Apr 26, 2013·Digital Access to Libraries (Université catholique de Louvain (UCL), l'Université de Namur (UNamur) and the Université Saint-Louis (USL-B))
Specific supply-chain investments are vital in achieving faster lead-time performance and more competitive costs. In practice, such as in the highly leveraged telecom sector, the coordinating original equipment manufacturers (OEM) often delegate the upstream coordination of suppliers to contract manufacturers. This can be justified by informational advantages or economies of scale. However, the rationale of such schemes has also been challenged by analytical work on three-stage chains, leading to open questions. In this paper, we study the organizational and contractual choice of a supply chain coordinator (say an OEM) to either control or delegate the investment decision of some shared resource (say dedicated machines, information or product standards, etc) to a contract manufacturer (CM) or to an upstream supplier in a three-stage supply chain. The analysis derives closed-form results for the economic performance of three scenarios under asymmetric information on investment cost: direct contracting with an integrated CM-supplier, decentralized contracting to tier-1 suppliers and centralized contracting to tier-1 and tier-2 suppliers. The results show that the observed practice to delegate investments to tier-1 and possibly tier-2 suppliers leads to relatively poor performance due to under-investments. The superior arrangement is the centralized conditional model, where the OEM forces coordination among upstream suppliers by offering conditional financing. We close the paper with an analogy to the Boeing 787 supply chain and some discussion about the assumptions and applicability of the model.
Arianna De Nicola, Simone Gitto, Paolo Mancuso, Vivian Valdmanis
Over the past twenty years, important changes in the Italian health system have led to different approaches in organizing, delivering and financing health services throughout the country's regions. In this paper, we assess the impacts that such changes have had on health efficiency. The analysis performed here is in two stages. In the first stage, healthcare efficiency is measured via bootstrapped Data Envelopment Analysis. In the second stage, the impacts of organizational and environmental variables on efficiency are investigated. Our results highlight that the organizational model adopted by the Lombardia region allows for the best results in healthcare efficiency in Italy. A process of administrative decentralization from the regional governments to local health units appears to be a source of inefficiency. Finally, patient mobility has a significant impact on healthcare efficiency.
Efficiency Analysis Using DEA
Health Systems, Economic Evaluations, Quality of Life
Iracema Machado de Aragão Gomes, Íkaro Daniel de Carvalho Barreto, Suzana Leitão Russo
Policies that support entrepreneurship are keys to the generation of new business. In Brazil, seed capital, installation of technology parks, programs and zero interest financing, economic subsidy as Program First Innovative Company (PRIME) are examples of incentive policies. For the implementation of PRIME, in particular the Brazilian Innovation Agency (FINEP) decentralized operationalization so that business incubators could select innovative projects. This paper analyzes the program PRIME Business Incubator Center of the State of Sergipe (CISE) after calculating the mean and standard deviation of the grades obtained by companies in the factors of innovation, market potential, financial return economic, market strategy and staff and application of the Mann-Whitney test.
This thesis proposes several protocols for achieving secure com- putation under concurrent and physical attacks. Secure computation allows many parties to compute a joint function of their inputs, while keeping the privacy of their input preserved. It is required that the pri- vacy one party's input is preserved even if other parties participating in the protocol collude or deviate from the protocol. In this thesis we focus on concurrent and physical attacks, where adversarial parties try to break the privacy of honest parties by ex- ploiting the network connection or physical weaknesses of the honest parties' machine. In the rst part of the thesis we discuss how to construct proto- cols that are Universally Composable (UC for short) based on physical setup assumptions. We explore the use of Physically Uncloneable Func- tions (PUFs) as setup assumption for achieving UC-secure computa- tions. PUF are physical noisy source of randomness. The use of PUFs in the UC-framework has been proposed already in [14]. However, this work assumes that all PUFs in the system are trusted. This means that, each party has to trust the PUFs generated by the other parties. In this thesis we focus on reducing the trust involved in the use of such PUFs and we introduce the Malicious PUFs model in which only PUFs generated by honest parties are assumed to be trusted. Thus the secu- rity of each party relies on its own PUF only and holds regardless of the goodness of the PUFs generated/used by the adversary. We are able to show that, under this more realistic assumption, one can achieve UC- secure computation, under computational assumptions. Moreover, we show how to achieve unconditional UC-secure commitments with (ma- licious) PUFs and with stateless tamper-proof hardware tokens. We discuss our contribution on this matter in Part I. These results are contained in papers [80] and [28]. In the second part of the thesis we focus on the concurrent setting, and we investigate on protocols achieving round optimality and black- box access to a cryptographic primitive. We study two fundamental functionalities: commitment scheme and zero knowledge, and we focus on some of the round-optimal constructions and lower bounds con- cerning both functionalities. We nd that such constructions present subtle issues. Hence, we provide new protocols that actually achieve the security guarantee promised by previous results. Concerning physical attacks, we consider adversaries able to re- set the machine of the honest party. In a reset attack a machine is forced to run a protocol several times using the same randomness. In this thesis we provide the rst construction of a witness indistinguish- able argument system that is simultaneous resettable and argument of knowledge. We discuss about this contribution in Part III, which is the content of the paper. [edited by Author]
Open access
Cryptography and Data Security
Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and Hardware Security
On the current stage, an important direction towards completion fiscal regulation is to regionalise economic and social processes, decentralize an important part of state functions on the local authorities. Herewith, to finance the expenditure by attaching appropriate income sources which will strengthen the role of local finances and assist the prosperity of regional economy. At the contemporary stage local budgets country, its separate regions development one of the most powerful leverage. Without them it is impossible political stability as in whole country, as in its separate regions. Local budget funds, social infrastructure forming are one of the major sources. Developed countries local budgets, density spare of social expenditures are higher than the state budgets. Local budget expenditures, especially on social provision spent funds promote in society social conflict softening that in contemporary conditions of each county’s sustainable development stipulating factor.
The famous new money Bitcoin is classified as a technical informational money (TIM). Besides introducing the idea of a TIM, a more extreme notion of informational money will be developed: exclusively informational money (EXIM). The informational coins (INCOs) of an EXIM can be in control of an agent but are not owned by any agent. INCOs of an EXIM cannot be stolen, but they can be lost, or thrown away. The difference between an EXIM and a TIM shows up when considering a user perspective on security matters. Security for an EXIM user is discussed in substantial detail, with the remarkable conclusion that computer security (security models, access control, user names, passwords, firewalls etc.) is not always essential for an EXIM, while the application of cryptography based information security is unavoidable for the use of an EXIM. Bitcoin seems to meet the criteria of an EXIM, but the assertion that "Bitcoin is an EXIM", might also be considered problematic. As a thought experiment we will contemplate Bitguilder, a hypothetical copy of Bitcoin that qualifies as an EXIM. A business ethics assessment of Bitcoin is made which reveals a number of worries. By combining Bitguilder with a so-called technical informational near-money (TINM) a dual money system, having two units with a fluctuating rate, may be obtained. It seems that a dual money can remedy some, but not all, of the ethical worries that arise when contemplating Bitcoin after hypothetically having become a dominant form of money. The contributions that Bitcoin's designers can potentially make to the evolution of EXIMs and TIMs is analyzed in terms of the update of the portfolio of money related natural kinds that comes with Bitcoin.
The famous new money Bitcoin is classified as a technical informational money (TIM). Besides introducing the idea of a TIM, a more extreme notion of informational money will be developed: exclusively informational money (EXIM). The informational coins (INCOs) of an EXIM can be in control of an agent but are not owned by any agent. INCOs of an EXIM cannot be stolen, but they can be lost, or thrown away. The difference between an EXIM and a TIM shows up when considering a user perspective on security matters. Security for an EXIM user is discussed in substantial detail, with the remarkable conclusion that computer security (security models, access control, user names, passwords, firewalls etc.) is not always essential for an EXIM, while the application of cryptography based information security is unavoidable for the use of an EXIM. Bitcoin seems to meet the criteria of an EXIM, but the assertion that "Bitcoin is an EXIM", might also be considered problematic. As a thought experiment we will contemplate Bitguilder, a hypothetical copy of Bitcoin that qualifies as an EXIM. A business ethics assessment of Bitcoin is made which reveals a number of worries. By combining Bitguilder with a so-called technical informational near-money (TINM) a dual money system, having two units with a fluctuating rate, may be obtained. It seems that a dual money can remedy some, but not all, of the ethical worries that arise when contemplating Bitcoin after hypothetically having become a dominant form of money. The contributions that Bitcoin's designers can potentially make to the evolution of EXIMs and TIMs is analyzed in terms of the update of the portfolio of money related natural kinds that comes with Bitcoin.
This Comment examines the potentially destabilizing effects of emerging digital currencies on the international foreign currency exchange market. Specifically, it examines "Bitcoin," a decentralized, partially anonymous, and largely unregulated digital currency that has become particularly popular in the last few years. This Comment argues that the International Monetary Fund, the institution responsible for coordinating the stability of foreign exchange rates, is ill-equipped to handle the widespread use of digital currencies in the foreign currency exchange market It highlights the inability of the Fund to intervene in the event of a speculative attack on a currency by Bitcoin users. This Comment concludes by suggesting two interpretations of the Fund's incorporating document, the Articles of Agreement, that would allow it to intervene in the event of such an attack.
After over thirty years of decentralization in Spain and having to face the acute economic crisis, it may be time to raise new proposals that could increase the economic efficiency by means of increasing the responsible performance of regional demand and supply of public goods and services. This is the context of this article, which is a critical analysis of expenditure and revenue responsibilities in Spain from a comparative law perspective. Regarding the expenditure responsibility, this article highlights the imprecision of the Spanish system and its underdeveloped legal theory and judicial cases on the subject compared to federal states. After a comparative analysis on the revenue responsibility, this article highlights some of the major drawbacksof Spanish system of regional financing, and finally it makes severalproposals addressed to improve the fiscal responsibility of the autonomous communities.
Susanne Höhle-Pasques, Johannes Hankowitz, Peter Oberender
Against the background of increasing cost pressure in the German Health Care system German health policy introduced several law changes to increase competition within German health care system for both, payers and health care providers. At the same time law changes included centralization of decisions—counteracting a real competition. Both approaches are part of an austerity plan. The latest example for this approach is the new drug law (AMNOG) in 2011 with the core element of centralized early benefit assessment (§ 35a SGB V) for new drugs and therapies and price negotiations between federal association of health insurances and pharmaceutical company. In this review we examine the implementation of the new drug law with respect to the achievement of political objectives: Ensure sustainable financing of innovations in the German health care system, provide innovations early to the patient, decrease overregulation and establish a transparent environment in which efforts of the pharmaceutical industry are being honored by fair prices. We reviewed the new AMNOG process since its implementation on 1st January 2011 and first 64 values dossiers from pharmaceutical companies that have been evaluated by G-BA (Federal Joint Committee) between January 2011 and December 2013 with respect to the above mentioned political objectives. Parameters such as added value, determination of an adequate competitor, patient relevant endpoint surrogate parameter and subgroup analysis are being discussed. AMNOG process has been implemented as a learning system and indeed several issues have already been addressed, such as the determination of the adequate comparator by G-BA as well as the treatment of orphan drugs in this process. Basically implementation of AMNOG and early benefit assessment is a necessary step on the way to transparent priorisation of health care benefits. But the AMNOG process is one step further towards centralization of the German health care system and therefore contradicts a healthy and fair competition within the system. As a consequence the development of high quality solutions for patients might be hampered. The analysis of the first 64 value dossiers shows that less of half of the affected patient populations (40 %) have access to new therapies being reimbursed by health insurances with a premium price. There is a major inbalance in assessment of drugs in different therapeutic areas. In combination with increased uncertainty for the pharmaceutical companies the AMNOG process on the middle and long-term might jeopardize the commitment of pharmaceutical industry in the German market. This in turn endagers the political objective to ensure patients early access to innovative therapies. Besides this, centralization of the subjective parameter “added value” seems to be problematic, since value decisions should be taken by democratic processes. We therefore suggest a model in which only objectively measurable value decisions are being taken centrally and subjective value decisions are as much as possible decentralized. This results in both a stronger competition of qualitatively best solutions for patients and in a higher fault tolerance. Instruments such as health care research and conditional reimbursement can help to enhance a fair competition for more quality in regionally organized health care and more economical allocation of short resources.
Open access
Pharmaceutical studies and practices
Health and Medical Studies
Health Systems, Economic Evaluations, Quality of Life
Blind signature-based electronic voting is the simplest paradigm for implementing remote voting platforms due to the fact that it does not employ complicated zero-knowledge proofs. Unfortunately, the existence of a trusted entity (the "Authentication Server") that, in case of corruption, would be able to cast indistinguishable fake votes reduces the acceptance of the paradigm in non fully trusted environments. Trust on the system can be increased by splitting this entity into of a set of parties that are unlikely to collaborate in a dishonest manner. Nevertheless, this technique increases the risk of failure of some of them causing a service interruption during the voting period. Better fault tolerance is provided by proposals which permit to anticipate the interaction with the distributed authentication server before the voting period begins, so that, in case of failure, there is a broad time margin for system restoration. Previous proposals following this approach have been proven to be cryptographically weak or just provide individual verifiability. In this paper, a system that employs blind certificates is presented. Unlike previous proposals, it provides universal verifiability and permits to detect double voting without putting voters' privacy at risk.
Abstract The election of Head of region as the democracy mechanism to the head of region that the application is based on the Law Number 23 2004 about Regional Government is still found some problems, such as the application of the head of region election gives the burden the government finance plan so that it’s not really efficient and effective, and also the head of region election results the unharmonious head and the vice head of the region (about 93.84% all over Indonesia). So that for the consequence as the lawful country, Indonesia has to revise that problem that needs to administer the law to become the ideal law in regulating the head of region election. The ideal law regulation will become the basic to the application of the head of region election with the better result as the effort to accomplish the purpose of autonomy region in boosting the society welfare of the autonomy region’s people as the implementation of people’s sovereignty through the process of political decentralization to the autonomy region. Keywords: Ideal Law, People’s welfare, People’s Sovereignty. Abstrak Pemilukada sebagai suatu mekanisme demokrasi untuk pengisian jabatan kepala daerah yang penyelenggaraannya didasari Undang-Undang Nomor 32 Tahun 2004 tentang Pemerintahan Daerah dalam penerapannya masih dijumpai berbagai persoalan, diantaranya; pelaksanaan pemilukada cukup membebani anggaran pemerintah sehingga dirasa tidak efisen dan efektif, juga pemilukada justru menghasilkan pasangan kepala daerah yang tidak harmonis (93,84 % se Indonesia). Oleh karena itu sebagai konsekuensi Indonesia negara hukum, maka untuk memperbaiki berbagai persoalan tersebut, perlu dilakukan penataan hukum menuju hukum ideal dalam pengaturan pemilukada. Pengaturan hukum ideal akan menjadi dasar untuk penyelenggaraan pemilukada dengan hasil yang lebih baik sebagai upaya untuk mewujudkan tujuan otonomi daerah dalam meningkatkan kesejahteraan masyarakat daerah otonom sekaligus perwujudan kedaulatan rakyat melalui proses desentralisasi politik kepada daerah otonom. Kata kunci: Hukum ideal, Kesejahteraan rakyat, kedaulatan rakyat.
Nico Krisch’s new book, Beyond Constitutionalism: The Pluralist Structure of Post-National Law (BC), is a major contribution to the field of legal pluralism as applied to international legal regimes.1 In clear and accessible prose, BC develops a nuanced account of the structural features of global law from a wide range of carefully considered normative positions and empirical claims, and provides detailed case studies of pluralism in action. For readers of I·CON, I would regard it as essential reading. Given space limitations, my focus will be on the main disagreements I have with BC. Krisch stakes out complex positions, often through an “on the one hand [x], but on the other [y]” style of analysis that anticipates objections. My criticisms do not always capture the subtleties of the arguments and, for the sake of debate, are sometimes more sharply drawn than warranted. I will make three points. First, Krisch’s conclusions are heavily dependent upon a theoretical construction—a supposed dichotomy between “constitutional” and “pluralist”—that is, in fact, a false one. Second, “constitutional pluralism” is a structural feature of the national legal orders to which BC pays the most attention (European), belying the dichotomy. Third, the case studies in BC provide empirical support for an alternative view: at least in some domains, a rights-based constitutional order is being constructed on pluralist foundations. Driving much of the analysis of BC is a supposed distinction between two types—the constitutional and the pluralist—which Krisch characterizes as “competing models” (p. 226) and “true alternative[s]” (p. 71). BC sustains discussion of only one mode of constitutionalism, embodied in what he labels the “foundational” and “comprehensive” constitution. In its liberal-democratic guise, the constitution constitutes state and polity, and provides the normative underpinnings for constructing and challenging the polity’s legitimacy over time. The foundational constitution is assumed to be complete: it establishes a single “overarching legal framework” (p. 23) and “comprehensively determin[es] the structure, processes, and values” of the system (p. 53). In contrast to pluralism, constitutionalism entails “clear cut hierarchies” (p. 103), stable Grundnormen, settled “rules of recognition” (pp. 11, 72, 74), and “ultimate conflict norms” and “rules” (pp. 293, 296) whose purpose is to enable a designated authority to resolve conflicts among norms and institutions effectively. Pluralism is explicitly conceptualized in opposition to constitutionalism. Whereas constitutionalism is related to “depoliticization,” and the desire “to tame politics” through legal rules (p. 69), pluralism is about “politics” and “political deliberation” but not the “rule of law” or “rule-based processes,” (pp. 23, 69, 277). What is crucial is how Krisch applies these distinctions to the relationship between treaty-based systems and national legal orders, the central topic of the book. Krisch sums up his position as follows: Constitutionalism and pluralism are distinguished . . . by the different extent to which [each] formally link[s] the various spheres of law and politics. While pluralism regards them as separate in their foundations, global constitutionalism, properly understood, is a monist conception that integrates those spheres into one. As a result, rules about the relationship of national, regional, and global norms are immediately applicable in all spheres, and neither political nor judicial actors can justify non-compliance on legal grounds (p. 242; emphasis added).2 Thus, global constitutionalism can only find its expression in a strong form of hegemonic monism.3 The resulting model is indistinguishable from federalism. “A constitutionalist setting needs to define hierarchies between the polities,” Krisch claims, in order “to integrate them into a common whole,” a task that must include the promulgation of clear rules delineating the respective competences of all levels of governance, as well as fixing the “rules for the amendment of the overall constitution” (p. 275). I reject Krisch’s constitutionalism–pluralism dichotomy on both theoretical and empirical grounds. To get to the notion of “constitutional pluralism” one must specify what is simultaneously constitutional and pluralistic about the structure of a legal system.4 When considering the interface between international regimes and national legal orders, scholars typically identify, as the basic scaffolding of a constitution, jus cogens norms, other substantive fundamental rights, standards of procedural due process, and access to justice.5 These norms find expression in multi-lateral and regional treaties, are firmly supported by opinio juris, and overlap fundamental rights inscribed in the vast majority of national constitutions.6 What makes the system “constitutional” is an overarching normative structure:7 the code of rights that judges and other officials are under a legal duty to enforce; and a set of shared techniques that national and international judges have developed to adjudicate rights, in dialogues with one another. At the same time, the distribution of authority within this presupposed constitution is pluralistic: the system is comprised of discrete hierarchies, national and treaty-based, each of which has an autonomous claim to legitimacy. Sovereignty—the authority to enforce fundamental rights—is “decentralized,”8 not least, in that no “ultimate conflict rule” or “final authority” to resolve conflicts exists. Before turning to empirics, let me clarify the nature of the disagreement. First, to my knowledge, no one in the field would contest the basic elements of Krisch’s concept of pluralism: by definition, under conditions of pluralism, there is no “single decision-maker” applying “overarching conflict rules,” who will have the final word on many important legal questions (p. 296). Understanding legal pluralism, we would presumably agree, requires the analyst to take into account multiple vantage points at once, including the respective internal legal perspectives of actors operating in autonomous legal orders. Second, Krisch argues from a position that makes “constitutional pluralism” an oxymoron, a theoretical impossibility, whereas others in this same field have staked out a rights-based version of constitutionalism that accommodates pluralism.9 For Krisch, normative authority flows exclusively from hierarchy, rather than being grounded (my view) in the intrinsic legitimacy, binding nature, and integrating properties of fundamental rights themselves. Third, I reject Krisch’s law–politics distinction. Rights politics under conditions of pluralism are today heavily structured by law, legal discourse, and other rule-like norms and procedures, and they have steadily built new legal practices that serve to manage pluralism. As the empirics in BC show, rights politics and constitutional pluralism have been co-constitutive of one another. We have not moved “beyond constitutionalism,” rather, the age of global constitutionalism has barely begun. The false dichotomy is fully exposed when we examine the formal “architecture” of rights-based constitutionalism in Europe (ch. 4).10 For Krisch, “constitutionalism” implies a focal point of “ultimate authority” (p. 103), whereas “pluralism” accepts “conflicting claims to ultimate authority” (p. 70). When it comes to rights protection, however, many domestic constitutional orders in Europe are pluralistic. Either we have to accept that these national systems are no longer, or never were, truly constitutional, or the theoretical framework of BC must be rejected. As has been extensively documented,11 not only have conflicting authority claims between national high courts not been resolved, they have generated the kind of inter-jurisdictional, and jurisgenerative, politics that Krisch associates with pluralist orders. To illustrate, Krisch (pp. 14–17) argues that three basic strategies are available to a jurisdiction (X) when it is threatened by the lawmaking and supremacy claims of an external jurisdiction (Y), when Y seeks a change in how X takes decisions and makes law. First, X can pursue “containment,” by working to “limit the impact” of Y, in order to maximize its own autonomy and minimize disruption to standard ways of doing things. Second, X can seek to “transfer” the underlying logics of its ways to Y, thus lowering the costs of adjustment. Third, X can “break” with its established repertoire and, in effect, embrace or leverage pluralism as a means of increasing its own relevance, flexibility, and capacity to constrain Y in the future. Krisch developed the framework to analyze pluralist politics but, in fact, it neatly applies to rights politics within national orders that possess multiple, functionally differentiated high courts (the majority in Europe). Consider bids on the part of constitutional courts to “constitutionalize” adjudication in the ordinary (non-constitutional) courts, through promoting the direct effect of rights. It is important to stress that this process, which is ongoing, is analogous to the Court of Justice of the European Union’s (CJEU) move to “constitutionalize” the EU through its doctrines of supremacy and direct effect. In Western Europe, constitutionalization has gone furthest in Germany and Spain, in the form of delicate accommodations forged by inter-court conflict and dialogue. Nonetheless, the supreme courts continue to marshal significant “containment” operations,12 and their “transfer” efforts often succeed. In Italy, the Italian Court’s bid for supremacy failed: a “war of judges” ended in a settlement that, in effect, codified pluralism. Under the so-called “doctrine of the living law,” the Supreme Court (Cassazione) has de facto the “last word” on statutory interpretation and application, accepting only the “persuasive authority” of the ICC’s jurisprudence.13 In France, the Constitutional Council has no formal means of imposing its rights interpretations on the Supreme Court (Cassation) or Supreme Administrative Court.14 Each of the three high courts is autonomous in its domain, and both supreme courts have positioned themselves to enforce EU rights and the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), even against statute. The outcome comprises a hugely important “break” with traditional separation of powers doctrine (the prohibition of judicial review of statute), while constituting a pluralist order within the French legal system. In Central and Eastern Europe, too, many national supreme courts have refused to accept the binding interpretive authority and supremacy claims of the constitutional courts.15 The Polish courts have negotiated their own version of the Italian “living law” solution; and in the Czech Republic, the Supreme Court provoked a “war of judges” when it “openly revolted” against the Constitutional Court. In his empirical study of this topic, Garlicki (a former judge of the Polish Constitutional Court and the ECHR Court) concludes: “constitutional courts appear as weaker participants . . . and, in case of conflict, they are not always able to deliver that last word.” Indeed, for constitutional judges, a strategy of “dialogue and persuasion” has been more effective than have efforts to prevail in an “open conflict” about ultimate authority.16 The development of European rights has further consolidated rights pluralism within national orders. Today, one finds multiple sources of rights that are judicially enforceable against all conflicting infra-constitutional legal norms, including statute; there are multiple high courts that enforce these rights; and often there is no agreed upon conflict rule or procedure to settle conflicts of norms and authority. In most national legal systems, three such sources of rights—the national constitution, the EU treaties, and the ECHR—overlap. Individuals have a choice of which source to plead, and judges have a choice of which right to enforce. Ordinary judges may seek to limit the impact of the jurisprudence of the European courts; but they may also prefer to apply it, rather than domestic constitutional case law, in order to enhance their own authority and subvert that of constitutional courts. The German labor courts, for example, have partnered with the (CJEU) to raise German standards of rights protection in employment law, regaining the authority they had lost to German Federal Constitutional Court (GFCC), which has been steadily marginalized. Indeed, the German labor courts have invested heavily in the development of EU rights, as a means of cajoling the GFCC to change its (less-progressive) positions.17 Authority conflicts between high courts within domestic systems have long been a primary source of pluralist interactions between the CJEU and national constitutional courts (a fact Krisch largely ignores in chapter 4). To take a recent, dramatic example, in 2010, the Czech Constitutional Court declared a part of the CJEU’s ruling in Landtová to be ultra vires under Czech constitutional law, a first in the EU. The ruling was an attempt to discipline the Supreme Administrative Court, which had sent the Landtová reference to the CJEU in the first place. In response, the Supreme Administrative Court denied that it was bound by the Constitutional Court’s decision, and referred the matter to the CJEU, clearly indicating that it disagreed with the Constitutional Court on both the merits and the authority claim (the case is still pending before the CJEU). This is domestic constitutional pluralism in action, as structured by the legal enmeshment of European and national systems of rights protection. Krisch analyzes such authority conflicts as if they were primarily between a European court and a national constitutional court, thus missing an essential part of the story. With respect to the ECHR, all 47 full members of the Council of Europe have now incorporated the Convention (through constitutional provision, legislative act, or judicial decision) in a form that provides for the judicial review of state acts, including statute, under the ECHR.18 In all but two states (Ireland and the UK), judges must refuse to enforce statutes judged to be incompatible with the ECHR. The domestication of the ECHR has diffused judicial review powers with respect to rights claims to all national judges, and institutionalized constitutional pluralism at the domestic level. In Belgium, the Constitutional Court has that the ECHR but infra-constitutional which the Supreme Court to that the ECHR its autonomy the Constitutional Court. courts are in their respective domains, but neither can its will on the Krisch such a “constitutional” or In the Italian Constitutional Court a strong that Italian judges are to national law in of the ECHR and, a conflict is to the matter to the ordinary judges this while their own authority to refuse to apply a on grounds of with the In the of a which is to the of the the has no means of its own case law. In France, the and the de facto of rights is the ECHR, not the national constitution, and in and much of Eastern and Europe, new of rights were on the but the point be national rights protection in Europe today is both constitutional and pluralistic. The that Krisch to the hierarchies, conflict final or to the of his In chapter Krisch a a whose on the constitutionalism–pluralism dichotomy. the were a constitutional he claims, we would to find a European rights law with the ECHR at its (p. one finds pluralism. In with his basic Krisch by national constitutional courts to supposed claims of the CJEU or the Court as against the “constitutional (pp. In fact, such in of the constitutional pluralist constitutionalist pluralist would a constitutional court to by formally the national constitutional order to the constitutional judges to their own supremacy within their own domain, and to in the politics of pluralism, including both and with the European courts and their own national supreme courts. This is, in fact, what has While Krisch he all but ignores the of “transfer” and even when has been by the same ruling Thus, he the only in of BC is on the fact that, in this same decision, the German Court a clear “break” with establishes a strong that all German judges are to apply the Court’s jurisprudence when it is on in including when is the only to a of the fundamental in the The ruling also the constitutional Individuals can now a of German basic that or to properly take into account the European Court’s case law, an by the Constitutional have further the of the Convention at The support a about European rights politics that to be with BC. Given formal in the (the of the Court’s case law within national orders will the constitutional of the overall and the pluralism of domestic systems of rights protection. This is, in fact, what is in most BC three detailed case studies of pluralism that, in my provide strong empirical support for the of constitutional The that a pluralist constitution can be built through interactions between autonomous legal orders. The claim to the the more are the rights-based interactions between different legal orders, the more it will be that a constitutional jurisprudence of pluralism will and a legal structure to these Whereas Krisch the pluralism of European rights protection in chapter it is also clear that his discussion is also about in a as Krisch (pp. constitutional stress of such as judicial and other of What about the case studies in and of BC on the that the Council developed the on the in Krisch the of are and for and that only a are to (pp. Whereas the Council had all but rights other the various rights as well as a of national courts the for to provide with due process, including the means of challenging their on the and access to an judicial authority. The chapter with an analysis of the CJEU’s which EU to review under EU fundamental rights, and the In response, the Council an to and to make formal on for The empirics of this case provide strong support for the constitutional pluralist which the structure of rights, and for rights-based conflict into constitutional Under this the of the on “constitutional” features when to it on rights grounds before and courts. courts and the CJEU fundamental rights in both national, regional, and international law, and a style to In Krisch’s judges are the central of the pluralist which he in of the and of international and national levels of (pp. as BC the extent of pluralist to be on the of rights and other constitutional Indeed, the would state that of the CJEU, at the of and to the of a and process, to the . . . of the of the BC was for of the to as Krisch had (pp. In the Court of the EU a it would in of the within the of the the and long the by the clearly to of effective judicial The the at while as the provoked by The established by the Court neither for judicial procedure for review of decisions of the nor for a to that be available to the in order to to The also the fact that an would within the that is, an to an from the In of and under from and other the Council the of the codified procedures, and with and the of the to will now prevail there is not to it, in which case states further are if the is to be than two the of the on Human Rights and While that the Council to and had due process, that the new system still not international rights standards due or to a strategy on the part of courts long as due is not at the when or as national European courts will to judicial review over the national the ended by more if by the would make it that national or European courts to the procedure of the before their jurisdiction in to the national or European To the has resulting in decisions to the one and one (the are the Council the who had the European courts as well as national This is but the now has a The is also about The how conflict the GFCC and the over supremacy claims serve to rights-based constitutionalism in Europe, the fact that supremacy conflicts were never firmly Krisch style as a for the and norms” (pp. that are for the of rights-based pluralism within when rights are not central to pluralism, the of constitutional is how in and European to and generated in response, Krisch European courts are now with law in this the fact that the CJEU had that the do not possess direct effect within the EU such interactions may take on constitutional for now they to on grounds. as in his review of most global and standard setting in such as and is today generated through that the of and state While much of is pluralist in most of it is not constitutional in BC is the most important on the development of legal pluralism at the of not international regimes and national legal orders. Given the my focus has been on the constitutional of the book. I have three main points. First, the dichotomy is a false one. now legal systems as both constitutional and pluralistic for of empirical Second, when it comes to rights protection, most domestic constitutional orders in Europe are in fact pluralistic. As Krisch legal pluralism and authority conflicts often hand in and we find both within national constitutional orders. Third, the notion of “constitutional pluralism” the in BC than the framework from the dichotomy. The provides strong support for rights-based constitutionalism when rights in fact, on the and when courts, are major as one would we find of constitutional pluralism when rights are not in and when courts are not the main
For a while now, one has been wondering if in a world of more and more fragmented communities the idea of constitution as intrinsically tied to the notion of the state is still adequate, or if it must be readjusted to entities of a non-state nature. Globalization, the Great Deconstructor, revealed (once again) that it has become rather illusory to believe in a single, all-embracing social rationality.1 Traditional statist doctrines that still see states as the ultimate site for the creation and the legitimacy of law have come under increasing reflexive pressure. A new constitutionalism, however, offensively describes law-making processes within functional, transnational systems of society as a pluralistic-fragmented morphogenesis of “constitutions without state”. The constitution is dead—long live the constitution! The trend towards recognition of stateless sovereignty has, of course, difficulties in conceptualizing processes of autonomous constitutionalization as detached from common representations of hierarchy and in converting the two most important constitutional issues—conditions for validity and justified violence—into the grammar of fragmented social realities. It is not surprising that uncertainty arises in particular with regard to individual rights:2 because they sharply reveal the recursive relation between self-validating autonomy and constituted subjectivity, which tends to give legal statements on the relation between autonomy and sovereignty the form of a “chicken-or-egg” riddle. Gunther Teubner observes that, in the course of society’s functional differentiation, transnational “regimes” emerge and emancipate themselves from state order. The regimes are thereby confronted with the—according to Teubner genuinely constitutional—issue how to define themselves in distinction from and in relation to their environments. Such a redescription of constitutionalization is supported by much empirical evidence. Various sectors of global and local civil society (trade associations, multinational enterprises, sport associations, social networks) tend to equip themselves with their own programs of law that not only regulate organizational matters but also reflect relations with other functional systems. Statist conceptions of constitution claim to comprise and to control the functional entities of society—but, according to Teubner, they lack the means to fulfill these expectations. They not only encounter territorial limits but are also often unable to provide adequate solutions to conflicts between transnational functional rationalities. There is no global constitution that might overcome these deficiencies in sight. And traditional mechanisms of public international law that could extend national principles by agreement, suffer from paralyzing consensus requirements or from ineffective enforcement—or from both. Hence, it seems plausible to follow the traces of constitutionalization from a transnational perspective. It is then necessary to shift the focus from “state” as a hierarchically structured unit of societal conflict management to autonomous, heterarchical regimes developing on their own and responding to each other—if at all—on a horizontal or diagonal level.3 Common patterns of justification, according to the new theory, have to be fundamentally adapted in light of the increasing impossibility to derive rules of conflict “from above.” Given such a fundamental turnover it does not surprise that dogmatic resistance is imminent.4 If one looks at transnational societal functional systems as potential creators of their own constitutions one has to radically modify the nineteenth-century conception of “citizens’ liberty,” on the one hand, and the twentieth-century conception of competition-based “private legal society,” on the other: It is necessary to detach processes of self-regulation from the “state” or from culturally defined entities and to reimagine them in the context of complex processes and couplings within and between functional systems. The constitutional question is shifted to the inside and implanted into the “capillary” arteries of every autonomous system’s “self-consciousness.” Presumably such systems, only through their full emancipation, become aware of their universal competence for specific functions5 and at the same time a specific competence for the universal. An avant-gardist approach of transnational constitutionalism has to develop a new concept of constitution, although Teubner himself merely acknowledges (after all: considerable) modifications of traditional constitutional concepts. “Self-constitution” is only the starting point for the auto-productive genesis of “regimes”; what matters is the moment of constitutionalization (which for Teubner is decoupled from power6). It then becomes possible to specify the functions of such regime constitutions in order to establish political institutions and to institutionalize politics. If, on the one hand, one wants to rely—like Teubner—on an evolutionary understanding of constitution and, on the other, to go beyond it and normatively reconstruct the concept of constitution for a global context, things become a little complicated. The theoretical starting point is the observation that a constitution links the—separated—systems of politics and of law as a “structural coupling.” This “super-concept” enabled Niklas Luhmann’s systems theory to describe all kinds of interrelations between functional systems such as politics, law, economy, science, art etc. Indeed, this proved to be helpful in describing the conception of constitution functionally: as a coupling law and politics, the concept of constitution makes possible a legal solution to the problem of self-reference within the political system and at the same time a political solution to the problem of self-reference of the legal system.7 The concept of constitution makes it possible to handle the undeniable paradox that self-bound sovereignty remains unbound. Within the legal system, one can externalize the paradox of foundation to a political consensus; in the political system it can be externalized to a constitutional core8—with the consequence that neither system has to struggle with the (missing) last grounds any longer.9 As it were, this makes any ontotheological metaphysics unnecessary—and makes it possible to carry on. According to the engineers of systems theory, recursivity and self-referentiality are in principle no obstacles but, quite the contrary, the starting point for further opera tions. The same holds true for autonomy and sovereignty which presuppose each other without logically being able to do so. Teubner deals with the paradox of (non-)foundation with the “artifice” of pasting the traditional concept of sovereignty into autonomous regimes. The necessity of unfolding or disguising the paradox—through hierarchies, self-exemption from the binary legal code, solemn declarations, and so on—then poses itself as a problem which each functional system/regime must and can cope with on its own, through building its own creation myths and narratives. At the crucial point where mere juridification turns into substantive constitutionalization, it is precisely law that provides the necessary help: as a structural coupling between “societal law” und “societal politics,” constitution itself is characterized by a “double reflexivity.” Within societal systems, function-related operations produce further operations through which a contingent form of reflexivity procedurally builds itself; and these processes of autonomization via reflexive social processes need stabil ization that only law can provide.10 The circularity of self-constitutionalization can then be reformulated—and here is the essential “jump”—with respect to each functional system: “The Self must first be defined heteronomously through legal norms in order to be able to define itself.”11 There are two hearts beating in Teubner’s transnational regime constitution: one that is supplying the structure of the specific societal order and another supplying secondary rules on rules. The “hybrid meta-encryption” prevails over the difference lawful vs. unlawful as well as over the idiosyncratic systemic logic (x vs. non-x) in a self-reflexive form. The encryption serves as a mode of the different intra-systemic (intra-law, intra-politics, intra-economy, etc.) operations of sense that keep haunting each other in their respective languages, into the arteries of functional differentiation.12 Constitution as a “binding institution” mutates into a form of legal, political, social, and economic communication, thus passing from the unity of law to a multitude of discursive fragments. The description of society, according to the systems theoretical approach, can be reformulated as a conglomerate of socially and legally constitutionalized multiple identities. To put it a little more simply: every constitution is a vital process of social and legal self-ascertainment within a functional system.13 The conditions of intra-systemic programming,14 however, remain in the “shadows of politics” which must be separated from the social system. The separation of politics from the respective social system is, however, not possible, which is why politics, for Teubner, takes an ambivalent form that can be expressed—or “invisibilized”—by the distinction between la politique and le politique.15 The political system (la politique) does not determine the fundamental principles of subsystems which, because of their societal significance, are highly political and thus subject to their internal politicization. The charm of such a procedural generalogy that abstains from the “big moment” of a Rütli oath is that the global functional systems, via an autological but invisible accolade, are able to impose on themselves responsibilities that could not be established with similar consequences within the hierarchical order of a traditional state constitution. Only autonomous constitutions enable functional regimes to create normative conditions for their internal politicization. In course of the re-entry of politics into the—at the outset non-political—functional systems, their constitutions work as catalyzers, as conditions for a reflexive internal and external reference. Now, where is the link to the modern challenges of global society, scandals, human rights violations, scarcity of resources, financial crises, etc.? Luhmann has described as the “fall” of functional differentiation the question how to deal with self-referential systemic autonomy.16 Systems theory, however, primarily looks at reproduction, not so much at self-destruction or autopoietic “approaches to impossibility.”17 The latter is somewhat of a blind spot if one focuses on reproduction of reproduction, a blind spot that threatens second-order observers with unemployment.18 Worried about the abysmal problems that we are undeniably facing, Teubner holds catastrophe to be contingent, which means: not compelling but selectable. Adequate societal conditions of self-constitutionalization can only be formulated through reflexive self-limitation—and hence not only as a determination of “rules” but as a genuinely constitutional question. To put it in more technical terms: the issue is how it is possible to limit the destructive effects of fragmented energies in a fragmented world, and how each functional system can handle self-expansion and self-restraint at the same time.19 The proposed solution is called exogenous self-binding. One cannot violently impose on social universes an institutional policy of morals as a consequence of which—like in Macchiavelli’s Ideal Republic—the commitment to the common good coincides with the actors’ interests. It is instead necessary for functional systems to become sensitive to their environments, to develop an “ecology” in a broader sense, so that self-restraint—and potentially the sustainment of the system’s environment—becomes part of the intra-systemic functional rationality.20 Constitutions are to limit expansive rationalities by the means of law.21 Thus, fundamental rights as elements of different subsystems do not primarily solve conflicts between individuals but avert dangers arising from non-individual “anonymous matrices” and “institutions, discourses, systems.”22 To address the problem of justiciability one has to shift from individual conflicts to conflicts between systems and environments.23 The program is demanding: Teubner asks us to recognize that the autological, autonomous, self-destructive, and damaging unfolding of functional strength can be transformed into a new constitutional, functional, decentralized doctrine. The self-reflection of functional rationality is sparked by pressure from outside24—but not in the sense of direct, heterogenous causality, but rather as a provocation to self-reflexivity within the system through irritation. Since all systems are only environments to one another, they are unable to communicate with one another; they can only communicate about one another, adapting to one another through selective and by this into a part of their own and respective the internal sovereignty to of its own which the necessity to question the idiosyncratic The the of or is a without which systems suffer One must The question rules of self-restraint how are legal how can conflicts be without In of systems theory, legal institutions of are only within the procedural of functional of legal and processes within the constitutional these processes are by from their own and this only becomes in processes they the According to Teubner, the does the is to go into is the moment” with Only catastrophe is it become essential within the system to limit to by for could be as Teubner’s of principles of and As an of how self-constitutionalization could Teubner to of the here could that the economic system limits the creation of by the the to create Given the and of such processes it does not surprise that Teubner are we with a problem has no of The seems to be of systems through the respective of the what if self-restraint to be with the idiosyncratic systemic if self-reflexivity expansive or if external pressure and are not to self-reflexive to the point of the paradox of As we have Teubner converting the paradox structure of into its own logic of it is necessary to the with to for limits within to with The societal of is to the destructive effects of autonomy with to provide for external through rather through the of state becomes the discursive which or internal It remains how Teubner to be by the regimes themselves and state as a mere One describe of of principles and of rationalities as of law with but the crucial question that remains to be is self-reflexive observation provides control over the it possible to subject of to idiosyncratic systemic Teubner does not to the on then the discursive within autonomous systems remain in a and the constitutional full to only a The of self-reflexivity to the question how conflicts between systemic rationalities can be with at a technical legal a is in Teubner’s world of systems, it seems to the potential of the concept of of law” rules from international law into the between functional idea which, in and the has it remains highly from the of systems theory, the is well systems, according to this theory, do not do their rationalities state rules do in specific more one The of in conflict of does not to be helpful in the complex of and between systems. If the conflict of of is with it becomes to define any rules of one an public transnational that could as a common the difficulties to define an public are well from traditional international to of international public In legal the of be as and respective in the enable or is and, more in the for as as are no rules for the rules as well as their and as as transnational “regimes” have no of their own, they have constitutions of or are not constitutionalized at One must not functional systems with or are but this it is to describe the as a a of social that in the but remains as a of the it matters the within a respective social system are of what Teubner they systems themselves through decentralized of must in the of transnational themselves all kinds of other normative being it remains at that of self-reflexive constitutionalization develop under of and If the functional systems at from legal transnational it quite to a constitutional reflexivity from the contrary, such the of towards a In other idiosyncratic seems to reflexivity beyond functional rationality in the a is to the can be beyond processes and beyond it that Teubner one might have to of international and as on self-reflexive it be necessary to for their In of the of the concept of that Teubner the seems a little as it paradox constitution of a Teubner full and thus “constitutions of rather constitutional of a nature. becomes in where the of constitutions are To a of reflexivity for a constitution as a “binding seems to be in conflict with the individual in functional systems that is often and This does not the system’s not the of a through systems one has to that a form of as a for part in processes more which the concept of itself In other is no that self-reflexive This the to the theoretical its of for a a the social and legal of constitution is described as a at the same time legal and one that is to specific this one could the question if a of constitutionalism from the of systems theory the point of a primarily concept of rules. An with a focus on only without being able to do with The of the system cannot as that only a societal itself is able to as at the of social If and are the of then the constitutional question is how can on the of law in full of its ambivalent all difficulties in consensus in a world, it is to describe without a of and to of law from any form of Only under the of autopoietic has systems theory come to the that the autonomy of functional by for the and by for the of systems from not a by their If one that constitutional of are quite the problem of constitutional validity be to the question such particular a itself but socially This not only it to the difference between autonomy and sovereignty a as the difference between and constitutions could then also be as of necessary As state constitutions have the over constitutions of regimes that they can expectations. to their which a under of uncertainty and the more or processes of such a on only be by the constitutional subject as its own A constitutional in functional as a in of the of individuals with transnational regimes. A of constitutional hearts from the state to the regime the the that tend to limit themselves to functional This is more with regard to institutional (which at have to be under and to the which be necessary to process by the and to develop complex legal and technical There be to that “regimes” in the of the of global and are unable to develop mechanisms of in order to Teubner’s description of non-state constitutions from all not only because the crucial problem of the relation between constitution and is civil constitutional law with civil As the relation between constitutional law and law has been by recursive claim to patterns of to The from the and from different of while constitutional law validity on the of hierarchies, law such a by that the of has no for to the claim for of see themselves to each The and respective for which to solve with concept of these it is true that conflicts between societal systems in cannot be as theory and still in a by on autonomy or on that is, by the difference between autonomy and It more to these conflicts on a “private constitutional external and them This of by the systems precisely because of the necessity to establish rules of this recognition a more of fundamental rights the traditional constitutional however, as as for with regard to the of or the passing of to through are question the of an autological self-constitutionalization from the of the of state For can the to legally be to the logic of a it according to a common legal and management and been a or state the regime an under law, have And the often as the of a no rules on legal To the question of legal means to in principle any conflict with defined of state law or that are in with respect to all legal on the of not only to the but also to If and to through the financial world under and any of the that have to first of as the of an autological legal the of law and systems theory, it might to be to for limits to the self-expansion of as they are established in Such rules at self-restraint in order to social The theory of constitution has primarily it as the to to and transnational conditions of be in the form of and by and and It is true that such an order is in the process of through mechanisms in which cannot neither can One must also that not have in in the first the effects of on other systems, a that can be the question how to cope with societal social, challenges of autonomy has the the of decentralized of it to of the of and the potential of their rationality as a in which not only are but also the of as well as exogenous and of as legal its of a description of society, the has formulated the conditions of a civil society as a discursive for One of course, political this it has not fundamental As takes in every social system without them seems to from a point of to more to the processes of internal and external of the full sense of the The same to the constitutional question that Teubner does not The concept of has, so at been a rather of through and through their the of constitutional theory, the question of constitutionalization without has been here with It be to see the juridification of the fundamental and rights by the of as a of economic “from it can rather be described as a of transnational constitutionalization “from The of the in of global challenges more as a of sovereignty through is and in this is precisely why it seems that transnational regimes be able to cope with the of limits of The transnational through autonomy in with transnational regime as the which in of and resources, as separation and of and most of an of that could instead of not Teubner’s “constitutions without the and no more be on that still see the constitutional in in the Systems proposed by There be different about where reflexivity The of the processes that are necessary for constitutionalization the of the problem is to Teubner’s the societal in a and The have to of this and to process its the become so that society without being
Preschool education is implemented in the institutions for care, education, and upbringing of children – kindergartens. The compulsory primary school education in Republic of Macedonia consists of one preparatory year, four years elementary class teaching and four years junior high school courses. After completing primary education the pupils choose among various secondary schools in which they acquire general or special education according to the type of the chosen secondary school. With the process of decentralization, the preschool education and the primary education are under the authority of the municipalities which take responsibilities over their administration and partial financing. The municipalities allocate finance from the local budgets with which they replenish the finance provided by the Ministry of Education and Science.
Keywords-preschool; primary education; encompassment; authorities; financing
Single-prover interactive proofs can recognize PSPACE; if certain complexity assumptions are made, they can do so in zero-knowledge. Generalizing to multiple non-communicating provers extends this class to NEXP, and at the same time removes the complexity assumption needed for zero-knowledge. \n \nHowever, it was recently discovered that the non-communication condition might be insufficient to guarantee soundness. The provers can form joint randomness through non-local computation without communicating. This could break protocols that rely on the statistical independence of the provers. \n \nIn this work, we analyze multi-prover interactive proofs under the constraint of statistical isolation which prohibits non-local computation. We show that there exists perfect zero-knowledge proofs for NEXP under statistical isolation.
최근 스마트 기기는 결제, 할인쿠폰 등 각종 기능을 제공하는 수단으로 진화되면서 통신과 금융이 융합된 모바일 NFC 서비스의 시장이 급성장할 것으로 전망되고 있다. 특히 모바일 NFC 결제 서비스 시장의 활성화가 예상됨에 따라 모바일 NFC 결제 서비스는 국내 외적으로 널리 주목받고 있다. 하지만 이에 따른 NFC 기술 활용 증가로 개인정보 이용이 늘면서 침해요소 또한 증가하고 있다. 최근 한국인터넷진흥원에서 발표한 "NFC 개인정보보호 대책 최종보고서"에 따르면 개인정보 암호화를 부분적으로 미지원하거나 불필요한 개인정보의 과도한 수집 및 저장 등이 문제점으로 제기되었으며 Google사의 Google Wallet 서비스의 개인정보 유출 사고 또한 이러한 문제점을 뒷받침하는 근거가 되고 있다. 본 논문에서는 기존에 서비스되고 있는 NFC 모바일 결제 서비스 상에서 결제정보의 이동 경로 별 결제 기술의 위협을 분석하고 OTA(Over the Air) 상에서 안전한 정보교환을 위한 NTRU 기반 상호인증 기법과 사용자와 은행 간의 결제 단계에서 결제정보를 직접적으로 사용하지 않고 결제자를 증명할 수 있는 NTRU기반 영지식 증명 기법에 대해 제안한다. Recently, smart devices for various services have been developed using converged telecommunications, and the markets for near field communication (NFC) mobile services is expected to grow rapidly. In particular, the realization of mobile NFC payment services is expected to go commercial, and it is widely attracting attention both on a domestic and global level. However, this realization would increase privacy infringement, as personal information is extensively used in the NFC technology. One example of such privacy infringement would be the case of the Google wallet service. In this paper, we propose an mutual authentication scheme based on NTRU for secure channel in OTA and an zero-knowledge proof scheme NTRU based on for protecting user information in NFC mobile payment systems without directly using private financial information of the user.
The question of whether and how law plays a role in producing social change has received renewed scholarly attention, powered by research on the role of social movements in law making and the relation between court decisions and backlash. Reflecting the broader turn to empiricism within legal scholarship, this research either directly engages in or builds upon the empirical study of law in ways that chart exciting new scholarly directions — but also raise important conceptual and methodological questions. This essay explores these questions in an effort to frame what is at stake and guide future research. It makes three contributions.First, it offers a map of the law and social change field, suggesting how researchers across disciplines have asked a set of questions that can be understood as part of a coherent model in which law is viewed as both an “input” and “output” of social change campaigns. Within this model, debate centers on what factors cause lawyers and activists to turn to law as a tool of reform in the first instance (input analysis) and whether legal mobilization ultimately advances movement goals (output analysis). Focusing on the input side, the Essay next outlines how existing research presents a more nuanced story of legal mobilization than posited by the conventional view of rights claiming in court to advance underrepresented interests. In contrast to the traditional account of lawyers deploying litigation as a substitute for traditional politics, the input literature offers a more complex and dynamic account of the relationship of legal mobilization to political power; of lawyers to clients and constituencies; and of litigation to other legal and nonlegal social change strategies.Finally, the Essay turns to the output side to consider the multiple — and often contested — ways in which law may effect change. Here, it highlights an important challenge that empiricism poses to law and social change researchers: the challenge of evaluation. In particular, much of the debate about law and social change has centered on whether legal mobilization makes positive or negative contributions to reform efforts. As these debates become more informed by interdisciplinary research, it is useful to think about how the questions asked may shape the answers produced — and what this means for our understanding of law as a tool of transformative politics. Toward this end, the Essay identifies four key evaluative challenges — how to account for background conditions, select baselines, understand burdens of proof, and weigh counterfactuals — and offers some thoughts on how they might be addressed.
이동 통신 기술이 발달함에 따라 통신 기기간의 메시지 교환이 가능한 서비스가 생겨나고, 그 사용 횟수가 폭발적으로 늘고 있다. 기기간의 통신을 위해서는 통신 기기간의 서비스 구성원이라는 인증이 선행되어야 한다. 하지만, 기존 인증 기술은 Trusted party와 같은 제 삼자와의 통신이 수반되는데, 이로 인하여 대역폭이 낭비되거나, 기지국 범위 밖의 이동 통신 기기는 기기간 통신에 참여할 수 없다는 문제점이 발생할 수 있다.BR 본 논문에서는 제 삼자의 개입이 없는 새로운 이동 통신 기기간 인증 기법을 소개할 것이다. 제안된 기술에 대하여, 서비스의 가입 여부 및 서비스 가입 시간을 모두 검증해야 하므로, 이를 가능하게 하는 새로운 영지식 증명 기법을 개발하여 적용할 것이다. 또한, 이 영지식 증명 기법은 인증정보를 암호화된 그대로 검증하기 때문에 증명 하고자 하는 기기의 프라이버시가 보장이 되며, 질의-응답 방식을 사용하기 때문에 다른 기기의 인증 메시지를 재사용하는 공격으로부터 보호할 수 있다.
Neither East nor West East-West cleavages in Europe are a key determinant to understanding Vienna as a rich, but nevertheless semi-peripheral city between Eastern and Western Europe. The Habsburg Empire (1282-1918), of which Vienna was the capital city, covered large parts of the region between Western Europe, the Ottoman Empire and Russia. It was characterized by multiple nationalities and was internally structured with multiple and changing centre-periphery relations – North-South, as well as East-West, and dominant German/Hungarian nationalities versus the other, mainly Slavic nations. Vienna is thus a privileged site for the study of the spatial imaginaries and strategies accompanying the transformations of this broad region, and their socio-economic, political and cultural implications. East and West have been crucially antagonistic mind maps in Western thought, like ‘we’ and ‘the others’, Orient and Occident, and the West and ‘the rest’ (Hall 1994). In the ninth century, Charlemagne separated the Franco-Germanic part of Europe from the Slavic East with an East-West divide very similar to the one later erected by the Iron Curtain (Szücs 1990: 13). In the West, a Christian feudal order evolved out of a symbiosis of the Roman slaveholder latifundium and the German communitarian social organization. Its relatively decentralized power structure permitted a plurality of languages and autonomous cities evolved from the power vacuum (Anderson 1978: 148), constituting a fertile ground for later modernization. From the end of the Middle Ages onwards, the territorial expansionism of the West resulted in the crusades, reconquista and colonization (Komlosy 1994; Hobsbawm 1990). The East experienced a different trajectory. Russia, the sentinel of Europe on the eastern front, had to bear the brunt of repeated invasion waves by Mongols, Tartars and other Asian nomadic people (Anderson 1980), a crucial determinant to an understanding of the centralist and authoritarian structure of its state and society. These different historical-geographical trajectories have significantly contributed to shaping the ‘morphological contrast between the state in the East and West’ (Gramsci 1971) and the different forms of political praxis: ‘In the East the State was everything, civil society was primordial and gelatinous; in the West, there was a proper relation between State and civil society’ (Gramsci 1971: 238). The Habsburg Empire was part of eastern Central Europe, which was surrounded by the West and Russia. This ‘in-between region’ (Szücs 1990), consisting of Poland, Prussia and the Habsburg Empire, for centuries oriented itself towards the West, but had difficulties in building truly Western institutions, especially a strong civil society. The countryside was sparsely populated (Anderson 1980), the cities were smaller and less independent, the nobility was larger and more influential (Szücs 1990), and the Counter-Reformation was strong. The Habsburg Empire was thus a hybrid, combining elements of the East and the West under one dynasty for more than 600 years.
TABLE OF CONTENTS I. Introduction II. Standards of Proof--An Overview A. The Burden of Proof B. The Role and Types of Standards of Proof C. Previous Empirical Studies 1. Survey Evidence 2. Experimental Studies III. Microsoft v. i4i and Presumption of Validity in Patent Law IV. Methodology and Study Design A. Hypotheses About i4i's Impact B. Why an Experiment? C. Study Design V. Discussion A. Results B. Implications C. Directions for Future Research VI. Conclusion Appendix A Appendix B I. Introduction Our litigation system is based upon assumption that standards of proof matter. (1) They serve instruct factfinder concerning degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in correctness of factual conclusions. (2) The various standards of proof reflect legal system's judgment about proper allocation of risk between litigants, as well as relative importance of issues at stake. (3) For example, in criminal cases where defendant's liberty may be at stake, prosecution carries burden of proving every element of criminal charge beyond a reasonable doubt. (4) In contrast, of a much less stringent standard, is most common in civil cases. (5) The third main standard, and convincing is an intermediate standard employed in civil litigation when the individual interests at stake ... are both 'particularly important' and 'more substantial than mere loss of money.' (6) But despite perceived importance of standards of proof, few empirical studies have tested lay jurors' understanding and application of standards of proof, particularly in civil litigation. (7) Specifically, to our knowledge, there has not been a large-scale study of a demographically representative population comparing jurors' decisions when confronted with two standards of proof used in civil litigation: (1) preponderance of evidence, and (2) clear and convincing (8) Patent law recently presented an opportunity to assess impact of varying standard of proof in civil litigation. Under Section 282 of Patent Act, every claim in a issued U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) is presumed to be valid. (9) This same statute also provides that [t]he burden of establishing invalidity of a or any claim thereof shall rest on party asserting such invalidity. (10) However, statute fails to specify standard of proof necessary to overcome this presumption of validity. In a recent case, Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. Partnership (i4i), U.S. Supreme Court heard competing arguments regarding proper standard of proof for finding a invalid. (11) Microsoft argued that preponderance of evidence standard should apply, at least when USPTO had not considered prior art that allegedly invalidated patent. (12) But Court unanimously affirmed U.S. Court of Appeals for Federal Circuit's (Federal Circuit) longstanding interpretation that invalidity must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. (13) However, Court also held that if party challenging a patent's validity could introduce new evidence in litigation that had not previously been considered USPTO during patent's examination, then the challenger's burden to persuade jury of its invalidity defense clear and convincing evidence may be easier to sus-sustain. (14) In such situations, jury should be instructed that it has heard evidence that [US]PTO had no opportunity to evaluate before granting patent and to consider that fact when determining whether an invalidity defense has been proved clear and convincing evidence. (15) But at same time, Court declined endorse any particular formulation for such an instruction. (16) Both parties in i4i and Court apparently assumed that standard of proof would affect lay jurors' decisions regarding invalidity, at least on margins. …
This paper aims to investigate the measures taken by Chinese commercial banks to deal with the financial difficulties facing small businesses, based on the case study on the decentralized lending system of “SanBaoYiGua”. About the problem of financing of small and medium-sized enterprises in China, before 2003, although the central financial institution took policy measures, such as reform to Credit Cooperatives, encouraging construction and maintenance of small business credit guarantee system, they did not pay attention to the role of State Owned Bank in small and medium-sized credit market. After 2003, the most typical policy measure that State Owned Commercial Bank took for small business lending is the decentralized lending system of “SanBaoYiGua”. After considering the effects and limitations of lending system of “SanBaoYiGua”, this paper clarifies the reason why the lending system of “SanBaoYiGua” was not able to play prearranged role in small business credit market by focusing the relationship-lending. Finally, this paper gives a policy proposal for solving the problem in conclusion.