Blockchain Papers

Tan, Kwan Hong

This thesis examines whether Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs) can resolve the fundamental trilemma of global public goods provision, specifically addressing the seemingly impossible simultaneous achievement of effective climate action, responsible AI governance, and equitable international coordination. Building upon Dani Rodrik's recent formulation of a "new trilemma" that constrains contemporary global governance, this research develops a novel theoretical framework termed "Decentralized Trilemma Resolution" (DTR) that demonstrates how DAO governance mechanisms can transcend traditional coordination failures through innovative institutional design. The research contributes to both DAO governance literature and global public goods theory by proposing that blockchain-based decentralized governance can create positive-sum dynamics across traditionally competing policy objectives. Through comprehensive analysis of existing DAO implementations, including Gitcoin's $50+ million in public goods funding, Klima DAO’s coordination of $17+ million tonnes of carbon credits, and Aragon′s governance infrastructure supporting $4+ billion in managed assets, this thesis provides empirical validation for the theoretical framework. The DTR framework introduces four core mechanisms that enable trilemma resolution: Multi-Stakeholder Token Governance (MSTG), Algorithmic Transparency and Accountability (ATA), Modular Governance Architecture (MGA), and Incentive Alignment Mechanisms (IAM). Mathematical formalization demonstrates how these mechanisms create superadditive utility functions where coordination across climate action, AI governance, and equitable development generates synergistic rather than competitive outcomes. Key findings indicate that DAOs demonstrate 6-20x faster decision-making, 3-5x higher stakeholder participation, and 2-5x lower administrative costs compared to traditional governance mechanisms. However, challenges remain in enforcement capabilities, regulatory recognition, and scaling to nation-state level coordination. The thesis concludes that hybrid models combining DAO governance with traditional institutional structures offer the most promising pathway for near-term trilemma resolution, while pure DAO governance may emerge as viable for global coordination as technical and regulatory infrastructure matures. This research provides the first systematic framework for understanding how decentralized governance can address the fundamental coordination challenges of the 21st century, offering both theoretical insights and practical implementation pathways for policymakers, technologists, and global governance practitioners.

SANDRA INGELKOFER, RENATA FAIZOVA

Climate governance is entering a period of turbulence, with policy reversals in some democracies and rapid expansions elsewhere. This paper compares how centralized, decentralized (federal), and polycentric/hybrid governance designs shape mitigation and adaptation outcomes. Using a qualitative comparative approach across China, the United States, Canada, Türkiye, Norway, and Saudi Arabia, assessing policy ambition, legal instruments, implementation capacity, subnational authority, stakeholder participation, finance mobilization, and equity considerations. A qualitative comparative approach is applied across six country cases - China, the United States, Canada, Türkiye, Norway, and Saudi Arabia - evaluating policy ambition, legal instruments, implementation capacity, subnational authority, stakeholder participation, finance mobilization, and equity considerations. Insights are then extended to the Central Asian context, where climate governance remains predominantly centralized, shaped by Soviet-era institutional legacies, uneven local capacity, and constrained civic participation. The analysis demonstrates that no model is universally superior; the most effective arrangements combine top-down coherence with bottom-up experimentation and social legitimacy. Norway’s polycentric governance model and Türkiye’s hybrid approach illustrate how localized climate planning can be integrated within broader national frameworks. For Central Asia, pragmatic hybrid pathways are recommended that align national targets and financing with empowered regional pilots, transparent monitoring, and inclusive engagement. These context-sensitive combinations offer the best prospects for durable emissions reductions, climate resilience, and just transition outcomes in the region.

Nir Kshetri

This chapter identifies and evaluates a broad range of ethical and moral issues that can be anticipated in the development of Web3 and the metaverse. It delves into concerns that have been raised regarding the exploitation of young game developers and game players by metaverse platforms and other powerful actors. It also contends that Web3 is potentially more harmful than other forms of data colonialism due to blockchain's decentralization, which leads to a lack of accountability for any wrongdoing when issues arise. The chapter also provides a perspective on ethical issues of P2E games in which NFT owners take a large share of earnings of players who rent NFTs. It also explores carbon footprints and environmental impacts of Web3 and the metaverse. Finally, the chapter also highlights a range of pollution-reduction strategies that have been proposed for Web3 and the metaverse.

Pedro Baiz, Weilun Lao

The origin of carbon markets can be traced back since the early 1990’s with initiatives like the USA Clean Air Act and the Kyoto Protocol, and over these past three decades the ecosystem continues to evolve and grow to meet its ultimate goal of reducing carbon concentration in our planet. The present chapter aims to describe the latest developments across the ecosystem standards, especially developments involving the use of distributed ledger technologies.

Shyam Nath, Yeti Nisha Madhoo

Abstract This paper extends the climate literature by examining the feasibility of integrating sub‐national governance into global club governance for mitigating CO 2 emissions. Global climate clubs become an argument for having separate bundles of emission targets and incentive mechanisms in the form of opportunities for climate finance and technology sharing among the club members. An exploratory analysis is important to examine the role of import and export taxes and other channels, such as the clean development mechanism, in meeting the objective of nonmember countries to join the club. The crux, however, is how, after determining national‐level quotas, the mitigation responsibilities are shared with subnational entities. We propose a design of a carbon entry tax at the subnational level, namely states, districts, and municipalities. The carbon entry tax uses the nighttime luminosity data published by NASA as a measure of carbon, which constitutes the tax base. The carbon entry tax serves as a fiscal instrument of decarbonization in a decentralized framework.

Marco Schletz, Axel Constant, Angel Hsu, Simon J.D. Schillebeeckx · 6 authors

The Regenerative Finance (ReFi) movement aims to fundamentally transform the governance of global common pool resources (CPRs), such as the atmosphere, which are being degraded despite international efforts. The ReFi movement seeks to achieve this by utilizing digital monitoring, reporting, and verification (D-MRV); tokenization of assets; and decentralized governance approaches. However, there is currently a lack of a clear path forward to create and implement models that actually drive the “Re-” in ReFi beyond perpetuating the existing extractive economics and toward actual regeneration. In addition, ReFi suffers from growing pains, lacking a common interoperability framework and definition for determining what a ReFi project is and how the individual components align toward the grand ambition. This paper provides a definition of the ReFi stack of interconnected components and examines how it can address limitations in climate change accounting, finance and markets, and governance. The authors also examine the theory of regenerative economics and CPRs to encourage further discussions and advancements in the ReFi space. The crucial question remains if and how ReFi can drive a change in paradigm toward the effective regeneration of global CPRs.

Gill Allwood

In November 2019 the European Parliament (2019/2930(RSP)) declared a climate and environmental emergency, calling for urgent and concrete action. The year 2019 was Europe's hottest year on record (Copernicus Climate Change Service, 2019), and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2018, p. v) reported that ‘emissions of greenhouse gases due to human activities, the root cause of global warming, continue to increase, year after year’. Swedish teenage climate activist Greta Thunberg inspired and led a worldwide school strike movement, and mass protests dominated by young women took place around the world (Wahlström et al., 2019). The European Parliament resolution of 14 March 2019 (2019/2582(RSP)) ‘welcomes the fact that people across Europe, in particular younger generations, are becoming increasingly active in demonstrating for climate justice’. At the institutional level 2019 was a year of renewal, with the European Parliament elections in May, the adoption of a new Council strategy in June and the appointment of a new Commission in December. Climate change was a priority for all these institutional actors. The Council strategy 2019–24, for example, insists on the urgent need to build a ‘climate-neutral, green, fair and social Europe’. The new President of the Commission Ursula von der Leyen announced her intention to see Europe become the first climate-neutral continent by 2050. Climate change arrived on the EU agenda in the 1980s, emerging out of environmental policy, which was already established as an area that required transnational action. Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s the climate ambition of the EU exceeded its ability to agree on, and implement, effective actions (Dupont and Oberthür, 2015). When the USA withdrew from the Kyoto protocol in 2001 the EU took on a global leadership role and has continued to construct an identity as a global actor around the issue of climate change (Jordan et al., 2010). This had economic motivations (to avoid being undercut by exporters with lower environmental standards) but was also part of the post-Maastricht efforts to increase the EU's global actorness. The past decade has seen climate change gain prominence and take centre stage. In 2009 the landmark climate and energy framework (COM(2014)15 final) introduced targets for greenhouse gas emissions, energy efficiency and renewable energy. Within the European Commission climate action gained its own Directorate General, DG CLIMA. This was an important part of the process of institutionalizing climate change. The issue of climate change continued to rise up the EU and the global agenda, and there was a strong dynamic between the two. The Lisbon Treaty (2007) gave the EU competence to conclude international environmental agreements. The EU, along with its member states, is a party to the United Nations Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and plays a key role in trying to reach agreement on global targets (Biedenkopf and Dupont, 2013; Oberthür and Groen, 2018). It is in this context that the EU emerged as an influential player in the 2015 Paris Agreement, the first climate agreement to be universal and legally binding. International targets and monitoring and reporting have acted as an impetus for action on the part of the EU and many, although not all, its member states (Dupont, 2019). The European Green Deal (2019), drafted against the background of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2018) report on the predicted impact of a global temperature rise of 1.5°C, further highlights the way that the issue of climate change has become part of the institutional fabric of the EU. Reinforcing the EU's commitments under the Paris agreement, as well as the UN's 2030 Agenda, with its Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (2015), it provides a framework in which the EU can try to assert leadership and mould its own efforts towards a sustainability that ‘leaves no-one behind’. The Council's conclusions on climate diplomacy of 18 February 2019 describe 2019 as the year of pushing further convergence between the SDGs and the climate agenda. The initial focus of EU climate policy was climate change mitigation. This refers to strategies for reducing climate change, largely through the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. Key policy frameworks are the Climate and energy package and the Environmental Action Programme, which provides an overarching framework for all environmental and climate policy. The European Green Deal (COM(2019)640 final), proposed by the new Commission in 2019, sets out a strategy to achieve net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 while sustaining economic growth, and promises to enshrine this in legislation, with the first climate laws due to be proposed in 2020. Since 2013, internal EU climate policy has also included an adaptation strategy, in recognition of the fact that climate change is having an impact within the EU, as well as, more obviously, elsewhere. While climate change mitigation is more readily framed as an issue to be dealt with at the EU level, adaptation to the effects of climate change appeared, until recently, to require local responses or to be of concern only in the countries that are most severely hit by the impact of climate change, and are concentrated in the global south. The floods and heat waves of the early 2000s raised awareness of the impact of climate change within the EU and of its cross-border nature (Rayner and Jordan, 2010), prompting the adoption of an EU adaptation strategy (COM(2013)216). Member states are encouraged to produce national adaptation strategies, setting out, for example, how they will climate-proof their transport, energy and agriculture sectors, and protect their populations from flooding, droughts and heat waves. Adaptation has a longer history as part of EU external relations. The visible impact of climate change in developing countries, and the use of development aid for adaptation purposes, mean that climate change has been prominent in EU development policy. A Commission communication in 2003 (COM(2003)85 final) declared that climate change was a problem for development, as well as an environmental problem. Since the Lisbon treaty (2007), however, climate change has been substantially reframed on the external agenda, replacing a development frame with one much more closely related to migration and security (Youngs, 2014). Development policy is expected to align with the Union's strategic priorities, set out in the Global Strategy (2016), which is the overarching statement of EU foreign policy and that frames climate change as a security threat and a root cause of migration (Global Strategy, 2016, p. 27). This article will focus on two aspects of recent EU climate policy. The first is not new, but is important. It is the recognition that climate change, like other cross-cutting issues, cannot be addressed in isolation. It is inextricably connected to key areas of EU activity, including energy, transport and agriculture. Climate objectives need to be integrated into all areas of policymaking. This is referred to as climate mainstreaming and has been embraced by EU policymakers as a desirable practice. It has obvious parallels with gender mainstreaming, but, as this article shows, is itself gender blind, and this is problematic. The second aspect of recent EU climate policy on which this article focuses is new. It is the growing presence of statements about the need for a ‘just transition’ to a climate-neutral economy, one which ‘puts people first’ and ensures that ‘no-one is left behind’. I argue that embedding a gender lens in these two aspects of EU climate policy makes a valuable contribution to efforts to create a sustainable and just future. On the surface, it may seem that climate change affects everyone equally. As British Conservative MEP and member of the European Parliament Committee on Women's Rights and Gender Equality, Marina Yannakoudakis, said, ‘The climate is the same for males and females, so far as I know. When it rains we all get wet’ (BBC News, 2012). However, gender, development and environment scholars have produced a large volume of literature demonstrating that climate change is, indeed, gendered. The early contributions to this literature argued that structural inequalities in the global political economy and within societies increase women's vulnerability to the impact of climate change (Agrawala and Crick, 2009; Alston, 2013; Brody et al., 2008; Skinner, 2011). They argued that climate change has a particularly detrimental effect on the poorest countries and, within them, on the poorest parts of the population. As women constitute a large proportion of the poorest in society, they will be amongst the hardest hit and the least well positioned socially, legally and economically, to respond (Morrow, 2017). There is evidence to support the argument that women's vulnerability to the effects of climate change is increased in relation to men's by their relative disadvantage in terms of access to resources, land ownership, education and caring responsibilities (Dankelman, 2010). However, there is also a crucial insistence in the literature that women cannot be perceived as helpless victims of climate change (MacGregor, 2017). A second strand of the early gender and climate change literature emphasized women's agency and specific skills and knowledge which, it was argued, made them potentially useful actors in climate change adaptation. As food producers, for example, they were well placed to adapt agricultural techniques to changing environmental conditions. It was also argued that, as energy users in the home, they could play a role in climate change mitigation by adopting new forms of cooking stoves, for example. The gendered impact of climate change and women's role as climate actors are not confined to the global south, and researchers have demonstrated these links in rich industrialized countries, including EU member states (Tschakert and Machado, p. They have that there are gendered in the of climate change, including transport and energy They have gendered in vulnerability to the effects of climate as heat waves and and they have gendered in towards climate change and towards the need to mitigation and adaptation on and gender is to between women and and between and of women and not to between of and which can be by and women and Gender inequalities with other structural inequalities including and and Gender is one of of that have an impact on the of and as a of and makes it of in its with other structural lens has been by scholars to important contributions to of the impact of climate change and responses to it et al., and and Machado, 2012). can and in relation to climate change. women as victims of climate change, an that social on as gender, and place the vulnerability and of and example, on and the EU and 2013; and that there are gendered in energy and but that gender is not the only more women are not a and there are within the global and the global south. and p. for example, argue that, climate most have in with women across Europe with their at the Commission and this to their climate impact as well as climate to which inequalities in and p. and have out that women's presence in climate is and have for this to be and Development 2018). 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Andrew Lockley, Zhifu Mi, D’Maris Coffman

Geoengineering is a proposed response to anthropogenic global warming (AGW). Conventionally it consists of two strands: Solar Radiation Management (SRM), which is fast-acting, incomplete but inexpensive, and Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR), which is slower acting, more expensive, and comprehensive. Pairing SRM and CDR offers a contractually complete solution for future emissions if effectively-scaled and coordinated. SRM offsets warming, while CDR takes effect.We suggest coordination using a blockchain, i.e. smart contracts and a distributed ledger. Specifically, we integrate CDR futures with time and volume-matched SRM orders, to address emissions contractually before release. This provides an economically and environmentally proportionate solution to CO2 emissions at the wellhead, with robust contractual transparency, and minimal overhead cost. Our proposal offers a ‘polluter pays’ implementation of Long & Shepherds SRM ‘bridge’ concept. This ‘polluter geoengineers’ approach mandates and verifies emissions-linked payments with minimal friction, delay, or cost. Finally, we compare alternative market designs against this proposal, finding that this proposal offers several advantages. We conclude that blockchain implementation of the ‘polluter geoengineers’ approach is attractive and feasible for larger wellhead contracts. We also identify a handful of advantages and disadvantages that merit further study.

Margaret Rosso Grossman

“Climate change, once considered an issue for a distant future, has moved firmly into the present.”1 Atmospheric and ocean temperatures are rising, “[p]recipitation patterns are changing, sea level is rising, the oceans are becoming more acidic, and the frequency and intensity of some extreme weather events are increasing.”2 The 2017 Climate Science Special Report describes the current state of scientific knowledge about U.S. and global climate change. The report concludes that “it is extremely likely that human influence has been the dominant cause of the observed warming since the mid-20th century. For the warming over the last century, there is no convincing alternative explanation.”3 Global data show that 2016 was the warmest year on record and the third consecutive year for record global average surface temperatures.4 In the continental United States, 2016 was the second warmest year on record, after 2012, with higher than average precipitation and fifteen climate-related disasters including drought, wildfire, floods, and severe storms, which caused losses of more than $1 billion.5 The emission of greenhouses gases (GHGs),6 which move about in the atmosphere, is a major cause of global climate change. GHGs absorb terrestrial radiation that leaves the Earth’s surface. Although GHGs “create the natural heat-trapping properties of the atmosphere” and are “necessary to life as we know it,” high concentrations of GHGs cause an increase in the Earth’s absorption of energy and the resulting increase in temperature referred to as global warming.7 Recent research identifies deadly effects of climate change, “one of the biggest global threats to human health of the 21st century.”8 If global GHG emissions are not reduced, heat waves will affect 74% of the world’s population by 2100. Even with drastic GHG reductions, almost half of humans will face deadly heat.9 In Europe, increasing temperatures will result in weather disasters, especially heat waves and coastal flooding, and a sharp increase in climate-related deaths by 2100.10 By 2050, climate change may affect nutrition in developing countries as rising temperatures reduce availability of plant proteins.11 Although a number of U.S. statutes govern human activities related to climate change, no comprehensive climate change legislation exists.12 Federal programs (including the Obama administration’s Climate Action Plan13), as well as regional, state, and local initiatives, promised to mitigate and adapt to the effects of climate change. Recent developments, however, have diluted federal efforts.14 For example, in March 2017, President Trump revoked significant Obama-administration climate change policies, including the Climate Action Plan and related strategies.15 This revocation and others that followed are likely to result in increased emissions and a failure to meet climate targets (e.g., energy efficiency, methane emissions).16 Significantly, in June 2017, the United States announced its withdrawal from the Paris Agreement,17 a decision that triggered international condemnation, as well as criticism from state and local governments and large corporations in the United States. In August 2017, the United States notified the United Nations of its intent to withdraw from the Paris Agreement as soon as the United States is eligible, unless it “identifies suitable terms for reengagement.”18 The U.S. withdrawal was characterized as a “severe backwards move and an abrogation of its responsibility as the world’s second largest emitter . . . when more, not less, commitment is needed from all governments to avert the worst impacts of climate change.”19 Despite this withdrawal, however, the United States could meet its Paris goals through the efforts of cities, states, and businesses.20 The global crisis of climate change has affected the practice of law.21 Indeed, in recent years, climate change has engendered “a rapidly building wave of litigation” in the United States.22 Although the judiciary is “a latecomer to the crisis that has worsened in the hands of the legislative and executive branches,”23 litigation can play a role in forcing government regulatory action and perhaps in providing remedies for harm from GHG emissions. As commentators observed, “[t]he president might root out climate policy from executive branch decision-making, but he cannot unilaterally remove the issue from judicial consideration.”24 This Report, guided by a questionnaire prepared for the Twentieth General Congress of the International Academy of Comparative Law, addresses the topic of climate change lawsuits and the individual. The questionnaire focuses on lawsuits filed by individual plaintiffs against public and private actors to achieve mitigation of climate change to its not on as corporations and the of climate change filed in the United States, a number individual that on of mitigation and for this Report of action to climate change. a number of by plaintiffs in climate change The Report a number of by individual plaintiffs and against public and private Climate change is of state, local judicial litigation in which the and an issue of the policy of climate change and U.S. and climate change to of government responsibility to GHG emission by and government with for in to GHG climate change litigation to and climate change into in The of litigation” and by a of U.S. climate change litigation This to more than a of for and related to climate change. In some of the in the climate change is not the of the in federal and state the public and and a climate change and significant number of U.S. climate change are on federal statutes and and judicial of and have government regulatory by more for mitigation the for example, to climate-related action and to as the of the and federal for failure to GHG emissions and the of climate change. of climate change lawsuits have to example, of emissions after with plaintiffs Even more state of GHG emissions and climate change state that on and regulatory in local on local government Although climate change litigation on federal and state statutes has a plaintiffs have of with are for and have on the of action in climate change and some for with and considered is and some on public with its on may for some climate change lawsuits are to with a to the however, federal public in by that and the it federal to of emissions from on state may to plaintiffs have in but some commentators as the cause of for a in of and significant in against GHG especially in that emissions a to plaintiffs and that emissions caused may more in against local governments but that the than an extreme precipitation was cause of harm may Despite the of some climate change may not an to mitigate adapt to climate change. As change the this and in and in emissions the a action and as to once all of and of will have to climate change from a that is to private and local than Climate change and cannot through the was to private of and was and cannot to a to and for and all of have and the to and to and after a regulatory has been can and play a plaintiffs have filed a number of in on the public are of a global the Atmospheric with a with in and governments to natural of for and Although the of public in U.S. is to the is an of federal and state with in recent public litigation that the government a to its to public including the and affected by GHG emissions. public is and may to climate change. have the as a public and a have in a state GHG have public have that are to and have public to the is that to climate change could an state to as of the public in and to natural and as in of climate change the of judicial to climate change perhaps on and the Climate change, it is is “a global and is that by the of and the by international have to the for from harm caused by GHG emissions. in the of climate and from the on Climate and others that emissions of GHGs are a major cause of climate The in in in global temperatures has with a significant increase in the of in the the are For when is into the atmosphere, it the of a energy and the of is a a Despite judicial of the climate change litigation a number of in all climate change others to of on the cause of action and the The focuses on major to to mitigate the effects of climate change. not to plaintiffs in climate change of the U.S. which federal judicial to and plaintiffs in federal have to state The of to that the has a in the and that will in a The U.S. the of in an a show it has an in that is and and not the is to the action of the and it is as to that the will by a The for is to the than to the have to the of the and the the of the of and climate change lawsuits on of the have have to in the are to the and the the the of individual in the The in and The that we that the affect the in a and individual have that plaintiffs that are more than by all a global however, climate change of The that from climate change are may to that are but in a the that not the in the of The to the a and caused by climate change. the of plaintiffs are to a to a of As the U.S. of for the the of in climate change might by which a public action on to an a of scientific of “a of the of for can for of the climate change no could the on the harm by the this more As the in climate change has the that the reduce global but not that a decision can of climate change of a to government failure to the impacts of climate change in the the The that the statutes the government to more regulatory action to mitigate climate federal the the government to the impacts of that affect the to government failure to climate change in in the effects of a than and and harm global was not in the to plaintiffs of climate change have the decision that the harm is not related to climate and and to the failure to climate change could with in the when plaintiffs that are (e.g., failure to climate change in a decision that in harm to may to when can an for that is not climate is when a the failure to GHG emissions federal was a issue in States, local and private that the U.S. its responsibility the to the emissions of including from the to the to GHG emissions and the for to with the In its the that GHG emissions caused but that the state of the for as and for its from the of rising sea that could coastal In terms of emissions from to GHG The of emissions to the by and its The decision in was of as but some that the decision the for especially and As private plaintiffs could the to in from rising sea to climate change, but have been on are in the is that “a government action leaves some that to climate change and its The in a a of which in a federal it that of are to an branch of government and not in federal The might considered an of the for that can for the of In a the of a and that of is from the the the as a The that that are not Indeed, have been to In the climate change the was in and in a federal of emissions from The federal in that climate change was and especially on a of an policy of a for and that it needed a legislative policy it could the global warming The the as the the in and that of the The was not and the could a public the The but not the the that the which the to federal In a more recent of and public a federal in of the in The that the not a but a of been The however, that plaintiffs a have to to of the of judicial and the to litigation in the of climate the not and others that it was not to to it not of not from the of the The of a of issue the judicial and legislative has the of some climate change on federal decision is a federal public for that GHG emissions from to global Federal when Congress not and that the federal of GHG emissions. The its and the regulatory the the and the it federal to of emissions from The for of federal is the to of to the to not to emissions federal the The however, that . . . not judicial through in the federal Although plaintiffs in that not on the of For example, of was a federal public against energy for by an by from waves and to global Although federal could to the that to the of and that of the of action all its the federal public as it the issue in The was not affected by the that for that the GHG of the triggered which the executive branch has not its on federal but not the state The however, that availability . . . of a state on the of the a and and is the of climate change that the can more GHG Recent harm to public including the and not issue in and the has not been to public as public which and are by the are the government to the As a a the and the which to the however, of may a significant to in for caused by climate change. the the GHG emissions and as well as the of to that The of climate change significant GHGs from some have in the atmosphere, and others are emissions. emissions from when In on Climate describes the of climate change as in the and of harm the when can related to plaintiffs in climate change will face in especially emissions from a of into the atmosphere, and once there to climate change, which caused a . . . and that 2017 international that has that GHG emissions to climate change impacts for the of plaintiffs face the of that GHG emissions a in of of GHGs will of action that the a government GHG emissions not may have in plaintiffs may not meet the of cause for example, was caused by extreme than of by the that the of the resulting harm was that harm result from the plaintiffs from climate change, in and and in a of that the of from a in is of by climate change plaintiffs are to in climate in scientific have on than more local in scientific research may of plaintiffs to and to responsibility more in for example, that climate change is the result of emissions and emissions to major The on from to that of global emissions of and methane from international and For some this could of In the United States, have the to on regulatory and in statutes have that and others affected by regulatory to for after to the meet the however, have the for litigation against governments private plaintiffs in climate change litigation to and The some by Although climate change and in the United States, climate change in the United States have on human In the in the on that U.S. failure to GHGs human The not the but the to human of climate In recent years, public in state has human with by the of that public government action on climate change. for as well as “a with and others in all by a of and and lawsuits have been but a have to regulatory litigation the to its judicial role in public government to the as a public and remedies that will that the federal filed in the efforts of individual plaintiffs to of the public in the of climate change. in United are for and a with a in the United States, the and executive that for that the climate but and of concentrations in the to the U.S. not the plaintiffs in that to and and that have to natural in for the and for a that been and an and of a to reduce emissions of and moved to that the plaintiffs the federal government is not to public The and the of the to The the are for some of the harm caused by climate change, plaintiffs may climate change policy in and this can to change policy of the of the the the in of the and that the not a but a of have plaintiffs for and which are and likely to are to and are the to out emissions and reduce will to climate The and public a of of a the that to a climate of human life is to a and The that a action is and the climate in a that will cause human human result in to human and the it a for a The the of harm to public and that the to the federal not public and characterized as can in federal the of the that have been and in the of and the has for moved for an but in June 2017, the The United States filed a of in the in that in this show a and intent to the of Congress to policy energy of public and by out of a to a of human The the and on is the federal decision that might a to a but it to a climate that the plaintiffs will Indeed, the the of a against federal public was a of state in state may For example, a state of the public with a of individual and a that the public the government to GHG emissions. The of that the state a public to natural including the atmosphere, but that public the and than by a The addresses of GHGs and plaintiffs the to in the cannot GHG emissions. the the for the federal and state mitigation of climate change. example, regulatory others of GHG emissions and climate change in decision against public actors regulatory to mitigate climate by plaintiffs as of litigation lawsuits against public actors for In plaintiffs of of for In the GHG in the the and public and but its was on In of individual state and a of to the to GHG emissions as by the which regulatory and that it with the state The and the of and that the not with the the to that of of a on emissions that may the emissions from of of emission for and that on an of was a to the of of a for a to GHG emission to the In June the the of to its of especially in of the which the characterized as an to on climate change, that the of action on climate change, but to emission In the the second of the but the state and to public and the state In however, after the the the to its and for GHG emission to the The of this By the of the its GHG and GHG emission to the in a 2016 the to to a for that that is and to a The of the to the plaintiffs in In the of the that federal to the are more than to the States the to the In 2017, the of the 2016 as an of The in is significant of its of the crisis of climate change, its of of the atmosphere, and its on the of for In the an public responsibility of in a by severe to and significant number of U.S. than on government responsibility to the of GHG emissions and climate change in decision Federal on the the and state on state In an of litigation through “a well . . . that GHG emissions and climate change impacts are for but that the for the level of been but some more recent have of climate change in The on for federal of GHG emissions and climate change effects the 2017 executive that to but the withdrawal in 2017 not change the will to of climate change in and on of of have to of climate change by federal to the of in an have of climate change in others have climate change a of and the For example, a recent by on of individual is U.S. in of of the and that the on federal in major impacts on affected global climate change, and of the of the effects of on and of the the the In the prepared for the the and of not the effects of GHGs and climate and considered of a of the that the was not and This however, has been as of of its to to the energy that is the of climate plaintiffs mitigation of climate change to In U.S. for example, that of on almost in federal statutes by to climate change, global and GHG emissions. Although have to have plaintiffs to that in no scientific for that climate change that climate change cause harm to the in show that the to plaintiffs to that the of the a to climate the that plaintiffs to show that to the The federal the for of the state in the with a number filed have individual are with as especially the have been more than the In for of for example, a that the report was in it to the effects of a large on GHGs global individual plaintiffs of climate change in of local with For example, individual plaintiffs failure to an of a for a for was the failure to the effects of and emissions from effects on and increased GHG emissions. the the that of the was a the and of an of on an to the but not the climate change was In an individual and the on prepared the The that the with the but the individual the that the was The that the which considered GHG not climate change and effects of the The however, of the which to with a of the by of when the not that might mitigate significant effects on the Climate change policy and litigation in the United States with on however, has more in policy and and local have been especially in the of climate effects on coastal and to others for filed after not for failure of the of to adapt to the effects of climate change. The action in the and it to increased the government increased the of flooding, and the not to of cause of however, was but some in of for In from plaintiffs of the more than that the and failure to the to from The that the failure to and the to severe The in that the to the federal not The of the but the for and its the the government was from the to the decision for the government affected the plaintiffs been as well as In litigation after the government and individual filed a against the United that the of the increased and after and resulting in of The of decision on in which that the in and the was a cause of the The in that plaintiffs with and that the severe and a In after failure of the to the of for the was not plaintiffs no for the of for the of on the and for of as a result of The a with for a of and The U.S. of for the Federal will the of As federal the government in from related to climate change but government may more to which not government could the failure to that increase not of the the government is for a of that not have for government the and the cause of In some however, government failure to to and the might that and plaintiffs can against and local and are of that is for plaintiffs can that of the of climate and the that governments will for state for and some but is likely to Although government in some failure to public may state and local governments from for failure to failure to that have no to Despite some for state and local governments as are to for impacts from and of individual In a recent to after severe in the the of and its of in for failure to to The that it no knowledge of a is from for activities a For the a to the the to the The no to plaintiffs the of was the to the and the in plaintiffs to for of after In the against and government the public which to of government to the public than to individual are than in which governments to for to adapt to the effects of climate change. In a the local government over to a The a of the the but significant to the and others in the In a over a the and an The that for a on a of all and that increase the of the In a are to the of not to a not to a out that the resulting from a public the for may the of for as well as from the to individual climate change plaintiffs have private of private are not by but the some federal may and some that are in goals of . . . its to against private actors have not been to for a of by and a emissions and as well as the of against perhaps and climate change of that may but others example, of harm from climate to was a action against a number of energy corporations by a coastal by for of public and private and as well as The that the for the but not the and that the not as a The was when the but judicial to a of for the and the not the a by on of its individual and and that and a to public health and the in to adapt to effects of climate change, a sea level extreme could the In 2017, the federal to for but that plaintiffs for for not likely to 2100. actors may in by In 2017, local governments in private and to for of from and methane from to of action in the public private and for failure to and that since the but that GHG from affected climate and sea plaintiffs that to that plaintiffs and for and of of and plaintiffs have climate change that energy have and the public about the of climate change from recent filed in on of that by failure to climate-related may more significant in climate change The and climate change and its including impacts and extreme weather in the and others are from energy and an for as a government of its and of on climate Recent research that energy of the of climate change, the to reduce but to the As the climate change litigation especially for private as well some and are of but plaintiffs have been including the and of for individual and Although U.S. to have been to on private may some of the and that have Even individual plaintiffs may that lawsuits to mitigate adapt to climate change are not and than individual are more likely to have the to climate change This Report is on by the of and commitment of the issue to a a of and for the of an policy of a for the of a of the of an for to a decision the of from by on and to a to and are that plaintiffs likely could not the through the

Martin Oulu

No abstract is available for this record.

Kenneth W. Abbott

Negotiators preparing for Rio+20 are missing an important opportunity. Private sustainability governance (PSG) is thriving: organizations created by business and civil society groups, as well as public—private partnerships, adopt and apply significant regulatory standards and undertake valuable operational activities, including pilot projects and financing. However, even though reforming the institutional framework for sustainable development is a central part of the Rio+20 agenda, negotiators are focusing almost exclusively on inter-governmental organizations such as the UN Environment Program (UNEP), the Commission for Sustainable Development and the Economic and Social Council. This public—private engagement gap isolates international governance from the energy and innovation of PSG, and impedes efforts to coordinate the bifurcated and decentralized system of sustainability governance. This article argues that states, and especially international organizations, should actively support PSG as part of the institutional framework for sustainable development, while steering private and public—private schemes towards good organizational practices and the pursuit of public goals. Engagement with PSG would help international institutions pursue their sustainability missions more effectively, promote the emergence of effective and legitimate private schemes, manage fragmentation, promote experimentation and learning, and enhance citizen participation. The article outlines two fruitful modes of engagement pioneered by UNEP: regulatory cooperation, in which international authorities engage directly with business firms, industry groups and other ‘targets’, influencing them to adopt more sustainable behaviors; and orchestration, in which authorities engage with intermediary organizations, such as multi-stakeholder private governance schemes, catalyzing, supporting and steering them as they seek to influence the ultimate targets of policy.

Kenneth W. Abbott

In climate change, as in other areas, recent years have produced a ‘Cambrian explosion’ of transnational institutions, standards, financing arrangements, and programs. As a result, climate governance has become complex, fragmented, and decentralized, operating without central coordination. Most studies of climate governance focus on inter state institutions. In contrast, I map a different realm of climate change governance: the diverse array of transnational schemes. I analyze this emerging system in terms of two theoretical frameworks developed to describe, explain, and evaluate complex governance arrangements—regime complex theory and polycentric governance theory—revealing fruitful avenues for positive and normative research. I conclude by arguing that the benefits of institutional complexity could be increased, and the costs reduced, through nonhierarchical ‘orchestration’ of climate change governance, in which international organizations or other appropriate authorities support and steer transnational schemes that further global public interests.