The article deals with the certain aspects of the criminal law measures appliedto legal entities, the phenomenon of electronic legal entities (Decentralized Autonomous Organization or Decentralized Autonomous Corporation), the possibility of applying criminal law measures to electronic legal entities.
Legal Services industries are entering a period of major disruption caused by new legal technologies (LawTech), such as artificial intelligence (AI), Internet of Things (IoT) and Blockchain. An area already undergoing major innovation is alternative dispute resolution (Alternative Dispute Resolution (2017) Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alternative_dispute_resolution), especially automated online dispute resolution (Online Dispute Resolution (2017) Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Online_dispute_resolution; Katsh, E. and Rifkin, J. (2001) Online Dispute Resolution: Resolving Conflicts in Cyberspace. Jossey-Bass Wiley, New Jersey). In terms of LawTech, we broadly divide online dispute resolution into (a) Consumer ODR—uses technology to facilitate the resolution of disputes between ecommerce parties, typically online suppliers and consumers; (b) Judicial ODR—covers any means of settling ‘ordinary’ disputes where there is a hearing (using technology) but outside of the courtroom, such as divorce or personal injury cases; and what we refer to as (c) Corporate ODR—the use of technology to manage the resolution of any contractual disputes that may emerge from major multi-partner projects or financial transactions. This paper focuses on ODR and specifically the future use of automating anticipatory Corporate dispute resolution using AI and blockchain technologies. The paper describes the legal sector, and how it is being radically transformed by computer science.
Daniel Augot, Hervé Chabanne, Olivier Clémot, William R. George
The most fundamental purpose of blockchain technology is to enable\npersistent, consistent, distributed storage of information. Increasingly common\nare authentication systems that leverage this property to allow users to carry\ntheir personal data on a device while a hash of this data is signed by a\ntrusted authority and then put on a blockchain to be compared against. For\ninstance, in 2015, MIT introduced a schema for the publication of their\nacademic certificates based on this principle. In this work, we propose a way\nfor users to obtain assured identities based on face-to-face proofing that can\nthen be validated against a record on a blockchain. Moreover, in order to\nprovide anonymity, instead of storing a hash, we make use of a scheme of Brands\nto store a commitment against which one can perform zero-knowledge proofs of\nidentity. We also enforce the confidentiality of the underlying data by letting\nusers control a secret of their own. We show how our schema can be implemented\non Bitcoin's blockchain and how to save bandwidth by grouping commitments using\nMerkle trees to minimize the number of Bitcoin transactions that need to be\nsent. Finally, we describe a system in which users can gain access to services\nthanks to the identity records of our proposal.\n
We summarize the results and perspectives from a companion article, where we presented and evaluated an alternative architecture for data storage in distributed networks. We name the bio-inspired architecture RAIN, and it offers file storage service that, in contrast with current centralized cloud storage, has privacy by design, is open source, is more secure, is scalable, is more sustainable, has community ownership, is inexpensive, and is potentially faster, more efficient, and more reliable. We propose that a RAIN-style architecture could form the backbone of the Internet of Things that likely will integrate multiple current and future infrastructures ranging from online services and cryptocurrency to parts of government administration.
Bitcoins’ technology brings a new level of innovation to business and communication across the world. However, the advantages of a virtual currency payment system face the threat from criminal activities occurring over a pseudonymous network where there is virtually no current regulation to cover illegal transactions. The current situation in Georgia is as follows: the second Bitcoin’s processing datacenter has opened in Georgia. While the virtual money is new even in developed countries, more unusual it is for Georgia, where local economists are more skeptical toward cryptocurrency. Therefore, they believe that electronic money is not controlled by any central bank that gives a lot of opportunities for illegal transactions. According to the Georgian experts, bitcoin is a very risky currency that can be used for money laundering, as it is completely uncontrolled. However, the Georgian central bank system claims that bitcoins are not dangerous, and the lack of awareness gives rise to talk about money laundering. The biggest challenge seems to be regulation of Bitcoin without hindering the potential for growth. While there is usually certainly a chance that Bitcoin could fail or be pushed out of existence by a more innovative technology, policymakers must be careful not to hinder a technology that could change the way global economy functions.
The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA), de nes a technique for generating and validating digital signatures. We start by reviewing the mathematics behind the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) and its elliptic curve analogue (ECDSA). Secondly, we describe how the ECDSA is used in Bitcoin technology.
In recent years, hype surrounding the proliferation of blockchain-based technology has been significant. Apart from the creation of bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies, it has been difficult to determine what practical utility might lie in the adoption of blockchain, mainly because there are so few in existence at present. Even so, interest in the technology has increased tremendously. This paper is a primer for software quality professionals. It briefly describes the history of blockchain technology, attempts to define and disambiguate terminology, fosters a general understanding of how blockchain works, and discusses how and why software quality professionals might want to invest time and energy in learning about, implementing, or using blockchain-based technologies in their own organizations -- or alternatively, improving the quality of blockchain technology itself.
The mining process in blockchain requires solving a proof-of-work puzzle, which is resource expensive to implement in mobile devices due to the high computing power and energy needed. In this paper, we, for the first time, consider edge computing as an enabler for mobile blockchain. In particular, we study edge computing resource management and pricing to support mobile blockchain applications in which the mining process of miners can be offloaded to an edge computing service provider. We formulate a two-stage Stackelberg game to jointly maximize the profit of the edge computing service provider and the individual utilities of the miners. In the first stage, the service provider sets the price of edge computing nodes. In the second stage, the miners decide on the service demand to purchase based on the observed prices. We apply the backward induction to analyze the sub-game perfect equilibrium in each stage for both uniform and discriminatory pricing schemes. For the uniform pricing where the same price is applied to all miners, the existence and uniqueness of Stackelberg equilibrium are validated by identifying the best response strategies of the miners. For the discriminatory pricing where the different prices are applied to different miners, the Stackelberg equilibrium is proved to exist and be unique by capitalizing on the Variational Inequality theory. Further, the real experimental results are employed to justify our proposed model.
To adaptively grow in rapidly changing business environments, a number of organizations have challenged the traditional bureaucratic way of organizing for a new, more flexible organizational structure: self-organizing. It is based on minimal hierarchy, decentralized decision-making power and a workforce autonomously striving towards a common goal. But to achieve this, one needs proactive and self-managing employees, and accordingly, facilitating the intrinsic motivation and self-determination of the employees becomes a key challenge to make self-organizing a reality. In this chapter, we will first outline the key characteristics of, and differences between, bureaucracy and self-organizing. Then, we turn to a discussion of human nature and motivation, arguing that while extrinsic rewards and controlling might work in bureaucratic settings, only intrinsic motivation and self-determination are compatible with self-organizing. To support our case, we will end the chapter with practical examples of how a few rapidly growing companies have solved the various challenges of self-organizing and been able to keep the business profitable while having highly engaged and proactive employees.
Public blockchain networks using proof of work (PoW)-based consensus protocols are considered as a promising platform for decentralized resource management with financial incentive mechanisms. In order to maintain a secured, universal state of the blockchain, PoW-based consensus protocols financially incentivize the nodes in the network to compete for the privilege of block generation through cryptographic puzzle solving. For rational consensus nodes, i.e., miners with limited local computational resources, offloading the computation load for PoW to the cloud/fog providers (CFPs) becomes a viable option. In this paper, we study the interaction between the CFPs and the miners in a PoW-based blockchain network using a game theoretic approach. In particular, we propose a lightweight infrastructure of the PoW-based blockchains, where the computation-intensive part of the consensus process is offloaded to the cloud/fog. We formulate the computation resource management in the blockchain consensus process as a two-stage Stackelberg game, where the profit of the CFP and the utilities of the individual miners are jointly optimized. In the first stage of the game, the CFP sets the price of offered computing resource. In the second stage, the miners decide on the amount of service to purchase accordingly. We apply backward induction to analyze the subgame perfect equilibria in each stage for both uniform and discriminatory pricing schemes. For uniform pricing where the same price applies to all miners, the uniqueness of the Stackelberg equilibrium is validated by identifying the best response strategies of the miners. For discriminatory pricing where the different prices are applied, the uniqueness of the Stackelberg equilibrium is proved by capitalizing on the variational inequality theory. Further, the real experimental results are employed to justify our proposed model.
This article examines contract as a focal point of modern society both in terms of the way that it is used to classify relationships and the way in which it is used to order relationships. I look at how contractual structures and relationships across a variety of speciman scenarios (private sector supply contracts and public service delivery contracts) can be explained using the work of Ian Macneil. He gives us an account of how the socialising contexts of contract relationships evolve and change. Smart contracts offer a new way of constructing relationships. Their advocates suggest that they have the potential to revolutionise the practice of exchange. I consider smart contracts from Macneil’s perspective and work through whether his account of relationality will be able to encompass this new practise.
Muhammad Umer Wasim, Abdallah Ali Zainelabden Abdallah Ibrahim, Pascal Bouvry, Tadas Limba
Breaches in online contracts (Service Level Agreements, SLAs) are usually compensated by gift vouchers at present, however as the online contracts emerge towards smart contracts, the breaches could potentially lead to court injunctions over blockchains. This research proposes Probability based Factor Model (PFM) that can be implemented over the blockchain to automatically identify breaches that can cause substantial damage and have high probability for recurrence. PFM can also issue court injunctions for the breaches. The underlying concept in PFM is built upon the notion of factor analysis and stochastic modeling from the discipline of Data Science. High performance computing (HPC) cluster at University of Luxembourg (HPC @ Uni.lu) and docker (a software container platform) were used to emulate contractual environment of three service providers: Redis, MongoDB, and Memcached Servers. The results showed that court injunction(s) was issued only for Redis and MongoDB Servers. Technically, this difference could be attributed to the fact that Memcached is simply used for caching and therefore, it is less prone to breach of contract. Whereas, Redis and MongoDB as databases and message brokers are performing more complex operations and are more likely to cause a breach. This research will benefit enterprises that view breach of contract as a limiting factor for implementation of smart contract in cyber-physical system or internet of things.
Adam Brinckman, Donal Luc, Jarek Nabrzyski, Gary L. Neidig · 8 authors
The Cloud computing paradigm is built on the concept of virtualization, allowing multiple virtual machines to cohabit on one physical device to enable the scaling up and down of applications through elastic on-demand provisioning. More recently containers e.g. Docker, have been shown to enable a more lightweight mechanism than hypervisors and proved to be a viable alternative for virtualization, based on shared operating systems. The advent of such lightweight environments has brought a multitude of application uses in research, science and industry, enabling pre-configured operating environments to be shared, reused and instantiated on demand. The sharing of containers has currently been exposed using centralized repositories (e.g. Dockerhub), which allows containers to be shared and to form the building blocks for further development. In this paper, we take a look at the next evolution of this lifecycle and consider whether it is viable to securely share container-based applications within a decentralized group of individuals and to provide an audit trail recording exactly who has shared what, and with whom. For this purpose we consider the use of Blockchain technologies, and consequently perform a comparative analysis of Blockchain technologies for this use case. The paper provides mostly a review and taxonomy of different ledger systems, which we believe may be of interest to the SafeData Workshop participants.
Remo Manuel Frey, Pascal Bühler, Alexander Gerdes, Thomas Hardjono · 6 authors
In light of digitalization, customers increasingly share private data through their online behaviors and actions. Yet, customers have become reluctant to share data due to privacy concerns. From a psychological perspective, a reduction of users' perceived risks should result in a higher willingness to share sensitive data. The development of blockchain-supported, multi-part computation thereby represents an interesting novel empirical context to study such willingness to disclose personal data, as such technologies involve a privacy-preserving approach that could not only technically solve privacy issues but also ought to address precisely the user's risk perception. Therefore, we conducted an online experiment with 420 participants to examine the willingness to disclose personal data dependent on different privacy protection mechanisms. A deception based experiment allowed to measure not only user intention, but also real user behavior. Surprisingly, our results demonstrate that participants shared similar amounts of personal data for blockchain-supported approaches and standard privacy policies. Even though an aversion to the blockchain system due to its novelty and potentially perceived complexity was not detected. Furthermore, we found that the willingness to share data increased significantly specifically for technically affine people when they were presented with the opportunity to monetize their data. We further discuss the effects of privacy awareness and whether prior knowledge of blockchain technology had a supporting effect for user acceptance.