Blockchain Papers

Enrico Rossi

No abstract is available for this record.

Abdalla Sid Ahmed Osman, Eiman Hag, Hind Amin Merghani, Naeema Al Gasseer

Primary health care (PHC) is high on the agenda of the ongoing health system reform. The health system in Sudan is decentralized with three levels of governance: federal, state, and locality. The interim Constitution of Sudan ensures the promotion of public health and guarantees equal access and free PHC to all its citizens. The government of Sudan is highly committed to achieving universal health coverage (UHC) by the year 2020. The higher authority in Sudan is the National Health Coordination Council chaired by the president of Sudan. This council is committed to UHC and endorses the family health policy. The PHC directorates, which receive the funds to facilitate the implementation of the PHC expansion, finance family health practice teams including the family medicine training programme in nine states in Sudan in addition to the in-service training of medical assistants and community health workers.

Radim Tobolka

No abstract is available for this record.

Abebaw, Mesfin

Local government is the tier of public authority that citizens first look to solve their immediate social problems. Among all the public institutions at local level, council has a special status and authority as local elected bodies. They are uniquely placed to provide vision and leadership to their local communities. They are able to make things happen on the ground where it really matters. The government of Ethiopia in general and Addis Ababa city administration in particular establishes council at different tiers of government as parliamentary control mechanism to ensure effective policy implementation, promote local democracy and improve service delivery. However, woreda councils in Addis Ababa city administration were not seen playing such role of democracy promotion. Moreover, studies conducted in regional woredas divulged that Woredas council have not yet managed to exercise sufficient local autonomy due to several reasons such as absence of clearly established legal mandate, lack of devolution of power, poor organization of the system and tight control and intervention by higher authorities. Therefore, this study aimed to assess the challenges and prospects that woreda council at Addis Ababa city administration has faced in promoting democracy among grass-root people. It also examines the overall operations of the councils from the viewpoints of democratic government and decentralization In order to pursue the objective of the study the researcher use multi-stage sampling technique and relied on both primary and secondary data source. Primary data collected through questionnaires, interview and observations while secondary data obtained from document analysis like legislation on the issue, minutes and reports complied by counsel's office. It was found that problems prevailed in regional woreda councils are also impeded woreda councils at Addis Ababa City Administration. The internal working system of woreda councils reflected that executive domination is very soaring, and councils are not responsive to the needs of the community and most importantly democratic essence viz. accountability, transparency, participation and autonomy are not adhered principles in the councils conduct. Therefore, councils as they are impeded by the above-mentioned challenges are playing insignificant role in cultivating democratic value and improving the service delivery to the grass root people. Therefore, it is recommended that the internal working system of councils need to be very transparent, responsive, participatory and free from any unnecessary intervention. Councilors must be sensitive to public interest; legal back up from the city administration is also needed in order to make councils strong, autonomous and powerful. The field that councilors operating also should be open to all stakeholders as the democracy promotion works calls for the involvements of different actors

Kidane, Chekol, Alemu, Getnet

The objective of this study is to
\n explore in depth public finance issues and their impact on
\n decentralized service delivery at the regional and woreda
\n levels in Benishangul Gumuz (BG) region. The study is
\n carried out as part of the federal and some regional case
\n studies designed to examine effectiveness of public finances
\n of sub-national governments. This study was expected to (i)
\n review the institutional arrangement for managing public
\n finances at the regional level including policies, budgetary
\n institutions, systems and processes; (ii) assess the level,
\n trend, and composition of public spending (both functional
\n and economic classification) in per capita terms over the
\n past five years and identify key achievements and
\n limitations; (iii) assess the level, trend, and, composition
\n of revenue at the regional level and examine the financing
\n framework, including ways to increase local revenue
\n generation capacity; (iv) assess the role of external aid in
\n supporting decentralized service delivery and the
\n sustainability of the program in absence of external aid;
\n (v) review the planning and budgeting process as well as the
\n quality of PFM system; and (vi) data permitting, establish
\n the link between the level of spending and the outputs and
\n outcomes for selected sectors. The study used standard
\n public financial process review methodologies used for
\n undertaking PFM assessments. The report reviewed the various
\n studies, plans and performance reports of the various
\n sectors in the regions between 1997 and 2001. In addition,
\n key informant interviews were carried out at bureaus levels
\n and woreda offices of education, health, water, agriculture
\n and rural development, finance and economic development,
\n revenue, General Auditor, rural road and woreda administrations.

Alebachew, Abebe, Alemu, Getnet

The objective of this study is explore
\n in depth public finance issues and their impact on
\n decentralized service delivery at the regional and woreda
\n level in Amhara region. The study is carried out as part of
\n the federal and some regional case studies designed to
\n examine effectiveness of public finances of sub-national
\n governments. This study was expected to (i) review the
\n institutional arrangement for managing public finances at
\n the regional level including policies, budgetary
\n institutions, systems and processes; (ii) assess the level,
\n trend, and composition of public spending (both functional
\n and economic classification) in per capita terms over the
\n past five years and identify key achievements and
\n limitations; (iii) assess the level, trend, and, composition
\n of revenue at the regional level and examine the financing
\n framework, including ways to increase local revenue
\n generation capacity; (iv) assess the role of external aid in
\n supporting decentralized service delivery and the
\n sustainability of the program in absence of external aid;
\n (v) review the planning and budgeting process as well as the
\n quality of PFM system; and (vi) data permitting, establish
\n the link between the level of spending and the outputs and
\n outcomes for selected sectors. The study used standard
\n public financial process review methodologies used for
\n undertaking PEFA assessments. The report reviewed the
\n various studies, plans and performance reports of the
\n various sectors in the regions between EFY 1997 and 2001. In
\n addition, key informant interviews were carried out at
\n bureaus levels and woreda offices of education, health,
\n water, agriculture and rural development, finance and
\n economic development, revenue, General Auditor, rural road
\n and woreda administrations.

Alex de Waal

In the months following his death on 20 August, Ethiopia's Prime Minister Meles Zenawi has been eulogized and demonized in equal measure. But his policies, and the transformational paradigm on which they were based, have rarely been elucidated. While alive, Meles was equally indifferent to praise and blame. To those who acclaimed Ethiopia's remarkable economic growth, he would ask, do they understand that his policies completely contradicted the neo-liberal Washington Consensus? To those who condemned his measures against the political opposition and civil society organizations, he demanded to know how they would define democracy and seek a feasible path to it, in a political economy dominated by patronage and rent seeking? Meles did not hide his views, but neither did he ever fully present his theory of the ‘democratic developmental state’ to an international audience. Over nearly 25 years, I was fortunate to be able to discuss political economy with him regularly, including critiquing his incomplete and unpublished master's dissertation. During this time, his thinking evolved, but his basic principles and sensibilities remained constant. World leaders have lauded Meles' economic achievements without acknowledging their theoretical basis. Human rights organizations have decried his political record as though he were a routine despot with no agenda other than hanging on to power. Reviewing his writings on the developmental state, this essay shows the unity of his theory and practice. Meles had the quiet certitude of someone who had been tested – and seen his people tested – to the limit. Along with his comrades in arms in the leadership of the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), he had looked into the abyss of collective destruction, and his career was coloured by the knowledge that Ethiopia could still go over that precipice. Many times during sixteen years of armed struggle in the mountains of northern Ethiopia against the then-military regime led by Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam, Meles had close personal brushes with death. In 1988, he and other central committee members avoided a likely-fatal aerial bombing by just twenty minutes after their hideout was betrayed by a spy and Ethiopian fighter-bombers targeted it. Later that year, he was taken gravely ill with malaria and was evacuated to hospital in Khartoum – one of the very few times he left the field during the entire armed struggle. As Meles crossed the border back into Ethiopia, I met him for the first time, and we began the first of our seminars on political economy. As dusk fell, still recuperating in his pyjamas, Comrade Meles climbed aboard a creaky Soviet Zil truck, captured from the Ethiopian army. All travel was at night, to avoid the MiGs, and we bumped our way along rocky tracks, first through the forested lowlands, camping out during daylight hours under trees next to a dry riverbed. Such was the itinerant life of the TPLF leadership. The next night our truck rumbled up a road cut through the mountainside by the guerrillas, with hairpins so tight that our truck had to make three-point turns. We spent the next day in caves at the TPLF's temporary headquarters in a mountain called Dejena, and the next nightfall I watched as an apparently uninhabited hillside gave forth a battalion of men, a dozen trucks and a tank, all of them completely obscured by camouflage until that moment. The TPLF had turned concealment into science. The discomfort of the journey was less memorable than the travelling discussion group of Comrade Meles, Comrade Seyoum (head of TPLF foreign relations and later Ethiopia's longest-serving Foreign Minister), a dozen fighters, a representative from a European agricultural assistance agency, and myself. I learned quickly that the most necessary attribute of a guerrilla fighter is functioning without sleep. Meles was a voracious consumer of information and analysis, and a tireless questioner. We discussed perestroika in the USSR, theories of people's liberation warfare, the imperfections of grain markets, and, above all, peasant survival strategies during drought. At one point we met a hunter on the track and Meles spent an hour discussing with him the importance of conserving endangered species. Meles was a convinced Marxist-Leninist, pragmatic but certain that the way of life of the Ethiopian peasants had to change or die. Having just completed my doctoral dissertation on famine survival strategies in Sudan, I tried to convince him that rural people were best served by diversified livelihoods, and that pastoral nomadism was an effective adaptation to the vagaries of life in a drought-prone ecosystem. He did his best to convince me that traditional livelihoods were doomed to stagnation and that Ethiopian peasants had to specialize in farming, trade, or livestock rearing. The abiding impression left by Meles and the TPLF leadership was that their theory and practice were deeply rooted in the realities of Ethiopia, and that they would succeed or fail on their terms and no others. The TPLF had convinced the people, and that was all that mattered. They did not measure their record or their policies against external standards; on the contrary, they evaluated outside precepts against their own experience and logic. It was a refreshing, even inspiring, dose of intellectual self-reliance. Meles was unflinchingly optimistic about the prospects for the armed struggle and assured me that the Tigrayan guerrillas, until a few months previously confined to the hills and the borderlands with Sudan, would penetrate as far south as Shewa, the Amhara heartland just a hundred miles from the capital Addis Ababa, within a year. I did not take his promise seriously (neither did any other non-Ethiopian). But he was correct, and within two and a half years, the TPLF – now a member of the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) coalition – achieved the remarkable feat of capturing the capital city. The EPRDF took Addis Ababa on 28 May 1991, amid international predictions that Ethiopia would go the way of Somalia, where guerrillas had overrun Mogadishu just four months earlier. On 31 May, government salaries and pensions were due. They were paid on time. Police were back on the street within days. During the next 21 years, Meles often looked as though he was camping out in the palace. He moved into his predecessor's semi-subterranean bunker home in the sprawling grounds of the old palace of the Emperor Menelik, and took over Mengistu's spacious but damp modernist executive office. The artwork scarcely changed over the next two decades, the carpets just once. Meles was not interested in the trappings of power, only in what could be done with it. From the outset, what needed to be done was to conquer poverty. From his early days in the field through to his last years as an international statesman, Meles was absolutely consistent in this aim. Ethiopia's overriding national challenge was to end poverty, and in turn this needed a comprehensive, theoretically rigorous practice of development. Marxism-Leninism was, for him, not a dogma but a rigorous method for assembling evidence and argument, to be bent to the realities of armed struggle and development. When the TPLF first administered ‘liberated’ territories in the 1970s, it took a conventional leftist line, tried to regulate trade and moneylending, and failed. The Front responded by adjusting its policies to encourage the local petit bourgeoisie in the villages and small towns it controlled. When the great famine of 1984–5 struck, the TPLF took the strategic decision to make feeding the peasantry its priority, even at the expense of losing ground to the enemy. Meles was primus inter pares in the EPRDF's collective leadership and chief economic theoretician. In an episode made famous by Joseph Stiglitz,1 Meles objected to the IMF position that international assistance was too unpredictable to be incorporated into national budget planning purposes, with the absurd consequence that national spending on infrastructure, health, and education could not be increased in line with foreign aid flows. Meles produced arguments and data and forced the Bretton Woods Institutions to rethink. Meles inverted Kissinger's dictum that holding office consumes intellectual capital rather than creating it. He was always learning, reading, debating, and writing, and while he never abandoned the fundamental principles forged in the field, his views evolved greatly. After 1991, he studied for a degree in Business Administration at the Open University (graduating first in his class) and subsequently a Masters in Economics at Erasmus University, Rotterdam, under the supervision of the former Minister of Development Cooperation, Jan Pronk. He never finished his thesis due to the outbreak of war with Eritrea in 1998, but the draft manuscript, ‘African Development: Dead Ends and New Beginnings’, was the justification and blueprint for a ‘democratic developmental state’. Excerpts are available online with the intriguing disclaimer: ‘The author is the Prime Minister of Ethiopia. The views expressed are personal and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Government.’2 Some of his analysis is also contained in a chapter in a recent collection edited by Akbar Noman and others.3 The war with Eritrea not only interrupted Meles' studies but provoked the most bitter dissension within the EPRDF. Meles was accused of having been soft on Eritrea and blind to Eritrean preparations for war, and subsequently for stopping the war once Ethiopia had expelled the invader from occupied territory. The internal party debate then took an ideological turn that seems to outsiders to be oddly anachronistic, replete with references to Bonapartism and the ‘Kulak line’. Meles clearly stated that there should be no confusion that the EPRDF's mission was to build a capitalist state. He further stated that rent seeking and patronage within the ruling party posed the key dangers to this objective, and they needed to be thoroughly stamped out. Meles' adversaries accused him of selling his revolutionary soul to imperialism and serving Eritrea at the expense of Ethiopia. Meles won by the skin of his teeth – just two votes in the Central Committee of the TPLF. His rivals then walked out and Meles seized the moment to consolidate his power. The next decade was to be his chance both to hone and to implement his theory of ‘democratic developmentalism’. One may disagree with Meles' thesis or argue that he failed to implement it properly. But without question it represents a serious attempt to develop, and apply, an authentically African philosophy of the goals and strategies of development. He explained the background to me. ‘For the first ten years after we took over,’ he said, ‘we were bewildered by the changes. The New World Order was very visible and especially so in this part of the world. The prospect of an independent line appeared very bleak. So we fought a rearguard action not to privatize too much.’4 Meles was doubly constrained: internally the EPRDF was regressing, rehearsing its rhetoric but practising what Meles came to dub pervasive ‘socially wasteful rent seeking.’5 But after emerging from the fractious debates of 2000–1, Meles had the upper hand, at the same time as international thinking shifted away from the neo-liberal demand for a non-interventionist ‘night-watchman’ state towards recognizing the need for a capable state to lead development. Meles agreed with the neo-liberals that the ‘predatory state’ of Africa's first post-colonial decades was one dead end, but argued that allowing the market to rule was a second dead end. ‘You cannot change a rent-seeking political economy just by reducing the size and role of the state. The neo-liberal paradigm does not allow for technological capacity accumulation, which lies at the heart of development. For that, an activist state is needed, that will allocate state rents in a productive manner.’6 South Korea and Taiwan were Meles' favourite examples of developmental states that succeeded by subverting neo-liberal dogma. China's rise provided something else: by challenging American dominance it made space for alternatives. In his thesis he wrote, ‘there has to be more political space for experimentation in development policy than has been the case so far in Africa … The international community has a role in creating such a space by tolerating development paradigms that are different from the orthodoxy preached by it. Africans have to demand and create such a space’ (p. 39). Meles' starting point was that Ethiopia (and indeed Africa as a whole) lacked comparative advantage in any productive field. He laid out his case in one discussion we held.7 ‘African workers produce textiles at nine times the price of the Chinese.’ Similarly, African foodstuffs could not compete in international markets. ‘In these circumstances, the best way to make money is through rent: natural resource rent, aid rent, policy rent. So the private sector will be rent-seeking not value creating, it will go for the easy way and make money through rent.’8 In reaction to this, Ethiopia postponed private land ownership and kept state control of the financial sector and telecoms. The argument continued, ‘If the state guides the private sector, there is a possibility of shifting to value creation – it needs state action to lead the private sector from its preference (rent seeking) to its long-term interest (value creation). So the state needs autonomy.’9 The government should choose when and how to partner with the private sector (an example was developing Ethiopia's leather industry) and should invest in education and research. Meles clearly identified the challenge of development as primarily a political one: it is necessary to master the technicalities of economics, but essential not to let them become a dogma that masters you. It is the politics of the state that unlocks development. The ‘developmental state’ should, he argued, be obsessed with value creation, making accelerated and broad-based growth a matter of national survival. If Ethiopia could sustain its growth levels – which have been running at close to 10 percent per annum for most of the last decade – it could achieve middle-income status and escape from its trap. To succeed in this, a third element was needed, namely the hegemony of developmental discourse, in the Gramscian sense that it is an internalized set of assumptions, not an imposed order. Meles liked to give the example of corrupt customs officials in Taiwan, who exacted bribes worth 12 percent of the value of imports of consumer goods, while not demanding bribes on imported capital goods, illustrating how value creation had been internalized in this way – so that even the thieves followed the norm. African countries might have the trappings of human rights and democracy, but, he said, ‘there is no sustainable democracy in a society characterized by pervasive rent seeking. We need value creation to be dominant for there to be a foundation of democracy, for politics to be more than a zero sum game, a competition to control state rents.’ Worse, he added, ‘I am convinced that we will cease to exist as a nation unless we grow fast and share our growth.’10 Thus far, I found Meles' case compelling, though I questioned if it were possible to create a common mindset of value creation in a country as vast and diverse as Ethiopia, in such a short period. Was there not a danger that a theory, however sophisticated, would degenerate into a set of dogmas parroted by party cadres who scarcely understood the meaning of ‘pervasive rent seeking’ but who knew the rewards of loyally following the party line? Meles' response was that the EPRDF had indeed neglected political education and party organization for years, which explained the 2000–1 internal crisis and the poor performance in the 2005 elections, including being out in the he argued, a of leaders was he was the party at all and, above all, his policies were had the recent economic growth and the in and – and this, he said, would the country in the next in Meles' paradigm was a theory of He if a developmental state was to be about growth, it would have to build the capital that is for its It would have to out patronage and rent seeking. are the very same that create the for politics that is from (p. Meles condemned as and that, in a poor developing political and would become patronage rather than the for a political and sustainable development. He a in which for which one could best the state. states could in Meles argued, provided that they the hegemony of value creation, were from the private sector, stamped out rent seeking and and policy for to developmental state could be but in Africa's diverse was a Ethiopia's and Meles his preference was to have two of which for developmental but in their the would be a dominant party or dominant such as or in In the Ethiopian he wrote, peasant is the of a developmental His this them the chance of for alternatives. Meles' to democracy and human rights was all of a with his He said, developmental has done its it will its own to be by a or he argued, what meaning did civil and political rights have in a of or political Development and a state were for human and Ethiopia needed to these or this is a serious argument that serious In early I Meles he had been so about his He that he should not Ethiopia's by a personal intellectual agenda that would be to from his and he that his which had been just a few years were common and that as the time for him to office at the elections, he to his dissertation and 25 years Meles was indifferent to and argument that failed to his own and was that would their own and that would him when I Meles what he would his he was in those who his government as or and only the question of was in It would be he said, that question could be Meles also that the intellectual of the theoretical of his and that analysis to what he called the African state, characterized by a political was just of Meles' writings are in the to that Meles was a that his unpublished to out the less of his intellectual

Obsa Tolesa Daba

This study explored decentralization and rural community participation in primary education in three woredas in Horro Gudurru Wollaga Zone of Oromia Regional State, Ethiopia. The study has illustrated how communities participate in their local schools and examined the successes and challenges in the implementation process. The main fieldwork was conducted in July and August 2009. Qualitative research approach was applied and focus group interview, qualitative interview, documents and field observation were used for data collection. The study majorly involved 24 informants that include woreda education officers, headmasters, Kebelle Education and Training Boards, Parent Teacher Associations and community members. \n\nThe study investigated that the decentralization in education has improved community participation in education. This has improved access and equity in education, sense of community ownership and school level disciplinary problems. Despite these encouraging outcomes, the implementation of decentralization and community participation in education is suffering from many challenges. Poverty in the community and fluctuation in households’ income were found to affect community capacity to finance schools. The block grant fund for schools was inadequate. Schools have no adequate infrastructure and the existing ones were intended to fix problems quickly and hence are of low quality. The PTA and KETB lack basic knowledge and experience for the position and were not succeeded in performing their functions effectively. These bodies have also limited power over control of teachers and performance of headmasters. Further, there is inequality between localities and weak relationship between actors and sectors. \n\nGenerally, the decentralization of education and community participation has brought great change in the way a school is financed, but little change in the way a school is managed and educational quality is improved. Hence, the decentralization of education is serving as a tool for lessening state responsibility for provision of education. Moreover, the lack of necessary resource and trained manpower at the local level are potential challenges for the successful implimetation of the decentralization of education and the promotion of community participation and hence for local educational development.

International Monetary Fund

This paper examines the Annual Progress Report on the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia’s Poverty Reduction Strategy. The broad thrust of the government’s strategy remains creating rural growth, accelerating private sector growth in the modern economy to create employment and incomes, and strengthening of public institutions to deliver services. The government has embarked on an aggressive program to accelerate progress as rapidly as possible, including a big push on education to create human capacity, expanding infrastructure as rapidly as financing and capacity will allow, opening the economy, building institutions, and decentralizing government.

Susan M. Kenyon

Book Reviews 131 for her long dead father rather than address the business of government. The closest she came to making a political decision was to approve the demand to make Teferi Negus of Ethiopia. Even then, her choice of the date of coronation was overruled by Teferi's supporters who insisted on having the Ras crowned right away. Despite the restrictive environment in which it was written, the chronicle is a useful, contemporary reflection on a significant period of Ethiopian politics. The book is rich in insights and unbiased in its treatment of Iyasu. In many respects, it complements such sources as Zikre Neger (1962 Eth. C), Ya Tarik Mastawesha (1962 Eth. C) and the Autobiography of Emperor Haile Sellassie I (1976). The translation is done meticulously, although the English rendition is dense, repetitious and, at times, inaccurate. Molvaer goes to great lengths to try and explain the meaning of some Amharic parables, metaphors and common usages that really do not make for accurate and fluent English. In the process, he sacrifices readability for the sake of literal translation. On balance, though, Molvaer deserves to be congratulated not only for translating an important historical source but also for making available a beautifully calligraphed Amharic text. Ezekiel Gebissa Michigan State University The Sufi Brotherhoods in the Sudan Ali Salih Karrar Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1992. Pp. 234. This book is an important contribution to our understanding of Sufism in the Sudan and indeed to the history of Islam in Africa. Ali Salih Karrar has worked for many years in the National Records Office in Khartoum. He is also from the Shayqiyya people, "one of the most prominent riverain ethnic groups of the northern Sudan" (4). Each of these qualifications gives him unparalleled access to some of the most important documentation in the history of the Sufi orders, and also to major religious families in the Sudan. Based on both archival work and field research conducted in the Shayqiyya region in 1982, Karrar's account draws on interviews he made with some of the senior representatives of these families and their followers, on visits to major historical and religious villages and towns of 132 Book Reviews the region, as well as on a wide range of documentary material which includes published and unpublished, Arabic and non-Arabic sources (1901 ). Originally written as the author's Ph.D. dissertation at the University of Bergen, it has been revised and shortened for this edition. As Karrar notes at the outset, "Sufism was the most fundamental characteristic of Islam in the Sudan" (1). His aim in this study is . . . "to trace the historical developments and the impact of the Sufi brotherhoods on the Sudan until the end of the 19th century, with special reference to the Shayqiyya region" (xi), and particularly to the period of colonial rule (1820-1881), a time when the arrival of a new style of Sufi organization was to have profound impact on most Sudanese Muslims. After briefly summarizing the activities of the individual holy men {fuqara) who brought Islam to the Sudan, Karrar turns to the coming of the tariqas (sic) into the Shayqiyya region, describing "a gradual transition from what may be described as a 'Sudanic belt' pattern of individualfuqara to a Middle Eastern and North African one with organized Sufi brotherhoods" (20). He traces first the evolution of the "ancient," decentralized brotherhoods into "autonomous branches, each with its independent shaykh and its particular chain of spiritual authority, silsila"(20). In his discussion of the two brotherhoods which were important in the Shayqiyya homeland, the Qadiriyya and the Shadhiliyya, he provides rich detail on some of the major figures in the movements, past and present. In addition he discusses the ideas and doctrines governing the movements, as well as detailing their growth and decline "within the context of the political and economic conditions of the region" (40). Karrar then turns to the second stage in the coming of the tariqas: that of the centralized "reformist" brotherhoods. These were far more important in the Shaygiyya region than the ancient brotherhoods, attracting increasingly large numbers of recruits, especially during the colonial period (1820-1881). He looks particularly at the...