This paper analyzes the institutional constraints on the effective implementation of the LEADER/Community-Led Local Development (CLLD) approach in Bulgaria and proposes a concrete institutional model for overcoming them. The study proceeds from the premise that the approach holds substantial potential as a territorially oriented instrument for local development, but that its effectiveness is limited by a structural contradiction between the decentralized conceptual logic of LEADER/CLLD and the centralized institutional framework of its national implementation in Bulgaria. The analysis shows that the current distribution of functions between the Ministry of Agriculture and Food, as Managing Authority, and the State Fund “Agriculture” – Paying Agency creates a structural asymmetry, whose measurable consequences are systemic delays in contracting and disbursing project funds, limited procedural flexibility, and insufficient specialized administrative capacity. As an institutional response to these deficits, the paper proposes the creation of a specialized executive agency under the Rural Development Programme, with functions covering the administrative management of projects, methodological support for Local Action Groups (LAGs), monitoring and evaluation, and coordination of multi-fund financing. Two options for the institutional positioning of the agency are examined — as an independent structure under the Ministry, or as a specialized unit within the existing administration — and these are compared with established European practices (Austria, Germany, Ireland). The study concludes that overcoming the structural contradiction requires not a change in the conceptual philosophy of the approach, but a targeted institutional reconfiguration aimed at increasing the autonomy of Local Action Groups.
SaucerSwap democratizes DeFi by structuring its governance model after a decentralized autonomous organization (DAO). A DAO treasury fund will serve to retain value on the protocol and fund development of community-voted features
This paper offers a brief overview of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) from its origins until the present day in order to identify the factors that have been shaping its evolution. It then attempts to evaluate how persistent these trends will be in the future, whether new policy imperatives are gaining relevance in CAP reform and what they imply for the CAP over the coming years. Budget crises, international trade pressures and enlargement have driven the CAP reforms of the last fifteen years. In the future, change will be driven by the need to maintain the economic rationality and political acceptability of agricultural policy in an enlarged European Union of twenty‐seven heterogeneous member states. Further decentralization of decision making and financing can be expected.
This thesis consists of a summary and four papers. The first two papers address political economy and indus-trial organization aspects of agricultural policy, and the last two international aspects of environmental policy. Paper [I] explains Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) subsidies to farmers by the influence of farmer interest-groups with an EU-wide membership. The analysis is based on panel-data for fifteen commodities over the period 1986-2003. Because the CAP is set as an overall EU policy, effective lobbying presents a collective ac-tion problem to the farmers in the EU as a whole. Indicators of lobbying, which are based on this perception, are found to explain part of the variation in agricultural support. In Paper [II], the Bresnahan-Lau framework is used to analyze whether policy reforms, i.e. the two-price sys-tem (an input quota, 1986-1991) and a general deregulation of dairy policy (1991-1994) had any market power effects on the Swedish butter market. The results show that the null hypothesis of no market power cannot be rejected, for any of the specific policy reforms, at any reasonable significance level. Paper [III] concerns the welfare consequences of environmental policy cooperation. It is assumed that coun-tries finance their public expenditures by using distortionary taxes, and that they differ with respect to compe-tition in the labor market. It is shown how the welfare effect of an increase in the expenditures on abatement depends on changes in the environmental damage, employment and work hours. The welfare effect is also related to the strategic interaction among the countries in the prereform equilibrium. In Paper [IV] environmental policy in an economic federation, where each national government faces a mixed tax problem, is addressed. It is assumed that the federal government sets emission targets, which are imple-mented at the national level. It is also assumed that the economic federation is decentralized. The results high-light a strategic role of income and commodity taxation, i.e. each country uses its policy instruments, at least in part, to influence the emission target.
David S. McCauley, Robert Bruce Anderson, Richard L. Bowen, Ibrahim Elassiouty · 6 authors
Egypt seems to be on the brink of a new era in water management. The country suppose to follow a different operational mode that is “water conservation oriented, decentralized, environmentally sensitive, private sector oriented, equitable and operationally efficient” The focus of this study was on market-based instruments (MBI’s) as complements to traditional command and control measures for managing water quantity and quality. Prior to evaluating potential water MBIs, it was necessary to identify the water management problems and challenges that need to be addressed through policy adjustments. \nThese challenges were threat of water shortages, service delivery in municipal water supply, lake Nasser pollution, Irrigation service delivery challenges, Nile River pollution above Cairo, Insufficient irrigation system upkeep, water pollution in the Nile Delta, Pollution of lakes , low user contribution to irrigation system upkeep, groundwater contamination, and Weak attention to in-stream flows. \nSuch challenges have impacts on: (1) Nonrenewable groundwater management, (2) Adverse effects on human health, (3) Subsidies affecting water use efficiency, (4) Reduced agricultural productivity, (5) Rainfall capture and flash flood protection. The impacts generated some Threats to aquatic ecosystems, particularly, Negative consequences of rising water tables and Negative impacts on aesthetics (incl. tourism) \nA two-step screening process was developed and utilized to evaluate the likely success of alternative market-based policy instruments in response to one or more of water management challenges. The instruments were screened based on economic efficiency and equity and other economic factors relating to the nature of the instrument itself. They also were evaluated based on criteria that considered the specific social, cultural, political, and institutional context in which the instrument will be applied. \nThereon, the study explored the applicability of economic instruments to help address Egypt’s current water management challenges. It resulted in an initial evaluation of twenty instruments that seemed most promising. Screening criteria were developed and applied to assess the merits of each, and direction also was received from nearly 60 participants who attended the study’s concluding Workshop on Economic Incentives for Water. The most promising policy instruments that concluded from the study were: \nWoith respect to the water quantity management deemed of highest priority for follow-up analysis and possible policy action were: Groundwater Extraction Charges, Tariff Reductions for Imported Water Meters and Water Conserving Equipment, Several other measures were identified as warranting careful further analysis. These include area-based irrigation service charges; volumetric water delivery charges for large agricultural enterprises; and increased user fees for the supply of urban and industrial water services. \nLikewise, the most promising policy measures identified to address water quality \nproblems were: Increased User Fees for Wastewater Treatment, Increased Subsidies to Finance Wastewater Treatment Facilities, Subsidized Rural Sanitation, and Subsidized Pollution Control Equipment \nTo achieve such model four approaches to positive change have been identified. These include Creating incentives and disincentives for water management to protect its quality. In addition to Institutionalizing the role private participation; environmental protection and identifying mechanisms to ensure appropriate benefits for participating private sector partners, decentralizing decision making, institutionalizing environmental protection, changing the role of government and improving personnel policies at macro-level decision making regarding uses of the Nile River, and improving awareness of water resources and associated environmental issues.