The Non-Fungible-Token (NFT) market has experienced explosive growth in recent years. According to DappRadar, the total transaction volume on OpenSea, the largest NFT marketplace, reached 34.7 billion dollars in February 2023. However, the NFT market is mostly unregulated and there are significant concerns about money laundering, fraud and wash trading. The lack of industry-wide regulations, and the fact that amateur traders and retail investors comprise a significant fraction of the NFT market, make this market particularly vulnerable to fraudulent activities. Therefore it is essential to investigate and highlight the relevant risks involved in NFT trading. In this paper, we attempted to uncover common fraudulent behaviors such as wash trading that could mislead other traders. Using market data, we designed quantitative features from the network, monetary, and temporal perspectives that were fed into K-means clustering unsupervised learning algorithm to sort traders into groups. Lastly, we discussed the clustering results' significance and how regulations can reduce undesired behaviors. Our work can potentially help regulators narrow down their search space for bad actors in the market as well as provide insights for amateur traders to protect themselves from unforeseen frauds.
Jason Milionis, Ciamac C. Moallemi, Tim Roughgarden
We consider the impact of trading fees on the profits of arbitrageurs trading against an automated market maker (AMM) or, equivalently, on the adverse selection incurred by liquidity providers (LPs) due to arbitrage. We extend the model of Milionis et al. [2022] for a general class of two asset AMMs to introduce both fees and discrete Poisson block generation times. In our setting, we are able to compute the expected instantaneous rate of arbitrage profit in closed form. When the fees are low, in the fast block asymptotic regime, the impact of fees takes a particularly simple form: fees simply scale down arbitrage profits by the fraction of blocks which present profitable trading opportunities to arbitrageurs. This fraction decreases with an increasing block rate, hence our model yields an important practical insight: faster blockchains will result in reduced LP losses. Further introducing gas fees (fixed costs) in our model, we show that, in the fast block asymptotic regime, lower gas fees lead to smaller losses for LPs.
Price feeds of securities is a critical component for many financial services, allowing for collateral liquidation, margin trading, derivative pricing and more. With the advent of blockchain technology, value in reporting accurate prices without a third party has become apparent. There have been many attempts at trying to calculate prices without a third party, in which each of these attempts have resulted in being exploited by an exploiter artificially inflating the price. The industry has then shifted to a more centralized design, fetching price data from multiple centralized sources and then applying statistical methods to reach a consensus price. Even though this strategy is secure compared to reading from a single source, enough number of sources need to report to be able to apply statistical methods. As more sources participate in reporting the price, the feed gets more secure with the slowest feed becoming the bottleneck for query response time, introducing a tradeoff between security and speed. This paper provides the design and implementation details of a novel method to algorithmically compute security prices in a way that artificially inflating targeted pools has no effect on the reported price of the queried asset. We hypothesize that the proposed algorithm can report accurate prices given a set of possibly dishonest sources.
Christopher J. Cho, Timothy J. Norman, Manuel Nunes
In a financial exchange, market impact is a measure of the price change of an asset following a transaction. This is an important element of market microstructure, which determines the behaviour of the market following a trade. In this paper, we first provide a discussion on the market impact observed in the BTC/USD Futures market, then we present a novel multi-agent market simulation that can follow an underlying price series, whilst maintaining the ability to reproduce the market impact observed in the market in an explainable manner. This simulation of the financial exchange allows the model to interact realistically with market participants, helping its users better estimate market slippage as well as the knock-on consequences of their market actions. In turn, it allows various stakeholders such as industrial practitioners, governments and regulators to test their market hypotheses, without deploying capital or destabilising the system.
Abstract This study introduces a novel pairs trading strategy based on copulas for cointegrated pairs of cryptocurrencies. To identify the most suitable pairs and generate trading signals formulated from a reference asset for analyzing the mispricing index, the study employs linear and nonlinear cointegration tests, a correlation coefficient measure, and fits different copula families, respectively. The strategy’s performance is then evaluated by conducting back-testing for various triggers of opening positions, assessing its returns and risks. The findings indicate that the proposed method outperforms previously examined trading strategies of pairs based on cointegration or copulas in terms of profitability and risk-adjusted returns.
We develop a formalism for reasoning about trading on decentralized exchanges on blockchains and a formulation of a particular form of maximal extractable value (MEV) that represents the total arbitrage opportunity extractable from on-chain liquidity. We use this formalism to prove that for blockchains with deterministic block times whose liquidity pools satisfy some natural properties that are satisfied by pools in practice, this form of MEV is invariant under changes to the ordering mechanism of the blockchain and distribution of block times. We do this by characterizing the MEV as the profit of a particularly simple arbitrage strategy when left uncontested. These results can inform design of blockchain protocols by ruling out designs aiming to increase trading opportunity by changing the ordering mechanism or shortening block times.
This study provides a practical introduction to high-frequency trading in blockchain-based currency markets. These types of markets have some specific characteristics that differentiate them from the stock markets, such as a large number of trading exchanges (centralized and decentralized), relative simplicity in moving funds from one exchange to another, and the large number of new currencies that have very little liquidity. This study analyzes the possible risks that specifically characterize this type of trading operation, the potential opportunities, and the algorithms that are mostly used, providing information that can be useful for practitioners who intend to operate in these markets by providing (and risking) liquidity.
Introduction: The paper addresses the challenging problem of predicting the short-term realized volatility of the Bitcoin price using order flow information. The inherent stochastic nature and anti-persistence of price pose difficulties in accurate prediction. Methods: To address this, we propose a method that transforms order flow data over a fixed time interval (snapshots) into images. The order flow includes trade sizes, trade directions, and limit order book, and is mapped into image colour channels. These images are then used to train both a simple 3-layer Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) and more advanced ResNet-18 and ConvMixer, with additionally supplementing them with hand-crafted features. The models are evaluated against classical GARCH, Multilayer Perceptron trained on raw data, and a naive guess method that considers current volatility as a prediction. Results: The experiments are conducted using price data from January 2021 and evaluate model performance in terms of root mean square error (RMSPE). The results show that our order flow representation with a CNN as a predictive model achieves the best performance, with an RMSPE of 0.85+/-1.1 for the model with aggregated features and 1.0+/-1.4 for the model without feature supplementation. ConvMixer with feature supplementation follows closely. In comparison, the RMSPE for the naive guess method was 1.4+/-3.0.
We investigate the theoretical and empirical relationships between activity in on-chain markets and pricing in off-chain cryptocurrency markets (e.g., ETH/USD prices). The motivation is to develop methods for proxying off-chain market data using data and computation that is in principle verifiable on-chain and could provide an alternative approach to blockchain price oracles. We explore relationships in PoW mining, PoS validation, block space markets, network decentralization, usage and monetary velocity, and on-chain Automated Market Makers (AMMs). We select key features from these markets, which we analyze through graphical models, mutual information, and ensemble machine learning models to explore the degree to which off-chain pricing information can be recovered entirely on-chain. We find that a large amount of pricing information is contained in on-chain data, but that it is generally hard to recover precise prices except on short time scales of retraining the model. We discuss how even noisy information recovered from on-chain data could help to detect anomalies in oracle-reported prices on-chain.
This paper studies the optimal liquidation of stocks in the presence of temporary and permanent price impacts, and we focus in the case of cryptocurrencies. We start by presenting analytical solutions to the problem with linear temporary impact, and linear and quadratic permanent impact. Then, using data from the order book of the BNB cryptocurrency, we estimate the functional form of the temporary and permanent price impact in three different scenarios: underestimation, overestimation and average estimation, finding different functional forms for each scenario. Using finite differences and optimal policy iteration, we solve the problem numerically and observe interesting changes in the optimal liquidation policy when applying calibrated linear and power forms for the temporary and permanent price impacts. Then, with these optimal policies, we identify optimal liquidation trajectories and simulate the liquidation of initial inventories to compare the performance among the optimal strategies under different parametrizations and against a naive strategy. Finally, we characterize the optimal policies based on the functional form of the inventory and find that policies generating the highest revenue are those starting with a low trading rate and increasing it as time passes.
By investigating nonfungible tokens (NFTs), we provide the first systematic study of retail investor behavior through asset bubbles. Given that NFTs are recorded in public blockchains, we are able to track investor behavior over time, leading to the identification of numerous price run-ups and crashes. Our study reveals that agent-level variables, such as investor sophistication, heterogeneity, and wash trading, in addition to aggregate variables, such as volatility, price acceleration, and turnover, significantly predict bubble formation and price crashes. We find that sophisticated investors consistently outperform others and exhibit characteristics consistent with superior information and skills, supporting the narrative surrounding asset pricing bubbles.
Jason Milionis, Ciamac C. Moallemi, Tim Roughgarden
In decentralized finance ("DeFi"), automated market makers (AMMs) enable traders to programmatically exchange one asset for another. Such trades are enabled by the assets deposited by liquidity providers (LPs). The goal of this paper is to characterize and interpret the optimal (i.e., profit-maximizing) strategy of a monopolist liquidity provider, as a function of that LP's beliefs about asset prices and trader behavior. We introduce a general framework for reasoning about AMMs based on a Bayesian-like belief inference framework, where LPs maintain an asset price estimate. In this model, the market maker (i.e., LP) chooses a demand curve that specifies the quantity of a risky asset to be held at each dollar price. Traders arrive sequentially and submit a price bid that can be interpreted as their estimate of the risky asset price; the AMM responds to this submitted bid with an allocation of the risky asset to the trader, a payment that the trader must pay, and a revised internal estimate for the true asset price. We define an incentive-compatible (IC) AMM as one in which a trader's optimal strategy is to submit its true estimate of the asset price, and characterize the IC AMMs as those with downward-sloping demand curves and payments defined by a formula familiar from Myerson's optimal auction theory. We generalize Myerson's virtual values, and characterize the profit-maximizing IC AMM. The optimal demand curve generally has a jump that can be interpreted as a "bid-ask spread," which we show is caused by a combination of adverse selection risk (dominant when the degree of information asymmetry is large) and monopoly pricing (dominant when asymmetry is small). This work opens up new research directions into the study of automated exchange mechanisms from the lens of optimal auction theory and iterative belief inference, using tools of theoretical computer science in a novel way.
We describe a plausible probabilistic model for a blockchain queueing environment in which rational, profit-maximising schedulers impose adversarial disciplines on incoming messages containing a payload that encodes a state transition in a machine. The model can be specialised to apply to chains with fixed or variable block times, traditional priority queue disciplines with `honest' schedulers, or adversarial public mempools. We find conditions under which the model behaves as a bulk-service queue with priority discipline and derive practical expressions for the relative block and message number of a transaction. We study this setup in the context of orders to a CFMM DEX where the execution price a user receives may be quite sensitive to its positioning in the chain -- in particular, to a string of transactions scheduled for prior execution which is not knowable at the time of order creation. We derive statistical models for the price impact of this order flow both in the presence and absence of MEV extraction activity.
Constant-product market making functions were first introduced by Hayden Adams in 2017 to create Uniswap, a decentralised exchange on Ethereum. This enables users to exchange assets at any given rate. Some variations such as Balancer and Curve were later introduced. In this paper, we analyse the maths that rule this type of protocol. We show that splitting a trade in multiple smaller trades does not impact the final exchange rate. We also show that the protocol is safer and more profitable when no one recompounds their fees.
We examine the influence of Twitter promotion on cryptocurrency pump-and-dump events. By analyzing abnormal returns, trading volume, and tweet activity, we uncover that Twitter effectively garners attention for pump-and-dump schemes, leading to notable effects on abnormal returns before the event. Our results indicate that investors relying on Twitter information exhibit delayed selling behavior during the post-dump phase, resulting in significant losses compared to other participants. These findings shed light on the pivotal role of Twitter promotion in cryptocurrency manipulation, offering valuable insights into participant behavior and market dynamics.
Liquidity providers (LPs) on decentralized exchanges (DEXs) can protect themselves from adverse selection risk by updating their positions more frequently. However, repositioning is costly, because LPs have to pay gas fees for each update. We analyze the causal relation between repositioning and liquidity concentration around the market price, using the entry of blockchain scaling solutions, Arbitrum and Polygon, as our instruments. Lower gas fees on scaling solutions allow LPs to update more frequently than on Ethereum. Our results demonstrate that higher repositioning intensity and precision lead to greater liquidity concentration, which benefits small trades by reducing their slippage.
Abstract This study examines blockchain technologies and their pivotal role in the evolving Metaverse, shedding light on topics such as how to invest in cryptocurrency, the mechanics behind crypto mining, and strategies to effectively buy and trade cryptocurrencies. While it contextualises the common queries of "why is crypto crashing?" and "why is crypto down?", the research transcends beyond the frequent market fluctuations to unravel how cryptocurrencies fundamentally work and the step-by-step process on how to create a cryptocurrency. Contrasting existing literature, this comprehensive investigation encompasses both the economic and cybersecurity risks inherent in the blockchain and fintech spheres. Through an interdisciplinary approach, the research transitions from the fundamental principles of fintech investment strategies to the overarching implications of blockchain within the Metaverse. Alongside exploring machine learning potentials in financial sectors and risk assessment methodologies, the study critically assesses whether developed or developing nations are poised to reap greater benefits from these technologies. Moreover, it probes into both enduring and dubious crypto projects, drawing a distinct line between genuine blockchain applications and Ponzi-like schemes. The conclusion resolutely affirms the staying power of blockchain technologies, underlined by a profound exploration of their intrinsic value and a reflective commentary by the author on the potential risks confronting individual investors.
The Ethereum blockchain network enables transaction processing and smart-contract execution through levies of transaction fees, commonly known as gas fees. This framework mediates economic participation via a market-based mechanism for gas fees, permitting users to offer higher gas fees to expedite processing. Historically, the ensuing gas fee volatility led to critical disequilibria between supply and demand for block space, presenting stakeholder challenges. This study examines the dynamic causal interplay between transaction fees and economic subsystems leveraging the network. By utilizing data related to unique active wallets and transaction volume of each subsystem and applying time-varying Granger causality analysis, we reveal temporal heterogeneity in causal relationships between economic activity and transaction fees across all subsystems. This includes (a) a bidirectional causal feedback loop between cross-blockchain bridge user activity and transaction fees, which diminishes over time, potentially signaling user migration; (b) a bidirectional relationship between centralized cryptocurrency exchange deposit and withdrawal transaction volume and fees, indicative of increased competition for block space; (c) decentralized exchange volumes causally influence fees, while fees causally influence user activity, although this relationship is weakening, potentially due to the diminished significance of decentralized finance; (d) intermittent causal relationships with maximal extractable value bots; (e) fees causally influence non-fungible token transaction volumes; and (f) a highly significant and growing causal influence of transaction fees on stablecoin activity and transaction volumes highlight its prominence. These results inform strategic considerations for stakeholders to more effectively plan, utilize, and advocate for economic activities on Ethereum, enhancing the understanding and optimization of within the rapidly evolving economy.
Financial markets are undergoing an unprecedented transformation. Technological advances have brought major improvements to the operations of financial services. While these advances promote improved accessibility and convenience, traditional finance shortcomings like lack of transparency and moral hazard frictions continue to plague centralized platforms, imposing societal costs. In this paper, we argue how these shortcomings and frictions are being mitigated by the decentralized finance (DeFi) ecosystem. We delve into the workings of smart contracts, the backbone of DeFi transactions, with an emphasis on those underpinning token exchange and lending services. We highlight the pros and cons of the novel form of decentralized governance introduced via the ownership of governance tokens. Despite its potential, the current DeFi infrastructure introduces operational risks to users, which we segment into five primary categories: consensus mechanisms, protocol, oracle, frontrunning, and systemic risks. We conclude by emphasizing the need for future research to focus on the scalability of existing blockchains, the improved design and interoperability of DeFi protocols, and the rigorous auditing of smart contracts.
Decentralized finance (DeFi) is known for its unique mechanism design, which applies smart contracts to facilitate peer-to-peer transactions. The decentralized bank is a typical DeFi application. Ideally, a decentralized bank should be decentralized in the transaction. However, many recent studies have found that decentralized banks have not achieved a significant degree of decentralization. This research conducts a comparative study among mainstream decentralized banks. We apply core-periphery network features analysis using the transaction data from four decentralized banks, Liquity, Aave, MakerDao, and Compound. We extract six features and compare the banks' levels of decentralization cross-sectionally. According to the analysis results, we find that: 1) MakerDao and Compound are more decentralized in the transactions than Aave and Liquity. 2) Although decentralized banking transactions are supposed to be decentralized, the data show that four banks have primary external transaction core addresses such as Huobi, Coinbase, and Binance, etc. We also discuss four design features that might affect network decentralization. Our research contributes to the literature at the interface of decentralized finance, financial technology (Fintech), and social network analysis and inspires future protocol designs to live up to the promise of decentralized finance for a truly peer-to-peer transaction network.
With the emergence of decentralized finance, new trading mechanisms called Automated Market Makers have appeared. The most popular Automated Market Makers are Constant Function Market Makers. They have been studied both theoretically and empirically. In particular, the concept of impermanent loss has emerged and explains part of the profit and loss of liquidity providers in Constant Function Market Makers. In this paper, we propose another mechanism in which price discovery does not solely rely on liquidity takers but also on an external exchange rate or price oracle. We also propose to compare the different mechanisms from the point of view of liquidity providers by using a mean / variance analysis of their profit and loss compared to that of agents holding assets outside of Automated Market Makers. In particular, inspired by Markowitz' modern portfolio theory, we manage to obtain an efficient frontier for the performance of liquidity providers in the idealized case of a perfect oracle. Beyond that idealized case, we show that even when the oracle is lagged and in the presence of adverse selection by liquidity takers and systematic arbitrageurs, optimized oracle-based mechanisms perform better than popular Constant Function Market Makers.
Automated Market Makers (AMMs) have cemented themselves as an integral part of the decentralized finance (DeFi) space. AMMs are a type of exchange that allows users to trade assets without the need for a centralized exchange. They form the foundation for numerous decentralized exchanges (DEXs), which help facilitate the quick and efficient exchange of on-chain tokens. All present-day popular DEXs are static protocols, with fixed parameters controlling the fee and the curvature - they suffer from invariance and cannot adapt to quickly changing market conditions. This characteristic may cause traders to stay away during high slippage conditions brought about by intractable market movements. We propose a Reinforcement Learning (RL) framework to optimize the fees collected on an AMM protocol. In particular, we develop a Q-Learning Agent for Market Making Protocols (QLAMMP) that learns the optimal fee rates and leverage coefficients for a given AMM protocol and maximizes the expected fee collected under a range of different market conditions. We show that QLAMMP is consistently able to outperform its static counterparts under all the simulated test conditions.
Song Li, Jian Zhou, Chong Mo, LI, Jin · 6 authors
Graph convolutional networks (GCNs) is a class of artificial neural networks for processing data that can be represented as graphs. Since financial transactions can naturally be constructed as graphs, GCNs are widely applied in the financial industry, especially for financial fraud detection. In this paper, we focus on fraud detection on cryptocurrency truct networks. In the literature, most works focus on static networks. Whereas in this study, we consider the evolving nature of cryptocurrency networks, and use local structural as well as the balance theory to guide the training process. More specifically, we compute motif matrices to capture the local topological information, then use them in the GCN aggregation process. The generated embedding at each snapshot is a weighted average of embeddings within a time window, where the weights are learnable parameters. Since the trust networks is signed on each edge, balance theory is used to guide the training process. Experimental results on bitcoin-alpha and bitcoin-otc datasets show that the proposed model outperforms those in the literature.
The goal of cryptocurrencies is decentralization. In principle, all currencies have equal status. Unlike traditional stock markets, there is no default currency of denomination (fiat), thus the trading pairs can be set freely. However, it is impractical to set up a trading market between every two currencies. In order to control management costs and ensure sufficient liquidity, we must give priority to covering those large-volume trading pairs and ensure that all coins are reachable. We note that this is an optimization problem. Its particularity lies in: 1) the trading volume between most (>99.5%) possible trading pairs cannot be directly observed. 2) It satisfies the connectivity constraint, that is, all currencies are guaranteed to be tradable. To solve this problem, we use a two-stage process: 1) Fill in missing values based on a regularized, truncated eigenvalue decomposition, where the regularization term is used to control what extent missing values should be limited to zero. 2) Search for the optimal trading pairs, based on a branch and bound process, with heuristic search and pruning strategies. The experimental results show that: 1) If the number of denominated coins is not limited, we will get a more decentralized trading pair settings, which advocates the establishment of trading pairs directly between large currency pairs. 2) There is a certain room for optimization in all exchanges. The setting of inappropriate trading pairs is mainly caused by subjectively setting small coins to quote, or failing to track emerging big coins in time. 3) Too few trading pairs will lead to low coverage; too many trading pairs will need to be adjusted with markets frequently. Exchanges should consider striking an appropriate balance between them.