In this paper, we propose a fully decentralized and smart contract-based insurance protocol. We identify various issues in the Decentralized Finance (DeFi) insurance context and propose a solution to overcome these shortcomings. We introduce an economic model that allows for risk transfer without any external dependencies or centralized intermediaries. In particular, our proposal does not need any sort of subjective claim assessment, community voting or external data providers (oracles). Moreover, it solves the problem of over-insurance and proposes various ways to mitigate the capital inefficiencies usually seen with DeFi collateral. The work takes inspiration from peer-to-peer (P2P) insurance and collateralized debt obligations (CDO). We formally describe the protocol, assess its efficiency and key properties and present a reference implementation. Finally, we address limitations, extensions and ideas for further research.
On November 22nd 2022, the lending platform AAVE v2 (on Ethereum) incurred bad debt resulting from a major liquidation event involving a single user who had borrowed close to \$40M of CRV tokens using USDC as collateral. This incident has prompted the Aave community to consider changes to its liquidation threshold, and limitations on the number of illiquid coins that can be borrowed on the platform. In this paper, we argue that the bad debt incurred by AAVE was not due to excess volatility in CRV/USDC price activity on that day, but rather a fundamental flaw in the liquidation logic which triggered a toxic liquidation spiral on the platform. We note that this flaw, which is shared by a number of major DeFi lending markets, can be easily overcome with simple changes to the incentives driving liquidations. We claim that halting all liquidations once a user's loan-to-value (LTV) ratio surpasses a certain threshold value can prevent future toxic liquidation spirals and offer substantial improvement in the bad debt that a lending market can expect to incur. Furthermore, we strongly argue that protocols should enact dynamic liquidation incentives and closing factor policies moving forward for optimal management of protocol risk.
Decentralized finance (DeFi) is known for its unique mechanism design, which applies smart contracts to facilitate peer-to-peer transactions. The decentralized bank is a typical DeFi application. Ideally, a decentralized bank should be decentralized in the transaction. However, many recent studies have found that decentralized banks have not achieved a significant degree of decentralization. This research conducts a comparative study among mainstream decentralized banks. We apply core-periphery network features analysis using the transaction data from four decentralized banks, Liquity, Aave, MakerDao, and Compound. We extract six features and compare the banks' levels of decentralization cross-sectionally. According to the analysis results, we find that: 1) MakerDao and Compound are more decentralized in the transactions than Aave and Liquity. 2) Although decentralized banking transactions are supposed to be decentralized, the data show that four banks have primary external transaction core addresses such as Huobi, Coinbase, and Binance, etc. We also discuss four design features that might affect network decentralization. Our research contributes to the literature at the interface of decentralized finance, financial technology (Fintech), and social network analysis and inspires future protocol designs to live up to the promise of decentralized finance for a truly peer-to-peer transaction network.
Cooperation is fundamental for human prosperity. Blockchain, as a trust machine, is a cooperative institution in cyberspace that supports cooperation through distributed trust with consensus protocols. While studies in computer science focus on fault tolerance problems with consensus algorithms, economic research utilizes incentive designs to analyze agent behaviors. To achieve cooperation on blockchains, emerging interdisciplinary research introduces rationality and game-theoretical solution concepts to study the equilibrium outcomes of various consensus protocols. However, existing studies do not consider the possibility for agents to learn from historical observations. Therefore, we abstract a general consensus protocol as a dynamic game environment, apply a solution concept of bounded rationality to model agent behavior, and resolve the initial conditions for three different stable equilibria. In our game, agents imitatively learn the global history in an evolutionary process toward equilibria, for which we evaluate the outcomes from both computing and economic perspectives in terms of safety, liveness, validity, and social welfare. Our research contributes to the literature across disciplines, including distributed consensus in computer science, game theory in economics on blockchain consensus, evolutionary game theory at the intersection of biology and economics, bounded rationality at the interplay between psychology and economics, and cooperative AI with joint insights into computing and social science. Finally, we discuss that future protocol design can better achieve the most desired outcomes of our honest stable equilibria by increasing the reward-punishment ratio and lowering both the cost-punishment ratio and the pivotality rate.
In this paper we give an elementary analysis of economics of Bitcoin that combines the transaction demand by the consumers and the supply of hashrate by miners. We argue that the decreasing block reward will have no significant effect on the exchange rate (price) of Bitcoin and thus the network will be transitioning to a regime where transaction fees will play a bigger part of miners' revenue. We consider a simple model where consumers demand bitcoins for transactions, but not for hoarding bitcoins, and we analyze market equilibrium where the demand is matched with the hashrate supplied by miners. Our main conclusion is that the exchange rate of Bitcoin cannot be determined from the market equilibrium and so our arguments support the hypothesis that Bitcoin price has no economic fundamentals and is free to fluctuate according to the present demand for hoarding and speculation. We point out that increasing fees bear the risk of Bitcoin being outcompeted by its main rival Ethereum, and that decreasing revenues to miners depreciate the perception of Bitcoin as a medium for store value (hoarding demand) which will have effect its exchange rate.
Modern technology has brought novel types of wealth. In contrast to hard cash, digital currency does not have a physical form. It exists in electronic forms only. To date, it has not been clear what impacts its ongoing growth will have, if any, on wealth distribution. Here, we propose to identify all forms of contemporary wealth into two classes: ‘distinguishable’ or ‘identical’. Traditional tangible moneys are all distinguishable. Financial assets and cryptocurrencies, such as bank deposits and Bitcoin, are boson-like, while non-fungible tokens are fermion - like. We derived their ownership-based distributions in a unified manner. Each class follows essentially the Poisson or the geometric distribution. We contrast their distinct features such as Gini coefficients. Furthermore, aggregating different kinds of wealth corresponds to a weighted convolution where the number of banks matters and Bitcoin follows Bose–Einstein distribution. Our proposal opens a new avenue to understand the deepened inequality in modern economy, which is based on the statistical physics property of wealth rather than the individual ability of owners. We call for verifications with real data.
As of August 2022, blockchain-based assets boast a combined market capitalisation exceeding one trillion USD, among which the most prominent are the decentralised autonomous organisation (DAO) tokens associated with decentralised finance (DeFi) protocols. In this work, we seek to value DeFi tokens using the canonical multiples and discount cash flow (DCF) approaches. We examine a subset of DeFi services including decentralised exchanges (DEXs), protocol for loanable funds (PLFs), and yield aggregators. We apply the same analysis to some publicly traded firms and compare them with DeFi tokens of the analogous category. Interestingly, despite the crypto bear market lasting for more than one year as of August 2022, both approaches evidence overvaluation in DeFi.
Oguzhan Akcin, Robert P. Streit, Benjamin Oommen, Sriram Vishwanath · 5 authors
There are a multitude of Blockchain-based physical infrastructure systems, operating on a crypto-currency enabled token economy, where infrastructure suppliers are rewarded with tokens for enabling, validating, managing and/or securing the system. However, today's token economies are largely designed without infrastructure systems in mind, and often operate with a fixed token supply (e.g., Bitcoin). This paper argues that token economies for infrastructure networks should be structured differently - they should continually incentivize new suppliers to join the network to provide services and support to the ecosystem. As such, the associated token rewards should gracefully scale with the size of the decentralized system, but should be carefully balanced with consumer demand to manage inflation and be designed to ultimately reach an equilibrium. To achieve such an equilibrium, the decentralized token economy should be adaptable and controllable so that it maximizes the total utility of all users, such as achieving stable (overall non-inflationary) token economies. Our main contribution is to model infrastructure token economies as dynamical systems - the circulating token supply, price, and consumer demand change as a function of the payment to nodes and costs to consumers for infrastructure services. Crucially, this dynamical systems view enables us to leverage tools from mathematical control theory to optimize the overall decentralized network's performance. Moreover, our model extends easily to a Stackelberg game between the controller and the nodes, which we use for robust, strategic pricing. In short, we develop predictive, optimization-based controllers that outperform traditional algorithmic stablecoin heuristics by up to $2.4 \times$ in simulations based on real demand data from existing decentralized wireless networks.
The 2022 Russia Ukraine War has led to many sanctions being placed on Russia and Ukraine. The paper will discuss the impact the 2022 Russian Sanctions have on agricultural food prices and hunger. The paper also uses Instrumental Variable Analysis to find how Cryptocurrency and Bitcoin can be used to hedge against the impact of sanctions. The 6 different countries analyzed in this study including Bangladesh, El Salvador, Iran, Nigeria, Philippines, and South Africa, all of which are heavy importers of wheat and corn. The paper shows that although Bitcoin may be volatile compared to other local currencies, it might be a good investment to safeguard assets since it is not correlated with commodity prices.Furthermore, the study demonstrates that transaction volume has a strong relationship with prices.
Carolina E S Mattsson, Teodoro Criscione, Frank W Takes
Circulation is the characteristic feature of successful currency systems, from community currencies to cryptocurrencies to national currencies. In this paper, we propose a network analysis approach especially suited for studying circulation given a system's digital transaction records. Sarafu is a digital community currency that was active in Kenya over a period that saw considerable economic disruption due to the COVID-19 pandemic. We represent its circulation as a network of monetary flow among the 40,000 Sarafu users. Network flow analysis reveals that circulation was highly modular, geographically localized, and occurring among users with diverse livelihoods. Across localized sub-populations, network cycle analysis supports the intuitive notion that circulation requires cycles. Moreover, the sub-networks underlying circulation are consistently degree disassortative and we find evidence of preferential attachment. Community-based institutions often take on the role of local hubs, and network centrality measures confirm the importance of early adopters and of women's participation. This work demonstrates that networks of monetary flow enable the study of circulation within currency systems at a striking level of detail, and our findings can be used to inform the development of community currencies in marginalized areas.
Conditional thank-you gifts are one of the most widely used incentives for charitable giving. Past studies explored non-monetary thank-you gifts (e.g., mugs and shirts) and monetary thank-you gifts (e.g., rebates that return some of the donations to the giver). Following the rapid growth of blockchain technology, a novel form of thank-you gifts emerged: the crypto rewards. Through two studies, we analyze crypto thank-you gifts to shed light on fundraising designs in the digital world. In Study I, we examine the Ukrainian government's crypto fundraising plea that accepts donations in both Ethereum and Bitcoin. We find that Ethereum is substantially more effective in enticing giving than Bitcoin, as the hourly donation count increased 706.07% more for Ethereum than for Bitcoin when crypto rewards are present. This is likely because the crypto rewards are more likely to be issued on Ethereum than Bitcoin. However, the decrease in contribution sizes is also more substantial in Ethereum than in Bitcoin in response to the crypto rewards. In Study II, we conducted a laboratory experiment following a dictator game design to investigate the impact of crypto rewards in a more general scenario, with the crypto rewards specified as non-fungible tokens (NFTs). The crypto rewards in Study II carry no monetary value but only serve to recognize donors symbolically. As such, the NFT thank-you gifts did not effectively induce people to donate; a traditional 1:1 donation matching strictly outperforms both the condition without thank-you gifts and the condition with NFT thank-you gifts. Nevertheless, the NFT thank-you gifts effectively increased the contribution sizes, conditional on the choice to give, when the NFT's graphic design primes donor identity and encompasses the charity recipient.
Recent advances in Artificial Intelligence (AI) have made algorithmic trading play a central role in finance. However, current research and applications are disconnected information islands. We propose a generally applicable pipeline for designing, programming, and evaluating the algorithmic trading of stock and crypto assets. Moreover, we demonstrate how our data science pipeline works with respect to four conventional algorithms: the moving average crossover, volume-weighted average price, sentiment analysis, and statistical arbitrage algorithms. Our study offers a systematic way to program, evaluate, and compare different trading strategies. Furthermore, we implement our algorithms through object-oriented programming in Python3, which serves as open-source software for future academic research and applications.
Ziqiao Ao, Lin William Cong, Gergely Horváth, Luyao Zhang
Decentralized finance (DeFi) has the potential to disrupt centralized finance by validating peer-to-peer transactions through tamper-proof smart contracts, thus significantly lowering the transaction cost charged by financial intermediaries. However, the actual realization of peer-to-peer transactions and the levels and effects of decentralization are largely unknown. Our research pioneers a blockchain network study that applies social network analysis to measure the level, dynamics, and impacts of decentralization in DeFi token transactions on the Ethereum blockchain. First, we find a significant core-periphery structure in the AAVE token transaction network where the cores include the two largest centralized crypto exchanges. Second, we provide evidence that multiple network features consistently characterize decentralization dynamics. Finally, we document that a more decentralized network significantly predicts a higher return and lower volatility of the decentralized market of AAVE tokens on the Ethereum blockchain. We point out that our approach is seminal for inspiring future extensions related to the facets of application scenarios, research questions, and methodologies on the mechanics of blockchain decentralization.
Carlo Campajola, Raffaele Cristodaro, Francesco Maria De Collibus, Tao Yan · 6 authors
More than ten years ago the blockchain was acclaimed as the solution to overcome centralised trusted third parties for online payments. Through the years the crypto-movement changed and evolved, although decentralisation remained the core ideology and the necessary feature every new crypto-project should provide. In this paper we study the concept of centralisation in cryptocurrencies using a wide array of methodologies from the complex systems literature, on a comparative collection of blockchains, in order to define the many different levels a blockchain system may display (de-)centralisation and to question whether the present state of cryptocurrencies is, in a technological and economical sense, actually decentralised.
By comparing the historical patterns of currency development, this paper pointed out the inevitability of the development of digital currency and the relationship between digital currency and the digital economy. With the example of China, this paper predicts the future development trend of digital currency. In the context of the rapid development of private cryptocurrency, China launched the digital currency based on serving the digital economy and committed to the globalization of the digital renminbi (RMB) and the globalization of the digital economy. The global economy in 2022 ushered in stagnation, and China treats digital fiat currency and the digital economy development as a breakthrough to pursue economic transformation and new growth. It has become one of the forefront countries with numerous experiences that can be learned by countries around the world.
Blockchain introduces decentralized trust in peer-to-peer networks, advancing security and democratizing systems. Yet, a unified definition for decentralization remains elusive. Our Systematization of Knowledge (SoK) seeks to bridge this gap, emphasizing quantification and methodological coherence. We've formulated a taxonomy defining blockchain decentralization across five facets: consensus, network, governance, wealth, and transaction. Despite the prevalent focus on consensus decentralization, our novel index, based on Shannon entropy, provides comprehensive insights. Moreover, we delve into alternative metrics like the Gini and Nakamoto Coefficients and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), supplemented by an open-source Python tool on GitHub. In terms of methodology, blockchain research has often bypassed stringent scientific methods. By employing descriptive, predictive, and causal methods, our study showcases the potential of structured research in blockchain. Descriptively, we observe a trend of converging decentralization levels over time. Examining DeFi platforms reveals exchange and lending applications as more decentralized than their payment and derivatives counterparts. Predictively, there's a notable correlation between Ether's returns and transaction decentralization in Ether-backed stablecoins. Causally, Ethereum's transition to the EIP-1559 transaction fee model has a profound impact on DeFi transaction decentralization. To conclude, our work outlines directions for blockchain research, emphasizing the delicate balance among decentralization facets, fostering long-term decentralization, and the ties between decentralization, security, privacy, and efficiency. We end by spotlighting challenges in grasping blockchain decentralization intricacies.
This paper aims to analyze the effect of Bitcoin on portfolio optimization using mean-variance, conditional value-at-risk (CVaR), and Markov regime switching approaches. I assessed each approach and developed the next based on the prior approach's weaknesses until I ended with a high level of confidence in the final approach. Though the results of mean-variance and CVaR frameworks indicate that Bitcoin improves the diversification of a well-diversified international portfolio, they assume that assets' returns are developed linearly and normally distributed. However, the Bitcoin return does not have both of these characteristics. Due to this, I developed a Markov regime switching approach to analyze the effect of Bitcoin on an international portfolio performance. The results show that there are two regimes based on the assets' returns: 1- bear state, where returns have low means and high volatility, 2- bull state, where returns have high means and low volatility.
Explaining changes in bitcoin's price and predicting its future have been the foci of many research studies. In contrast, far less attention has been paid to the relationship between bitcoin's mining costs and its price. One popular notion is the cost of bitcoin creation provides a support level below which this cryptocurrency's price should never fall because if it did, mining would become unprofitable and threaten the maintenance of bitcoin's public ledger. Other research has used mining costs to explain or forecast bitcoin's price movements. Competing econometric analyses have debunked this idea, showing that changes in mining costs follow changes in bitcoin's price rather than preceding them, but the reason for this behavior remains unexplained in these analyses. This research aims to employ economic theory to explain why econometric studies have failed to predict bitcoin prices and why mining costs follow movements in bitcoin prices rather than precede them. We do so by explaining the chain of causality connecting a bitcoin's price to its mining costs.
The fast-growing, market-driven demand for cryptocurrencies worries central banks, as their monetary policy could be completely undermined. Central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) could offer a solution, yet our understanding of their design and consequences is in its infancy. This non-technical paper examines how The Bahamas has designed the Sand Dollar, the first real-world instance of a retail CBDC. It contrasts the Sand Dollar with definition-based specifications. The author then develops a scenario analysis to illustrate commercial bank risks. In this process, the central bank becomes a deposit monopolist, leading to high funding risks, disintermediation risks, and solvency risks for the commercial banking sector. This paper argues that restrictions and caps will be the new specifications of a regulatory framework for CBDCs if disintermediation in the banking sector is to be prevented. The anonymity of CBDCs is identified as a comparative disadvantage that will affect their adoption. These findings provide insight into governance problems facing central banks and coherently lead to the design of the Sand Dollar. This paper concludes by suggesting that combating cryptocurrencies is a task that cannot be solved by a CBDC.
Blockchain technology truly opened the gate to a wave of unparalleled innovations; however, despite the rapidly growing load of hype, the integration into the business, apart from a few applications, seems to be coming at a slower rate. One reason for that delay may be the need in the real-world applications for the so-called trust model. Trust models are rarely mentioned in blockchain application proposals despite their importance, which creates skepticism about their successful developments. To promote trust model implementation and help practitioners in its redaction, this article provides an outline of what a trust model is, why it is essential, and an example of how it is elaborated. The discussed example comes from a case study of a dairy company that implemented blockchain for the traceability of its products. Despite being tailored on a traceability project, the redaction and elements of the trust model, with few adjustments, could be easily readapted for other applications.
Decentralized Finance (DeFi) services are moving traditional financial operations to the Internet of Value (IOV) by exploiting smart contracts, distributed ledgers, and clever heterogeneous transactions among different protocols. The exponential increase of the Total Value Locked (TVL) in DeFi foreshadows a bright future for automated money transfers in a plethora of services. In this short survey paper, we describe the business model for different DeFi domains - namely, Protocols for Loanable Funds (PLFs), Decentralized Exchanges (DEXs), and Yield Aggregators. We claim that the current state of the literature is still unclear how to value thousands of different competitors (tokens) in DeFi. With this work, we abstract the general business model for different DeFi domains and compare them. Finally, we provide open research challenges that will involve heterogeneous domains such as economics, finance, and computer science.
Carlo Campajola, Marco D'Errico, Claudio J. Tessone
We propose a novel framework to analyse the velocity of money in terms of the contribution (MicroVelocity) of each individual agent, and to uncover the distributional determinants of aggregate velocity. Leveraging on complete publicly available transactions data stored in blockchains from four cryptocurrencies, we empirically find that MicroVelocity i) is very heterogeneously distributed and ii) strongly correlates with agents' wealth. We further document the emergence of high-velocity intermediaries, thereby challenging the idea that these systems are fully decentralised. Further, our framework and results provide policy insights for the development and analysis of digital currencies.
What happens to mining when the Bitcoin price changes, when there are mining supply shocks, the price of energy changes, or hardware technology evolves? We give precise answers based on the technical forces and incentives in the system. We then build on these dynamics to consider value: what is the cost and purpose of mining, and is it worth it? Does it use too much energy, is it bad for the environment? Finally we extend our analysis to the long term: is mining economically feasible forever? What will the global hash rate be in 40 years? How is mining impacted by the limits of computation and energy? Is it physically sustainable in the long run? From first principles, we derive a fundamental scale-invariant feasibility constraint, which enables us to analyze the interlocking dynamics, find key invariants, and answer these questions mathematically.
A transaction fee mechanism (TFM) is an essential component of a blockchain protocol. However, a systematic evaluation of the real-world impact of TFMs is still absent. Using rich data from the Ethereum blockchain, the mempool, and exchanges, we study the effect of EIP-1559, one of the earliest-deployed TFMs that depart from the traditional first-price auction paradigm. We conduct a rigorous and comprehensive empirical study to examine its causal effect on blockchain transaction fee dynamics, transaction waiting times, and consensus security. Our results show that EIP-1559 improves the user experience by mitigating intrablock differences in the gas price paid and reducing users' waiting times. However, EIP-1559 has only a small effect on gas fee levels and consensus security. In addition, we find that when Ether's price is more volatile, the waiting time is significantly higher. We also verify that a larger block size increases the presence of siblings. These findings suggest new directions for improving TFMs.