Abstract Crypto research highlights the anarcho-libertarian feature of the crypto movement, characterizing the industry as a radical departure from governmental and corporate influence. This study investigates the characteristics of the US crypto elite, highlighting how the demographic structure and the institutional connections of the industry resemble those of the established financial elite. Drawing on original data from board members of top US crypto and financial firms, Fortune 1000 companies, and major policy-planning organizations, it develops three comparisons. Results show that crypto elites share similar socio-educational traits with traditional finance leaders and engage with powerful corporate and political affiliations, despite being more peripheral in corporate networksâlikely due to the sectorâs recent emergence. Notably, the White House appears in the career paths of both groups, suggesting a shared pattern of revolving door integration into state structures. Rather than a structural transformation, crypto appears to align with the broader elite configuration of the US political economy.
Existing typologies of think tanks classify institutions by ideology, thematic focus, or organizational affiliation-but none addresses how think tanks interact with their principals. This note introduces T-Notation, a functional classification system modelled on the B2B/B2C framework, categorizing think tanks by interaction mode: T2G (government), T2B (business), T2I (international organizations), T2M (media), and T2T (think tank-to-think tank). The framework is applied to the SCO think tank ecosystem, where it reveals a structural deficit and suggests a protocol-based alternative-the Think Tank Distributed Ledger (TTDL)-to the secretariat model currently under deliberation.
This chapter turns to recent advances in sociology of singularities (Reckwitz 2020) to advance the study of digital sigularization in four key respects. First, by opening up singularization research to the realities of late-modern society, dubbed as society of singularities by Reckwitz. Second, to (re)consider the role of digitalization and technology in singularization. The sociology of singularities finds in digitalization one of the key structural drivers propelling society from industrial modernity dominated by the social logic of the general to society of singularities (the social logic of the particular/singular). Third, Reckwitz offers useful tools to explore the processes and practices of collective singularization. Lastly, his sociology of singularities provides a fresh vantage point for further reflecting on Web3 and the evolution of Web imaginaries covered in Part II of the book.
Blockchain technology claims to disrupt the existing financial system, the way of doing business, and to empower ordinary citizens against an elitist economy through decentralization of the decision-making process. In the political arena, the disruptive ideology branded as âpopulismâ challenges the neo-liberal establishment. By appealing to peoplesâ fears, frustrations, and dissatisfaction with the political elites, exploiting distrust in the so-called establishment, populism claims to deliver more power to the people. In this article, we draw a parallel between core foundations of political populism and those of blockchain and propose a theory of technological populism. Technological populism as reflected by blockchain platforms exploits the rhetoric of empowering the disenfranchised through decentralized decision-making process, enabling anonymity of transactions, dehumanizing trust (promoting trust in computation rather than trust in humans and institutions) as well as breaking the monopoly in the financial system and money supply. The rhetoric of empowering the disenfranchised against financial elites is not only propaganda but also a method of accumulating wealth for technocratic elites. Ultimately, the blockchain and cryptocurrency world has perfected what political populists have pioneered â unrealistic promises, turning the citizen against âthe elitesâ only so long as they are not the elites in charge.
The building of the blockchain is predicted to harken the end of the contemporary sovereign order. Some go further to claim that as a powerful decentering technology, blockchain contests the continued functioning of world capitalism. Are such claims merited? In this paper we consider sovereignty and blockchain technology theoretically, posing possible futures for sovereignty in a blockchain world. These possibilities include various forms of individual, popular, technological, corporate, and techno-totalitarian state sovereignty. We identify seven structural tendencies of blockchain technology and give examples as to how these have manifested in the construction of new forms of sovereignty. We conclude that the future of sovereignty in a blockchain world will be articulated in the conjuncture of social struggle and technological agency and we call for a stronger alliance between technologists and democrats.
T HE PROLIFERATION OF INTEREST GROUPS and the explosion of group advocacy in the United States and other liberal democracies in the 1980s has led to a renewed attention to the comparative study of interest politics. Among the major questions at issue is the relationship between political, social and economic change and group formation, proliferation, organizational maintenance and group action. Interest group theory suggests that groups proliferate during periods of rapid change. As India approaches its first half century of independence, a study of changes in its interest group system provides an excellent opportunity to attempt to assess the impact of systemic change on interest group development and behavior.' In the decades since independence and especially since 1980, India has experienced an accelerated process of economic, social and political change. The Indian rate of economic growth has increased, literacy rates have risen sharply, the pace of urbanization has quickened and most importantly the size of its middle class has increased significantly. These economic and social changes have been accompanied by striking political and policy changes that include the decline of party, heightened pressure for decentralization and fundamental alteration of India's past model of planned development. These changes have begun to alter the nature and conduct of interest politics in India. India has experienced an increase in the mobilization, proliferation and transformation of groups and significant changes in interest group roles, styles and strategies. As a result the Indian system of state-dominated pluralism in which autonomous groups were overshadowed by an omnipresent state2 is eroding as interest politics have