Blockchain Papers

Ivan Damgård, Jens Groth, Gorm Salomonsen

No abstract is available for this record.

Ueli Maurer

No abstract is available for this record.

Mario Di Raimondo, Rosario Gennaro

No abstract is available for this record.

Randal C. Picker

No abstract is available for this record.

Malcolm Segall

District health systems, comprising primary health care and first referral hospitals, are key to the delivery of basic health services in developing countries. They should be prioritized in resource allocation and in the building of management and service capacity. The relegation in the World Health Report 2000 of primary health care to a 'second generation' reform--to be superseded by third generation reforms with a market orientation--flows from an analysis that is historically flawed and ideologically biased. Primary health care has struggled against economic crisis and adjustment and a neoliberal ideology often averse to its principles. To ascribe failures of primary health care to a weakness in policy design, when the political economy has starved it of resources, is to blame the victim. Improvement in the working and living conditions of health workers is a precondition for the effective delivery of public health services. A multidimensional programme of health worker rehabilitation should be developed as the foundation for health service recovery. District health systems can and should be financed (at least mainly) from public funds. Although in certain situations user fees have improved the quality and increased the utilization of primary care services, direct charges deter health care use by the poor and can result in further impoverishment. Direct user fees should be replaced progressively by increased public finance and, where possible, by prepayment schemes based on principles of social health insurance with public subsidization. Priority setting should be driven mainly by the objective to achieve equity in health and wellbeing outcomes. Cost effectiveness should enter into the selection of treatments for people (productive efficiency), but not into the selection of people for treatment (allocative efficiency). Decentralization is likely to be advantageous in most health systems, although the exact form(s) should be selected with care and implementation should be phased in after adequate preparation. The public health service should usually play the lead provider role in district health systems, but non-government providers can be contracted if needed. There is little or no evidence to support proactive privatization, marketization or provider competition. Democratization of political and popular involvement in health enhances the benefits of decentralization and community participation. Integrated district health systems are the means by which specific health programmes can best be delivered in the context of overall health care needs. International assistance should address communicable disease control priorities in ways that strengthen local health systems and do not undermine them. The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria should not repeat the mistakes of the mass campaigns of past decades. In particular, it should not set programme targets that are driven by an international agenda and which are achievable only at the cost of an adverse impact on sustainable health systems. Above all the targets must not retard the development of the district health systems so badly needed by the rural poor.

Feng Deng

No abstract is available for this record.

Innocent Semali

The current need and enthusiasm for health reforms open an important arena for deeper analysis of the policy process with a view to understanding the political determinants of reforms and strengthening implementation. The studies described in this thesis analyse positions of different actors in the reform process, their actions in support or opposition of the process, and their impact on the health sector reform process. Globally and especially in developing countries health sector reforms have been implemented over long periods. Although there have been improvements in health, the remaining burden of disease in many countries is still very high. Reasons for the high burden of disease have been classified into lack of resources and poor organizational and managerial capacity. Good stewardship was needed to facilitate improvement in the performance of health systems. Stakeholders’ alignment and support was one of the most important components of good stewardship. However, stakeholder analysis had not been a common undertaking in developing countries despite the reforms that were being implemented in most of them. It was the aim of this study to answer the question: What has been the role and importance of stakeholders in supporting or opposing the health sector reform process? The study was conducted in Tanzania as one of the poorest countries in Africa, using the decentralization of the Expanded Programme on Immunization (EPI) as a case reference. The study units were the Ministry of Health Headquarters, Medical Stores Department, Expanded Programme on Immunization, national archives, regions and districts. At district level the study units were District Council, Council Health Management Team, EPI managers at regional and district levels, ward and village authorities, health facility, facility providers and households. Qualitative and quantitative methods were used to collect data from January 2000 to June 2002. Relevant data collection instruments were prepared and pre-tested. The qualitative data collection methods included document review,
\nin-depth interviews, key informants interviews and observations. Quantitative
\nmethods involved retrieval of secondary data, health facility survey and
\nhousehold surveys. Regular discussions with key informants and data
\ncollectors were held to verify the findings. Qualitative data was analysed
\nmanually. Quantitative data was captured and analysed using Epi Info version
\n6.1 and STATA version 6.0. The study involved answering five main questions. The first question was: Do
\nreforms learn from history? Analysis of the waves of health reforms prior to
\nthe current reforms from 1926 was done to answer the question. The main
\nstakeholders in the reforms were the political party in power, the government
\nand donors who supported the reforms each time. Each wave of health sector
\nreforms provided information on health provision, financing and resource
\ngeneration. Due to the political contexts, information on failures of health
\nfinancing did not provide lessons for succeeding reforms of the health sector.
\nStakeholders’ political interests opposed lessons that did not match the
\npolitical ideology at the time i.e. free public services versus privatization and
\npaying for social services. Lessons from previous health reforms were
\nselective, and did not consider health-financing needs among others. The
\nongoing health reforms needed to use information from all functional aspects
\nof the health system to provide lessons for improving the health system. The second question was: Who were the stakeholders in the current health
\nreforms and what were their interests and reactions? The main stakeholders
\nwere donors, and the government. The two had a very high support for the
\nreforms evidenced by their participation in problem identification, justification,
\nreform design, planning and implementation. The health sector reforms thus
\nhad high political support at central level. In the implementation process,
\nissues that triggered stakeholders’ reaction included sectoral versus local
\ngovernment decentralization. Another issue was the donor modality in
\nfinancing the health sector and need for adopting new financial management
\nsystems. Among the donors there was hesitancy to join the common financing
\nmodalities that included a Sector Wide Approach (SWAp) and Basket
\n Funding. As a result, there was delay in the process in order to reach better
\nconsensus.
\nThe third question was: What was the impact of stakeholders in the process of
\nreforming a vertical programme like EPI? Health Sector Reforms in EPI
\nincluded integration of generic functions, for example, vaccine procurement to
\nmedical stores department. Qualitative and quantitative data was collected
\nand analysed from the Ministry of Health, EPI management unit. This again
\nrevealed that EPI reforms were well supported by the government and donors
\ncentrally. EPI managers at both district and regional levels opposed some of
\nthe EPI reforms. They argued that coverage was falling due to the reforms.
\nHowever, there was no concrete evidence relating reforms in the EPI
\nprogramme and falling coverage. The primary aim of certain actors was to
\nmake sure that they continued receiving extra income from EPI functions. One
\nof the effects of stakeholders’ reaction was reversal of reforms (recentralization)
\nand return to the status quo. The fourth question was: What was the immediate reaction of stakeholders to
\ndecentralization at district level and how might it have affected performance of
\nEPI functions and the challenges? The immediate reaction of stakeholders
\nwas reduced cooperation between the Council Health Management Team
\n(CHMT) and the District Council who were politically supreme in the district.
\nWithin the Council Health Management Team there was inadequate
\ncommunication, which led to poor teamwork. The result of this was reduced
\nsupervisory visits to peripheral health facilities. The EPI coverage in the study
\ndistrict was 52.8 per cent, which was well below the previous national average
\n(80 per cent). A logistic regression model for EPI service quality variables on
\nchildren between 12 months and 23 months who had completed vaccination
\nwas applied. Certain EPI quality of service variables predicted significant
\nchanges in the odds ratio for completing vaccination. It was then suggested
\nthat strategies were needed to improve management skills among the CHMT
\nand District Council members. Also there was a need of hastening the
\nprocess of increasing remuneration and motivation of peripheral health
\nworkers. The fifth and final question was: What was the interest of the stakeholders
\nand prospects of increasing EPI coverage at district level? Decentralization
\nand integration of EPI functions were among the reforms at district level. The
\nanalysis revealed that active stakeholders at district level were the Ministry of
\nHealth, CHMT, EPI managers at district and regional levels and facility
\nproviders. The Ministry of Health opposed integration of EPI at district level by
\nissuing the directive that DCCOs and MCHCOs (EPI manager at district level)
\nshould resume their tasks. However, the CHMT had no option but to comply.
\nThis action reversed some of the health reforms at district level. Analysis of
\nthe importance the community attached to EPI, using willingness to pay for
\nEPI cold chain kerosene, was done. The support was low (48.7 per cent). EPI
\nservice quality variables were significantly negatively associated with odds
\nratio for willingness to pay for EPI input. Simulation with Policy Maker
\ncomputer software predicted that an increased number of stakeholders
\nthrough community participation would significantly improve the current low
\nlevel of EPI coverage. It was then proposed to do a similar analysis in other
\nvertical programmes and implement on a trial basis the results of the
\nsimulation.
\nIn conclusion, stakeholders were found to be active and influential in the
\nhealth sectors of developing countries like Tanzania but poorly considered in
\nimplementation of reforms. Stakeholders are important since some strongly
\nsupport while others oppose the reforms. The reaction of stakeholders is
\nevident through deployment or non-deployment of information depending on
\ninterest and context. This would result in poor management leading to
\ninefficiency in resource use, which would then be followed by poor quality of
\nservices, poor support by communities and consequently poor utilization of
\nhealth services. It is suggested that stakeholder analysis be conducted in
\nother vertical programmes in the process of integration. Promotion of
\nstakeholder analysis and also Policy Maker as a tool to manage stakeholders
\nwill facilitate the management of reforms in the health sector.

Vinit Mukhija

Contents: Introduction - A New Strategy in Mumbai: The puzzles of slum redevelopment Placing the research in the context of the literature A preview of the arguments Study methodology The structure of the book. The Evolution of the Slum Redevelopment Strategy: Introduction The Mumbai context The evolution of Mumbai's redevelopment strategy Regulating the development potential of land. Decentralized Conflict: Introduction Literature review Dharavi redevelopment plan: contested intentions PMGP and SPARC: the battle over Markandeya Conflicts between SPARC and the private contractor Uncivil society: distrust between SPARC and the community SPARC's new role as a developer Reexamining NGOs in housing delivery Decentralization and centralization in housing delivery. Demolition and Redevelopment: Introduction Literature review: tenure legalization The physical structure of properties in Dharavi Slum upgrading and slum redevelopment Change in property rights and property attributes High land values and medium-rise living Slum redevelopment and tenure legalization Demand-driven or supply-driven development. Financing Slum Redevelopment: Introduction Literature review: markets and partnerships State finance for redevelopment Private capital from the non-profit and the for-profit sectors Institutional responses to the scarcity of finance Private and public roles. Enabling Slum Redevelopment in Mumbai: The Mumbai experience An analytical framework for upgrading The paradox of enabling Future research Squatters as developers Appendices: Appendix 1 - list of interviewees Appendix 2 - property values in Mumbai Appendix 3 - Scion Shivaji Nagar CHS Appendix 4 - Markandeya CHS: annexure II, SRD application Appendix 5 - Cost estimate of the Rajiv Indira CHS Notes Bibliography Index

Torsten Eymann, Stefan Sackmann, Günter Müller, Ingo Pippow

The mobile and increasingly ubiquitous use of information technology leads to more dynamic, constantly self-reconfiguring networks. Their services are available anytime and anywhere; as software agents, they can make local, context-aware decisions. F. A. von Hayek developed a theory for economic coordination based on individual decision making. This paper presents the explanation concepts of economic self-organization as at least one option for the design of decentralized coordination of information systems consisting of autonomous software agents with limited information processing capacity and incomplete information. Experiments using a multi-agent system show that a targeted change of this basic rule set directly influences the behavior of the individual elements and indirectly the behavior of the overall system.

Daniele Micciancio, Erez Petrank

No abstract is available for this record.

Yili Gong, Fangpeng Dong, Wei Li, Zhiwei Xu

Grids enable users to share and access large collections and various types of resources in wide areas, and how to locate resources in such dynamic, heterogeneous and autonomous distributed environments is a key and challenging issue. In this paper, a three-level decentralized and dynamic VEGA Infrastructure for Resource Discovery (VIRD) is proposed. In this architecture, every Border Grid Resource Name Server (BGRNS) or Grid Resource Name Server (GRNS)has its own local policies, governing information organization, management and searching. Changes in resource information are propagated dynamically among GRNS servers according to a link-statelike algorithm. A client can query its designated GRNS either recursively or iteratively. Optimizing techniques, such as shortcut, are adopted to make the dynamic framework more flexible and efficient. A simulator called SimVIRD is developed to verify the proposed architecture and algorithms.Experiment results indicate that this architecture could deliver good scalability and performance for grid resource discovery.

Hirotada Kobayashi

No abstract is available for this record.

Lejf Moos

With inspiration from the educational paradox: how can actors, as external influences, enable human beings to act independently of external leadership? This article will discuss an organizational paradox: how can staff be lead in ways that enable them to become autonomous followers? The educational paradox was originally phrased in the beginning of the Enlightenment epoch and it therefore links education with democracy: ‘Bildung’ was seen as a way to facilitate people in being emancipated, action competent citizens of democratic societies. The organizational paradox is also phrased as a vision of a democratic education in a democratic setting. The article discusses this leadership vision in the light of contemporary trends in society, politics, governance and culture: globalization, decentralization, contingency, neo-liberalism and neo-conservatism, new public management and the efforts to promote and stress the managerial aspects of school leadership.

Yaling Zhang

Based on the zero-knowledge proof protocol a new forward-secure digital signature scheme is proposed. The scheme is proven to be forward secure based on the hardness of factoring,discrete logarithm and quadric remain problems in the random oracle model.

Zhou Si

The advent of the Web, electronic commerce and the creation of electronic distribution channels for content have brought new challenges regarding the protection of intellectual property. Digital watermarking is a new information security technique. Using zero knowledge proofs in the cryptography we propose a watermark detection based on zero knowledge, of solving that the existence of a watermark without revealing what the watermark is , of providing the security when we apply watermarking.

Yvo Desmedt, Yongge Wang

No abstract is available for this record.

Vijayalakshmi Atluri, Soon Ae Chun

No abstract is available for this record.

Roy Bahl, Paul Smoke

Part 1 Overview of fiscal decentralization in South Africa, Roy Bahl and Paul Smoke: introduction - the approach, the context of reform in South Africa South African fiscal decentralization South African fiscal decentralization in comparative perspective the framework for analysis - critical choices that reflect system objectives, the rest of the volume. Part 2 Municipal powers and functions - the assignment question, Larry Schroeder: introduction theory related to the assignment question legal and historical context - the transition period, the legal and statutory basis for assignment of powers and functions alternative divisions of powers and functions - objectives and principles, assumptions, alternative arrangements, alter 1 primary powers and functions assigned to B municipalities, alternative 2 redefining metros to include B1 municipalities, alternative 3 asymmetric divisions by service and type of municipality, alternative 4 districts retain service authority, summary evaluation conclusions. Part 3 Overview of the local government revenue system, Roy Bahl et al: introduction norms for a local tax evaluating the local revenue system - utility/user charges, property rates, regional service council (RSC) levy other local government revenue options - utility excise tax, motor vehicle taxes summary. Part 4 Property taxation, Peter Vaz: introduction correspondence with theory reform options - extension of the property tax into areas previously untaxed, uniformity of the tax base versus local choice, frequency of property valuations, property tax relief the local government property rates bill - extension of the property tax into areas previously untaxed, unifomity of the tax base versus local choice, frequency of property valuations, property tax relief case studies of selected municipalities - Greater Tzaneen municipality, Matjhabeng municipality, Mbombela municipality, Moses Kotane municipality, Phokwane municipality, Ulundi municipality, implications of the case studies implementation strategy - communication strategy, phase-in of tax liablity changes, administrative changes conclusions. Part 4 The regional service council levy, Roy Bahl and David Solomon: introduction is the RSC levy a good local tax? administration of the RSC levy - identification, record keeping, assessment, collection, audit and penalty evaluation of the RSC levy - revenue performance, revenue importance, vertical equity, horizontal equity, neutrality, administration costs, fiscal disparities, benefits and burdens, political feasability, legal implications options for reform - option 1 leave it as it is, option 2 convert the RSC levy to a true local government tax, option 3 turn the administration of the RSC levy over to SARS, option 4 abolish the RSC levy and adopt a payroll tax, general issues - should SARS absorb RSC levy administrations?. (Part contents).

Philipp Obreiter, Birgitta König‐Ries, Michael Klein

In the context of mobile and wireless devices, an information system is no longer a centralized component storing all the relevant data nor is it a decentralized component governed by a common authority. Rather, the information spread across huge numbers of autonomous mobile and wireless devices owned by independent organizations and individuals can be regarded as a highly dynamic, virtual information system. For this vision to become reality, the autonomous devices involved need to be motivated to cooperate. This cooperation needs to occur not only on the application layer, but, depending on the network architecture, also on the lower layers from the link layer on upwards. In this report, we investigate on which protocol layers cooperation is needed and what constitutes uncooperative behavior. We then identify necessary properties of incentive schemes that encourage cooperation and discourage uncooperative behavior. In this context, we examine remuneration types that are a major constituent of incentive schemes. Finally, using the example of ad hoc networks, the most challenging technical basis of a wireless information system, we compare existing incentive schemes to these characteristics.

Jorge Martínez-Vázquez, James Alm

Section I - Intergovernmental fiscal relations: fiscal decentralization - the provincial-local dimension, Roy Bahl, Sally Wallace challenges of fiscal decentralization in developing and transitional economies - an Asian perspective, M. Govinda Rao liberalization and the spatial allocation of population in developing and transition countries, David E. Wildasin on the measurement and impact of fiscal decentralization, Robert D. Ebel, Serdar Yilmaz comments of section I, Deborah Wetzel. Section II - Tax evasion, tax administration and the role of government: the cost of government and the misuse of public assets, Vito Tanzi, Tej Prakash institutions, paradigms and tax evasion in developing and transition countries, James Alm, Jorge Martinez-Vazquez the circular flow of debts and barter in a transition economy - the case of Ukraine, Wayne Thirsk. Section III - Fiscal policy: growth and taxes - some implications for developing economies, Jack M. Mintz is fiscal stability compatible with decentralization? the case of Latin America, William Dillinger, Guillermo Perry, Steven B. Webb how should tobacco be taxed in EU-accession countries, Sijbren Cnossen taxation of electronic commerce in developing countries, Charles E. McLure, Jr comments to section III, Peggy Musgrave, Francois Vaillancourt. Section IV - a summing up: taking the low road, Richard Bird.

Daniele Micciancio, Salil Vadhan

No abstract is available for this record.

Yuko Akune, Makoto Nobukuni, Suminori Tokunaga

This paper assesses the impact on local government budget of the rearrangement of central-local fiscal relationship under proposal in Japan, or the so-called Trinity Reform, where it is proposed that some of the tax base be handed from the central to the local governments, in conjunction with drastic cut in both transfer of the tax revenue and a collection of subsidies. The tool used for this objective is the Nagoya City University Econometric Model (NCUEi 2003) whose core system has been duly modified to simulate proposals, and also to investigate the performance of the local economy under the strain of declining and aging population. The object case taken up in this paper is Nagoya City.The model is characterized by the market adjustment of the regional total demandsupply balance, where the age distribution of the population is incorporated so as to assess the impact of the demographic change both on the total demand and productive capacity. The forecast and simulations show that while the abovementioned Reform generates persistent unfavorable impact to the local government, the dominant negative impact comes from the demographic change, in terms of the primary balance of Nagoya City. Unless proper measures are to be taken, the simulations indicate, the local government's fiscal soundness will hardly be maintained under the two major pressures, one from the fiscal decentralization as represented in the subsidy cut-cum-tax base transfer and the other from the demographic change. The simulation of the abovementioned reform reveals that it definitely worsens the primary balance of the locality, and implies that practically an additional transfer of consumption tax must accompany this reform, even for one of the most favorable localities like Nagoya where its major industrial sectors, or the automobile-industry-led industries in this case, are steadily growing. The implication will be obvious for localities where economy is less favorable.

Christine Wong, Deepak Bhattasali

In China, the highly decentralized fiscal system undermines improvements in policy outcomes and contributes to increasing disparities among its regions. However, rather than re-centralizing, China would benefit from pursuing reforms to: improve expenditure and revenue assignments for the various levels of government; distribute fiscal resources more equally; and improve the use of these resources through better budget management at all levels of government. This report recommends a comprehensive reform effort that covers all the components of the inter-governmental fiscal system, arguing that selective interventions to address specific local financial problems such as defaults on pension and unemployment stipends, and payment arrears on teachers ' salaries, have created some pervasive incentives. A piecemeal approach to inter-governmental fiscal reform is unlikely to succeed because it will not take into account the interdependence of transfers on revenue assignments or the role played by expenditure assignments on the adequacy of revenue assignments and transfers.

Hongbin Yang, Ji Won Jung, Dong-Ho Won

This paper proposes the optimal 4-move ZKIP (Zero-Knowledge Interactive Proof systems) of knowledge for SAT and its application. Using the trapdoor bit commitment scheme and the WI(Witness Indistingushable) and the WH(Witness Hiding), it is shown that as compared with 6-move ZKIP for SAT, the proposed ZKIP is 4-move ZKIP for SAT and under claw-free pairs of functions the proposed ZKIP is also 4-move ZKIP. The proposed scheme is more efficient at the points of computational complexity and communication complexity.