Consumption of artworks and luxury items has always reflected traditional dynamics of class and social status. This chapter considers how globalisation, digitalisation and the emergence of younger generations of consumers have reshuffled these conventions, introducing new markers of status and distinction: Subversive elevations: brands draw from “low-brow” art such as graffiti or pop-art to build appeal among younger customers and create a cultural barrier with the older or aspirational segments Diversified access: the creation of ensemble collaborations where product-based collaborations are accompanied by non-fungible tokens (NFTs) has introduced further layers of differentiation Experience: with many collaborations being available as events or in other experiential formats, status is growingly expressed through experience as a new form of cultural capital based on inside knowledge and timing
ion ‘‘the nation’’ once provided (Sassen 2010:3). Besnik Pula’s essay, ‘‘Urban Planning in the Colonial Cities of Italy’s Fascist Empire’’ is one example of how to challenge ‘‘nation centered’’ ways of viewing the world. Pula demonstrates that urban planners and architects in Italy ‘‘saw in colonial empire the opportunity to demonstrate the social utility and transformative capabilities of their trade’’ (p. 390). In other words, the development of ‘‘national’’ traditions in architecture and urban planning could only be fully realized in the context of transnational engagements. The chapters that make up Part III show the extent to which ‘‘Western’’ modernity is a product of what Bhambra (2013:296) calls ‘‘the colonial global.’’ Essays on topics like ‘‘Nation and Empire in the French Context’’ and ‘‘State Formation in British Malaya and the American Philippines’’ not only explode the myth of Europe and America’s endogenous development, they also throw into question the continued efficacy of theoretical and methodological apparatuses that have, until quite recently, un-problematically accepted this notion. Daniel Goh aptly sums up exactly what is at stake for all sociologists, not just sociologists of empire, when he explains why neo-Weberians have ‘‘carefully avoided the question of colonial state formation.’’ The comparison of empires, he explains, ‘‘poses theoretical problems, since they involved a complex jostling of states, institutions, and social groups that defies the state-society framework. The comparison of colonial states also poses methodological issues, since these involved the extension of metropolitan sovereignty into colonial territories through subsidiary state [sic], thereby complicating the independence of the neo-Weberian unit of analysis’’ (p. 465). Once sociology’s ‘‘imperial entanglements’’ have been un-masked and the ‘‘Pandora’s box’’ of new analytical possibilities has been opened, the question of what this means for the discipline as a whole still remains. Do we finally abandon our quest for ‘‘grand theory’’? Should we do away with the comparative method given its theoretical and methodological utility in displacing ‘‘imperial power over the colonized into an abstract space of difference’’ (Connell 1997:1530)? The four chapters that make up Part II, Current Sociological Theories of Empire, engage specific empirical questions such as the rise of a new security empire post-9/11 (Kim Scheppele) or China’s imperial thrust into Africa (Albert Bergensen) in ways that seek to avoid the theoretical and methodological traps of previous studies. The purpose of the chapters is not to construct a singular, overarching ‘‘grand theory’’ of empire, however. The essays are more in keeping with Merton’s idea of ‘‘middle range’’ theories, which recognize that any attempt to generate sociological generalizations must account for the fact that all complex systems are also historically variable systems. Michael Mann’s essay, which asks whether the ‘‘recent intensification of American economic and military imperialism’’ are connected or not, concludes that ‘‘societies are not systems and states are not cohesive. In fact, they are both a bit of a mess, full of contradictions, muddles, mistakes.’’ This is not to deny that societies have enduring and powerful social structures. Rather, it emphasizes the fact that ‘‘these are plural, with logics that are distinct’’ (p. 243). Bergensen speculates that we ‘‘may be entering a new twenty-first-century phase of neocolonial relations that are qualitatively different from what the world system has seen before’’ (p. 300). Although he cannot say for certain whether the evidence points to definitive proof of a new economic model or a ‘‘momentary instance’’ he nevertheless maintains that China’s pursuit of economic dominance in Africa via stateowned enterprises may mean that ‘‘historical development has outrun the scope of social theory’’ (p. 311). Scheppele’s essay on the ‘‘Terrorism and the New Security Empire After 9/11’’ likewise suggests that ‘‘empires are not what they used to be’’ (p. 244). Since empires are no longer ‘‘predictably universal’’ theories of empire must also seek to synthesize different schools of thought. ‘‘As we rethink this new security empire, we need to recall not just the 16 Review Essays Contemporary Sociology 44, 1 analyses of economic globalization but the lessons learned from postcolonial studies’’ (p. 252). Sociology and Empire should be seen as an important intervention in a longstanding trend whereby sociologists have charted a new course for the future by rewriting the history of the past. As Gurminder Bhambra pointed out in her reflection on ‘‘The Possibilities of, and for, Global Sociology,’’ our only hope of being able to ‘‘understand and address the necessarily postcolonial (and decolonial) present of ‘global sociology’’’ lies in ‘‘reconstruct[ing] backwards’’ our ‘‘historical understandings of modernity and the emergence of sociology’’ (Bhambra 2013:296–297). For at least two decades sociologists have worried about their declining prestige in the academic marketplace. The questions that sociologists have been pondering relating to their ‘‘value’’ in the marketplace have now hit the social sciences and the humanities as a whole. At the same time, the world has grown ever more complex and interdependent and politicians and lay people alike ponder everything from terrorism to ‘‘post-racialism.’’ A century ago sociology emerged in the context of the ‘‘political difficulties’’ and contradictions created by the co-existence of imperialism and liberalism (Connell 1997:1530). Sociology’s theories and models of the world ‘‘offered a resolution’’ (ibid.). Today we find ourselves in a similar position. Sociology stands poised, once again, to provide a level of analysis desperately needed by policymakers and the educated public. As Steinmetz points out in his preface, ‘‘today we are confronting two crises that are often experienced as separate but are actually interwoven: ‘the crisis of the universities’ and the ‘crisis of empire’’’ (p. xiii). With the benefit of hindsight, such as provided by Parts I and III of Sociology and Empire, we can avoid making the mistakes we did in the past. The questions, problems, and theories for understanding the world today, such as provided in Part II, open up the exciting possibility that we can chart a different course for the future.
This article introduces the Symposium on the History of CITASA, the Communication and Information Technologies section of the American Sociological Association, from 1988 through 2005. It traces this history from the interest of those who founded the original Microcomputing section in developing computer applications for doing sociological research and teaching. It discusses the fit of this interest with the continuing “war” in the organization of computing between computer center centralization and individually autonomous decentralization. It explains the expansion of the scope and membership of the session to encompass the sociological study of communication and information technologies.
Progressivism and Philanthropy Lenore T. Ealy (bio) and Steven D. Ealy (bio) Toward the end of the nineteenth century America faced unfamiliar circumstances that seemed to make its traditional social institutions obsolete and threatened the hope for social stability. Steady immigration swelled the ranks and diversity of the urban poor, and headlong industrialization radically changed the ways in which people worked and lived. The growing complexity of social and economic affairs contributed to a widespread belief that a new social and political order must be created. The response of many social critics and scholars, today known broadly as "Progressives," was to forge an approach to social and institutional change rooted in evolutionary philosophy, enamored with scientific objectivism, and often infused with German ideological statism. Traditional Anglo-American common sense and the rule of common law were increasingly suspect as the new "social sciences" emerged with hopes of rationalizing social control. In the decades that followed, most American institutions were organized or re-organized according to the Progressive prescription. The flow of social responsibility was away from more primary, local, and voluntary institutions to those more centralized, professionalized, and tax-supported. This transformation was financed in part by the fledgling philanthropic foundations of Carnegie, Rockefeller, Sage and others who subscribed to some version of the new corporate liberalism. The hierarchical, corporate organization of business entities created a work force with middle-class means and proletarian status, and many of the society's major responsibilities were newly assumed by remote national organizations or assigned to some level of government. By mid-century, in the wake of the New Deal, America's institutions and practices of mutual aid were widely displaced by specialized professionals. Those in need of assistance became clients or "cases." Today, at the turn of another century, new circumstances are rendering the Progressive prescriptions largely obsolete. American society is outgrowing the institutions the Progressives designed for it. The practical virtue and utility of classical liberal principles have triumphed over the ideologies of socialism and statism. Government administration has been shown to suffer from and to reinforce significant knowledge problems. The electronic revolution has suggested and enabled a more horizontal corporate organization in which more and more working people are self-managed. In short, the centralizing thrust of the 20th century seems to be giving way to a decentralizing tendency in the 21st. The purpose of this paper is to foster better understanding of the origins and rationale of the Progressive "old order" and of its continuing impact on American philanthropy. Drawing upon dozens of readings from Progressive-era journals and popular magazines, we seek to uncover the intellectual foundations of Progressivism and to identify its strengths and vulnerabilities. Part of our exploration is also intended to understand how we might best articulate a new rationale for philanthropic enterprises that are today working to return social responsibility to local communities and to support the emergence of new forms of mutual aid and voluntary action. A more robust understanding of the promise of decentralized voluntary action is needed to facilitate the reclamation of responsibility from the outdated, bureaucratic institutions born in the Progressive era. Philanthropists who are today glimpsing the opening of new paths for human action and who wish to encourage the present transformations must understand the challenges in proceeding. A better understanding of the "old order" as well as the entrenchment of contemporary institutions in Progressive assumptions can help promote more effective action in the present. Only when we understand the old assumptions and their compelling hold on the present can we begin fruitfully to challenge these assumptions with a new vision for the future. I. What's Wrong With Charity? A hallmark of the Progressive movement was its effort to reform politics and government administration, to reclaim them from the corrupt patronage system of the party bosses and to apply new, more professional means to accomplishing the ends of government. In the name of reform the Progressives viewed the legitimate ends of the national government as more expansive and substantive than in previous eras. Ever present in the minds of many reformers was the fear of popular revolution, and "the labor question" was of central importance. In the years...