Jason M. Patlis, Fullbright Senior Scholar, Rokhmin Dahuri, Maurice Knight
This paper describes the mechanics of establishing a voluntary, incentive-based integrated coastal management program in Indonesia that is consistent with the newly established laws relating to decentralization. It first offers a close analysis of those laws, specifically Act No. 22/1999 and its implementing Regulation No. 25/2000 regarding management authorities, and Act No. 25/1999 and its implementing Regulation 104/2000 regarding financial relations and financial management. The paper then discusses why these new laws increase the need for a vertically and horizontally integrated coastal resource management (ICRM) program in Indonesia. Lastly, the paper describes how a program can be developed under decentralization. The paper proposes a voluntary program in which the central government establishes standards and guidelines for developing provincial and district ICRM programs. In addition to developing standards, the central government would also put in place specific programs providing incentives available to provinces and districts that prepare a ICRM plans in accordance with these standards and guidelines. After coordination with relevant village and provincial governments, the districts, through the provincial government, would submit their plan for approval by the central government. Upon approval, the central government would provide technical and financial assistance, and as additional incentive, would commit to adhering to the regional plan itself. The paper further identifies sources of discretionary funding available to the central government to use for financing such a program.
Since the mid-1980s, China has made substantial progress in the reform of the financing of education, including the establishment of a decentralized and diversified system of financing and the mobilization of additional resources for the education sector. In compulsory education, however, significant challenges remain; they include, in particular, the financial difficulties of poor and rural areas as well as large and widening disparities in per-student spending across areas. Intergovernmental grants from central and provincial levels could be used to address these challenges but their use in China has so far been very limited. This paper argues for the establishment of a regularized and substantial scheme of intergovernmental grants in the financing of compulsory education and highlights some of the issues to be explored in the future. The analysis draws upon information on educational financing in China and examines the potential relevance of the experience of other large decentralized systems in the use of intergovernmental grants.
Geochemistry and Geochronology of Asian Mineral Deposits
An alternative to centralized top‐down city governance is a multi‐level bottom‐up structure based on small neighborhood contractual communities. This paper analyzes the voting rules and public finances of decentralized, contractual urban governance and the likely outcome of such a constitutional structure, substantially reduced transfer seeking or rent seeking. Tax and service substitution, with lower‐level funding and services substituting for higher‐level public finance, is the general process by which the governance would devolve. Land rent is the most feasible source of such decentralized public finance, and local communities could also engage in local currency and credit services. Some empirical examples demonstrate the implementation of some of these governance structures.
Uganda has been engaged for a number of years in an ambitious programme of political and financial decentralization involving significantly expanded expenditure and service delivery responsibilities for local governments in what are now forty‐five districts. Fiscal decentralization has involved allocation of block grants from the centre to complement increased local tax revenue‐raising efforts by districts and municipalities. This article is concerned with the financial side of decentralization and in particular with an examination of district government efforts to raise revenue with the tax instruments which have been assigned to them. These are found to be deficient in a number of ways and their tax raising potential not to be commensurate with the responsibilities being devolved. Achievement of the decentralization aims laid down, therefore, must depend either on the identification of new or modified methods of raising revenue locally, or increased commitment to transfer of financial resources from the centre, or both.
This study examines organizational structural changes within the finance and accounting function following the adoption of new information system. Many accounting researchers have predicted changing environment and role for management accountants resulting from competition, regulation, and manufacturing and information technology (see Baker, 1992; Cooper, 1996; Cox, 1992; Drucker, 1990; Elliott, 1992; Epstein, 1993; Ezzamel, 1994; Flamholtz, 1992; Johnson and Kaplan, 1987; Kaplan, 1984, 1986; King et al., 1991; Madden and Holmes, 1991; McNair, 1996; Siegel et al., 1997; Shea and Kleinsorge, 1994; Spicer, 1992; Tyson, 1996; Weaving, 1995). Disagreement exists regarding the nature of the changes, and whether is actually taking place. Cooper (1996) foresees an increased need for management accounting, but decreased need for management accountants. He predicts the management accounting function will be decentralized to those on the shop floor. After new management accounting systems are in place, m uch of the day-to-day management accounting can be transferred to the workforce (Cooper, 1996: 36). Elliott (1992) also predicts an increased reliance on blue-collar workers as they become knowledge-workers, and part of the aggregate brainpower of the organization; they are supposed to help figure out how to improve quality, speed production, and contribute to customer satisfaction. The management accounting department may adopt supportive and monitoring role rather than more proactive decision-making role, as advocated by Kaplan (1995) and Boer (1995), among others. study of the evolving role of management accountants, King et al. (1991) report that a sea of change is taking place as management accountants become more proactive in the decision-making process. McNair (1996) disagrees with the premise that management accounting has become more relevant. In general, we see desire for change, but little evidence that management accounting has had the courage to let go of its ties to financial accounting and external reporting requirements (McNair, 1996: 40). According to McNair, there has been much discussion about changed emphasis in management accounting, but she describes the changes as old wine in new bottles. Since the early 1980s, numerous research projects have been conducted to gain better understanding of the management accounting function in organizations (Keating, 1995) and to develop theoretical basis for management accounting research in the future (Kaplan, 1986). This article seeks to add to that literature by identifying changes taking place in accounting functions as hypothesized by set of literature-based expectations. The most significant finding of the study is support for flattening the organizational hierarchy and developing networked organization within the accounting function. The levels of management within the accounting function at one site were reduced from four to two over the course of five years; accountants began reporting to supervisors located at sites worldwide. At the second site, shared services activities were centralized at one location for the North American continent. The centralization resulted in reduction of accounting function costs from 1.7 percent of sales to 1 percent of sales. Our study reveals that accountants became less involved in many routine tasks of cost accounting and began providing support role both to plant personnel and to business managers in making strategic decisions. The remainder of the article is divided into four sections. The next section develops three research propositions for fieldwork, based on review of the accounting, information technology (IT), and organizational literature. Then we consider research design issues including site selection, field research, and data sources. After this we present the field research findings in relation to our research propositions. The final section discusses conclusions, limitations, and opportunities for future research. …
This paper examines the recent changes in collective bargaining in France and the characteristics and conditions of the emergence of a post-Fordist bargaining system. For the last two years, die system of collective bargaining in France has been through an accelerated phase of change. The Aubry laws on 35 hours have revitalized the collective bargaining on working time and work organization by expanding the decentralization movement observed since the early 1980s: the number of enterprise agreements increased from 6,400 in 1987 to 13,300 in 1998 and 31,000 in 1999. The revival of collective bargaining through the government's political agenda has also rekindled the controversy over the respective roles of die agreement and the law in the production of standards governing labour relations. Due to the social partners' reticence about contractual commitment as well as the state's influence, industry-wide collective bargaining has for a long time been confined to a secondary role in relation to die legal provisions on which it could only improve or complement. From the early 1980s onwards, this hierarchy of standards based on me principle of favour was gradually weakened as enterprise agreements that allowed for working time beyond standards were legalized. This radically changed the function of bargaining. As a law- improvement tool, it became an instrument of change and decentralized adaptation to work rules, especially in the firm. Since less than 10 per cent of French employees were unionized, this change gave rise to numerous questions about me unequal distribution of capacities of action between employers and employees' representatives. The greater autonomy of enterprise regulation vis-a-vis die legal standards and industry-wide agreements cardes the risk of a return to employer self-regulation. This risk is all the greater as collective bargaining has become more complex and tends to be more oriented towards job regulation than distributive management of the capital-labour relationship. The social compromise of the Golden Age was based on a scheme of statutory bargaining that entalled a trade-off between wages and contribution to production, the organization of which was left to management by die union actor. With a focus on a compromise between employment and competitiveness — through reduction of working time in the case of France — post-Fordist collective bargaining deals simultaneously with all the parameters of me employment relation: working time, qualifications, quantitative job evolution, reorganization of production, wage policy, and investment strategies. Such an extension of the field of bargaining inevitably leads to a rethinking of the actors' doctrines and strategies, inasmuch as they had strongly incorporated the division between economie and social matters inherent in the Fordist compromise. For employers, this implies sharing, if not only a part of their managerial power, then at least information on the firm's economie strategies. For trade unions, these new contractual dynamics imply greater expertise and a renewal of modes of legitimation, which were previously based mainly on conventional wage demands. The new paradigm of collective bargaining, which is more autonomous, more complex and more demanding for industrial relations actors, undoubtedly calls for a greater consideration of local or regional dynamics. Previously, the decentraHzation of industrial relations was not accompanied by a regional framework sensitive to the negotiated regulation of labour relations. Yet, the growing importance of local forms of coordination in the performance of social Systems of production, as well as in managerial practices, tends to erase the firm's physical borders. The forms of outsourcing of activities that often come with a triangulation of labour relations (dissociation between the worker, the user of the workforce and the person responsible for the employment relationship) make the regulation typical of the Fordist era quite ineffectual. Neither the firm nor the industry is up to the emerging challenges of employment regulation in these new production organizations. Although the legal resources necessary for regionalizing collective bargaining do exist, the hegemony of industry federations and the structural weakness of local inter-industry authorities, both workers' and employers', still constitute a formidable obstacle.