AttheBorders oftheHuman.Beasts, Bodies andNatural Philosophy intheEarlyModern Period. Ed. by ERICA FUDGE, RUTH GILBERT, and SUSAN WISEMAN. Basingstoke: Macmillan;New York:St Martin'sPress. I999. xii + 369 pp. ?42.50. Perceiving Animals:HumansandBeastsin EarlyModernEnglish Culture.By ERICAFUDGE. Basingstoke: Macmillan; New York: St Martin's Press. 1999. x + 232 pp. ?42.5o. Arguably, a mark of a good conference is the 'buzz' effect, by which every paper (including, naturally,one's own) seems linked in dynamic ways to every other, an amazing number of illuminating connections are made between sessions and papers, and no defence is needed for the conference theme, its statusbeing so selfevidentlybeyond doubt. All of which goes to prove exactly how importanta topic it is and how right one was to go along. With luck, such satisfyingeuphoria lasts one out of the conferencevenue and at leasthalfan hourinto thejourney home. Perhaps a collection of essaysthat requiressimilarconnective skillsof its readers should be effective likewise, but while it is possible to make links between the various contributionsto AttheBorders oftheHuman, I am less confidentof a resultantbuzz. According to the preface, this collection investigatesdefinitionsof 'the human' in the early modern period, focusing on three particular areas where the borders between human and non-human are most challenged: human/animal; organism/ machine; physical/non-physical. This is a wide and, it transpires, diffuse remit, resulting in a lack of conviction for the collection and a lurkingsuspicion that the attempt to bring several trendy but disparatetopics under the same umbrella has proved too much. A diffuse whole does not preclude good individual elements, however:therearecertainlysome good thingshere and some intriguingassociations for the reader to make. Brian Cummings reveals the flounderingat the borders of what is mental and what isphysical,exposed by discussionsof shame, which trouble the distinctionsbetween man and beast or Spaniard and Indian. Margaret Healy offers an interesting discussion of human/inhuman behaviour which reveals the porous natureof the body, liable to invasionby devilsor (ifone isverylucky)angels, but ends at the point where fuller discussion of effortsto control these boundaries would be appropriate.The resultantsense of curtailmentis also felt when reading Alan Stewart'sandJulie Sanders'scontributions.Stewart'sdiscussionof intellectual pursuit ('the humanities') as proof of proper human status, as opposed to the nobility's preferredpursuit of hunting, contains an interestingenough description of the one-upmanshipbetween Erasmusand Bude over poverty,but failsto develop its relation to the collection's theme. Sanders's piece on the role of the midwife suffers doubly. Not only it is abbreviated, but it also seems oddly out of place. Clearly there is something worthwhile to be said about the sleight of hand of Jonson's TheMagnetic Lady,by which the substitutionsof female control of the birth chamber and literal substitutionof children can be read as a commentary on the role of midwives and suspicion of male denigration of that role, but Sanders has neither the space not the context to develop it here and I was left wishing for the differentarenathatthisparticularpiece seems to deserve. Bacon's emphasison visualproof tenuouslylinksSanders'spiece to the restof the collection and is again exploited by Erica Fudge on vivisection, and Ruth Gilbert, who declares a focus on the anatomy/erotics boundary, but in fact more simply brings together a selection of hermaphroditetexts as viewing becomes voyeurism. Peter, the Wild Boy, is also subject to a gaze that hovers between voyeurism and scientific scrutinyas Michael Newton intelligentlypresents Defoe's intriguingand generallyoverlookedAlereNATUREDelineated and the questionof where the human begins is raised. SusanW^iseman and Mary Peace furtherexplore this topic in their 264 Reviews YES, 32, 2002 discussionsof apes and women respectively,both of which left me unsure.I am not convinced that for Tyson the 'fragileborders'and 'temporallyalterablegradations' between human and ape are 'at stake' exactly. There is clearly a fascination here, but confidence in mankind'sposition at the summit of the process emanates from Tyson and denies the phrase 'at stake'.In this the early modern outlooks seem free of the paranoia of the late twentieth century. When it comes to women, of course, there is an unease, which Peace traces in terms of sentimental discourse, but while her concluding assertionthatwomen can be regardedas bestial is credible, it is not secure and is untouched in the...
The Italian general government expenditure is empirically modeled by considering demand-side, supply-side, and institutional factors. The authors estimate a long-run relationship with government expenditure driven by the demand-side and supply-side effects of domestic income and bureaucratic power, respectively, as well as by an institutional factor, namely, the decentralization of public expenditure. The disequilibrium error positively affects income growth and local spending, implying that when government expenditure is above its equilibrium level, both economic growth and local governments benefit. However, tighter government spending within the European Monetary Union environment suggests that local governments will have to become more efficient to find additional resources for their financing.
This paper addresses the decentralization of health services financed by the Unified Health System (SUS) in the city of Natal initiated in the mid 90s. This decentralization primarily involved the transference of health services financed by SUS, which had previously been developed by the state of Rio Grande do Norte, to the city government of Natal. Based on the data gathered mainly from SUS¿ Ambulatory Information System (SIS/SUS), the authors attempted to verify to what extent this decentralization of health services provided by SUS in the city of Natal had improved public access to health services or, on the contrary, had resulted in a privatization process, implying more difficult access to those services.
Based on the reliability mechanism of biological system, the design theories and methods of high reliabe power electronic system, includingautonomous decentralized control,redundancy design, intelligent design, self-reproducion and self-repair, self-adaptive and self-organization control, are firstly described in detail. The research results show that the reliabi1ity of complex power electronic systems is improved markedly in these bionic methods. The power electronics technology can draw some research inspiration from living being. And bionics will have wide applications in the field of power electronics. As a concept Autonomous Cell (AC) and Autonomous Decentralized Power Electric System (ADPES) are defined. It is pointed that AC is autonomous controllable and autonomous cooperative. Based on AC, ADPES is built.A novel autonomous decentralized single-phase inverter of high reliability is inverstigated in the method of bionic. Bionic design methods of power electronics system are original from methodological point of view in this paper. Theresearch in this paper is a practical guide to the applications of bionics on power electronics, especial on design of high reliable power electronics systems.
The price system is widely regarded as an efficient way to use decentralized information, and some authors have argued that a market for vote would make voting more efficient by allowing intensities of preferences to be expressed. We develop a model of vote trading equilibrium to show that when individual preferences are correlated to some privately observed signals the existence of a market for votes can be socially harmful (thereby justifying secret ballots). Although the market is an efficient mechanism to aggregate private information about individual welfare, voting is an efficient mechanism to aggregate private information about collective welfare, and using both mechanisms at the same time when both types of decentralized information are to be aggregated can result into the destruction of the second type of information. This provides some justification for secret ballots and public subsidies to political campaigns. Erreur ! Argument de commutateur inconnu. Section 1 : Introduction. The market mechanism has been viewed for a long time as an efficient way to aggregate decentralized information: in the Arrow-Debreu model, individual agents only need to know their own preferences and to observe the equilibrium price system, and the resulting allocation cannot be (Pareto-)improved even if a single agent knew everybody's preferences at the same time. The voting mechanism constitutes another commonly used mechanism to allocate ressources, whose efficiency properties are usually questionned by economists and other social theorists. Unsurprisingly, several authors have thought of using the market mechanism to mitigate the presumed inefficiency of the voting mechanism: the basic argument is that a market for votes would allow the intensity of preferences to be expressed; that is, a majority may prefer x to y although everybody could be better off if y was implemented and the proponents of y could compensate the proponents of x by buying their votes. However all modern democraties have secret ballots, implying that vote trading contracts are in effect impossible to enforce, and many reasonnable people hold strong views against the idea of a market for votes. This paper attempts to explain why vote trading can indeed be socially The view that the problem of economic organization consists essentially of finding efficient mechanisms to use decentralized information, and in particular that the price system provides us with such a mechanism, dates back at least to Hayek(1945). E.g., Mostly in the public choice tradition, starting with Buchanan and Tullock(1962). Voting processes within parliaments often don't entail secret ballots, presumably because this is the only way voters can monitor their representative. In effect, this typically leads to massive vote-trading (although lobbying does not usually take the form of direct vote-trading contracts, the effects are similar; see section 4 for an application to such quasi-vote-trading Erreur ! Argument de commutateur inconnu. harmful in a world of decentralized information, and by doing so gives some new insights regarding the informational conditions under which voting and the market constitute efficient mechanisms. To understand our basic argument, it may be useful to recall that of Condorcet's Jury Theorem: assume all individuals (say, in a jury) share common values (if the state of nature s=0 they all prefer x to y, if s=1 they all prefer y to x), that they all receive a signal about s, and that the true signal is delivered with probability q>1/2; then nobody wants to be the dictator and everybody wants to delegate the decision-making power to the majority (so as to benefit from information pooling). Now consider the more realistic situation where there is at the same time some decentralized information of the kind described by Condorcet (some voters receive some signals which are of positive value to other voters as well) and some decentralized information about the individual intensity of preferences (different voters have different intensity of preferences). Then the usual benefits of decentralized vote trading (in terms of using efficientely private information about individual preferences by allowing high-valuation agents to vote more by compensating low-valuation agents) can be overwhelmed by the destruction of socially useful signals: typically, some agents can receive a socially-useful signal but still be so uncertain that selling seems privately profitable while some other agents are sufficientely certain about their own preferences that they are ready to buy; in that case a transaction will take place although all uncertain voters (and society as a whole) may be better off if everybody was forced to vote. The key deficiency of the price system is its imperfect informativeness: the same equilibrium processes). Surprisingly enough, this transparent result does not seem to be as well known as Condorcet's majority cycles story, although both are extremely complementary: voting is an efficient mechanism to aggregate information in a common-values world, but results quickly into troubles (majority cycles) if it is used to aggregate conflicting interests. Erreur ! Argument de commutateur inconnu. price for votes prevails for completely different distribution of signals, so that uncertain voters don't get to learn what they should be fighting for. Therefore it may be socially desirable to forbid vote trading altogether. There exists very few analysis of the efficiency properties of vote trading in decentralized equilibrium. Most of the literature deals with non-equilibirum behavior, pointing out various kinds of equilibrium non-existence, in general for majority-cycles and related reasons or because it is assumed that the distribution of individual preferences is known with certainty (so that the probabilities of being decisive are certain, which implies that there will always be an excess supply of votes at any positive price and an excess demand at price 0; see Philipson and Snyder(1992) and subsequent references). The basic point that a market for votes cannot operate like a normal market has been made several times, but it is important to realize that the fact a vote-trading contract always involves external effects on othe r agents does not imply per se that allowing vote trading is socially harmful; what this implies is only that the equilibirum will not in general first-best efficient; we explain in section 3 why vote trading, by transferring voting rights to highvaluation agents and compensating low-valuation agents, is very likely to generate positive (though not maximal) Pareto-improvements as long as individual valuations are certain. One needs to invoke uncertain preferences and privately-observed, socially-useful signals to make a robust case against vote trading: even if market power could be regulated there would still exist good reasons for keeping the market out of politics. See in particular the free-riding argument of Grossman and Hart(1980) and the subsequent literature. For example by supporting the formation of large coalitions of voters with small individual stakes. Erreur ! Argument de commutateur inconnu. Our point is also related to Hirshman(1971)'s argument about the limited compatibility between and exit: Hirshman argues that the introduction of exit (the competitive mechanism) into a situation where was the primary regulatory mechanism can be socially harmful since it may induce agents who can most effectively to exit. If one interprets as a direct information-aggregation mechanism through communication (of which voting is a simple example), then we also suggest that the private regulation of individual weights within a voice club can be socially harmful. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 defines a competitive, rationalexpectations equilibrium concept for vote trading; section 3 applies it to show why competitive vote trading can result into substantial destruction of socially useful information; section 4 applies these same ideas to the financing of political campaigns; section 5 gives concluding comments. Section 2 : A Model of Equilibrium Vote Trading. A finite set of agents I=(1;...;n) has to choose between two possible collective decisions x and y . The preferences of agent i are represented by Ui = Ui(x,s) + ti if x is implemented The main difference with Hirshman's argument, apart from the formal modelling we offer, is that in our model there are prices for votes that could in principle undo this ineficiency by transmitting information (this strenghthens the argument).
Magdi El-Soudani, Heba S. El-Refaey, Hebat-Allah M. Mourad
Zero knowledge proofs form an important category in the public key identification protocols, they are depending on number theory. In 1989, Stern announced his protocol which is based on syndrome-decoding problem, he also studied the attacks against this type of problems. In this paper, we propose a broadcasting variant based on the Sternâ s Identification scheme. Broadcasting is applied when there are one prover and many verifiers. In the proposed broadcasting scheme, the prover is communicating with verifiers through a broadcasting channel so he is running the identification session once, which minimizes the time and the communication complexity. We have developed Stern basic scheme to be adequate for broadcasting applications, but the underlying hard problem that the security of Stern identification scheme depends on, is used as it is.
The Indonesian authorities are exploring options for the establishment of subnational government endowment funds and the Ministry of Finance (MoF) has drafted regulations in that context. However, the motivations and objective for establishing an endowment fund at the subnational level diverge across various stakeholders. Clarity of the objectives and purpose of the endowment fund will be critical for informing features of its architecture, and the endowment fund should be aligned with the national fiscal policy objectives. Establishing such funds at a time of fiscal deficit entails a âborrowing-to-saveâ approach which is not optimal from a fiscal policy perspective. Currently, there is a misalignment between the design of inflow and outflow rules, the endowment fundâs objectives, and the fiscal/economic context. In addition, the current draft MoF regulations restrict the investment policy to conform with the law on decentralization enacted in 2022. This report emphasizes that regardless of the structure of the endowment fund, it needs to be fully integrated within the budget. The report also provides recommendations on assessing the full cost of the subnational government endowment fund, its design and implementation, and provides suggestions to improve the draft MoF regulations.
Compared to the national level, the local government level in Hungary is more responsive to reform efforts. The Hungarian experience indicates that decentralization is a key programme of the transition process for the emerging democracies of eastern Europe. These experiences also show that the decentralization process will be efficient and effective only if three key requirements are met. These are: (1) a stable and democratic constitutional, legal background; (2) an efficient municipal finance system; and (3) a well-functioning local administration.
Local Government Finance and Decentralization
Hungarian Social, Economic and Educational Studies
There are some competition in our current system, such as the tax competition between central governmentand local governments; tax competition among the local governments and the tax competition in the government. There-fore, some suggestions are put forward to here, perfecting the reform of sub -- tax system, regulating the behavior of thelocal government, controling the struggle about the tax resources in the inner government.
While the issue of school finance has been studied extensively, relatively little effort has been devoted to understanding how school finance policies impact the nature of communities. This is peculiar in light of substantial evidence that public school quality â at least in the U.S. â has much to do with residential choices by households, and in light of increasing empirical evidence that residential segregation perpetuates income inequality. In this paper, I emphasize in particular the importance of considering not only the level of government that is funding public schools but also the role played by the private sector as well as its interaction with the existing public school system. Somewhat surprisingly, simulation results based on U.S. data suggest that, in terms of producing spatial income segregation, the role of centralization versus decentralization of public school financing is quite secondary to the role played by the private sector. A purely public school system â regardless of the degree of centralization of school finance â results in substantially more spatial segregation than a purely private system. However, it is the combination of a (centralized or decentralized) public system with a private school market that yields the least residential segregation as housing price distortions from the capitalization of the public system generate incentives for middle and high income private school attendees to live with lower income public school attendees. Motivated by this insight, additional simulations involving explicit government support for private schools in the form of vouchers are reported, and the sensitivity of results to alternative school production models is tested. 1
INTRODUCTION The Constitution requires that prosecutors prove a reasonable every element that constitutes the crime charged against a criminal defendant.1For many years, legislatures have sidestepped this constitutional requirement by denying that certain aspects of a crime are elements. Legislatures have instead labeled these aspects defenses2 or presumptions3 and thus transferred to the defendant the burden of proving their presence or absence. More recently, state legislatures and Congress have used the term factors4 to shift fact-finding responsibility regarding certain aspects of a crime from the jury to the judge, effectively lowering the required standard of proof from beyond reasonable doubt to preponderance of evidence.5 The Supreme Court has struck down some of these constructions as violating the criminal defendant's constitutional rights,6 and has upheld others.7 Until recently, however, the Court had not offered a clear rule or principle by which legislatures and lower courts could evaluate these criminal statutes.8 In Apprendi v. New Jersey,9 the Court announced such a rule: is unconstitutional for a legislature to remove from the jury the assessment of facts that increase the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed. It is equally clear that such facts must be established by proof a reasonable doubt.10 Apprendi is the most definitive statement in a quarter-century of Supreme Court decisions11 assessing the limits on a legislature's authority to define criminal offenses in ways that circumvent the constitutional protections guaranteed to criminal defendants. This Comment defines the issues at stake in this series of decisions and discusses how the Court's analysis has shifted, especially over the course of the four most recent decisions.12 This Comment contends that the majority's analysis in Apprendi should prompt reconsideration of the constitutionality of statutes that impose mandatory minimum sentences based on factors not submitted to the jury or proven a reasonable doubt.13 Part I presents several key decisions in the last quarter-century in which the Court has considered challenges to legislatures' definitions of criminal elements. Subpart A discusses the Maine statute at issue in Mullaney v. Wilbur, the analysis used by the Court to evaluate the constitutionality of the statute's rebuttable presumption of malice aforethought, and the guiding principle that emerged from the decision. Subpart B describes the statute at issue in Patterson v. New York and the distinctions the Court drew between the affirmative defense requirement in Patterson and the rebuttable presumption in Mullaney. It concludes that, although the effect of the two statutes was similar, the principle derived from Mullaney logically led the Court to reach a different result on the constitutionality of the statute in Patterson. Subparts C and D present, respectively, the mandatory minimum sentencing statutes at issue in McMillan v. Pennsylvania and Almendarez-- Torres v. United States, and discuss how the focus of the Court's analysis shifted from the legislature's authority to define proscribed activity to its role in determining how the proscribed activity should be evaluated. Subpart E describes the Court's reinterpretation in Jones v. United States of the rule articulated in Almendarez-Torres, and presents the language in Jones that foreshadowed the coming shift in the Court's analysis of sentencing factors. Finally, Subpart F discusses the enhancement statute at issue in Apprendi, and shows how the Court analyzed the statute's purpose and effect to conclude that it infringed on the defendant's constitutional right to trial by jury and proof reasonable of the elements of the offense. Part II compares the analysis and guiding principle of Apprendi to those of the other cases discussed in Part I, and concludes that the analysis in Apprendi should be followed in the future. âŠ
In response to the nationâs economic and agricultural system reform, Chinese agricultural schools have begun the transformation from academic institutions to vocational and technical education. Significant efforts have been made to reform the curricula, as it is the key element needed for the formation of the new educational system. Prior to the nationâs reform starting in 1978, the curriculum in agricultural schools was theoretical information based and the instruction was teacher-centered. Students usually had little involvement in teaching and learning. In addition, the value of practical âhands-onâ experiences in agricultural education had been neglected. During the past decade new ideas and approaches in curriculum development and instruction have been gradually incorporated into the agricultural vocational education through new policy initiatives and a pilot project launched by the Food and Agriculture Organization of United Nations during 1994-1998. The decentralization is one major feature of these changes. Introduction/Background China is undergoing a large transformation as its economic system is shifting from a centrally planned to a market-driven system (State Council, 1999). Agriculture the traditional foundation of Chinese society faces an especially great challenge in restructuring its system to meet the needs of the market economy. In particular, agricultural education is playing an important role in preparing people for a new phase of rural development. During the past decade, agricultural schools have started to take actions to reform their existing educational systems and to strengthen their vocational programs (Ministry of Agriculture, 1997). There are 360 agricultural schools distributed among the provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities throughout China. Agricultural schools are typically resident schools that require students to pass standardized admission exams. Schools usually enroll graduates from junior secondary schools and each program lasts for three or four years. The average enrollment for each school ranges from 1000-3000 students. One-third of agricultural schools are governed at the provincial level, while two-thirds are administered by prefectures. None of the schools falls directly under the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA). However, the Ministry undertakes the function of guidance and macro-management for all agricultural schools. In the past, agricultural schools were academic institutions classified as secondary specialized schools. The mission of these schools was officially described as to train intermediate-level specialists who were political and technical experts. Students were required to master basic theory, to have specialized knowledge, and to develop practical technical skills. Graduates from these schools were graded as âmiddle-level specialistsâ (Henze, 1984). Students were usually trained theoretically and narrowly. Most subjects studied in the schools were academic and usually had little relevance to the studentsâ workplace and reality. Upon leaving school, graduates were often assigned jobs according to a centrally organized plan. Just like graduates from higher education institutions or at least in theory every graduate would be assigned to a job position that could be characterized as âwhite collar.â In recent years, significant changes have taken place to reflect the continued reform and the development of the âsocialist market economy.â Today, jobs for graduates are no longer guaranteed and the government can only hire approximately 50% of agricultural graduates (Chen, 2000). As a result, it is becoming increasingly difficult for an agricultural graduate to find a job in the public sector. Accordingly, graduates need to find their employment in the private sector or they need to be self-employed. Studentsâ education has become more purposive and selective, since it now must relate to their training and to employment opportunities in the labor market. Moreover, the feedback to schools has indicated
An interactive zero-knowledge proof based protocol of identification and digital signature is proposed in this paper. The security of protocol is based on large number factorization and security of RSA problems. This protocol can be applied to smart cards. This scheme requires minimal amount of computation and communications information. Compared with Nyang's scheme, the scheme is more likely to win higher security. The k , which is the cycle number in order to achieve zero-knowledge, is smaller than Nyang's. On one cycle, the highest security degree, which the protocol can achieve, is independent of the user's identity. The protocol is versatile enough to be applied to digital signature, multiple digital signature, and (N, T) threshold digital signature.
Identity verification is an important information security. The following article introduces the basic idea of Zero Knowledge Proof and analyzes Identity Verification System on Zero Knowledge Proof as well. The purpose is to probe into the building of Identity Verification System based on Zero Knowledge Proof.
This paper presents a perfect zero knowledge proof system for a decision problem which is computationally equivalent to the Discrete Root Problem,and its zero knowledge property does not rely on any assumptions.Thus we provide additional evidence to the belief that perfect zero knowledge proof systems exist in a non trivial manner (i.e.,for language not in BPP).
Preface. Part I: Localization, Mapping and Navigation. On the Positional Uncertainty of Multi-Robot Cooperative Localization I.M. Rekleitis, et al. A Multi-Agent System for Multi-Robot Mapping and Exploration K. Konolige, et al. Distributed Heterogeneous Sensing for Outdoor Multi-Robot Localization, Mapping, and Path Planning L.E. Parker. et al. Mission-Relevant Collaborative Observation and Localization A.W. Stroupe, T. Balch. Deployment and Localization for Mobile Robot Teams A. Howard, M.J. Mataric. Multiple Autonomous Robots for UXO Clearance, the Basic UXO Gathering System (BUGS) Project T.N. Nguyen, et al. Part II: Distributed Survelliance. Programming and Controlling the Operations of a Team of Miniature Robots P.E. Rybski, et al. Autonomous Flying Vehicle Research at the University of Southern California S. Saripalli, et al. Part III: Manipulation. Distributed Manipulation of Multiple Objects Using Ropes B. Donald, et al. A Distributed Multi-Robot System for Cooperative Manipulation A. Das, et al. Part IV: Coordination and Formations. A Layered Architecture for Coordination of Mobile Robots R. Simmons, et al. Stability Analysis of Decentralized Cooperative Controls J.T. Feddema, D.A. Schoenwald. Snow White and the 700 Dwarves B.H. Wilcox. Part V: Sensor and Hardware Issues. GOATS: Multi-platform Sonar Concept for Coastal Mine Countermeasures H. Schmidt, J.R. Edwards. Design of the UMN Multi-Robot System A. Drenner, et al. Simulating Self-Organization With the Digital Hormone Model Wei-Min Shen, Cheng-Ming Chuong. Part VI: Design and Learning. Architecting a Simulation and Development Environment for Multi-Robot Teams S. Balakirsky, et al. RobotSoccer: A Multi-Robot Challenge M.M. Veloso. Part VII: Human/Robot Interaction. Human-Robot Interactions: Creating Synergistic Cyber Forces J.C. Scholtz. Communicating with Teams of Cooperative Robots D. Perzanowski, et al. Robot as Partner: Vehicle Tele-operation with Collaborative Control T. Fong, et al. Adaptive Multi-Robot, Multi-Operator Work Systems A.C. Morris, et al. User Interaction with Multi-Robot Systems D. Kortenkamp, et al. Human-Robot Interactions in Robot-Assisted Urban Search and Rescue R. Murphy, J. Casper. Usability Issues for Designing Multi-Robot Missions R.C. Arkin. Perception-Based Navigation for Mobile Robots K. Kawamura, et al. Author Index.
Ana Luiza dâĂvila Viana, Luiza Sterman Heimann, Luciana Dias de Lima, Roberta Gondim de Oliveira · 5 authors
This article discusses the trends and limits of the Brazilian health system decentralization process, identifying the three elements that constitute the strategic induction performed by the national system administrator in accordance with the guidelines contained in the Operational Norms of the Unified National Health System: systemic rationality, intergovernmental and service provider financing, and health care model. The effects of the Federal regulations are analyzed based on the results of the evaluation study focused on the implementation of the full management scheme at the Municipal level. The decentralization strategy induced by Basic Operational Norm 96 has succeeded in improving institutional conditions, management autonomy, and supply, as measured by the Federal resources transferred, installed capacity, production, and coverage of outpatient and hospital services, with the Municipalities authorized to conduct fully autonomous management, without altering the existing patterns of inequity in the distribution of funds to poorer Municipalities.