Benjamin D. Trump, MarieâValentine Florin, H. Scott Matthews, Douglas Sicker · 5 authors
Blockchain and distributed ledger technologies (DLTs) have the capacity to improve how many companies and organizations conduct transactions or store information securely, among many other potential benefits. However, their development and implementation does not occur in a contextual vacuum and instead must adapt to the needs and requirements of their given user. As such, we argue that the governance of DLT and blockchain must be applied against two core questions: who should have access to information within a given DLT/blockchain, and should management of that system be open or restricted/permissioned? While the technology is still emerging, its application to and success within various organizations will be largely dependent upon these key governance concerns.
Abstract Initial Coin Offerings ( ICO s) emerged in 2017 as a revolutionary form of raising capital by technology companies and investment vehicles. ICO s enable start-up companies to issue blockchain-based assets (âdigital tokensâ) to the public in return for a payment in cryptocurrencies or fiat money. The fundraising objective is to finance technology projects carried out by the â ICO issuerâ. The ICO funding model represents a financial revolution as it provides additional pools of liquidity for capital formation purposes and a powerful tool for incentivizing communities through network effects. More importantly, the latent value of ICO s lies in the usage of the raised funds to develop cutting-edge distributed ledger technologies ( DLT s). The advent of ICO s mushrooming worldwide promises to democratize financing, yet the commonly unregulated space in which ICO s operate, opens up a Pandoraâs Box of investment and legal risks. The present paper argues that regulation needs to be goal-orientated and for that purpose, it is crucial to identify the nature of the ICO funding model, the cryptoeconomics behind it and the legal nature of digital tokens. With ICO s, academia, economists and regulators are at ground zero. Practitionersâ first instinct is to apply the knowledge of capital markets, but ICO s are a fundamentally new model of raising funds that have spawned different dynamics from âtraditionalâ capital markets. If we can establish how to approach ICO s within their own right, then choosing the correct regulatory stance will become a matter of identifying how ICO s and markets interact and how the investment risks can be allocated. Keeping with the spirit of ICO s as a financial innovation, the paper proposes self-regulation by ICO issuers to be a suitable regulatory approach, while limiting the role of regulators to policing the secondary market of crypto-intermediaries. For the purpose of fully rationalizing this position, the paper outlines the process of carrying out an ICO , relevant benefits and risks to the model, the current state of ICO regulation, digital token characterization and merits of different regulatory approaches.
Similar1 to the economic system of the resource allocation of market and enterprise, distributed ledger technology may support an institutional form between decentralization and centralization, especially the smart contract that runs on it. The smart contract supports a more flexible, de-intermediary economic contractual relationship potentially. So distributed ledger technology can also be considered as an institutional technology [1]. According to the economic method, regarding the transaction cost as the basic unit, based on the technical and business characteristics of the distributed ledger, we analyzed economic contract innovation scenarios of distributed ledgers, and found important institutional features, including de-intermediation, intelligence and miniaturization. In addition, we made a preliminary empirical analysis through decentralized exchanges.
Digital currency became a relevant topic lately, with the central banks contemplating the idea of issuing their own virtual currencies. Central banks may issue their virtual currencies to simplify interbank cross-border settlements and make them cheaper. In order to achieve this, both commercial and central banks recognize these virtual currencies as means of payments. In these projects blockchain could be used to store information about the digital currencies, instead of fiat money. We have identified the risks associated with the virtual currencies issued by the central banks: conversion and volatility risks. We have looked at different approaches to the distributed ledger, principles for decentralized virtual currencies, possibility of these technologies being used by the central banks, various risks and their mitigation strategies. We also formulated the technological and legal principles that may guide the issuance of the digital currency by the central banks. And reviewed the practicability of issuing virtual currencies by the central banks, based on exogenous and endogenous factors.
This paper examines how circular economics addresses and uses smart technology, and demonstrates the lack of consideration given to ownership issues in such contexts. The extent to which circular economic ideals require controlling goods down-stream will be exposed. Following this is an analysis of the ramifications of smart technology, illustrated with recent examples of control through smart technology. This leads to a critique of the US Supreme Courtâs recent decision on patent exhaustion Impression Products v Lexmark alongside the CJEUâs decision in UsedSoft on copyright, addressing implications for contracting practices. The article concludes by urging close comparison of claimed benefits arising from circular economic approaches to smart technology with the potential costs of control (or lack thereof) of novel technologies.
Jul 1, 2018·2018 IEEE International Conference on Internet of Things (iThings) and IEEE Green Computing and Communications (GreenCom) and IEEE Cyber, Physical and Social Computing (CPSCom) and IEEE Smart Data (SmartData)
Emmanuelle Anceaume, Antoine Guellier, Romaric Ludinard
The presence of forks in permissionless blockchains is a recurrent issue. So far this has been handled either a posteriori, through local arbitration rules (e.g., âkeep the branch which has required the most computational powerâ)which are applied once a fork is present in the blockchain, or a priori, via a Byzantine resilient agreement protocol periodically invoked by a committee of well identified and online nodes. In the former case, local arbitration rules guarantee that if they are correctly applied by a majority of users, then with high probability forks are progressively resolved, while in the latter case, the sequence of Byzantine resilient agreements decide on the unique sequence of blocks to be appended to the blockchain. The question we may legitimately ask is the following one: To prevent the period of uncertainty inherent to optimistic-based solutions, are we doomed to rely on the decisions made by a unique committee whose members are already actively involved in the creation of blocks? We negatively answer this question by presenting a solution that combines the best features of optimistic and pessimistic approaches: we leverage the presence of Unspent Transaction Output (UTXO)owners and âthe public-key as identitiesâ principle to make UTXO owners (i.e. users)self-organize in small Byzantine resilient committees âaroundâ each new object (i.e., blocks and transactions)to decide on their validity. Validated objects are conflict-free, which guarantees the absence of blockchain forks and allows for fast-payment transactions facility. This is achieved without fearing Sybil attacks and selfish mining attacks. We are not aware of any solutions enjoying such features.
Distributed Ledger Technologies have triggered business model innovation activities among firms. While the available design choices are limited by the unique properties of any protocol, management research so far has neglected the architectural differences between the dominant protocol types. In this study, I analyse the business model design elements of firms seeking to utilise the IOTA Tangle as their underlying DLT protocol for innovation. I identify two potential business model patterns the IOTA Tangle facilitates that is a by-demand logic and the monetisation of data stream. I further find that the IOTA protocol is integrated into open or closed platforms.
We study the evolution of ideas related to creation of asset-backed currencies over the last 200 years and argue that recent developments related to distributed ledger technologies and blockchains give asset-backed currencies a new lease of life. We propose a practical mechanism combining novel technological breakthroughs with well-established hedging techniques for building an asset-backed transactional oriented cryptocurrency, which we call the digital trade coin (DTC). We show that in its mature state, the DTC can serve as a much-needed counterpoint to fiat reserve currencies of today.
Lin Chen, Lei Xu, Zhimin Gao, Yang LĂŒ · 5 authors
Many consensus protocols are based on the assumption that participants are either âgoodâ or âbadâ but ignore the fact that they may be affected by direct or indirect economic interests involved in the corresponding smart contracts. We analyze consensus in decentralized environments and demonstrate that the system cannot guarantee correct execution results.
The smart contract is an interdisciplinary concept that concerns business, finance, contract law and information technology. Designing and developing a smart contract may require the close cooperation of many experts coming from different fields. How to support such collaborative development is a challenging problem in blockchain-oriented software engineering. This paper proposes SPESC, a specification language for smart contracts, which can define the specification of a smart contract for the purpose of collaborative design. SPESC can specify a smart contract in a similar form to real-world contracts using a natural-language-like grammar, in which the obligations and rights of parties and the transaction rules of cryptocurrencies are clearly defined. The preliminary study results demonstrated that SPESC can be easily learned and understood by both IT and non-IT users and thus has greater potential to facilitate collaborative smart contract development.
Purpose The Bitcoin has experienced wide popularity in academic and commercial spheres during the years following 2012. Research has been conducted in respect of information technology, finance and reporting paradigms, but there has been little research into the taxation of the Bitcoin. The purpose of this paper is to present a conceptual approach for developing a taxation policy for the Bitcoin, using a multi-jurisdictional analysis. Design/methodology/approach An interpretive mixed-method approach is followed. The traits of the Bitcoin are determined through a review of the literature, followed by the determination of key taxation themes using a multi-jurisdictional view where the jurisdictions were determined using the largest Bitcoin exchanges. These form the row and column headings of the correspondence table research instrument, respectively. The correspondence table was completed by 40 tax experts. Correspondence analysis (a multivariate statistical technique) was then used to determine correlations between the Bitcoin traits and taxation themes, further used to present initial insights into developing a taxation policy for the Bitcoin. Findings The correspondence analysis reveals that, contrary to current tax laws, the manner of acquisition as opposed to the reason (intention) for acquisition is key in determining how the Bitcoin is to be taxed. For taxing purposes, Bitcoin is seen as being distinct from currency, given that transactions with the Bitcoin are seen as barter transactions. Finally, because of the unique characteristics of the Bitcoin, it is shown that exchanges and the Bitcoin need to be regulated in the same manner as a currency. Research limitations/implications This research focuses on income tax including capital gains tax and consumption taxes and was conducted with a sample of purposefully selected South African tax experts, given that the Bitcoin is experiencing enhanced popularity in South Africa. As a result, this research does not provide generalisable positivist conclusions and does not purport to represent the views of all tax practitioners. This paper does, however, provide an initial mechanism to develop taxation treatments for transactions not covered by existing legislation. Originality/value This paper is the first to provide normative recommendations on the taxation of the Bitcoin. Using correspondence analysis, this paper offers an innovative approach for developing taxation policies when a transaction is not specifically included in the extant legislation. Further value is added through the use of a third dimension in the correspondence analysis which enhances the exploratory potential of the research.
We study how attempts to regulate cryptocurrencies, or at least to mitigate the harm they do, are misdirected. We started by looking at how one might blacklist stolen bitcoin, and find that two established legal principles â the nemo dat rule and the Clayton's case precedent -- make tracing crime proceeds much simpler than researchers previously thought; they support a first-in first-out rule for taint tracking, which turns out to be much more efficient. However once we published initial results and were approached by theft victims, we discovered a more serious problem. Many bitcoin exchanges do not now give their customers actual bitcoin, but rather do off-chain transactions with other exchange customers or transact on customers' behalf with outsiders. Except where customers withdraw cryptocurrency into self-hosted wallets, the ownership of these assets is unclear. The number of off-blockchain transactions has increased enormously in the last eighteen months; we can't find good figures but the volume is sufficient to raise serious concerns and the practice falls under e-money regulations that are not being enforced. In short, the security, economics and regulatory problems of cryptocurrencies in 2018 turn out to be rather different from those described in the academic literature. The real problem is that we are seeing the emergence of a shadow banking system. Cryptocurrencies do not solve the underlying problems that made bank regulation necessary, and we sadly predict that many of the familiar second-order problems will also reappear. We discuss the implications for regulating cryptocurrencies and smart contracts more generally, and suggest eight things that regulators and central banks might usefully do.
Blockchain and Internet of Things are supposed to have big impact on logistics. This study presents a prototypical smart contract using smart storage containers in order to investigate the potential and the maturity of Blockchain and Internet of Things for logistical processes. A smart storage container is developed and connected to an Ethereum-based smart contract. The smart contract is based on a multi signature wallet of three parties to process the payment and arbitrate disagreements. Further research implications for the development of smart contracts for supply chains are derived from the experiences of this prototype study.
Amir Feder, Neil Gandal, JT Hamrick, Tyler Moore · 5 authors
This study examines blockchain technologies and their pivotal role in the evolving Metaverse, shedding light on topics such as how to invest in cryptocurrency, the mechanics behind crypto mining, and strategies to effectively buy and trade cryptocurrencies. Through an interdisciplinary approach, the research transitions from the fundamental principles of fintech investment strategies to the overarching implications of blockchain within the Metaverse. Alongside exploring machine learning potentials in financial sectors and risk assessment methodologies, the study critically assesses whether developed or developing nations are poised to reap greater benefits from these technologies. Moreover, it probes into both enduring and dubious crypto projects, drawing a distinct line between genuine blockchain applications and Ponzi-like schemes. The conclusion resolutely affirms the continuing dominance of blockchain technologies, underlined by a profound exploration of their intrinsic value and a reflective commentary by the author on the potential risks confronting individual investors.
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to develop a business theoretical foundation for distributed
ledger technology (DLT) in supply chain management. This consists of describing the
theoretical impact of DLT on transaction cost economics, agency theory and network theory
from a SCM perspective.
Design/methodology/approach
We conduct five explorative case studies of five different DLT-based solutions that are
implemented in current supply chains. The authors interrogate DLT providers as well as
users. Based on the empirical data, the authors derive the impact on three major theories in
the field of supply chain management.
Findings
The paper reveals the theoretical impact of DLT on the above-mentioned theories in the field
of SCM. DLT-based solutions reduce the transaction costs and provides new options to
coordinate market solutions better than implied before. Furthermore, in contrast to
existing implications of network theory, DLT benefits from the size of the network as
they reduce the chances for opportunistic behavior and provide more transparency.
Research limitations/implications
The paper is based on findings of early stage applications of DLT in supply chain
management. Thus, theoretical impacts are expected to be added at an advanced stage.
However, at this point of time the article builds a theoretical foundation for future research
on DLT.
Practical implications
The identification of theoretical impacts helps to understand the practical value of DLT in
supply chain management.
Original/value
This is one of the first papers to add a theoretical foundation to DLT research in supply chain
management that is dominated by application-oriented contributions.
Distributed Ledger (DL) has gained huge attention in the last years and will shift the conduction of business in the future. Until today, because of the great dynamics in the field a systematic approach to structure and define the field of DL does not exist. This led to a heterogeneous landscape of DL definitions and thus, misleading discussions. This paper gives a systematic overview of principles relevant to understand and structure the DL field. Furthermore, based on this it describes DL concepts and shows examples of protocols. The result can then be used for further research but also as a basis for successful collaborations in the field of DL.
D S Pradeepkumar, Kapil Singi, Vikrant Kaulgud, Sanjay Podder
Blockchain technology becomes the key solution to provide trust and security without any need for a central supervisory authority to validate the transactions. By now, it plays a key role in the digital transformation of several processes and industries with varying application use cases. To promote the wide adoption of blockchain technology we need mechanisms to identify the digitizability level of the given regulations to smart contracts and mechanisms to specify which blockchain technology is best suitable for the given regulations. In this work, we propose a modeling approach that supports the automated analysis of human-readable regulation representations by suggesting how much percentage of regulation is digitizable and the suitable blockchain environment to design the application. We identify smart contract components that correspond to real-world entities and its pertaining clauses and its digitizability property. With selected examples, we explore this capability and discuss our future research directions on smart contract generation according to the recommended environment.
Starting with BitTorrent and then Bitcoin, decentralized technologies have been on the rise over the last 15+ years, gaining significant momentum in the last 2+ years with the advent of platform ecosystems such as the Blockchain platform Ethereum. New projects have evolved from decentralized games to marketplaces to open funding models to decentralized autonomous organizations. The hype around cryptocurrency and the valuation of innovative projects drove the market cap of cryptocurrencies to over a trillion dollars at one point in 2017. These high valued technologies are now enabling something new: globally scaled and decentralized business models. Despite their valuation and the hype, these new business ecosystems are frail. This is not only because the underlying technology is rapidly evolving, but also because competitive markets see a profit opportunity in exponential cryptocurrency returns. This extracts value from these ecosystems, which could lead to their collapse, if unchecked. In this paper, we explore novel ways for decentralized economies to protect themselves from, and coexist with, competitive markets at a global scale utilizing decentralized technologies such as Blockchain.
Roberto Tonelli, Andrea Pinna, Gavina Baralla, Simona Ibba
We propose a model of software architecture where microservices are implemented by mean of Smart Contracts deployed in a blockchain, discussing similarities among the two paradigms and presenting an example of the implementation of an e-commerce platform.