Blockchain Papers

Aniah Anthony, Helen Aniah

No abstract is available for this record.

John W. Oller

Successful sharing of information-positive (actual) knowledge about facts, skills that are imparted, abilities developed and expressed-is the implicit goal of instruction in all its varied forms. It is the goal of training athletes, dancers, and professionals in every walk of life from early childhood to the most advanced level of education. PART ONE introduces mathematical proofs showing that the interactional successes engineered by instructors, other things being equal, must trend toward 100% shared information-mastery of the course of study. Failed efforts trend toward a complete absence of shared information. All this holds independently for the subject-matter, methods of instruction, and the attributes conducive to instructional success. In Part One, the underlying proofs are united by a very simple proof from the theory of true narratives showing that every iota of knowledge that might be shared in any instructional context depends on the kind of representations found in true reports of actual experience. Empirical studies in Part One confirm the predicted agreement in diverse contexts on the elements of good teaching. In Part Two, Kolmogorov's proofs from 1933 are generalized, amplified, and tested empirically showing successful instruction converging toward 100% agreement on 1) subject-matter, 2) which methods of presentation and assessment work, and even on 3) the abstract criteria for successful instruction. At the same time, as the proofs also show, the cumulative effects of failed communicative efforts must and do trend toward zero shared information.

Paul Kingsley

Educational constructivists maintain that knowledge is constructed by students as they learn. Sometimes this involves a weakening of the epistemological claim that knowledge involves discovering facts about an independent reality. In the terminology of Immanuel Kant, we are claimed to have access to phenomena or appearances, but not to things in themselves. This approach is closely linked to Husserl?s belief that objects must be ?for? some consciousness, and the early Wittgenstein?s view that the self is not part of the world. All of these views place a great deal of emphasis on the notion of a disembodied consciousness that somehow constructs the world it perceives. They tend to weaken our belief in an independent world about which we can have objective knowledge. Is this a mere philosophical quibble of no practical importance? Does it really matter?George Orwell, in his novel, 1984, introduces his unlikely hero, Winston Smith. He asks the question, ?If both the past and the external world exist only in the mind, and if the mind itself is controllable what then?? Smith?s tormentor, O?Brien, eventually supplies the answer. ?But I tell you, Winston, that reality is not external. Reality exists in the human mind, and nowhere else. Not in the individual mind, which can make mistakes, and in any case soon perishes: only in the mind of the Party, which is collective and immortal. Whatever the Party holds to be the truth, is truth. It is impossible to see reality except by looking through the eyes of the Party.? In short, the state engages in fabrications which are an extreme form of knowledge construction. Just once, Smith held in his hand absolute proof that the state had lied. He comes to see this mind-independent evidential challenge as the most radical kind of threat to a totalitarian state. Orwell outlines a situation where the distinction between constructing and discovering knowledge does matter. If important issues are at stake, we must take the greatest care before making claims that our knowledge is constructed. I shall argue that Kant, Husserl, and Wittgenstein conducted thought experiments with flawed research designs.

Steven L. Shafer

SCIENTIFICALLY based professionals face the dilemma described by James Oberg, National Aeronautics and Space Administration engineer and space journalist: “You must keep an open mind, but not so open that your brains fall out.”1Startling advances, such as the role of Helicobacter pylori in the etiology of stomach ulcers,2remind us of the need to be receptive to unexpected discoveries that challenge our beliefs.As practitioners of a science-based profession, physicians have a responsibility to patients to (1) critically interpret their medical history, (2) critically read and evaluate the scientific literature, and (3) critically plan their therapy using evidenced-based medicine. How well do we meet this standard?Anesthesiologists are arguably the most experienced practitioners of cardiopulmonary resuscitation. For example, my general anesthetics typically start with a ventilatory arrest (usually by intent), followed by need for cardiovascular support. The 2005 American Heart Association guidelines for cardiopulmonary resuscitation assess the evidence for “best practices” in resuscitation.3Class I recommendations describe interventions that unambiguously improve outcome and should always be provided. These include defibrillation, tracheal intubation, and (remarkably) taping the endotracheal tube. Class IIa recommendations, whose benefits almost always exceed risks, include many widely accepted interventions, such as administering oxygen, confirming carbon dioxide returning from the airway, the use of various airway maintenance devices, proper use of a defibrillator, magnesium for the treatment of torsade de pointes, fibrinolysis for suspected pulmonary embolus, and use of the impedance threshold device to improve recovery.In all probability, you have never heard of the impedance threshold device, also a class IIa recommendation, despite the fact improved outcome has been demonstrated in more than 50 animal and clinical trials of resuscitation. The device is a special valve that attaches to a facemask or advanced airway device (fig. 1). In the absence of a positive-pressure breath, it seals off the airway when the chest recoils during the decompression phase of cardiopulmonary resuscitation, thereby generating more negative pressure in the thorax to draw more blood into the great vessels and heart. This also decreases intracranial pressure. The device doubles cardiac output during cardiopulmonary resuscitation. According to a recent meta-analysis, the impedance threshold device nearly doubled short- and long-term survival after cardiac arrest, at a cost of approximately $99 per unit.The American Heart Association Guidelines characterize epinephrine and amiodarone as class IIb recommendations, meaning that benefit may exceed risk. Lidocaine and atropine are class III recommendations, indicating insufficient evidence. What does it mean that few anesthesiologists have ever used the impedance threshold device, which roughly doubles survival at nominal cost, and has stronger evidence for benefit than epinephrine, amiodarone, lidocaine, and atropine, mainstays of current practice? In my view, it means that we are not as scientifically based in our practice as we would like to believe. Instead, our clinical practice reflects traditions and beliefs instilled during training, which only gradually adapt to scientific progress.As practitioners of a science-based profession, we also have a responsibility to the society in which we live to function as role models for critical thinking. The public is surprisingly naive about the scientific method. How else can one explain the marketing of such unlikely marvels as running your car on water,†a heater that produces more energy than used,‡or curing cancer with magnets?§Consider the following urban legend: A businessman in New Orleans meets a prostitute in a bar. They go to her hotel room, where he blacks out. The next morning he awakens in a bathtub, with a note telling him to call 911. The dispatcher tells him to feel for a tube protruding from his lower back. He finds one, and is told his kidney has been stolen.Clinicians will readily dismiss this story because of the impossibility of performing a donor nephrectomy in a hotel room, and the sheer weirdness of awakening from surgery and anesthesia in a bathtub with a tube in your back. However, the claim has been so widely circulated that the National Kidney Foundation issued a formal repudiation.∥However, when this “innocent” urban myth circulated in South America, there was a 90% decrease in cadaveric kidney donations.4Considering that many individuals waiting for transplants die before receiving a transplant, this “harmless” urban legend may have resulted in significant morbidity and mortality. Ignorance has consequences!You have likely received e-mails promising fortunes in exchange for some nominal effort, such as helping transfer money from Nigeria or contacting an agency that has chosen your e-mail address in a previously unknown lottery. When the victim attempts to procure the money, he or she is instructed to pay increasingly large advance fees to facilitate the transaction. Such transparently bogus schemes net billions of dollars every year from gullible individuals.#Millions of gullible individuals firmly believe in alien abductions, crystal healing, channeling, psychic power, touch therapy, and implausible dietary wonders because they do not have the intellectual tools to evaluate fraudulent claims. More broadly, our political process, our allocation of national resources, our foreign policy, and our stewardship of the planet all suffer from an endemic resistance to think critically as a society. As physicians, we need to lead by example.If we are to be role models of critical thinking, we need to understand how to evaluate claims based on evidence. James Lett, Professor of Anthropology at Indian River Community College, proposed a taxonomy of six essential elements for reasoning from evidence: falsifiability, logic, comprehensiveness, honesty, replicability, and sufficiency (table 1).5Falsifiability refers to whether a claim can be disproved by evidence. If the truth of a claim is completely immune from all evidence against it, the claim cannot be evaluated scientifically. For example, some cultures believe that everything has a spirit, including the rocks, the trees, and even the wind. This belief does not yield any testable predictions. How can you disprove that the wind has a spirit? As these beliefs cannot be proved or disproved from evidence, they are simply beyond the realm of science.A lot of “new age” thinking suffers from lack of falsifiability. Can people really channel their thoughts through crystals? If this leads to testable predictions, then it can be prospectively evaluated. If not, the claim is scientifically meaningless. The same is true for many claims from practitioners of “alternative medicine.” How can one evaluate a treatment that promises to “improve your well-being”? If that cannot be defined, it cannot be tested.Infinite excuses are often used to protect pseudoscientific viewpoints from falsifiability. For example, creation “scientists” hold that God created the earth and its life forms based on literal reading of the Bible. The mountain of evidence for evolution through natural selection, drawn from epidemiology, evolutionary biology, comparative biology, geology, statistical modeling, paleontology, molecular biology, and genetics, including the sequencing of the genomes of many species, is entirely dismissed. Why are dinosaur bones buried in the earth? “God wanted it that way!” Not only is creation “science” devoid of falsifiable propositions, but infinite excuses preclude rational debate about the merits of creationism.Similarly, believers that the earth has been visited by extraterrestrials answer all criticism regarding the complete lack of evidence for extraterrestrial visitation on the basis that the evidence is suppressed by the government. It is all kept under lock and key in Area 51! This permits infinite excuses and prevents falsifiability of the claims. This is the essence of junk science.Logic involves valid methods of inference. Some methods are self-evident. If I say that all dogs have fleas, and Roxy is a dog, it follows that Roxy has fleas. However, if I say that all dogs have fleas, and Roxy has fleas, it does not follow that Roxy is a dog. Roxy could be the neighbor’s kid.Logic can be devilishly confusing. Consider the 1960s television game show Let’s Make a Deal hosted by Monty Hall. This show was based on a stage with three doors. Behind one of the doors was a valuable prize, frequently “Monty’s Cookie Jar” stuffed with money. Behind the other two doors were joke prizes, typically goats. The contestant was instructed to pick one of the doors. Let’s assume the contestant picks door 1.At this point in the show, Monty would typically open one of the two doors not chosen by the contestant, invariably revealing a goat to howls of inexplicable laughter from the audience. (Since Monty knew where the cookie jar was, did they think that Monty would reveal the cookie jar and spoil the game?) Let’s assume that Monty has opened door 3, revealing the goat. Ha ha! At this point the contestant is offered a choice: stay with door 1, the original selection, or switch to door 2. Nearly all contestants chose to stay with door 1.The logic could not be simpler: There are just three doors, and one question: stay or switch? It is remarkably nonobvious that the probability of winning Monty’s Cookie Jar is doubled by switching to door 2. The reason is that in opening door 3, Monty has told the contestant nothing about door 1. There was a one-third probability that this was the correct choice when the choice was made, and there is still a one-third probability after door 3 is opened. There was a two-thirds probability that Monty’s Cookie Jar was behind doors 2 or 3, and that is still the case. However, because there is zero chance that Monty’s Cookie Jar is behind door 3, there is a two-thirds probability that it is behind door 2. Therefore, the probability of winning Monty’s Cookie Jar is doubled by switching.**The same problem has confounded research in psychology for several decades. In studies of cognitive dissonance, a monkey is offered a choice between a red and a blue M&M. Let us assume that the monkey selects red. The monkey is then given a choice between a blue and a green M&M. The monkey is approximately twice as likely to pick green. Assuming that there was a 50:50 chance that the monkey would pick either color, the preference for green was assumed to represent “cognitive dissonance,” psychological angst over the selection of the previously rejected blue M&M. This has been the basis of decades of research in cognitive dissonance.However, there is not a 50:50 chance of the monkey picking a green M&M versus blue M&M. As pointed out by Keith Chen,6this is the Monty Hall problem. Assume that the monkey has a true preference among the three colors. Figure 2shows the six possible preferences. The monkey’s preference for the red M&M over the blue M&M rejects half of the possible preferences, shown as a line through three of the six possible preferences in figure 2. Among the remaining three possible rank orders, green is preferred over blue in two cases, and blue is preferred over green in one case. Therefore, the animal is twice as likely to pick the green M&M as to pick the blue M&M, not 50:50 as was assumed. The Monty Hall and monkey M&M choice problems are striking for the nonobviousness of the correct answer, which is particularly remarkable given the exceedingly simply structure: three doors or three M&Ms.Logic can be distorted by the ambiguity in our language. For example, many would agree that a ham sandwich was better than nothing. It is similarly evident that nothing is better than eternal happiness. If both statements are true, does it not logically follow that a ham sandwich is better than eternal happiness?Logic also involves statistics. 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Darius Nikbin

In Bertolt Brecht's The Life of Galileo , the ongoing conflict between rationalism and religious authority is portrayed through Galileo Galilei's epic battle with the might of the Vatican. The play depicts the later years of the Italian astronomer's life as he struggles to promote the ideas of Copernicus in the face of fierce opposition from the Catholic Church. In the 17th century, claiming that the Earth rotates around the Sun was tantamount to heresy; as the Italian philosopher Giordano Bruno found out to his cost in 1600, when he was burned at the stake for refusing to recant his heliocentric beliefs. According to Brecht's Galileo, Bruno's only mistake was that he had no proof.

Ruy de Queiroz, Luiz Carlos Pereira, Edward Hermann Hæusler

This volume contains the Proceedings of the 10th Workshop on Logic, Language, Information and Computation (WoLLIC'2003). The Workshop was held in Ouro Preto, Minas Gerais, Brazil from July 29 to August 1, 2003, in the Escola de Minas of the Universidade Federal de Ouro Preto ( UFOP ). WoLLIC is a series of workshops which started in 1994 with the aim of fostering interdisciplinary research in pure and applied logic . The idea is to provide a forum which is large enough in the number of possible interactions between logic and the sciences related to information and computation, and yet is small enough to allow for concrete and useful interaction among participants. Previous versions were held at: Recife (Pernambuco, Brazil) in 1994 and 1995; Salvador (Bahia, Brazil) in 1996; Fortaleza (Ceará, Brazil) in 1997; São Paulo (Brazil) in 1998; Itatiaia (Rio de Janeiro, Brazil) in 1999; Natal (Rio Grande do Norte) in 2000; Brasília (Distrito Federal, Brazil) in 2001; Rio de Janeiro (Brazil) in 2002. Scientific sponsorship comes from the Interest Group in Pure and Applied Logics ( IGPL ), the European Association for Logic, Language and Information ( FoLLI ), the Association for Symbolic Logic ( ASL ), European Association for Theoretical Computer Science ( EATCS ), the Sociedade Brasileira de Computação ( SBC ), and the Sociedade Brasileira de Lógica ( SBL ). Funding was kindly given by:(i) CNPq ( Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico , the scientific and technological development council of the Brazilian Ministério da Ciência e Tecnologia ) (grant 450709/2003-5);(ii) CAPES ( Fundação Coordenação de Apoio ao Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior , a Foundation for the Development of Higher-Education under the Brazilian Ministério da Educação e do Desporto ) (grant PAEP0565/03);(iii) FAPEMIG ( Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de Minas Gerais , the Minas Gerais state foundation for the support of scientific research);(iv) Escola de Minas da UFOP ( Universidade Federal de Ouro Preto ). Contributions were received in the form of short papers in all areas related to logic, language, information and computation, including:pure logical systems, proof theory, model theory, algebraic logic, type theory, category theory, constructive mathematics, lambda and combinatorial calculi, program logic and program semantics, logics and models of concurrency, logic and complexity theory, proof complexity, foundations of cryptography (zero-knowledge proofs), descriptive complexity, nonclassical logics, nonmonotonic logic, logic and language, discourse representation, logic and artificial intelligence, automated deduction, foundations of logic programming, logic and computation, and logic engineering. Apart from the contributed papers (15), and the invited talks (5), the programme includes 5 tutorial lectures: 1. Algorithmic Randomness and Derandomization by Eric Allender (Department of Computer Science, Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey, USA) 2. Generalized Quantifiers by Lauri Hella (Department of Mathematics, Statistics and Philosophy, University of Tampere, Finland) 3. Implicit computational complexity by Jean-Baptiste Joinet (Preuves-Programmes-Systèmes, Université Paris 7, France) 4. Proof search foundations for logic programming by Dale Miller (INRIA/Futurs/Saclay, and Laboratoire d'Informatique, École Polytechnique, France) 5. Iterated theory change by Hans Rott (Institut für Philosophie, Universität Regensburg, Germany) All papers in the volume were reviewed by the program committee consisting of Mauricio Ayala-Rinóon ( Departamento de Matemática, Universidade de Brasília, Brazil ) Argimiro Arratia ( Depto. Matematicas, Universidad Simon Bolivar, Venezuela ) Alessandra Carbone ( Institut des Hautes Études Scientifiques, and Université de Paris XII, France ) Marcelo Coniglio ( Centro de Lógica e Epistemologia, Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Brazil ) Gilles Dowek ( INRIA, France ) Arnaud Fleury ( Facoltà di Scienze, Università di Verona, Italy ) Dexter Kozen ( Cornell University, USA ) Maarten Marx ( ILLC, Faculty of Science, Universiteit Amsterdam, The Netherlands ) Anto˚nio Carlos da Rocha Costa ( Escola de Informática, Universidade Católica de Pelotas, Brazil ) Dieter Spreen ( Fachbereich Mathematik, Theoretische Informatik, Universität Siegen, Germany ) Luiz Carlos Pereira ( Departamento de Filosofia, PUC-Rio and UFRJ, Brazil ) Jouko Väänänen ( Department of Mathematics, University of Helsinki, Finland ) Renata Wassermann ( Departamento de Cie˚ncia da Computação, Instituto de Matemática e Estatística, Universidade de São Paulo, Brazil ) The organising committee consisted of Lucília Figueiredo ( Departamento de Computação, Universidade Federal de Ouro Preto, Brazil ) Fred Ulisses Maranhão ( Centro de Informática, Universidade Federal de Pernambuco, Brazil ) Anjolina Grisi de Oliveira ( Center of Informatics, Universidade Federal de Pernambuco, Brazil ) Elaine Pimentel ( Departamento de Matemática, Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais, Brazil ) (Co-Chair) Ruy de Queiroz ( Center of Informatics, Universidade Federal de Pernambuco, Brazil ) (Co-Chair) Maria Angela Weiss ( Departamento de Matemática, Universidade de São Paulo, Brazil ) The volume will be published as volume 84 in the series Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science ( ENTCS ). This series is published electronically through the facilities of Elsevier B.V. and its auspices. The volumes in the ENTCS series can be accessed at the URL http://www.elsevier.nl/locate/entcs A printed version of the current volume has been distributed to the participants at the workshop in Ouro Preto. We are very grateful to the following persons, whose help has been crucial for the success of WoLLIC'2003: Mike Mislove, one of the Managing Editors of the ENTCS series, for his assistance with the use of the ENTCS style files; Thanks are also due to the Department of Mathematics of Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais and the Department of Computing of the Universidade Federal de Ouro Preto, which has provided the logistic support to the organising committee. August 2, 2003 Ruy de Queiroz, Elaine Pimentel, Lucilia Figueiredo