Website: https://manual.warondisease.org/knowledge/appendix/wishocracy-paper.html Abstract: Politicians' votes have near-zero correlation with citizen preferences (Gilens and Page, 2014). Elite preferences predict policy outcomes. No mechanism connects citizen preferences to electoral consequences for representatives. RAPPA: Millions of citizens answer simple pairwise questions ("How would you split \$100 between these two budget categories?"). Geometric mean aggregation produces population-level preference weights from sparse individual responses. Unlike approval voting or ranked choice, RAPPA captures preference *intensity*, not just what people want, but how much they care. Compare aggregated preferences to each legislator's voting record. Publish Citizen Alignment Scores. Channel campaign resources to high-alignment candidates through Incentive Alignment Bonds. The mechanism achieves three properties no prior system combines: minimal cognitive load (~20 comparisons per participant yields statistical convergence), preference intensity capture, and approximate strategy-proofness. At system scale, the Optimal Governance Trajectory reaches 56.7x (95% CI: 19.3x-304x) the Earth baseline after 20 years, raises average income to \$1.16 million (95% CI: \$395,118-\$6.22 million) versus \$20,483 on the status-quo path, reaches \$10.7 quadrillion (95% CI: \$3.64 quadrillion-\$57.2 quadrillion) in total output, and recovers roughly \$101 trillion (95% CI: \$83.3 trillion-\$191 trillion)/year in suppressed value ([The Political Dysfunction Tax](https://political-dysfunction-tax.warondisease.org)). Summary: Representative democracy suffers from an inescapable principal-agent problem where elected officials' incentives diverge from citizen welfare. Wishocracy introduces RAPPA (Randomized Aggregated Pairwise Preference Allocation), which aggregates citizen preferences through cognitively tractable pairwise comparisons and creates accountability via Citizen Alignment Scores that channel electoral resources toward politicians who actually represent what citizens want.
We present two new proofs of the GibbardâSatterthwaite theorem, the foundational result in social choice theory establishing that every surjective, strategy-proof social choice function on three or more alternatives is dictatorial. Both proofs share a common engineâthe Mutual Exclusion of Influence (a six-line theorem showing that two voters cannot both control the same alternative pair at a shared profile while ranking the pair differently)âbut diverge in how they derive dictatorship from this principle. The first proof is purely combinatorial: mutual exclusion combined with a transition sequence identifies a uniquely decisive voter without constructing a classical pivotal voter. The second proof is information-theoretic: under the uniform distribution on preference profiles, strategy-proofness yields an exact identity relating conditional outcome entropy to option-set size. The zero-overlap theoremâa measure-theoretic consequence of mutual exclusionâforces influence entropy to concentrate entirely in a single voter, characterizing dictatorship as the unique entropy profile (log |X|, 0, âŚ, 0) compatible with strategy-proofness and surjectivity. To our knowledge, the second proof is the first to establish the GibbardâSatterthwaite theorem via Shannon-type information-theoretic quantities. The Mutual Exclusion Theorem itself is new and replaces the pivotal-voter construction across all four established proof routes with a single structural principle. Both proofs connect to the Adversarial Aggregation Channel (AAC) framework, in which the influence entropy corresponds to adversarial sub-channel capacity and the mutual exclusion principle instantiates a channel-capacity conservation law.
Token-based voting systems are increasingly adopted in digital governance contexts such as decentralized autonomous organizations and participatory budgeting, yet their standard aggregation rules often lead to undesirable outcomes, including oligarchic dominance or voter apathy. This paper introduces a general mathematical framework for token-based voting that interpolates between one-person-one-vote and one-token-onevote paradigms through the notion of radical voting functions. These functions map voting tokens to actual votes via concave transformations that preserve incentives for participation while compressing excessive voting power. We formalize consensus as an aggregation of transformed votes and study its structural properties using tools from convex analysis and majorization theory. We show that radical voting functions reward broad and evenly distributed support and penalize highly concentrated voting patterns, thereby favoring pluralistic outcomes over individualistic ones. Quadratic voting emerges as a special case within this framework, characterized by linear marginal voting costs. The analysis is extended to account for voter heterogeneity by incorporating similarity measures into the consensus function, linking voting outcomes to diversity among participants. Overall, the framework provides a principled foundation for designing voting mechanisms that balance merit, inclusiveness, and resistance to capture in token-based governance systems.
Abstract This chapter argues that, although political finance rules should be normatively assessed in tandem with the party system, in order to develop more precise recommendations for political finance design and reform, tailored to specific political systems, we need to consider a number of contextual factors. These include electoral institutions, institutions of decentralization, form of government, and party organization. Some of these factors may directly impact on a countryâs party system. But even when they do not, they should still be considered in the analysis at this stage as they can help to qualify the evaluation of party system/political finance combinations and thereby formulate more nuanced judgements that are well suited to the design of rules in a practical setting.
Lukas Weidener, Fabio Laredo, K. I. Pavan Kumar, Karlin Compton
This study presents a systematic scoping review of delegated voting (DV) in decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs), focusing on its governance implications, implementation forms, and challenges. DV refers to a mechanism through which token holders transfer their voting rights to other participants, often called delegates, who vote on their behalf. While DV is often adopted to address low participation and mitigate the cognitive burden of direct involvement, the existing literature highlights its potential to exacerbate centralization, particularly when whales or influential networks are disproportionate. This creates tension between the intended efficiency gains of the delegation and the unintended concentration of power. Various implementation models, including off-chain platforms (e.g., Snapshot), hybrid governance architectures, and token-based delegation systems, exhibit distinct trade-offs in transparency, cost, and adaptability. Although innovations such as quadratic voting, weighted delegation constraints, and reputation-based governance show promise for improving fairness and accountability, they also face vulnerabilities, such as gaming, collusion, and high implementation complexity. To explore the diverse approaches to DV, this review organizes and synthesizes key findings from recent scholarly publications examining its implementation, risks, and governance outcomes. Synthesizing insights from 13 publications, this review identifies key governance trade-offs, implementation patterns, and risks associated with DV. It also outlines future research directions, including multi-tiered governance structures and decision-support mechanisms, to guide more inclusive and context-aware DAO governance.
Abstract This chapter traces the development of a politics industry, and its contribution to the nationalization of campaigns and partisan polarization, with a focus on the United States. It looks at communications and campaign technologies as well as deregulation of campaign finance in the nineteen-nineties and early eighties. As parties have invested more resources in the data game of campaigns, they have outsourced many other functions---including mobilization, representation, and interest articulation---to non-party groups, which weakens the ability of parties to govern effectively. This chapter also provides a recent history of campaign finance, and explains how the decentralization of campaign finance makes it harder for parties to manage insurgent candidates.
Niclas Boehmer, Markus Brill, Alfonso Cevallos, Jonas Gehrlein ¡ 6 authors
We provide the first large-scale data collection of real-world approval-based committee elections. These elections have been conducted on the Polkadot blockchain as part of their Nominated Proof-of-Stake mechanism and contain around one thousand candidates and tens of thousands of (weighted) voters each. We conduct an in-depth study of application-relevant questions, including a quantitative and qualitative analysis of the outcomes returned by different voting rules. Besides considering proportionality measures that are standard in the multiwinner voting literature, we pay particular attention to less-studied measures of overrepresentation, as these are closely related to the security of the Polkadot network. We also analyze how different design decisions such as the committee size affect the examined measures.
The term âmovement partyâ has gained widespread currency in the social sciences in recent years, finding extensive application to political parties ranging from the radical left (Della Porta et al., 2017) to the far right (Caiani & CĂsaĹ, 2019; Pirro & Castelli Gattinara, 2018). Unlike with other academic buzzwords such as âpopulism,â however, there is also a notable lack of readily identifiable and competing theoretical paradigms that have made systematic attempts at conceptualizing the termâa problem that Kitschelt (2006, p. 278) already pointed out with his arguably first such attempt, noting that âmovement partyâ lacks well-defined status as âa formal concept with a specific terminological content.â Since then, an influential strand of scholarship building on Kitschelt's work has emerged around what might be termed an interactive-mobilizational approach, for which the primary definitional criterion for being a âmovement partyâ is a hybridity of mobilizational repertoires in the electoral-institutional and protest arenas giving rise to a loosely formalized interactive balance between movement and party orientations (hence the proposed syntagma âinteractive-mobilizationalâ). As will be argued in the following, while this approach has succeeded in spawning a wide range of applications across distinct party types (from anti-austerity to far-right), the definitional focus on protest activity concedes insufficient attention to the organizational dimension and renders the concept of movement parties more or less reducible to what BorbĂĄth and Hutter (2021) have referred to as âprotesting parties.â In recognizing both the merits and limitations of this literature, this paper proposes an alternative discursive-organizational approach, drawing on the author's previous work based on the post-foundational discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe (2001[1985]) to conceptualize movement parties as a distinct form of political organization: one that is predicated on horizontal integration of autonomously organized movement actors as the basic decision-making agents and constituent subjects within the party. From this perspective, I go on to examine three examples of movement parties of the radical left, center, and far right, respectively: the CUP (Candidatures d'Unitat Popular) in Catalonia, the (now defunct) EgyĂźtt in Hungary, and the Right Sector in Ukraine. All three examples vividly illustrate the inherent organizational precarity (and, in some instances, ephemerality) of the movement party form, but also the willingness of these actors to maintain a movement party structure in high-stakes institutional contexts and their ability to exert recognizable political weight within these settings. The discursive-organizational approach presented here draws on an expanded framework of post-foundational discourse theory in which political organization is understood as a performative extension of discursive constructions of collective identities (hence the syntagma âdiscursive-organizationalâ). As I will argue, movement parties are characterized internally by a privileging of a certain type of relationânamely, horizontal coordinative links between autonomously operating movement actors who maintain a dual identity as representatives of the party and of their respective movementsâin contrast to what I call Volksparteien of a new type (VNTs) such as Podemos and France Insoumise, which are characterized by vertical plebiscitary links between a centralized unitary leadership and a broad, undifferentiated popular base (e.g., via leadership-initiated referenda open to anyone registered online). As such, movement parties and VNTs can be considered paradigmatic opposites along the horizontal/vertical spectrum; movement parties tend to display a networked or coalitional structure, featuring âassemblies,â âplatforms,â and joint executive organs bringing together representatives of distinct movements that remain organizationally separate and autonomousâin the language of social movement theory, as contentious claims-making actors in their own rightâwhile pooling their decision-making input within the party. In this vein, the discursive-organizational approach can contribute to an awareness of the inherently precarious, tension-laden, and often transient nature of the movement party phenomenonâas already recognized by Kitschelt (2006)âwhile also going beyond the latter's interactive-mobilizational approach to develop an understanding of the organizational specificity of the movement party form. In the following, the paper proceeds in three main steps: first, an overview of the interactive-mobilizational approach, from Kitschelt's foundational work to more recent contributions; second, a presentation of the discursive-organizational approach, featuring conceptual reflections in conjunction with empirical an of the three movement parties of the radical left, center, and far right in by a The empirical is of an the to a of organizational distinct movement party as as notable examples of their or conceptual and empirical a for a the of which are in the Kitschelt's on a foundational for what has an interactive-mobilizational strand of on movement parties (e.g., & CĂsaĹ, 2019; Porta et al., Pirro & Castelli Gattinara, 2018). Kitschelt's (2006, is from movement to partyâ as a for of the protest and institutional rise to movement parties as of political who from social movements and to the organizational and of social movements in the of party an of in that emerged in the and in to and political parties in the of and protest movements Kitschelt & & & The of this is in movements parties and of party such as that of protest movements In his work on âmovement as a Kitschelt the as a specific within this to of collective and social parties collective via a of electoral-institutional and protest but with in the of formalized organization or of this the of movement parties in their mobilizational both protest and as as their of organizational and which in for between movement and party orientations the the movement parties are characterized by this between of protest and the right of as to the from one or the Kitschelt's movement parties are inherently and tend to be As the movement parties often parties the develop organizational and p. examples such as the parties in that the âmovement partyâ can be a transient is noting here that Kitschelt's a specific of organizational that the organizational of movement parties can a wide ranging from with a and to the of of being the in is both and however, a dual movement and party in with a of formalized organization: paradigmatic examples of âmovement such as the predicated on a of organizationally and formalized such as the or the of party and which have also for their (e.g., by a between party and to the of and p. have pointed out from the of radical theory that for protest movements on of or is and and are but be as the of more (e.g., will be in the In a of the interactive-mobilizational approach as by Kitschelt is the definitional focus on a dual of actors operating both in the protest and the & Castelli Gattinara, p. which go in with a wide range of organizational characterized by a of The organizational dimension is but primary this approach as is the the of organizational that movement The specific form of organization that from a mobilizational is Since the the of the movements of the and their of on movement parties within the interactive-mobilizational has work on distinct party such as âmovement parties (Della Porta et al., 2017) or right movement (Caiani & CĂsaĹ, a conceptual these have the definitional focus on the dual party and social movement which in with a range of organizational of movement a here to to with the paradigmatic of the anti-austerity being and the (Della Porta et al., and an understanding of based on political and discursive the hybridity of âmovement in their of contentious from the protest within the of that is to a wide range of radical right parties in the from the for and the to and the to and The approach can be to have succeeded in spawning a with a of applications to empirical across and The merits of this be in the that a is for âmovement as to and often transient within the of political in of the of of the the mobilizational hybridity of protest and repertoires or to as the definitional criterion for a âmovement BorbĂĄth and Hutter for have proposed the term âprotesting for the of in protest for a political party to be a movement party and a an organizational dimension is however, has left in the as movement parties are in of the of organizational the of a movement party reducible to to there is form of movement party organization from this perspective, but a of is this conceptual the merits of a understanding to the and by the movement party the alternative approach in the to The post-foundational discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe (2001[1985]) an understanding of discourse that beyond and and in their and performative understanding of as as also Laclau & I have proposed an expanded framework of post-foundational discourse for the of political organization as a performative extension of in this a between âmovement and parties of a new as horizontal and vertical of respectively: parties are predicated on the horizontal integration of autonomously organized social movement actors via and collective leadership within the VNTs are characterized by vertical plebiscitary links between a centralized unitary leadership and a undifferentiated of as the by the party The basic this is political actors collective identities and on the of organizational The theoretical here are and (2001[1985]) understanding of radical as a horizontal of and between that an specific to (e.g., and theory of that the vertical dimension of the of on the of a a wide range of around a In this vein, radical and can be understood as paradigmatic of horizontal and vertical characterized by a distinct of collective identities are in of horizontal between autonomously operating movement actors autonomously contentious of their or a vertical as to 2017) of around a popular this to these of horizontal and vertical out of political organization that have in the in the of the movements of 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featuring or to movement actors to with their movement within party in to a collective leadership with the of the vertical of across representatives of the paradigmatic of a movement party in this is the CUP in be in the from a on a organizational the party which as a for social movement actors such as radical and in the organizational with their own such as of the on the other can be understood as the paradigmatic of movement parties along the horizontal/vertical on the of a in to a of referred to as of the and to in decision-making via plebiscitary referenda in the and with party In this vein, the concept is to understanding of characterized by a of a of plebiscitary via referenda by and to a The of such a party is Podemos in referred to as the predicated on building the party around organized but the of the from the to the of their to with the of a in the of between the base and the leadership also & 2018). the of party the of movement parties proposed here is of which is as a of constituent such as and the main being the at in with party however, a of movement parties as understood here in a horizontal of the to the leadership of the party in the form of a collective leadership The concept of in draws on the of which also as a for his concept of partyâ to the or contrast to parties with their an and undifferentiated base with a party leadership that on a in more of In this the as understood here a of the the is already in the of party the paradigmatic contrast between movement parties and VNTs for a understanding of and as the of political from the of who the basic constituent subjects of party organization movement actors registered to their links are to what of leadership with plebiscitary the on movement the proposed here between movement parties and VNTs from a discursive-organizational is of what Kitschelt as a of between horizontal between movement and vertical or what Porta et p. have referred to as a range of from to In contrast to these movement parties are understood here in a as to one of this the privileging of horizontal between movement as to a distinct organizational form. 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Abstract In the last three decades, many Asian democracies have decentralized their political systems to promote the democratic, equal, and efficient distribution of national resources across regions. Nonetheless, most of these countries, including South Korea, are still in a stage of âpartial fiscal decentralization,â in which locally elected officials have spending authority, while a significant portion of their financing relies on transfers from the central government. This article argues that the decentralized distribution is significantly influenced by the partisan interests of central and local governments. The central government transfers more funds to local governments that their co-partisans govern, and local incumbents follow partisan policy priorities to obtain the allocation of available fiscal resources. This argument is strongly supported by the empirical analysis of subsidy transfers and regional social expenditures in South Korea from 2002 to 2015. First, we find that the central government in Korea transfers larger subsidies to politically aligned regions. Second, regional governments with larger subsidy transfers have higher levels of social expenditures. Third, governors or mayors affiliated with a progressive party spend significantly more on social welfare and education than do those affiliated with a conservative party.
During each election cycle, the city of Seattle distributes four $25 vouchers to every registered voter, which may be donated to and redeemed by campaigns for city office. Through a difference-in-differences research design, we study the causal effect of Seattle's program on various outcomes in city council elections in the first two cycles after implementation, with comparison cities drawn from large cities in Washington and California. We find a 53% increase in total contributions and a 350% increase in number of unique donors; these effects are largely explained by large increases in small donations, defined as contributions less than $200. We find statistically insignificant evidence of decreases in private donations, although our point estimates suggest moderate-to-substantial crowd-out ratios. We further estimate a highly significant 86% increase in number of candidates coupled with substantial decreases in incumbent electoral success. These results provide some of the first causal evidence of the effect of decentralized public campaign finance schemes, while speaking to the impacts of campaign regulation more generally on donation activity, candidate entry, and incumbency advantage.
Subnational governments have become more involved in the âregulation of unemploymentâ (the design, implementation and financing of unemployment-related benefits and activation), partly because they are thought to be better placed to activate the unemployed than federal governments. However, depending on its specific design, decentralization can reduce the incentives subnational governments have to implement effective activation. Such âinstitutional moral hazardâ is not yet systematically theorized. We examine how and to what extent it affects three federal countries. We distinguish three factors that influence whether institutional moral hazard is perceived as a problem and how it can be resolved. We identify two types of subnational challenges to federal control.
Abstract This article examines the politics of the Federal Reserve System of regional banks. While regional banks have long lacked meaningful influence over monetary policy, their leadership stands to provide a base of elite support for the Federal Reserve. To serve this role effectively, however, regional bank leadership must reflect the ideological diversity of political elites. This article provides the first quantitative empirical analysis of the ideological composition of the regional banking system, introducing a novel data set of all regional bank directors serving from 1980 to 2015 and linking each individual to a measure of political ideology derived from campaign finance contributions. With these data, I examine the degree to which regional banks are ideologically aligned with the districts and industries they are assigned to represent. The results highlight a new function for the decentralized central banking system and opportunity to address declining levels of public confidence in the Fed.
Abstract Why do common-pool problems persist over time in federations? The literature shows that macro institutional, economic, and political incentives facilitate bailouts through intergovernmental transfers and debt management. Little research, however, explores the legislative mechanisms that prevent common-pool problems from being effectively addressed. This article focuses on a most central mechanism: tax lawmaking. We argue that lawmakers, whose careers rest in the hands of provincial constituencies, administer the legislative process to promote bills that protect the federal transfers that finance vertical fiscal imbalances and to amend proposals that seek to change them. Using an expert-coded dataset designed to assess the direction and magnitude of tax policy change, as described by the amendments proposed by legislators to the full set of tax bills proposed to the Argentine Congress since 1983, we document the legislative dynamics underpinning the common-pool problems of decentralized fiscal federal arrangements.
The alleged undue influence of interest groups used to be and is one of the most critical problems in campaign and party financing in the United States and the Federal Republic. This chapter focuses on some issues which are debated vigorously in the United States and Germany. The party finance scandals in Germany have been about tax evasion, fraud, and in a very few instances corruption; they were not about illegally high amounts of donations. Corporate as well as union contributions are much more decentralized in the US than in Germany, paralleling the decentralized structure of American interest groups. In Germany public funding has been largely a reaction to increasing campaign costs. The party leadership in Germany should be made more accountable to the membership in financial matters. In both countries there is considerable suspicion that both candidates and parties depend financially on interest groups.
Amrita Dhillon, Grammateia Kotsialou, Peter McBurney, Luke Riley
This work discusses the potential of a blockchain based infrastructure for a decentralised online voting platform. When compared to paper based voting, online voting can vastly increase the speed that votes can be counted, expand the overall accessibility of the election system and decrease the cost of turnout. Yet despite these advantages, online voting for political office is subject to fraud at various levels due to its centralised nature. In this paper, we describe a general architecture of a centralised online voting system and detail which areas of such a system are vulnerable to electoral fraud. We then proceed to introduce the key ideas underlying blockchain technology as a decentralised mechanism that can address these problems. We discuss the advantages and weaknesses of the blockchain technology, the protocols the technology uses and what criteria a good blockchain protocol should satisfy (depending on the voting application). We argue that the decentralisation inherent in the blockchain technology could increase the publicâs trust in national elections, as well as eliminate voter impersonation and double voting. We conclude with a discussion regarding how economists and social scientists can collaborate with the blockchain community in a research agenda on the design of efficient blockchain protocols and new voting systems such as liquid democracy.
This chapter analyzes how multilevel elections, strong subnational governments, and decentralized electoral rules shape the workings of Brazilâs democratic institutions. I seek to answer two major questions. First, to what extent have institutions adopted by the 1988 Constitution created effective incentives for party nationalization and integration and, therefore, for organization of party competition around the dispute over the national executive? Second, what is the impact of multilevel elections on electoral coordination and party fragmentation in congressional races? The core argument is that the institutional mix chosen by the drafters of the 1988 Constitution created cross-cutting incentives. Concurrent presidential, national legislative, and state elections since 1994 have tended to strengthen presidential coattails and the related incentives for party coordination around presidential campaigns, and extensive presidential legislative powers facilitate centralization of the policy-making process. But, although these institutions foster the organization of a nationalized party system and effective intergovernmental coordination, incentives and opportunities provided by multilevel elections in the context of autonomous subnational party branches and highly permissive electoral rules allow for the survival and growth of poorly integrated, office-seeking party organizations organized around subnational races. The chapter concludes that Brazilâs federalism weakens the connection between presidential and legislative races, while at the same time fostering high levels of party fragmentation, therefore increasing the costs of coalition formation.
Public elections are one of the basis upon which representative democracy is built. Thus, it is of the utmost importance that governments and organizations are able to successfully hold non-fraudulent representative elections. Several methods are employed in order to allow citizens to cast their votes, such as Ballot-based voting, purely electronic methods, and Electronic Voting Machines, among others. However, we argue that current methods, specially those based on electronic platforms, provide unsatisfactory levels of transparency to voters, thus harming the trust voters have that the vote they cast was the same one counted by election officials, a problem known as voter confidence. Instead of stepping back to traditional and inefficient offline strategies, we suggest the modernization of State structures by the use of emerging technologies. In this research, we explore the possibility of using Blockchain technology to help in solving those transparency and confidence problems. First, we give an overview of Blockchain itself and other uses focused on societal problems and their respective analysis. We then analyze how the adoption of Blockchain into a digital government repertoire can contribute to common e-voting issues and also promote elections transparency, increase auditability, enhance voter confidence and strengthen democracy. By attending to this poster presentation, visitors will have a clear understanding of what is Blockchain and its basic concepts, why are market and researchers so excited about it, how it can help to solve common voting systems issues, who is already using it and the benefits and potential risks of its adoption.
The candidate selection process in the United States has been, since the second half of the 20th century, one of the most inclusive and decentralized among the developed democracies. While such systems often presuppose party weakness or lack of control over the process, this article shows that patterns of campaign finance indicate that party weakness over candidate selection in the U.S. case may be overestimated. It also argues that a very open selection process offers opportunities for insurgent movements within parties that bring new ideas and demands. Finally, it suggests that political culture may mediate the relationship between party strength and democratized selection methods.
This dissertation comprises three empirical essays in political economy. The first essay analyzes the implementation of a French social program by subnational governments following a decentralization reform. Using program implementation data, it shows that local political environments strongly influence implementation decisions after decentralization, and that decentralization results in an overall tightening of benefits. The second essay reports the results of a conjoint field experiment involving German welfare offices. Using random assignment of cues about ethnicity and other characteristics in requests to welfare offices, it is shown that putative non-German applicants receive replies at the same rate as putative Germans, but are disadvantaged in terms of the substantive quality of responses. This suggests that minority populations do experience discrimination when attempting to access social benefits. Finally, the third essay uses micro-level voter file data from Illinois to measure whether property tax limitations reduce participation in local elections. In contrast with prior research, results from panel regressions with matching adjustments suggest that tax limitations do not affect political participation negatively. Together, these essays contribute to our understanding of public finance and social policy in contexts characterized by multi-level governance.
Over the past decade, a large number of studies have shown that in advanced democracies policymakers are more likely to represent the preferences of high-income citizens than the preferences of low-income citizens (e.g., Gilens 2005, 2012; Bartels 2008; Ellis 2012; Giger, Rosset and Bernauer 2012; Hayes 2012; Rigby and Wright 2013). In a quest to understand this income bias in substantive representation, several authors have recently suggested that the persistent descriptive underrepresentation of low-income groups in policymaking institutions may explain why political decisions are so frequently skewed toward the preferences of the affluent (e.g., Carnes 2012; Carnes and Lupu 2015).2 However, although this is a plausible explanation, many previous studies dealing with the consequences of descriptive representation have failed to find an effect of policymakers' incomes or social class backgrounds on their behavior in office (e.g., Matthews 1984; Norris and Lovenduski 1995). In this essay, we argue that descriptive representation may indeed have an effect on policymaking, yet for it to be consequential three necessary conditions must be satisfied. We explain in the next section what these conditions are. We then present research that we have recently conducted on representation in the Swiss parliament. Our analyses show that although Swiss legislators coming from lower-income backgrounds appear to have distinct preferences over policy, these differences in preferences do not translate into distinct behavior in the policymaking arena. Finally, drawing upon the three necessary conditions described below, the last section provides some suggestions as to why we fail to find an effect of descriptive representation on legislative behavior in the current Swiss context. The descriptive representation of different income groups may be important simply on symbolic grounds, since the legitimacy and authority of a ârepresentativeâ body such as parliament can be undermined if it fails to reflect the composition of the population that it is intended to represent (e.g., Norris and Lovenduski 1995). If we assume, however, that constituents care primarily about policy outcomes (e.g., Downs 1957), rather than the composition of parliament, descriptive representation is important only to the extent that it affects legislative behavior.3 Based on this assumption, and following in part Carnes and Lupu (2015), we argue that there are three necessary conditions that must be satisfied for descriptive representation to have an effect on legislators' policymaking actions. First, legislators must share policy preferences with the group they represent descriptively, at least for a subset of the policies on the political agenda. Such preference congruence can be the result of two mechanisms. On the one hand, people with similar background characteristics may have âshared experiences,â which in turn promote similar interests and preferences over policy (Mansbridge 1999). By merely following their personal preferences, descriptive representatives then further not only their own interests but also those of the social groups they represent. On the other hand, congruence between the preferences of representatives and citizens belonging to the same socioeconomic group may be the product of responsiveness (Achen 1978). If the former have incentives to respond to the policy preferences of the latter (for instance because of reelection concerns; see, e.g., Mayhew 1974), the represented can âinduceâ preferences in their legislators (e.g., Snyder and Ting 2005). Second, much of the literature on legislative politics assumes that multiple principals can influence the voting behavior of legislators. Most important in this regard are party discipline and constituent pressure (e.g., Levitt 1996; Burden 2007; Carey 2009). Consequently, although legislators' behavior may be constrained by party leaders and constituents who do not belong to their descriptively represented groups, for descriptive representation to be relevant these principals must not determine legislators' actions completely. In order to be able to act according to the preferences of the groups they represent descriptively, representatives must therefore have some discretion in the policy decision-making process (see also Carnes and Lupu 2015). Third, legislators who descriptively represent a particular group must be presented with choices in the policymaking process that separate them from other legislators who do not represent the same group descriptively but are otherwise similar (e.g., in terms of party affiliation). If this is not the case, it is difficult to disentangle the effect of descriptive representation from the effects of other characteristics shared by the descriptive representatives and other (similar) representatives. Provided that these three conditions are satisfied, we expect descriptive representation to matter for legislative behavior. We turn next to a discussion of our research assessing whether and to what extent socioeconomic characteristics affect legislators' attitudes and behavior in the Swiss parliament. The Swiss parliament is a militia parliament. Hence, although the compensations legislators receive for their parliamentary activity may suffice to cover the cost of living, many retain a professional activity during their parliamentary mandates. Members of the Swiss parliament are therefore likely to have relatively diverse economic conditions, not only as a result of the different professions they exercised before entering parliament and the different levels of accumulated wealth, but also because their incomes can vary substantially depending on the professional activities conducted during their mandates. An important argument put forward by proponents of the militia system is that it allows for a more diverse composition of parliament and a closer connection between legislators and their constituents. However, in practice, the militia system does not seem to enhance the descriptive representation of different social classes, as the Swiss parliament is predominantly composed of liberal professionals, entrepreneurs, and high-rank civil servants (Pilotti et al. 2010, Pilotti this debate). These two features of the Swiss parliament â diversity in legislators' income levels, combined with a significant overrepresentation of representatives coming from high-income backgrounds â make it an interesting case for analyzing the link between the descriptive and the substantive representation of economically defined groups of citizens. In this essay, we thus report on two recent studies dealing with descriptive representation and its consequences in Switzerland. The first study focuses on policy preferences among candidates in the Swiss Federal elections of 2007 (Rosset 2013a, pp. 109-133). It is based on data from the candidate survey conducted as part of âSelects,â the Swiss electoral study. For this survey, all candidates to the two chambers of the Swiss parliament have been contacted and asked to answer a paper or online questionnaire regarding their political engagement, campaign activities, policy preferences as well as their socioeconomic background. Based on these data, the study analyzes candidates' preferences with regard to redistribution, using a question asking to what extent respondents agree with the statement that the state should do more to reduce income differences between the rich and the poor. The main independent variable of interest is the candidates' monthly household income. The analysis reveals that controlling for party affiliation, gender and education, income â even though measured only crudely by seven categories â has a significant negative effect on support for redistribution. In other words, candidates from the same party are on average less favorable to redistribution of income by the state if they themselves have higher incomes. Consequently, since citizens on average have both lower incomes and policy preferences that are much more favorable towards redistribution than their representatives (Rosset 2013b), this result suggests that the unequal descriptive representation of income groups in parliament could explain the unequal representation of their preferences on redistribution. The second study focuses on legislator responsiveness. It takes advantage of Switzerland's direct democratic system, in which parliament votes on each policy proposal that is put to a popular vote (WĂźest and Lloren 2014). This institutional setting thus provides a unique opportunity to compare legislators' and citizens' policy preferences on identical scales.4 The empirical analysis consists of two steps. First, based on data from surveys carried out after popular votes (âVoxâ surveys), the study examines whether citizens' policy preferences vary according to income. In line with previous research findings (Gilens 2009; Rigby and Wright 2011), this analysis shows that with regard to economic issues the poor tend to have more left-leaning preferences than more affluent citizens. After having shown that the preferences of poor and rich citizens differ, the study then assesses in a second step whether legislators with different socioeconomic backgrounds respond unequally to the policy preferences of different income groups. To do so, WĂźest and Lloren (2014) regress legislators' voting decisions in parliament on three sets of independent variables: (i) indicator variables showing whether a legislator has a lower-income, middle-income or higher-income occupation (see Pilotti, Mach and Mazzoleni 2010), (ii) variables measuring the preferences of poor, middle-income and rich citizens, respectively, in a legislator's reelection constituency and (iii) a set of indicator variables to control for legislators' party affiliations.5 The analysis reveals, first, that representatives are more responsive to higher-income groups and that the preferences of the less affluent are therefore underrepresented in the legislative arena. Second, and most importantly for this essay, representatives occupying low-wage jobs are not more likely to cast a left vote than their colleagues who have middle- and higher-income occupations. Thus, conditional on party affiliation, legislators' socioeconomic backgrounds do not affect their voting decisions. Finally, the results show that legislator responsiveness to income group preferences does not depend on party affiliation. Consequently, this second study suggests that occupational income has no effect on legislators' behavior in final passage votes and that the overrepresentation of well-off representatives in parliament does not contribute to explaining the lack of congruence between legislators and lower-income citizens. At first sight, this finding contradicts a growing body of research that politicians' personal such as gender or ethnic influence their political behavior at various stages of the legislative process, thus enabling marginalized groups to voice their political concerns more accurately (Lefkofridi, Giger, and Kissau, 2012; Lloren 2015b; Preuhs 2006; Swers 2002). Some might argue that grouping legislators' according to income could be an improper measure to grasp the effect of one's position in the social structure on political decision-making (Carnes 2012; this debate; Mansbridge this debate). Accordingly, the politics of presence (Philipps 1995) postulates that personal features matter only to the extent that they generate shared social experiences, such as discrimination. Indeed, although a law student and a manual worker can be found in the same income brackets, no one would expect them to have similar social experiences or life chances, and, in turn, share a distinct set of policy preferences. However, the study carried out by Rosset (2013a) and discussed in the previous section shows that personal income determines candidates' preferences with regard to redistribution. Our findings presented above have shown that Swiss legislators' socioeconomic backgrounds are related to their attitudes towards income redistribution, yet do not seem to translate into specific patterns of voting behavior. Hence, although more research is needed to better understand the relationship between representatives' preferences and policymaking actions, we conclude this essay by offering some suggestions as to why legislators' socioeconomic characteristics do not appear to affect their behavior in parliament. As set forth in the introduction, three conditions must be satisfied for descriptive representation to have consequences for legislative behavior. Whereas the first of these conditions â that preferences of legislators are close to the preferences of the socioeconomic group they descriptively represent â is obviously satisfied, the other two are potentially violated. The second condition is violated if legislators' behavior is completely determined by party leaders and/or constituents not belonging to the groups they represent descriptively. In Switzerland, parties are decentralized organizations and legislators do not attach much importance to party loyalty as a guiding principle for their actions (Loewenberg and Mans 1988). However, this does not mean that they do not act in a cohesive manner and recent research suggests that party unity is higher on final passage votes and votes on salient issues (Traber et al. 2014). Therefore, the small influence of socioeconomic characteristics on legislators' voting behavior might be explained by the fact that their behavior is largely determined by party positions in votes on economic issues which are arguably salient. With regard to constituent pressure, we first note that given the large size of the underrepresented group of low-income citizens, legislators have a priori little electoral incentives to respond exclusively to the preferences of the more affluent. However, there is a clear class bias in political participation, which might explain why representing richer citizens could be of particular importance for reelection-seeking legislators (Rennwald 2014). Further, given the lack of party finance regulations and the low level of party subsidies in Switzerland, it may also be that politicians attach more importance to the preferences of constituents with greater financial resources they can contribute to political campaigns. Finally, the third condition for descriptive representation to matter is violated if there are no alternatives on the political agenda separating descriptive representatives from other legislators who do not represent the same group descriptively but who are otherwise similar. While coalition patterns among Swiss parties tend to differ across policy domains, recent research shows that with regard to economic issues there is a clear left-right cleavage, with center and right-wing parties favoring less welfare state than left-wing parties (Afonso and Papadopoulos 2014). Economic policies, therefore, divide legislators strongly along party lines, blurring more subtle differences in preferences that may exist among legislators with different income levels within parties (see also Mansbridge this debate). Consequently, proposals on economic issues might simply be not heterogeneous enough to allow us to disentangle the effects that socioeconomic characteristics may have on legislative behavior. This discussion also intends to serve as a cautionary note. Although in our analysis we failed to find an effect of descriptive representation on legislators' behavior, this does not imply that descriptive representation is irrelevant for policymaking. Rather, we believe that its effect is context-dependent. When the context changes (e.g., when party pressure decreases or more heterogeneous proposals are voted on in parliament), descriptive representation may become more important in structuring legislative behavior. For example, women's descriptive representation in the Swiss National Council has increased substantive representation for women (Lloren 2015a). In that case, the three conditions discussed earlier were satisfied. Women legislators are more likely to favor women friendly policy than their male colleagues and to vote together â sometimes even against their party â to support women's interests, especially on policies that yield weak left-right polarization such as moral issues. Exploring such context dependencies for other politically marginalized groups thus constitutes a fruitful avenue for future research. Finally, we should note that legislators' socioeconomic backgrounds might affect behavior other than roll call voting. For instance, some scholars have argued that legislators are less constrained by party pressure in earlier stages of the legislative process, such as when sponsoring bills or in floor debates, and therefore have more discretion to act according to the preferences of groups they represent descriptively (see, e.g., Carnes and Lupu 2015; Lupu this debate). Anouk Lloren is a postdoctoral visiting fellow at Columbia University funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation. Within the field of political behavior, her work relates to political participation, representation, gender, and socio-economic inequalities. Jan Rosset is a postdoctoral researcher at the Mannheim Centre for European Social Research (MZES), University of Mannheim, with a fellowship from the Swiss National Science Foundation. His research focuses on the relationship between economic and political inequality and on democratic political representation. Reto WĂźest is a PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at the University of Geneva. His research interests include legislative institutions and behavior, economic inequality and political representation, and formal theory.
If millionaires in the United States formed their own political party, that party would make up just three percent of the country, but it would have a majority in the House of Representatives, a filibuster-proof super-majority in the Senate, a 5:4 majority on the Supreme Court, and a man in the White House. If working-class Americansâpeople employed in manual-labor and service-industry jobsâwere a political party, that party would have made up more than half of the country since the start of the twentieth century. But legislators from that party (those who last worked in blue-collar jobs before getting into politics) would never have held more than two percent of the seats in Congress. In the last few years, scholars of US politics have started taking a renewed interest in what I call white-collar government,1 the disproportionate numerical representation of wealthy people and white-collar professionals in our political institutions. Political scientists are once again asking how government by the upper class affects public policy in the United States. And they're starting to ask why our representative process consistently gives us such economically unrepresentative slates of politicians. By virtually any measure of class or social attainment, the average policy maker in the United States is vastly better off than the average citizen. The size of the social gap between citizens and their representatives varies somewhat across different political institutions and depends in part on how we measure class or economic standing. In general, though, politicians tend to be drawn overwhelmingly from the top strata of American society. For example, members of Congressâthe branch of the federal government often touted as most closely reflecting the nation's diversityâare considerably more privileged than the people who elect them. Lawyers and business owners make up approximately 10 percent of the population but constitute at least half of both chambers. Almost every member today is a college graduate, a distinction held by just one in three Americans (Ruggles et a1. 2009). And the median net worth of members of Congress is approximately $1.5 million (Center for Responsive Politics 2014), roughly eleven times the median net worth of American families. These imbalances are by no means recent developments (e.g., Domhoff 1967; Matthews 1954a; 1954b; 1985; Mills 1956; Pessen 1984; Zeller 1954). They have persisted, moreover, even as other underrepresented groups have begun to break through the glass ceiling. Figure 1 plots the percentage of members of Congress who served between 1901 and 1996 who were women, racial or ethnic minorities, and who were from the working class (that is, who last worked as manual laborers, service industry workers, or union officials before entering politics). Although women and minorities were still underrepresented at the end of the twentieth century, both groups gained considerable ground during the postwar period. In sharp contrast, working-class Americansâwho have made up more than half of the labor force for at least the last hundred years (even after that Information Revolution of the late-20th century)âhave never held more than two percent of the seats in Congress. The Demographic Makeup of the United States Congress, 1901â96 Source: Carnes 2012. This long-standing feature of American political life doesn't seem to be going anywhere any time soon. Data on the makeup of state and local institutionsâwhich tend to foreshadow demographic changes in national officesâsuggest that, if anything, working-class representation may decline even further in the short term. In state legislatures, for instance, women's representation skyrocketed from 8 percent to 24 percent between 1976 and 2007, and the share of lawmakers who were Black or Latino grew from 9 percent to 11 percent. During the same period, the share of state legislators from blue-collar jobs fell from 5 percent to 3 percent (National Conference of State Legislatures 2011). The path to political office has always been difficult for the working class, and it doesn't seem to be getting any easier. The Framers of the U.S. Constitution were skeptical about the importance of a politician's economic or social class background. In Federalist #35, Alexander Hamilton defended government by the privileged (see, for instance, Lewis 1961; Manin 1997), arguing that blue-collar workers âknow that the merchant is their natural patron and friend; and they are aware that however great the confidence they may justly feel in their own good sense, their interests can be more effectually promoted by the merchant than by themselves.â Why should it matter whether the people who represent us come from one background or another? Workers and business owners both want economic prosperity, so what's the harm in letting the upper class call the shots? This rosy take on government by the privileged has been an important part of American political thought ever since. Campaigns and candidates routinely invoke âslogans such as president Calvin Coolidge's âthe business of the nation is businessâ or Charles E. Wilson's (Eisenhower's secretary of defense and a former executive at General Motors) statement that âwhat was good for the country was good for General Motors and vice versaââ (Witko and Friedman 2008, 72). Unfortunately, the idea that class doesn't matter in our political institutions appears to be flat wrong. Scholars of public opinion have known for decades that Americans from different classes have different views about economic issues, that working-class Americans tend to be more progressive, and that the wealthy tend to want government to play a smaller role in economic affairs (e.g., Gilens 2009; Hout 2008; Keely and Tan 2008; Manza and Brooks 2008; Rehm 2010). Politicians seem to be no exception. Like ordinary citizens, politicians from different classes tend to have different personal views about economic issues. And because politicians often have some discretionâtheir hands aren't always tied by parties, citizens, and interest groups (Burden 2007)âthey sometimes base their choices in office on their own views about the issues before them. In Congress, for instance, legislators who had working-class jobs before being elected tend to have more progressive personal views about economic issues, tend to introduce more progressive economic proposals and work harder to pass them, and tend to cast more progressive votes on economic bills (Carnes 2012; 2013). Figure 2 plots data from the Chamber of Commerce (America's largest business association) on how frequently members of Congress sided with business interests when voting on major economic proposals. The figure divides legislators according to the main occupations they held before serving in Congress: average voting scores for members who worked in profit-oriented white-collar jobs (like owning a business) are graphed at the top, service-oriented white-collar jobs (like teaching, law, or social work) are plotted next, and working-class jobs appear at the bottom. The pattern in the data is unmistakable. Like ordinary citizens, lawmakers from the working class tend to be more pro-worker, and lawmakers from white-collar jobsâespecially profit-oriented jobs in the private sectorâtend to be more pro-business (even when I control for a wide range of constituency and legislator characteristics). Class and Roll Call Voting in Congress, 1999â2008 Source: Carnes 2013. These social class divisions are remarkably consistent across different datasets. They appear in voting scores computed by other organizations, in data from different periods of American history, in data on other forms of legislative conduct like introducing bills, and in surveys of state and federal legislators' personal beliefs (Carnes 2013). They are also mirrored in other studies that use different measures of class and privilege. Members of Congress from specific white-collar occupations like business (Witko and Friedman 2008) and law (Eulau and Sprauge 1964; Miller 1995) tend to vote differently on legislation that affects their industries. Legislators who have more money invested in stocks are more likely to vote to protect the markets (Grose 2013). Wealthier legislators are more likely to vote against the estate tax (Griffin and Anewalt-Remsburg 2013). Legislators with more wealth and education are more likely to support bills that increase economic inequality (Kraus and Callaghan 2014). However we define class or privilege, it seems to matter in our legislatures. Like ordinary citizens, lawmakers who are well off themselves are more likely to support policies that protect the well off. And these class-based differences in individual legislative conduct can have dramatic consequences in the aggregate. Figure 3 plots data from 1993 and 1995 on the social class makeups of state legislatures against data on the percentages of states' budgets devoted to social welfare programs (top panel), the generosity of unemployment benefits in each state (middle panel), and the tax rate on corporations in each state (bottom panel). State legislatures with more working-class members devote more of their resources to social safety net programs and tax corporations at higher rates. States with more business owners and executives in their legislatures spend less on welfare, provide lower levels of unemployment benefits, and tax companies at lower rates (Carnes 2013, ch. 5). Economic Policy and the Social Class Makeup of State Legislatures, 1994â1996 Source: Carnes 2013, ch. 5. Note: Lines represent quadratic best-fit estimates (with 95 percent confidence intervals shaded gray). Welfare spending and corporate tax rate data are from 1994 and 1996; maximum weekly unemployment benefits data are from 2001. Of course, many other features of US politics mute our government's response to the needs of the working class, like the decline of labor unions and the recent and unprecedented surge in campaign spending (see Gilens in this debate). White-collar government isn't the only barrier to pro-worker policy in the United Statesâbut it certainly belongs on the list.2 The rosy notion that lawmakers from business and professional backgrounds want what's best for everyone is seriously out of line with the realities of legislative decision making in the United States. The economic issues at stake in American politics often involve difficult trade-offs between the material well-being of different classes of citizens. And the scarcity of lawmakers from the working class ultimately tilts decisions about the distribution of economic resources, protections, and burdens in favor of the more conservative policies that affluent Americans tend to prefer. Government by the upper class promotes government for the upper classâand government for the upper class is often bad for everyone else. Why, then, are there so few working-class people in our political institutions in the first place? If the policy stakes are so high, why does our representative process consistently yield such an unrepresentative group of decision makers? Political scientists currently know more about the effects of government by the privileged in the United States than they do about the causes. However, a growing body of research seems to be ruling out several potential culpritsâand implicating others. Probably the most common view among pundits and political observers is that white-collar government is something of a practical necessity in the United States. One popular version of this argument holds that government by the privileged is what Americans want, that white-collar professional rule in the U.S. because American voters prefer white-collar candidates. Another common and related view is that government by the upper class is what Americans need, that working-class people don't have the skills or qualifications required for holding office. The Pulitzer-prize-winning journalist William A. Henry III (1995, 21) summarized both when he wrote that âvoters repeatedly reject insurrectionist candidates who parallel their own ordinariness [âŚ] in favor of candidates of proven character and competence.â Why are we governed by the rich? Many observers believe it's because the rich make better politiciansâand voters know it. These arguments have deep historical roots in the United States. However, they've never found much support in hard data on U.S. politics. There has never been an empirical study that has shown that American voters prefer white-collar candidates. And there has never been a single studyânot oneâthat has concluded that working-class people are underrepresented in public office because they are less qualified for the job. On average, members of Congress from the working class do almost exactly as well in elections as members from white-collar professions (Carnes n.d.). Experiments comparing hypothetical candidates from different classes reach identical conclusions. Sadin (2011) finds, for instance, that voters randomly assigned to evaluate a hypothetical candidate from the working class are just as likely to report that they would vote for him as those randomly assigned to evaluate an otherwise identical hypothetical candidate from an elite professional background. Far from âreject[ing] ⌠candidate[s] who parallel their own ordinariness,â voters seem to like working-class candidates just fine. A shortage of qualified workers doesn't seem to be to blame, either. It's true that on average working-class Americans are less likely to have many of the personal qualities that promote success in politics or that we might want in our leaders: knowledge about public affairs, confidence that the political process can be used to achieve real change, âtoleran[ce] of unpopular voicesâ (Verba 2003, 669), and so on. However, there are many more working-class people than there are white-collar professionalsâso many more, in fact, that there are actually more blue-collar workers with many of these desirable characteristics than there are white-collar professionals (Carnes 2013, ch. 6). If even just half a percent of the blue-collar workers in the United States have the skills required for holding office, there would be enough of them to fill every seat in Congress and in every state legislature more than 40 timesâwith enough left over to run a few thousand city councils. Something other than voters and qualifications seems to be responsible for the shortage of working-class citizens in American political institutions. Scholars haven't yet confirmed exactly what that is, but we're starting to make some headway. Building on research on other historically underrepresented groups like women (e.g., Crowder-Meyer 2010; Lawless and Fox 2005; 2010; Sanbonmatsu 2002; 2006), the nascent scholarship on the shortage of working-class Americans in public office is beginning to find evidence that workers are underrepresented not because of some deficiency on their part, but because of discouraging circumstances, like the practical burdens associated with holding office and the gatekeeping decisions of party leaders and interest groups. In places where holding office is less burdensome and in places where workers are better integrated into parties and interest groups, workers tend to hold office in larger numbers. Figure 4 illustrates this point with data on the share of working-class Americans in state legislatures (from Figure 3). In states with more professionalized legislaturesâthat is, where holding office takes more time and energyâfewer workers hold office. In states where working-class citizens make up larger shares of party and campaign volunteers, workers tend to hold office in larger numbers. And in states where unions are stronger, workers are more likely to lead (Carnes n.d.; see also Carnes forthcoming; Sojourner 2013). The factors that keep workers out of office don't seem to have to do with voters or with the supposed shortcomings of the working class itself. They seem to have far more to do with the structural features of the political landscape that have captivated scholars of U.S. politics for decades: parties, institutions, and interest groups. What Predicts Working-class Representation in State Legislatures? Source: Carnes n.d. These findings are still preliminary, of courseâthere simply hasn't been much research on this topic yet. Scholars still need to develop a complete account of the individual behavioral or psychological factors keeping workers from running and winning (e.g., differences in resources, ambition, recruitment, etc.). We need to link those factors to the structural features of the political environment that give rise to them, like the high cost of running an election, the weakness of labor unions in the US, and so on. We need to think through and identify the causal relationship between these factors and working-class representation. And we need to think about change over time. Many of these structural factors are changing in ways that probably discourage working-class office holdingâelections are getting more expensive and unions are getting weaker. Holding office was always challenging for workers (see Figure 1), but it may be getting even harder. Scholars need to understand how these changes are affecting the already difficult process of transitioning from a working-class job to a career in politics. Reformers do, too. In the last few years, activists have started taking an unprecedented interest in government by the privileged. In the 1990s, the New Jersey AFL-CIO launched a âcandidate schoolâ to identify, recruit, and train working-class citizens to run for public office. Since then, similar working-class candidate training programs have been launched in California, Connecticut, Maine, Nevada, New York, and Oregonâand more are on the way (Carnes 2013, ch. 6). Programs like these are premised on the same basic ideas that are emerging from the scholarly research on the factors keeping working-class Americans out of office, namely, that there are many qualified working-class Americans out there, that workers do well in elections when they run, and that electing more workers will tilt economic policy toward the progressive policies that workers tend to support and away from the conservative policies favored by America's rich. However, scholars and practitioners still have a lot to learn about why the United States has a white-collar governmentâand what we can do about it. Nicholas Carnes is Assistant Professor of Public Policy at the Sanford School of Public Policy at Duke University. His research focuses on U.S. politics, legislative decision making, representation, social class, economic inequality, and state and local politics. His new book White-Collar Government: The Hidden Role of Class in Economic Policy Making examines how the shortage of people from the working class in American legislatures skews the policymaking process towards outcomes that are more in line with the upper class's economic interests. He is also starting a large-scale study on the factors that discourage working-class Americans from holding public office and the programs that could help to address the shortage of working-class Americans in our political institutions.
Abstract We investigate the relationship between electoral institutions and committee autonomy in the context of U.S. state legislatures. The distributive theories of legislative organization suggest that electoral rules that make personal reputations more important motivate legislators to decentralize power and enhance committee autonomy to be able to target particularistic goods to their local constituencies. We argue that the distributive theories have direct implications for the relationship between candidate selection procedures and committee autonomy. The need to reach out to a large number of voters and to amass significant financial resources in states with more inclusive candidate selection procedures such as the open primary makes representatives more dependent on special interests, which is conducive to legislative particularism and committee autonomy. We take advantage of the great variation across the American states to investigate the effects of candidate selection procedures, a factor neglected in the previous literature. Examining 24 state legislatures from 1955 to 1995, we find that the inclusiveness of the selectorate, or the body electing candidates, has a significant effect on committee autonomy with more inclusive primary elections leading to more autonomous committee systems. By contrast, however, term limits were not a significant predictor of committee autonomy. This contributes to our understanding of how legislators amend institutional arrangements to achieve their electoral goals.