a – is that, there are competing calling for the and and the through economic or through the of by schemes for and or In the more Hague Academy the dilemmas and of in Rather, is in the three courses of the period of the early is that in its different new of thinking about the between and the up the that has international law – a that would with the international legal in the courses of Gros, and on the of as a to illustrate the stakes how in law, through the is an of often by In environmental treaty that and and but In the with its there is a of as of way to of by such a would be to that of international legal that and as the on of international The the of and the to experts to problems, rather than with legal as it this should the of especially in the role of the international in the courses of Jessup and Bilder – namely, to and for In this of is to in – in a course that be as a of – that, in of of and on rules for with is a for in and of course as its that has the of international As very title course the of and in the international how the was in mechanisms and is of as a for and the to the through of through such as the historical for by or the to by course, like is an attempt to the new and to a new to reflect on the as a of and a and between law, law, and instruments and in the that there are of in the it is precisely this and that has provided for and and in international law more This is very different from more traditional understandings of international law and modes of regulation of the as the the for an of is by a a However – or – the language of this course have to of the authors of the more traditional courses in this review, it be that the is a and its of the have become of at which the are just and and distribution of the of market-based mechanisms (for example, through the and historical for and course on international law of is of a more traditional in and to course. on the treaty that to and their and for dispute settlement and the of a traditional of international law the of the new concept of on how international law natural resources and on how about instead of modes of legal of access and to the as to the legal of schemes, and the of the which the of the – namely, the and equitable of the out of the of four in which international law has the of from (i) an strictly as in Jessup’s early course on the conservation of fish conservation was at a fishing to (ii) the as in the Convention or in the on This was by (iii) the as in the for form of is respect of its to and the which the of and and the fair and equitable of this economic with the of to it marks a to the of international law to set a between the different and the of the economic of which has led to a of the and of and the of the Ecological were in Jessup’s early course of and interwoven with the economy and economic thinking. As Hague Academy have pointed out over the years – and – has proved to be a for new modes of regulation that have traditional understandings of international law. such has meant regulating the through economic – and I this has – such economic instruments were of a and of concerns about and for example, in the courses of and or in the by and The are a of revision and about It is that this to the ‘general of and be as an to about international law as a more and

Damien Delorme

No abstract is available for this record.

Joshua Heath

What do Immanuel Kant and Pablo Picasso have in common? What sounds like the beginning of a bad academic joke was a serious question for the Russian philosopher-theologian Sergii Bulgakov (1871-1944). For the affinities between the twentieth-century artist and the eighteenth-century philosopher were, for him, substantial. Indeed, readers of Bulgakov’s The Tragedy of Philosophy—recently published in translation by Angelico Press—might consider the description of Kant as a ‘cubist’ and of his philosophy as a ‘cubism’, one of the book’s more outlandish and perplexing claims. Nor is it a claim that Bulgakov makes only once. In Tragedy, Kant’s epistemology is described as ‘subjective-cubistic’,11 Sergii Bulgakov, Tragedy of Philosophy, trans. Stephen Churchyard (New York: Angelico Press, 2020), 32, note 10. in response to Kant’s conviction that the unity of perceptions does not arise from objects themselves, but is instead imparted by the understanding to experience.22 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B 134. Later in the same work, Bulgakov simply inserts the exclamation ‘cubism!’ into a citation from Kant’s own text on the unifying role of the understanding. These are the only two instances in Tragedy where Kant’s alleged cubism is asserted. They are marginal and gnomic assertions, and give an indication of the perplexities that await the intrepid reader. But they nonetheless gesture toward the abiding concern of this work. For Kant’s ‘cubism’ has to do with his approach to unity, and particularly his view of the understanding as imparting unity to experience, rather than the unity of things being received by the understanding from the perceived objects themselves. Bulgakov has more to say on Kant’s ‘cubism’ elsewhere. The characterisation of Kant as a cubist pre-dates the extended discussion of the latter’s philosophy in Tragedy by a few years, first appearing in a 1914 article on the works of Pablo Picasso, published under the title ‘The Corpse of Beauty’.33 ‘Trup krasoty’ [The Corpse of Beauty], in Sergii Bulgakov, Sochineniia v dvukh tomakh, vol. 2, ed. I. B. Rodnianskaia (Moscow: Nauka, 1993), 527-45. Here Bulgakov claims that the parallel between Kant and Picasso has been noted elsewhere, and he is likely referring to another 1914 article on Picasso, this time by Nikolai Berdiaev.44 Rodnianskaia is the source of this connection. Cf. her notes in Sochineniia, vol. 2, 719. As for Bulgakov, what is at stake for Berdiaev in defining a ‘cubist’ philosophy is its approach to unity, and particularly the unity that both Bulgakov and Berdiaev claim for the world independently of reason. Berdiaev understands a cubist philosophy as one which sunders the unity of the world: ‘cubism is possible in philosophy also. Thus the critical genealogy ends in its latter stages with the slicing up and scattering of being’.55 Nikolai Berdiaev, ‘Pikasso’, first published in Sofiia 3 (1914). Available at http://www.picasso-pablo.ru/library/berdyaev-picasso.html (in Russian). (Accessed 28 September 2020). Bulgakov will describe cubism in similar—albeit more graphic—terms, as a decomposition of organic, living unity. ‘Putrefaction, the smell of rotting flesh and of the disintegrating physical plane are perfectly palpable’ when viewing Picasso’s portraits, whilst in cubism as a whole ‘everything, even living things become matter, become composite, and Bulgakov, The artist and the philosopher in of the living unity of things and in of the of the a to the of a and a of the of into an of But is one more is to the in the of Picasso, the artist is in with the by the artist an with the artist in a particularly with the of the world the artist is to that of the flesh which is the of the What Bulgakov to is that artist and are by a of the the unity of For the of the the of to the and the artist the that is in matter, the of in its this that is what it is to is but Sergii Bulgakov, The trans. B. to the unity of this world is to its unity with the world of what Bulgakov The of Picasso in a of his living as Thus they the of rotting the between the and the artist is the and the philosopher to They two of two to of the from the of this for in it is not from but from not in the of experience, but with the in and Sergii Bulgakov, and to The trans. and the philosopher to from the world and to it unity on it from The Bulgakov in Tragedy, to a world of of his own as Bulgakov, Tragedy, The the world from and is to a of its unity. In this the is in Tragedy as of a that the of not an into they are not to are in and are by to the of the of the and the philosopher is in two The first the that the the is the this not a in For the in from the to the is by a to the Indeed, is not the by the philosopher a of the to from the is the of the in the of a will have it the philosopher in it an for the and and The of trans. and (New York: is the of The of philosopher and in been Bulgakov by as a to the for do not independently in the world and the the philosopher with the are not and of the of the They of is to Bulgakov, the philosopher and the in to the latter with the artist as a with the of the this the of the that a of the flesh in its and which only the of the flesh but its that the of the which is in an and of Bulgakov, the of the and the artist with the a that a of the unity of the world with and with the is a of the and an of Bulgakov at the that Picasso’s work, which the of the unity of the a to and of the of the the of Picasso one the of that the with the of Picasso and in but in his in will of the of this Cf. The of Pablo Picasso (New York: Press, But what Bulgakov by this is that Picasso does not that the and unity of the is a of its being a as as physical an the of the to the of the The and is that the unity of the which to Bulgakov is the of Bulgakov, Tragedy, is with the of a from and this is the of Bulgakov’s of the of the whole a The of is a in for to of the it of Bulgakov this in Tragedy by that are when that is with of that independently of that is up of of the is of the is a more of the of are in as of with to the that are in the to that in to of the of for Bulgakov, the of Cf. for discussion of the of in his The Press, are outlandish and marginal Kant’s cubism to the of Bulgakov’s The Tragedy of The perceived of philosophy is that is of its philosopher but he into the but his in the of the and he and into Bulgakov, Tragedy, As have the of this in the to the world from when in is In response to this Bulgakov in Tragedy to what a of is the title of a by on Bulgakov in and on this in will an epistemology that from the of a of that of epistemology and For as the of the the in which is on the in which the of the unity of the world is a of to the the of the philosopher is a of of a of that Bulgakov will describe as in with to at in Tragedy, with to to is a and to which is described as Thus to in is from a of a that the of to the as Bulgakov’s of into the of is in with Kant’s critical Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, have to do with is a and one that to that even have the it will not to on with is the he at his For he does by the by in its What of What the of in this in with Kant’s the to have both and Kant will that the of a appearing to in not for the in Bulgakov will that the to which and are possible for the objects of and the that the for is that they with to a that and are and does not to an it that to the things that is that the unity of things is the unity of for Bulgakov, that the unity of things is For the of as is the of as and of the of the in the and of The of Tragedy is the of and a that has its in the of that the world is As a first in that it is that in its with unity, Tragedy is a of its Bulgakov that the of his was of they for a understanding of a The Russian for the of Sergii Bulgakov, in that in its with unity, Tragedy the view by that of Russian philosophy is that it to the and of as a in of 2, Russian with is in the of a that Tragedy, with the The latter is the translation of whilst a a a Cf. in ed. and trans. by and the of being of that is in the of is an unity, but to the of the world and the of with the with are the in what is as These are described as two they in and The is and at the beginning and of a that in the and to the of Russian and with to the the of philosophy and the for a and approach that and unity. In this was in the of an which on the of the of the the In this was in the of which that the is a of a that only living into that organic, unity. the and of this on unity are in the of a on the of Russian that in Bulgakov’s have in philosophy of unity, as and on in the of and the that is to In in the of his being as a the only a between the and the being only as the of an to its on ed. and trans. by Press, in the is to of as to an this is a one with the of the in of the of the of the is to for The of its own the of the as the the for the this is of and an of to its to the of the that which to its The between this and the that the of is the that the of is to this it from the of as the not it not the But in that not In the of as is a of as does the of as to the characterisation of being as and are of the first of of the the the in in and unity. In this first the is in that in the the the the the is in the where of the of as a to the that is the of being do not the unity to the same this unity is to in will as in the of the for in the of the of will is not from the in an unity with The to the of as and as as the first the the what is for the two is that being is being as the with in have for and with of Thus the by the by is and the as to the between of as the as and as But with this it that the of as is from the of as For to and this only a of the the is In the of is by the of But this is the of understanding of the that Bulgakov will in his more For Bulgakov’s of of the from the of and the of in the of in Bulgakov will that one that the of as a for the of the to with to the of is to the of the the of both a and a Thus with to the the of in as and on in Bulgakov, ed. 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Jorge N. Ferrer

HOW DO WE creatively participate in the mystery of spirituality? The participatory approach holds that human spirituality emerges from human co-creative participation in an undetermined mystery, generative power of life, the cosmos, or reality. My understanding of the mystery is aligned with Rabbi Michael Lerner’s account (in his book Spirit Matters) of Spirit as the “energizing Force” behind the Big Bang and the ongoing evolutionary process.Spiritual participatory events can engage the entire range of human epistemic faculties (e.g., rational, imaginal, somatic, vital, aesthetic) with both the creative unfolding of the mystery and the subtle entities or energies in the enactment — or “bringing forth” — of ontologically rich religious worlds. In other words, the participatory approach presents an enactive understanding of the sacred that conceives spiritual phenomena, experiences, and insights as co-created events. The emergence of spiritual knowing can be located amidst the connections of human multidimensional cognition, cultural context, subtle worlds, and the deep generativity of life or the cosmos. Importantly, this account avoids both the secular postmodernist reduction of religion to cultural-linguistic artifact and, as discussed below, the dogmatic privileging of a single religious tradition as superior or paradigmatic.The rest of this essay introduces nine distinctive features of the participatory approach: spiritual cocreation, creative spirituality, spiritual individuation, participatory pluralism, relaxed spiritual universalism, participatory epistemology, the integral bodhisattva vow, participatory spiritual practice, and social engagement.Spiritual co-creation has three interrelated dimensions — intrapersonal, interpersonal, and transpersonal. These dimensions respectively establish participatory spirituality as embodied (spirit within), relational (spirit in-between), and enactive (spirit beyond).Intrapersonal co-creation consists of the collaborative participation of all human attributes — body, vital energy, heart, mind, and consciousness — in the enactment of spiritual phenomena. This dimension is grounded in the equi-primacy principle, according to which no human attribute is intrinsically superior or more evolved than any other. To be sure, the mind-centered character of Western culture hinders the maturation of non-mental attributes, normally making it necessary to engage in intentional practices to bring these attributes up to the same developmental level the mind achieves through mainstream education. In principle, however, all human attributes can participate as equal partners in the creative unfolding of the spiritual path, are equally capable of sharing freely in the life of the mystery here on Earth, and can also be equally alienated from it. The main challenges to intrapersonal co-creation are cognicentrism, lopsided development, mental pride, and disembodied attitudes to spiritual growth. Possible antidotes to those challenges are the integral bodhisattva vow (discussed below), integral practices, the cultivation of mental humility, and embodied approaches to spiritual growth. Intrapersonal co-creation affirms the importance of being rooted in spirit within (i.e., the immanent dimension of the mystery) and renders participatory spirituality essentially embodied and integrative.Interpersonal co-creation emerges from cooperative relationships among human beings growing as peers in the spirit of solidarity, mutual respect, and constructive confrontation. It is grounded in the equipotentiality principle, according to which “we are all teachers and students” insofar as we are superior and inferior to others in different regards. This principle does not entail that there is no value in working with spiritual teachers or mentors; it simply means that human beings cannot be ranked in their totality or according to a single developmental criterion, such as brainpower, emotional intelligence, or contemplative realization. Although peer-to-peer human relationships are vital for spiritual growth, interpersonal co-creation can include contact with perceived nonhuman intelligences, such as subtle entities, natural powers, or archetypal forces that might be embedded in psyche, nature, or the cosmos. The main challenges to interpersonal co-creation are spiritual pride, psychospiritual inflation, circumstantial or self-imposed isolation, and adherence to rigidly hierarchical spiritualities. Remedies to those challenges include collaborative spiritual practice and inquiry, intellectual and spiritual humility, deep dialogue, and relational and pluralistic approaches to spiritual growth. Interpersonal co-creation affirms the importance of communion with spirit in-between (i.e., the situational dimension of the mystery) and makes participatory spirituality intrinsically relational and eco-socio-politically engaged.Transpersonal co-creation refers to dynamic interaction between embodied human beings and the mystery in the bringing forth of spiritual insights, practices, states, and worlds. This dimension is grounded in the equiplurality principle, according to which there can potentially be multiple spiritual enactions that are nonetheless equally holistic and emancipatory. For example, a fully embodied liberation could be equally achieved through Christian incarnation or Yogic integration of purusa (consciousness) and prakriti (nature); likewise, freedom from self-centeredness at the service of others can be attained through the cultivation of Mahayana Buddhist karuna (compassion) or Christian agape (selfless love) in the context of radically different ontologies. This principle frees participatory spirituality from allegiance to any single spiritual system and paves the way for a genuine, ontologically and pragmatically grounded, spiritual pluralism. The main challenges to transpersonal co-creation are spiritual disempowerment, indoctrination, spiritual narcissism, and adherence to naive objectivist or universalist spiritualities. Antidotes include: the development of one’s inner spiritual authority and the affirmation of the right to inquire, heretical courage, and enactive and creative spiritualities. Transpersonal co-creation affirms the importance of being open to spirit beyond (i.e., the subtle dimensions of the mystery) and makes participatory spirituality fundamentally inquiry-driven and enactive.Although all three dimensions interact in multifaceted ways in the enactment of spiritual events, the creative link between intrapersonal and transpersonal co-creation deserves special mention. Whereas the mind and consciousness arguably serve as a natural bridge to subtle spiritual forms already enacted in history that display more fixed forms and dynamics such as cosmological motifs, archetypal configurations, and mystical visions and states, greater access to the more generative power of life or the mystery can be found through attention to the body and its vital energies. From this approach, it follows, the greater the participation of embodied dimensions in religious inquiry, the more creative one’s spiritual life may become and a larger number of creative spiritual developments may emerge.In the infancy of participatory spirituality in the 1990s, spiritual inquiry operated within certain constraints arguably inherited from traditional religion. As the historian of religion, Mircea Eliade famously argued, many established religious practices and rituals are “re-enactive” in their attempt to replicate cosmogonic actions and events. Expanding this account, I have suggested that most religious traditions can be seen as “reproductive” insofar as their practices aim to not only ritually reenact mythical motives, but also replicate the enlightenment of their founder or attain the state of salvation or freedom described in allegedly revealed scriptures. Although disagreements about the exact nature of such states and the most effective methods to attain them abound in the historical development of religious ideas and practices — naturally leading to rich creative developments within the traditions — spiritual inquiry was regulated (and arguably constrained) by such pre-given unequivocal goals.Participatory enaction entails a model of spiritual engagement that does not simply reproduce certain tropes according to a given historical a priori, but rather embarks upon the adventure of openness to the novelty and creativity of life or the mystery. Grounded on current moral intuitions and cognitive competences, for instance, participatory spiritual inquiry can not only undertake the critical revision and actualization of prior religious forms, but also the co-creation of novel spiritual understandings, practices, and even expanded states of freedom.This emphasis in creativity is central to spiritual individuation, that is, the process through which a person gradually develops and embodies her or his unique spiritual identity and wholeness. Religious traditions tend to promote the homogenization of central features of the inner and outer lives of their practitioners, for example, encouraging them to seek the same spiritual states and liberation, to become like Christ or the Buddha, or to wear the same clothes (in the case of monks). These aspirations may have been historically legitimate, but after the emergence of the modern self, our current predicament (at least in the West) arguably calls for an integration of spiritual maturation and psychological individuation that will likely lead to a richer diversity of spiritual expressions. In other words, the participatory approach aims at the emergence of a human community formed by spiritually differentiated individuals.It is important to sharply distinguish between the modern hyper-individualistic mental ego and the participatory selfhood forged in the sacred fire of spiritual individuation. Whereas the disembodied modern self is plagued by alienation, dissociation, and narcissism, a spiritually individuated person has an embodied, integrated, connected, and permeable identity whose high degree of differentiation, far from being isolating, actually allows him or her to enter into a deeply conscious communion with others, nature, and the multidimensional cosmos. A key difference between modern individualism and spiritual individuation is thus the integration of radical relatedness in the latter.The participatory approach embraces a pluralistic vision of spirituality that accepts the formative role of cultural and linguistic factors in religious phenomena. This simultaneously recognizes the importance of nonlinguistic variables (e.g., somatic, imaginal, energetic, subtle, archetypal) in shaping religious experiences and meanings while also affirming the ontological value and creative impact of spiritual worlds.Participatory pluralism allows the conception of a multiplicity of not only spiritual paths, but also spiritual liberations, worlds, and even ultimates. On the one hand, besides affirming the historical existence of multiple spiritual goals, the increased embodied openness to immanent spiritual life and the spirit-in-between fostered by the participatory approach may naturally engender a number of novel holistic spiritual realizations that cannot be reduced to traditional states of enlightenment or liberation. If human beings were regarded as unique embodiments of the mystery or the cosmos, would it not be plausible to consider that as they spiritually individuate, their spiritual realizations might also be distinct even if potentially overlapping and aligned with each other?On the other hand, participatory pluralism proposes that different spiritual ultimates can be enacted through intentional or spontaneous participation in an undetermined mystery, spiritual power, or generative force of life or reality. Whereas I take these enactions to be ultimate in their respective spiritual universes, this consideration in no way relativizes the various traditions’ ultimates — nor does it posit a supra-ultimate spiritual referent beyond them. In contrast, I hold that participatory enaction allows one to not only move away from representational and objectivist accounts of spiritual cognition, but also avoid the problematic dualism of the mystery and its enactions. Building on both the enactive paradigm’s account of cognition as embodied action, I maintain that in the same way an individual is her actions (whether perceptual, cognitive, emotional, or subtle), the mystery is its enactions. In this understanding, emptiness (sunyata), the Tao, and God (in their many inflexions) can be seen as creative gestures of the mystery enacted through participating human (and perhaps nonhuman) individuals and collectives.Hence, the participatory perspective does not contend that there are two, three, or any limited quantity of pre-given spiritual ultimates, but rather that the radical openness, interrelatedness, and creativity of the mystery or the cosmos allows for the participatory co-creation of an indefinite number of ultimate self-disclosures of reality and corresponding religious worlds. Participatory approaches seek to enact with body, mind, heart, and consciousness a creative spirituality that lets a thousand spiritual flowers bloom. Although this may at first sound like a rather “anything goes” approach to religious claims, I hold to the contrary: namely, that recognizing a diversity of co-created religious worlds in fact asks both scholars and practitioners to be more perspicuous in discerning their differences and merits. Because such worlds are not simply given but involve human beings as agents and co-creators, individuals are not off the ethical hook where religion is concerned but instead inevitably make cosmo-political and moral choices in all their religious actions. As discussed below, ethical considerations are crucial, especially in light of the demonstrably pernicious ecological, political, and social impact many religions historically had — and continue to have today.The pluralistic spirit of the participatory approach should not eclipse its “more relaxed” spiritual universalism — although eschewing dubious equations among spiritual ultimates (e.g., the Tao is God or Buddhist emptiness is structurally equivalent to the Hindu Brahman), the participatory approach affirms an underlying undetermined mystery or creative spiritual power as the generative source of all spiritual enactions. This shared spiritual dynamism should be distinguished from any Kantian-like noumenon or “thing-in-itself” endowed with inscrutable qualities and from which all spiritual ultimates are always derived as incomplete, culturally conditioned, or cognitively constrained phenomenal manifestations. In contrast, the enactive epistemology of the participatory approach does away with the Kantian two-worlds dualism by refusing to conceive of the mystery as having objectifiable pre-given attributes (such as personal, impersonal, dual, or nondual) and by affirming the radical identity of the manifold spiritual ultimates and the mystery, even if the former do not exhaust the ontological possibilities of the latter. Put simply, the mystery co-creatively unfolds in multiple ontological directions.Moreover, the relationship between pluralism and universalism cannot be consistently characterized in a hierarchical fashion. Whereas there surely are “lower” and “higher” forms of both universalism and pluralism (e.g., more or the between universalism and pluralism, between the and the it may be the dynamics of the of the mystery. The affirmation of a between the and the in spiritual unfolding renders any or hierarchical between universalism and pluralism cannot be that participatory pluralism does not entail the or of or religious or forms of Put the participatory of an objectifiable pre-given spiritual ultimate referent does not in spiritual To be sure, like of traditions cannot be ranked according to their in or this account does not cannot be more or the participatory renders the of among traditions according to a or a of spiritual insights, these can be in a of (e.g., cognitive, emotional, I have suggested the which the to which spiritual and practices practitioners from and subtle forms of and and the which the to which the same the of all dimensions of the the many and in the of religion, it may be to an which the to which spiritual social and religious and and and other human light of these differences among traditions can be and this is important — from both and In a for example, traditions may have contemplative more than the same could be about emotional intelligence, social or and practices a relationship with In a traditions may be more than others to dissociation, and religious and or among The fact that different traditions have different human is of makes and arguably for the development of more integral spiritual and important be spiritual and may be more for different psychological and cultural as for the same individual at distinct developmental but this does not make them superior or The of action, and to mind in this as do other spiritual that can be found in other the participatory emphasis on and although arguably central to most spiritual may not be shared by more most religious traditions would likely not in of the or the For example, or subtle forms of or of the human body and its energies are the in most and contemplative one could and participation of the body in spiritual many religions have had a demonstrably and about of human even they have also vital to them. the and of the participatory is for the development of a participatory critical of these the of a which the of a fully is open to can as a principle The of is thus capable of for critical in spiritual that is, in spiritual might be From this principle, or to spiritual choices and practices can be In to self and one might consider the of such as the In the of other may the degree of integration of spiritual states, for of with of body and in this it will no be a practitioners a or account of the mystery, or their of spiritual cultivation is social conscious or communion with The spiritual in contrast, will be the degree to which each spiritual both an of self-centeredness and a fully embodied integration to make individuals not only more to the of others, nature, and the but also more effective agents of cultural and in their unique the conscious mind is the of most of an liberation of consciousness can be insofar as one can that one is fully in dimensions of the self are or in — as the of modern spiritual teachers Participatory spirituality to the engagement of all human attributes in the spiritual or his the spiritual of and the vital the was that the liberation of consciousness cannot be to an integral the spiritual of all human this in mind, I have an integral bodhisattva vow in which the conscious mind its liberation the body, the heart, and the can be as from that them from sharing freely in the unfolding life of the mystery here on to to an integral bodhisattva vow is not a to the spiritual aspirations of it entails a to the integral liberation of all rather than only of their conscious or of as the of the bodhisattva does not a to Buddhist accounts of liberation as of and and from the of vow is arguably to the of many religious such as Michael and for or and These and many others spiritual and of their traditions that seek not only to and but also to human dimensions that had been or even such as the of and body and or relationships and to many spiritual and of or participatory spiritual practice the embodied, and enactive (i.e., and dimensions of spiritual growth. This emphasis can be found in traditional practices, many of traditional practices, and a number of spiritual Whereas traditional practices (e.g., are participatory in many The Participatory in their modern one can more and of participatory I for example, Michael Lerner’s and and embodied of Buddhist and account of modern and Western approaches to and Christian of the body and in Christian among many the have the emergence of a of novel participatory spiritual practices, such as and embodied cooperative spiritual inquiry, and of embodied spiritual of practice with important participatory include and spirituality modern forms of integral relational approaches to spirituality, and modern of as spiritual path, among a are our relationships with both the human and nonhuman This is inevitably with a to social To be sure, this can take many different forms, from more social or in the (e.g., social spiritually grounded to more subtle of social or discussed by in his there is to about the of subtle embodied spirituality cannot be from a to political, and — this may arguably calls for the of a This however, cannot of moral religious and even mystical but to be in the of religious on human and cooperative spiritual In other words, it is likely that any will be grounded not only in human spiritual but also in the critical on such a history in the context of moral intuitions (e.g., about the of religious narcissism, and its for and the of — for with — to of the most of the such as the of and the of rich and the to cultural and and in although participatory spirituality arguably for critical in spiritual it is to consider the participatory or any participatory approach, a spiritual tradition that could be all In contrast, participatory spirituality might be as a spiritual (i.e., and creative that can be found in various within many that is in the ongoing of and that may also to spiritual and the emergence of novel religious or spiritual I that the participatory should be seen more as a of sharing a about the nature of spiritual the of and multidimensional cognition, or the of religious pluralism than as a of or through traditional The pluralistic character of a can greater diversity than a of which achieves its identity through to or a is not only with the pluralistic of the participatory but also in the of not a constraints to or the to into a the nature of a is with the of hierarchical and in and religion by many participatory as as with for peer-to-peer of and and of is an important of such might seek to not only sharing of but also to promote a of for and the and of a participatory approach the spiritual of not in any spiritual or but in the shared of communion with the generative dimension of the mystery. In other words, the spiritual of may not be found in the (i.e., in or even mystical but deep into the (i.e., in the embodied with our creative As the to and are among the for only in the The of such creative may to by in creative a of deep communion a may also engender a of to a spiritual to the spiritual individuation of its and the eco-socio-politically of the an to both scholars and practitioners to their and to the and to participatory in and into I with the that the participatory approach and to a more individuals in the embodied co-creation of their spiritual perhaps most participate more fully in the mystery of which