Bitcoin is a peer-to-peer electronic payment system that has rapidly grown in popularity in recent years. Usually, the complete history of Bitcoin blockchain data must be queried to acquire variables with economic meaning. This task has recently become increasingly difficult, as there are over 1.6 billion historical transactions on the Bitcoin blockchain. It is thus important to query Bitcoin transaction data in a way that is more efficient and provides economic insights. We apply cohort analysis that interprets Bitcoin blockchain data using methods developed for population data in the social sciences. Specifically, we query and process the Bitcoin transaction input and output data within each daily cohort. This enables us to create datasets and visualizations for some key Bitcoin transaction indicators, including the daily lifespan distributions of spent transaction output (STXO) and the daily age distributions of the cumulative unspent transaction output (UTXO). We provide a computationally feasible approach for characterizing Bitcoin transactions that paves the way for future economic studies of Bitcoin.
We study to what extent the Bitcoin blockchain security permanently depends on the underlying distribution of cryptocurrency market outcomes. We use daily blockchain and Bitcoin data for 2014-2019 and employ the ARDL approach. We test three equilibrium hypotheses: (i) sensitivity of the Bitcoin blockchain to mining reward; (ii) security outcomes of the Bitcoin blockchain and the proof-of-work cost; and (iii) the speed of adjustment of the Bitcoin blockchain security to deviations from the equilibrium path. Our results suggest that the Bitcoin price and mining rewards are intrinsically linked to Bitcoin security outcomes. The Bitcoin blockchain security's dependency on mining costs is geographically differenced - it is more significant for the global mining leader China than for other world regions. After input or output price shocks, the Bitcoin blockchain security reverts to its equilibrium security level.
This paper studies to what extent the cost of operating a proof-of-work blockchain is intrinsically linked to the cost of preventing attacks, and to what extent the underlying digital ledger security budgets are correlated with the cryptocurrency market outcomes. We theoretically derive an equilibrium relationship between the cryptocurrency price, mining rewards and mining costs, and blockchain security outcomes. Using daily crypto market data for 2014-2021 and employing the autoregressive distributed lag approach - that allows treating all the relevant moments of the blockchain series as potentially endogenous - we provide empirical evidence of cryptocurrency price and mining rewards indeed being intrinsically linked to blockchain security outcomes.
Dataset retrieved with an Ethereum client, and used by the code hosted here for this paper published in the Proceedings of the Web Conference 2021 (WWW ’21) Abstract: Cryptoassets such as cryptocurrencies and tokens are increasingly traded on decentralized exchanges. The advantage for users is that the funds are not in custody of a centralized external entity. However, these exchanges are prone to manipulative behavior. In this paper, we illustrate how wash trading activity can be identified on two of the first popular limit order book-based decentralized exchanges on the Ethereum blockchain, IDEX and EtherDelta. We identify a lower bound of accounts and trading structures that meet the legal definitions of wash trading, discovering that they are responsible for a wash trading volume in equivalent of 159 million U.S. Dollars. While self-trades and two-account structures are predominant, complex forms also occur. We quantify these activities, finding that on both exchanges, more than 30% of all traded tokens have been subject to wash trading activity. On EtherDelta, 10% of the tokens have almost exclusively been wash traded. All data is made available for future research. Our findings underpin the need for countermeasures that are applicable in decentralized systems.
Sam M. Werner, Daniel Pérez, Lewis Gudgeon, Ariah Klages‐Mundt · 6 authors
Decentralized Finance (DeFi), a blockchain powered peer-to-peer financial system, is mushrooming. Two years ago the total value locked in DeFi systems was approximately 700m USD, now, as of April 2022, it stands at around 150bn USD. The frenetic evolution of the ecosystem has created challenges in understanding the basic principles of these systems and their security risks. In this Systematization of Knowledge (SoK) we delineate the DeFi ecosystem along the following axes: its primitives, its operational protocol types and its security. We provide a distinction between technical security, which has a healthy literature, and economic security, which is largely unexplored, connecting the latter with new models and thereby synthesizing insights from computer science, economics and finance. Finally, we outline the open research challenges in the ecosystem across these security types.
In the high-stakes race to develop more scalable blockchains, some platforms (Binance, Cosmos, EOS, TRON, etc.) have adopted committee-based consensus (CBC) protocols, whereby the blockchain's record-keeping rights are entrusted to a committee of elected block producers. In theory, the smaller the committee, the faster the blockchain can reach consensus and the more it can scale. What's less clear, is whether such protocols ensure that honest committees can be consistently elected, given blockchain users typically have limited information on who to vote for. We show that the approval voting mechanism underlying most CBC protocols is complex and can lead to intractable optimal voting strategies. We empirically characterize some simpler intuitive voting strategies that users tend to resort to in practice and prove that these nonetheless converge to optimality exponentially quickly in the number of voters. Exponential convergence ensures that despite its complexity, CBC exhibits robustness and has some efficiency advantages over more popular staked-weighted lottery protocols currently underlying many prominent blockchains such as Ethereum.
We present positive evidence of price stability of cryptocurrencies as a medium of exchange. For the sample years from 2016 to 2020, the prices of major cryptocurrencies are found to be stable, relative to major financial assets. Specifically, after filtering out the less-than-one-month cycles, we investigate the daily returns in US dollars of the major cryptocurrencies (i.e., Bitcoin, Ethereum, and Ripple) as well as their comparators (i.e., major legal tenders, the Euro and Japanese yen, and the major stock indexes, S&P 500 and MSCI World Index). We examine the stability of the filtered daily returns using three different measures. First, the Pearson correlations increased in later years in our sample. Second, based on the dynamic time-warping method that allows lags and leads in relations, the similarities in the daily returns of cryptocurrencies with their comparators have been present even since 2016. Third, we check whether the cumulative sum of errors to predict cryptocurrency prices, assuming stable relations with comparators' daily returns, does not exceeds the bounds implied by the Black-Scholes model. This test, in other words, does not reject the efficient market hypothesis.
With the emergence of Bitcoin and recently proposed stablecoins from BigTechs, such as Diem (formerly Libra), central banks face growing competition from private actors offering their own digital alternative to physical cash. We do not address the normative question whether a central bank should issue a central bank digital currency (CBDC) or not. Instead, we contribute to the current research debate by showing how a central bank could do so, if desired. We propose a token-based system without distributed ledger technology and show how earlier-deployed, software-only electronic cash can be improved upon to preserve transaction privacy, meet regulatory requirements in a compelling way, and offer a level of quantum-resistant protection against systemic privacy risk. Neither monetary policy nor financial stability would be materially affected because a CBDC with this design would replicate physical cash rather than bank deposits.
Non Fungible Token (NFT) Industry has been witnessing multi-million dollar trade in recent times. With rapid innovation of the NFT market environment by technology, innovation, and decentralization, it is becoming hard to distinguish between genuine NFT from fads and scams. This article discuss the NFT market microstructure, with a focus on price formation, market structure, transparency, and applications to other financial areas. Market manipulation in NFT market with the context of wash-sale patterns has also been surveyed. The article concludes by providing pointers on due-diligence activity that can be adopted by investors to mitigate NFT trading risk.
Permissionless blockchains offer an information environment where users can interact privately without fear of censorship. Financial services can be programmatically coded via smart contracts to automate transactions without the need for human intervention or knowing user identity. This new paradigm is known as decentralized finance (DeFi). We investigate Compound (a leading DeFi lending protocol) to show how it works in this novel information environment, who its users are, and what factors determine their participation. On-chain transaction data shows that loan durations are short (31 days on average), and many users borrow to support leveraged investment strategies (yield farming). We show that systemic risk in DeFi arises from concentration and interconnection, and how traditional risk management practices can be challenging for DeFi.
In this paper, we analyze various Decentralized Finance (DeFi) protocols in terms of their token distributions. We propose an iterative mapping process that allows us to split aggregate token holdings from custodial and escrow contracts and assign them to their economic beneficiaries. This method accounts for liquidity-, lending-, and staking-pools, as well as token wrappers, and can be used to break down token holdings, even for high nesting levels. We compute individual address balances for several snapshots and analyze intertemporal distribution changes. In addition, we study reallocation and protocol usage data, and propose wrapping complexity as a proxy for measuring token dependencies and ecosystem integration. The paper offers new insights on DeFi interoperability as well as token ownership distribution and may serve as a foundation for further research.
In seeking to explain aspects of real-world economies that defy easy understanding when analysed via conventional means, Nobel Laureate Robert Shiller has since 2017 introduced and developed the idea of Narrative Economics, where observable economic factors such as the dynamics of prices in asset markets are explained largely as a consequence of the narratives (i.e., the stories) heard, told, and believed by participants in those markets. Shiller argues that otherwise irrational and difficult-to-explain behaviors, such as investors participating in highly volatile cryptocurrency markets, are best explained and understood in narrative terms: people invest because they believe, because they have a heartfelt opinions, about the future prospects of the asset, and they tell to themselves and others stories (narratives) about those beliefs and opinions. In this paper we describe what is, to the best of our knowledge, the first ever agent-based modelling platform that allows for the study of issues in narrative economics. We have created this by integrating and synthesizing research in two previously separate fields: opinion dynamics (OD), and agent-based computational economics (ACE) in the form of minimally-intelligent trader-agents operating in accurately modelled financial markets. We show here for the first time how long-established models in OD and in ACE can be brought together to enable the experimental study of issues in narrative economics, and we present initial results from our system. The program-code for our simulation platform has been released as freely-available open-source software on GitHub, to enable other researchers to replicate and extend our work
Shize Qin, Lena Klaaßen, Ulrich Gallersdörfer, Christian Stoll · 5 authors
The carbon footprint of Bitcoin has drawn wide attention, but Bitcoin's long-term impact on the climate remains uncertain. Here we present a framework to overcome uncertainties in previous estimates and project Bitcoin's electricity consumption and carbon footprint in the long term. If we assume Bitcoin's market capitalization grows in line with the one of gold, we find that the annual electricity consumption of Bitcoin may increase from 60 to 400 TWh between 2020 and 2100. The future carbon footprint of Bitcoin strongly depends on the decarbonization pathway of the electricity sector. If the electricity sector achieves carbon neutrality by 2050, Bitcoin's carbon footprint has peaked already. However, in the business-as-usual scenario, emissions sum up to 2 gigatons until 2100, an amount comparable to 7% of global emissions in 2019. The Bitcoin price spike at the end of 2020 shows, however, that progressive development of market capitalization could yield an electricity consumption of more than 100 TWh already in 2021, and lead to cumulative emissions of over 5 gigatons by 2100. Therefore, we also discuss policy instruments to reduce Bitcoin's future carbon footprint.
This research is to assess cryptocurrencies with the conditional beta, compared with prior studies based on unconditional beta or fixed beta. It is a new approach to building a pricing model for cryptocurrencies. Therefore, we expect that the use of conditional beta will increase the explanatory ability of factors in previous pricing models. Besides, this research is also a pioneer in placing the uncertainty factor in the cryptocurrency pricing model. Earlier studies on cryptocurrency pricing have ignored this factor. However, it is a significant factor in the valuation of cryptocurrencies because uncertainty leads to investor sentiment and affects prices.
Abstract Investors commonly exhibit the disposition effect—the irrational tendency to sell their winning investments and hold onto their losing ones. While this phenomenon has been observed in many traditional markets, it remains unclear whether it also applies to atypical markets like cryptoassets. This paper investigates the prevalence of the disposition effect in Bitcoin using transactions targeting cryptoasset exchanges as proxies for selling transactions. Our findings suggest that investors in Bitcoin were indeed subject to the disposition effect, with varying intensity. They also show that the disposition effect was not consistently present throughout the observation period. Its prevalence was more evident from the boom and bust year 2017 onwards, as confirmed by various technical indicators. Our study suggests irrational investor behavior is also present in atypical markets like Bitcoin.
The purpose of this paper is to review the concept of cryptocurrencies in our economy. First, Bitcoin and alternative cryptocurrencies' histories are analyzed. We then study the implementation of Bitcoin in the airline and real estate industries. Our study finds that many Bitcoin companies partner with airlines in order to decrease processing times, to provide ease of access for spending in international airports, and to reduce fees on foreign exchanges for fuel expenses, maintenance, and flight operations. Bitcoin transactions have occurred in the real estate industry, but many businesses are concerned with Bitcoin's potential interference with the U.S. government and its high volatility. As Bitcoin's price has been growing rapidly, we assessed Bitcoin's real value; Bitcoin derives value from its scarcity, utility, and public trust. In the conclusion, we discuss Bitcoin's future and conclude that Bitcoin may change from a short-term profit investment to a more steady industry as we identify Bitcoin with the "greater fool theory", and as the number of available Bitcoins to be mined dwindles and technology becomes more expensive.
Proof-of-work blockchains need to be carefully designed so as to create the proper incentives for miners to faithfully maintain the network in a sustainable way. This paper describes how the economic engineering of the Conflux Network, a high throughput proof-of-work blockchain, leads to sound economic incentives that support desirable and sustainable mining behavior. In detail, this paper parameterizes the level of income, and thus network security, that Conflux can generate, and it describes how this depends on user behavior and "policy variables'' such as block and interest inflation. It also discusses how the underlying economic engineering design makes the Conflux Network resilient against double spending and selfish mining attacks.
The mining of bitcoin is modeled using a system dynamics model that represents both the mechanism of coin creation and the adjustment of the network hash rate based on the economic incentive of mining. The results show that the past evolution of the network hash rate can be explained, to a large extent, by an efficient market hypothesis applied to the mining of blocks. The possibility of a decreasing trend in the network hash rate from the halving event of May 2020 is exposed, implying that the network may be close to ’peak hash’ if the price of bitcoin and the revenues from transaction fees will be insufficient to cover the operational expenditures of mining.
Skill verification is a central problem in workforce hiring. Companies and academia often face the difficulty of ascertaining the skills of an applicant since the certifications of the skills claimed by a candidate are generally not immediately verifiable and costly to test. Blockchains have been proposed in the literature for skill verification and tamper-proof information storage in a decentralized manner. However, most of these approaches deal with storing the certificates issued by traditional universities on the blockchain. Among the few techniques that consider the certification procedure itself, questions like (a) scalability with limited staff, (b) uniformity of grades over multiple evaluators, or (c) honest effort extraction from the evaluators are usually not addressed. We propose a blockchain-based platform named SkillCheck, which considers the questions above, and ensure several desirable properties. The platform incentivizes effort in grading via payments with tokens which it generates from the payments of the users of the platform, e.g., the recruiters and test-takers. We provide a detailed description of the design of the platform along with the provable properties of the algorithm.
In this paper, we investigate whether mixing cryptocurrencies to a German investor portfolio improves portfolio diversification. We analyse this research question by applying a (mean variance) portfolio analysis using a toolbox consisting of (i) the comparison of descriptive statistics, (ii) graphical methods and (iii) econometric spanning tests. In contrast to most of the former studies we use a (broad) customized, Equally-Weighted Cryptocurrency Index (EWCI) to capture the average development of a whole ex ante defined cryptocurrency universe and to mitigate possible survivorship biases in the data. According to Glas/Poddig (2018), this bias could have led to misleading results in some already existing studies. We find that cryptocurrencies can improve portfolio diversification in a few of the analyzed windows from our dataset (consisting of weekly observations from 2014-01-01 to 2019-05-31). However, we cannot confirm this pattern as the normal case. By including cryptocurrencies in their portfolios, investors predominantly cannot reach a significantly higher efficient frontier. These results also hold, if the non-normality of cryptocurrency returns is considered. Moreover, we control for changes of the results, if transaction costs/illiquidities on the cryptocurrency market are additionally considered.
Currently, there are no convincing proxies for the fundamentals of cryptocurrency assets. We propose a new market-to-fundamental ratio, the price-to-utility (PU) ratio, utilizing unique blockchain accounting methods. We then proxy various existing fundamental-to-market ratios by Bitcoin historical data and find they have little predictive power for short-term bitcoin returns. However, PU ratio effectively predicts long-term bitcoin returns than alternative methods. Furthermore, we verify the explainability of PU ratio using machine learning. Finally, we present an automated trading strategy advised by the PU ratio that outperforms the conventional buy-and-hold and market-timing strategies. Our research contributes to explainable AI in finance from three facets: First, our market-to-fundamental ratio is based on classic monetary theory and the unique UTXO model of Bitcoin accounting rather than ad hoc; Second, the empirical evidence testifies the buy-low and sell-high implications of the ratio; Finally, we distribute the trading algorithms as open-source software via Python Package Index for future research, which is exceptional in finance research.
Ariah Klages‐Mundt, Dominik Harz, Lewis Gudgeon, Junyou Liu · 5 authors
Stablecoins are one of the most widely capitalized type of cryptocurrency. However, their risks vary significantly according to their design and are often poorly understood. We seek to provide a sound foundation for stablecoin theory, with a risk-based functional characterization of the economic structure of stablecoins. First, we match existing economic models to the disparate set of custodial systems. Next, we characterize the unique risks that emerge in non-custodial stablecoins and develop a model framework that unifies existing models from economics and computer science. We further discuss how this modeling framework is applicable to a wide array of cryptoeconomic systems, including cross-chain protocols, collateralized lending, and decentralized exchanges. These unique risks yield unanswered research questions that will form the crux of research in decentralized finance going forward.
We discuss the idea of a purely algorithmic universal world iCurrency set forth in [Kakushadze and Liew, 2014] (https://ssrn.com/abstract=2542541) and expanded in [Kakushadze and Liew, 2017] (https://ssrn.com/abstract=3059330) in light of recent developments, including Libra. Is Libra a contender to become iCurrency? Among other things, we analyze the Libra proposal, including the stability and volatility aspects, and discuss various issues that must be addressed. For instance, one cannot expect a cryptocurrency such as Libra to trade in a narrow band without a robust monetary policy. The presentation in the main text of the paper is intentionally nontechnical. It is followed by an extensive appendix with a mathematical description of the dynamics of (crypto)currency exchange rates in target zones, mechanisms for keeping the exchange rate from breaching the band, the role of volatility, etc.
Bitcoin draws the highest degree of attention among cryptocurrencies, while coin mining is one of the most important fashion of profiting in the Bitcoin ecosystem. This paper constructs fresh coin circulation networks by tracking the fresh coin transfer routes with transaction referencing in Bitcoin blockchain. This paper proposes a heuristic algorithm to identifying coin miners by comparing coin circulation networks from different mining pools and thereby inferring the common profit distribution schemes of Bitcoin mining pools. Furthermore, this paper characterizes the increasing trend of Bitcoin miner numbers during recent years.