Capped-usage SaaS products -- LLM subscriptions such as Claude Code and ChatGPT, cloud platforms such as Vercel and Cloudflare Workers, corporate benefit platforms, identity-verification services with liability transfer -- share a structural signature with insurance products: a fixed premium decoupled from realized consumption, stochastic per-user demand with heavy-tailed severity, a non-fungible cap that resets on a fixed schedule, and a portfolio-level exposure that requires reserve adequacy under tail risk. We argue that this is not an analogy. It is the same operational problem actuarial science has been tooled for decades to address, restated with new dependent variables (tokens, bandwidth bytes, function-invocations, gym check-ins) in place of medical claims. This paper proposes a modeling framework for capped-usage SaaS pricing built from frequency-severity decomposition, premium calculation principles, and Monte Carlo reserve adequacy. We map the framework to publicly observable subscription tiers in two domains (LLM services and cloud platforms), ground it in canonical health-insurance economics (Arrow 1963; Pauly 1968; Manning et al. 1987; Brot-Goldberg et al. 2017), and demonstrate divergence from traditional unit economics through a worked example. The contribution is operational rather than theoretical: not a new theorem, but vocabulary and tools currently absent from cs.LG/stat.ML practice.
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Artificial Intelligence in Healthcare and Education
ABSTRACT The Non‐Fungible Token (NFT) market exhibits sustained activity, with secondary trading accounting for the majority of overall volume and creator revenue in recent years. Unlike primary mints of untraded NFTs, secondary purchases involve tokens with established ownership transfer histories recorded transparently and immutably on the blockchain. This study examines how these transaction histories shape consumers' value perceptions and purchase intentions. Based on a social value lens and cue‐utilization theory, we propose that transaction histories serve as diagnostic cues signaling perceived popularity, thereby enhancing social value and driving purchase intentions. Three preregistered experiments with NFT‐experienced participants support this framework. We find that traded (vs. untraded) NFTs elicit higher purchase intentions, an effect that emerges even with a single prior transaction and does not significantly increase with more transactions (Study 1). This relationship is serially mediated by perceived popularity and social value (Study 2). Furthermore, the effect is stronger when transaction histories are recent (vs. outdated) (Study 3). These findings highlight the psychological mechanisms underlying secondary market dominance in NFTs, emphasizing verifiable transaction records as key to fostering perceived community endorsement in liquid digital consumption contexts. The results offer implications for NFT ecosystem strategies, such as prioritizing active trading to sustain social value and long‐term viability.
Consumer Behavior in Brand Consumption and Identification
Jeong-Hyuck Park, Chanhee Park, Claudio J. Tessone, Yu Zhang
Digitalisation transforms money from distinguishable physical objects into fungible informational units. A recent theoretical framework predicts that such indistinguishable wealth obeys bosonic occupancy statistics, leading to geometric ownership distributions and enhanced inequality. Using Bitcoin blockchain data, we test this prediction on 63 UTXO denominations across 72 monthly snapshots (2018--2023). A one-parameter geometric model describes the ownership distributions, reproducing both mean holdings and their temporal evolution; Jensen--Shannon divergence values lie below $0.08$ in $99.74\%$ of cases. The inferred inverse-temperature parameter satisfies the analytic mean--temperature relation to better than $0.1\%$ in every sample -- a self-consistency test that two-parameter alternatives cannot pass -- and remains within a narrow band across eight orders of magnitude in denomination and over six years. Bitcoin UTXO ownership statistics are therefore consistent with bosonic occupancy laws, suggesting that the informational nature of electronic money may act as a structural driver of inequality in digital economies.
Centralised streaming platforms have become the dominant mode for distributing web series and digital video content; however, they continue to face persistent challenges related to opaque royalty mechanisms, delayed payments, high intermediary commissions, limited creator autonomy, and widespread piracy. These limitations have raised concerns among independent creators and production houses regarding fairness, transparency, and sustainability. Block-chain technology, characterised by decentralisation, immutability, and programmable smart contracts, offers a promising alternative to conventional streaming infrastructures. This paper critically examines block-chain adoption within the media and entertainment sector and proposes a simulated block-chain-based streaming framework named IndieWeb Originals. The proposed model integrates Hyper ledger Fabric, decentralised storage systems, and non-fungible tokens for content access control and monetisation. Two detailed case studies—IndieWeb Originals and the real-world Theta Network—are analysed using performance metrics including royalty payout delay, creator revenue share, transparency, and piracy resistance. The analysis indicates that block-chain-based platforms can significantly reduce royalty settlement times while improving revenue transparency, creator earnings, and intellectual property protection. The paper concludes by outlining future research directions involving artificial intelligence-driven fraud detection, cross-chain interoperability, and global regulatory standardisation to support large-scale adoption. DOI: https://doi.org/10.24321/3117.4825.202502
A non-custodial threshold instrument for Bitcoin would allow value to transfer between parties without network connectivity, fees, or custodial dependency. Digital signatures and multisignature scripts provide part of the solution, but the core benefit is lost if the issuer retains a key capable of unilateral redemption. All prior multisignature schemes have positioned the issuer at or above the spending threshold. We propose a system that inverts this: the holder receives the two keys constituting the spending threshold of a 2-of-3 multisignature script, and the issuer holds one key arithmetically below it.
Distributed ledger technology (DLT) has emerged as a transformative force in decentralized data management across e-transactions, with significant applications in the banking, finance, supply chain, and trade sectors. Recognizing its potential, governments, including Estonia and India, have implemented DLT-based e-services to enhance transparency and privacy in public administration. With numerous platforms arising/available in the DLT segment, such as Hyperledger, Ethereum, Corda, Ripple, Stellar, Dragonchain, IOTA, and Hedera, understanding interoperability mechanisms across heterogeneous platforms has become critical. This comprehensive research provides a systematic analysis of distributed ledger technology fundamentals, consensus mechanisms, smart contracts, and their applications in e-governance services. The study examines leading DLT platforms and their core features, with a specific focus on interoperability capabilities essential for seamless cross-platform integration. Through analysis of existing interoperability solutions, including trade finance platforms, central bank digital currency initiatives, and e-governance implementations, this work identifies critical challenges and evaluation criteria for DLT adoption. The research addresses three primary research questions: (1) what capabilities does DLT provide for implementing effective e-governance strategies? (2) How does interoperability influence the delivery and effectiveness of various e-governance services? (3) What is the current impact and growth trajectory of existing e-governance services providing interoperability capabilities? The primary contributions include systematic exploration of interoperability mechanisms in various DLT platforms, documentation of existing implementations across multiple countries, including Estonia, the European Union, Dubai, and India, identification of technical challenges and security considerations, and development of a future roadmap for DLT-influenced e-governance systems. The research demonstrates that effective interoperability, combined with emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence and quantum-resistant cryptography, can enable citizen-centric, transparent, and secure governance systems while maintaining regulatory compliance and data privacy.
Automated market makers (AMMs) quote prices from pool state rather than from a limit order book. AMM pools often stay close to a reference price because arbitrageurs correct profitable mispricing. A large part of decentralized finance therefore relies on a simple economic premise: once the AMM price drifts away from the reference price, arbitrage incentives push it back. This paper studies when that premise is strong enough to guarantee block-scale stability. We model the gap between the reference price and the AMM price as a stochastic tracking error, treat arbitrage as the corrective input, and place blockchain execution inside the loop through fees, discrete blocks, transaction ordering, delays, and transaction failure. The detailed execution layer is reduced to the total successful correction confirmed in each block. Under a block-level correction condition, we prove geometric ergodicity of the tracking error and obtain explicit one-step bounds that connect tracking quality to liquidity and execution quality. We also show in a constant-product example how fees, fixed execution costs, and local liquidity map into the no-trade band and the optimal corrective trade. Finally, we build empirical proxies for the theorem quantities from realized block data and use them to organize reduced and mechanism-focused simulations whose comparative statics are consistent with the theory. The contribution is to turn a basic economic intuition behind decentralized finance into a quantitative stability statement together with a tractable calibration interface.
The European Commission's April 2026 age verification framework, built on software-based Zero-Knowledge Proofs (ZKP) atop the European Digital Identity (EUDI) Wallet, fails to achieve its stated privacy guarantees due to a structural enrollment binding problem: any ZKP scheme whose trust root is a government identity credential inherits that credential's linkability at the point of issuance. This paper proposes a replacement architecture based on hardware bearer credentials — physically issued FIDO2 tokens whose identity binding is discarded immediately after issuance — combined with an anonymous hardware-handle revocation list, offline kiosk enrollment, and a self-funding economic model. The proposal is technically feasible with current production technology, financially viable at EU procurement scale, and operationally self-sustaining through a €10 citizen co-payment at issuance plus a €30 replacement fee. A cost model for national deployment using Italy as a case study demonstrates that the system requires near-zero net public expenditure. The primary novel contribution is a game-theoretic mechanism embedded in the replacement fee structure that renders secondary market trading of credentials economically irrational without requiring any surveillance of credential holders.
Résumé Au Maroc, les très petites entreprises (TPE) représentent 96 % du tissu entrepreneurial et génèrent 23 % du PIB, mais 75 à 80 % d'entre elles demeurent exclues du crédit bancaire formel. Dans ce contexte d'exclusion financière structurelle, la Finance Décentralisée (DeFi) — fondée sur les technologies blockchain et les smart contracts — se présente comme une alternative potentielle. Toutefois, son adoption par les dirigeants de TPE reste conditionnée par un ensemble de déterminants encore peu explorés dans la littérature, en particulier la confiance dans ces technologies. Cet article vise à identifier les déterminants de l'intention d'adoption de la DeFi par les TPE marocaines à travers une revue de la littérature et la proposition d'un modèle conceptuel de recherche. En s'appuyant sur le modèle UTAUT (Venkatesh et al., 2003) comme cadre théorique de référence, complété par les théories de la confiance dans les systèmes technologiques (McKnight et al., 2002 ; Pavlou, 2003 ; Zhou, 2011), cet article propose un modèle étendu intégrant cinq déterminants directs de l'intention d'adoption : la facilité d'usage perçue, l'utilité perçue, l'influence sociale, les conditions facilitatrices, et la confiance dans la technologie DeFi — algorithmi que et institutionnelle. Le genre et l'âge du dirigeant sont intégrés comme variables modératrices. Sur le plan théorique, cet article contribue à enrichir la littérature sur l'adoption des FinTech en proposant une opérationnalisation de la confiance adaptée aux spécificités de la DeFi dans un contexte d'économie émergente. Sur le plan managérial, il fournit un cadre actionnable pour les décideurs publics, les régulateurs et les concepteurs de solutions DeFi ciblant les marchés non bancarisés. Mots-clés : Finance Décentralisée (DeFi) ; UTAUT ; Confiance ; Adoption technologique ; TPE Maroc ; Inclusion financière ; Blockchain ; FinTech ; Modèle conceptuel Abstract In Morocco, micro-enterprises (TPEs) account for 96% of the entrepreneurial fabric and generate 23% of GDP, yet 75 to 80% of them remain excluded from formal bank credit. Against this backdrop of structural financial exclusion, Decentralized Finance (DeFi) — built on blockchain technologies and smart contracts — emerges as a potential alternative. However, its adoption by TPE managers remains conditional on a set of determinants that are still underexplored in the literature, particularly trust in these technologies. This paper aims to identify the determinants of DeFi adoption intention among Moroccan micro-enterprises through a literature review and the proposal of a conceptual research model. Drawing on the UTAUT model (Venkatesh et al., 2003) as the theoretical framework, complemented by trust theories in technological systems (McKnight et al., 2002; Pavlou, 2003; Zhou, 2011), this article proposes an extended model integrating five direct determinants of adoption intention: perceived ease of use, perceived usefulness, social influence, facilitating conditions, and trust in DeFi technology — algorithmic and institutional. The manager's gender and age are included as moderating variables. Theoretically, this article contributes to the FinTech adoption literature by proposing an operationalization of trust adapted to the specificities of DeFi in an emerging economy context. Managerially, it provides an actionable framework for policymakers, regulators, and DeFi solution designers targeting unbanked markets. Keywords: Decentralized Finance (DeFi); UTAUT; Trust; Technology Adoption; Micro-Enterprises Morocco; Financial Inclusion; Blockchain; FinTech; Conceptual Model
The rapid advancement of blockchain technology has given rise to Decentralized Finance (DeFi), a financial ecosystem that operates without traditional intermediaries and challenges the foundational structures of conventional banking. DeFi platforms enable peer-to-peer financial services through smart contracts, offering increased transparency, accessibility, and efficiency. This study aims to analyze the potential of DeFi to disrupt traditional banking models by examining its core mechanisms, value propositions, and structural differences from centralized financial institutions. The research seeks to assess both the opportunities and challenges posed by DeFi in reshaping financial intermediation. A qualitative analytical approach was employed, drawing on an integrative review of peer-reviewed literature, industry reports, and documented DeFi case examples. Data were analyzed through thematic synthesis to compare DeFi functionalities with traditional banking operations, focusing on governance, risk management, and financial inclusion. The findings indicate that DeFi introduces innovative financial models that reduce transaction costs, expand access to financial services, and enhance operational transparency. The study concludes that DeFi represents a transformative yet complementary force rather than a complete replacement for traditional banking. Its future impact will depend on regulatory adaptation, technological maturity, and institutional integration.
Ding Ding, Yang Li, Poh Ling Neo, Zhiyuan Wang · 5 authors
This paper develops a tractable theoretical framework to study how network participation shapes the boom–bust dynamics of non-fungible token (NFT) prices. We model NFT pricing under network effects and heterogeneous consumers, and show that prices and participation are jointly determined in equilibrium. The model implies a critical participation threshold that separates expansion from contraction regimes: above this threshold, positive feedback between participation and valuation generates self-reinforcing growth, while below it, weakening network benefits lead to contraction. We provide empirical evidence using data from the aggregate NFT market and prominent collections including Bored Ape Yacht Club (BAYC) and CryptoPunks. Reduced-form regressions show a positive association between prices and network participation, with stronger effects at the collection level than in the aggregate market. Threshold estimation further provides evidence consistent with regime-dependent dynamics, with clearer tipping behaviour in well-defined NFT communities than in the aggregate market. These findings suggest that NFT valuation is closely tied to network structure and participation dynamics. More broadly, this paper contributes a unified framework that links participation, price formation, and threshold behaviour in NFT markets.
Ignat Melnikov, Roman Vlasov, Vladimir Gorgadze, Andrey Seoev · 5 authors
Decentralized Finance (DeFi) is a rapidly evolving segment of blockchain technology that enables a transformative approach to financial services through Web3 applications. By leveraging smart contracts, DeFi allows developers to build flexible and innovative financial instruments. Among the most prominent DeFi primitives by liquidity are decentralized exchange~(DEX) swap protocols~(such as Uniswap, Curve, and Balancer) that facilitate fast token-to-token exchanges. However, new exchange mechanisms also introduce new market inefficiencies that can be systematically exploited by arbitrageurs. This paper focuses on swap protocols based on the Automated Market Maker~(AMM), where the product of reserves is preserved as an invariant. We analyze the interaction between arbitrageurs and AMM liquidity pools and develop a mathematical model grounded in empirical pool configurations. Using this model, we derive bounds on the joint revenue of liquidity providers~(LPs) and arbitrageurs, propose a method to estimate the expected number of blocks until the occurrence of Impermanent Loss~(IL), and obtain a lower bound on the pool fee required to achieve a fixed target probability of staying in the Impermanent Gain (IG) zone within a block. The proposed framework extends existing LP risk-assessment methodologies by quantifying symbiotic profitability zones, providing a principled basis for fee selection that aligns LP-arbitrageur incentives and enhances market stability.
Kemardo Tyrell, Khalid Ballouli, ALBERTO MAYDEU-OLIVARES, Andrew Goldsmith
Purpose This study examines adoption intentions for sports non-fungible tokens (NFTs) using the Unified Theory of Acceptance and Use of Technology 2 (UTAUT2) as an analytical framework. Specifically, it investigates how established technology adoption constructs operate in the context of blockchain-enabled, fan-oriented digital assets among prospective non-users. Design/methodology/approach Survey data were collected from 350 prospective sports NFT non-adopters. Structural equation modeling (SEM) was employed to test the influence of six UTAUT2 constructs—performance expectancy, effort expectancy, social influence, facilitating conditions, hedonic motivation, and price value—on behavioral intention. Habit was excluded due to the non-adopter sample. Findings Effort expectancy (β = 0.257, p = 0.010), facilitating conditions (β = 0.234, p = 0.048), and hedonic motivation (β = 0.296, p = 0.023) positively predicted behavioral intention, underscoring the importance of perceived usability, institutional support, and experiential appeal. Performance expectancy demonstrated a significant negative relationship (β = −0.254, p = 0.010), suggesting that strong functional expectations may generate skepticism in speculative digital asset markets. Social influence approached significance, while price value was not significant. Overall, prospective adopters prioritized emotional engagement and ease of interaction over economic considerations or normative pressures. Originality/value This study extends UTAUT2 to an emerging sport technology context and demonstrates how traditional adoption mechanisms recalibrate when applied to symbolic, blockchain-enabled fan assets. It contributes to sport management and technology adoption literature by highlighting the distinct motivational structure underlying early-stage sports NFT adoption.
A central question of the Ethereum ecosystem is where Maximal Extractable Value (MEV)revenue originates and to what extent it stems from harming unsuspecting users. It is acceptable if MEV arises from arbitrages between centralised and decentralised exchanges (CEX-DEX). Yet theoretical models have significantly underestimated the scale of these arbitrages, while empirical studies have highlighted their importance - though these remain conservative estimates, constrained by numerous debatable heuristic assumptions. Revisiting the theoretical model, we found that CEX-DEX arbitrages require trading volumes on the order of the total activity of major liquidity pools and yield profits comparable to MEV. Most prior AMM models utilised the Black-Scholes (BS) stochastic differential equation (SDE) - i.e., geometric Brownian motion - and assumed continuous price trajectories where asset prices move in small increments only.We argue that BS underestimates arbitrage profits by ignoring price jumps, which are precisely the points at which arbitrage opportunities tend to arise. To address this gap, we present an extended discrete-time AMM model in which the price process is the sum of a diffusive component and stochastic jumps that can have arbitrary noise distributions. Although mathematically more involved this framework allows us to employ a general discrete-time SDE and compute the stationary probability distribution via function iteration with geometric convergence. We further prove that the resulting mispricing process is an ergodic Markov chain. We implement our model in C++, collect spot prices and AMM exchange data from the Ethereum blockchain and fit the model parameters to the observed prices. The estimates derived from our model closely match empirical observations and provide a natural theoretical explanation for several fundamental questions in the blockchain ecosystem.
Using a comprehensive dataset from Deribit, we show that Bitcoin options trading activity is concentrated around two distinct intraday periods: 8:00–9:00 GMT and 14:00–15:00 GMT, relative to other hours of the day. The latter peak coincides with the opening of the New York Stock Exchange and is largely absent on weekends, suggesting spillovers from traditional equity markets to the Bitcoin options market. In contrast, the concentration of trading activity around the 8:00–9:00 GMT period appears to be driven by investors rolling over and re-establishing expiring options around the 8:00 GMT settlement, as this effect persists on both weekdays and weekends, and is stronger on days with more expiring contracts and for contracts with shorter maturities. These findings highlight how institutional trading conventions shape intraday activity in cryptocurrency derivatives and provide the first systematic evidence of intraday patterns in Bitcoin options trading.
The emergence of decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) represents a significant shift in organizational design driven by blockchain technology. Unlike traditional hierarchical structures, DAOs operate through decentralized governance, algorithmic rules, and collective coordination embedded within distributed systems. Despite growing scholarly attention, existing research remains fragmented, with limited integration across technological, governance, and organizational dimensions. This paper addresses this gap by developing a multidimensional theoretical framework that explains the organizational logic of DAOs through the interaction of blockchain architecture, governance mechanisms, and coordination processes. Drawing on an integrative review of the literature, DAOs are conceptualized as socio-technical systems in which technological infrastructure enables decentralized governance, governance mechanisms shape participation and decision-making, and coordination processes support collective action and value creation. The framework highlights the interdependencies among these dimensions and advances a set of theoretical propositions to guide future research. By offering a more integrated perspective, this study contributes to DAO scholarship and extends organizational theory to better account for decentralized and algorithmic forms of organizing. The findings also provide insights for designing and governing DAOs in the evolving digital economy.
Accurate, transparent, and scalable Measurement, Reporting, and Verification (MRV) of greenhouse-gas emissions is foundational to credible climate governance, yet prevailing systems remain fragmented, low-frequency, and vulnerable to manipulation. This paper proposes a hybrid IoT–Hadoop–blockchain architecture that reconceptualizes carbon data as a continuously governed digital asset rather than a static compliance artifact. High-frequency operational data are collected through IoT infrastructures, stored and pre-processed in Hadoop for scalability and data sovereignty, and anchored on a Hyperledger Fabric consortium blockchain using Merkle-tree commitments to ensure immutability and traceability. A Carbon Data Interface Standard (CDIS) harmonizes heterogeneous data sources, while Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO)-based governance distributes authority across individual and institutional stakeholders. A Dynamic Authority Selection Mechanism (DASM) aligns participation in the consensus process with verifiable performance, institutionalizing a coopetitive model of data stewardship. The architecture further integrates with a public-chain value layer, enabling tokenization pathways and interoperability with emerging Web3 and Real-World Asset (RWA) climate-finance mechanisms. The results demonstrate how decentralized infrastructure, cryptographic verification, and polycentric governance can jointly improve data integrity, transparency, and market relevance in MRV systems. The paper concludes by outlining empirical pilot pathways and future research directions in AI-assisted verification, dynamic standardization, and climate-linked digital finance.
Este artigo apresenta um esboço estruturado sobre “Dinâmica de Arbitragem entre DEXs e CEXs: Velocidade e Lucratibilidade.”. O objetivo é analisar os fundamentos técnicos e econômicos da arbitragem entre <i>centralized exchanges</i> (CEXs) e <i>decentralized exchanges</i> (DEXs), com foco em como velocidade, latência e estrutura de taxas condicionam a lucratividade dessas estratégias no ecossistema Web3 contemporâneo. Estudos empíricos recentes medem, em detalhe, a economia por trás da arbitragem CEX‑DEX e do MEV associado, mostrando que a maioria dos lucros é capturada por poucos <i>searchers</i> profissionais e que as oportunidades de arbitragem desaparecem em janelas de tempo de frações de segundo. Análises de mercado indicam que, em média, operações bem‑sucedidas de arbitragem CEX‑DEX podem exibir margens brutas em torno de 30–40% sobre o capital efetivamente arriscado por trade, mas que a competição e os pagamentos a <i>block builders</i> comprimem esses retornos ao longo do tempo, caracterizando um mercado altamente monopolizado. Pesquisas teóricas sobre <i>latency arbitrage</i> e sobre o <i>timing</i> ótimo de arbitragem entre CEXs e DEXs modelam explicitamente o efeito da latência de blockchain, da ordem “first‑come, first‑served” e da vantagem de co‑location em data centers, demonstrando que a maior parte do <i>excess return</i> se concentra em janelas de 0,5 a 2 segundos após o surgimento de um desvio de preço entre venues. Trabalhos que estudam a dinâmica de preços em AMMs mostram, ainda, que taxas de swap introduzem uma banda de não‑arbitragem em torno do preço de referência em CEXs, restringindo as oportunidades de arbitragem a desvios acima de um certo limiar e conectando diretamente estrutura de taxas, liquidez e frequência de arbitragem. Conclui‑se que a arbitragem CEX‑DEX é hoje um jogo de alta frequência e forte competição, em que velocidade de execução, acesso a canais privados (MEV‑Boost) e otimização de custos determinam quem captura a maior parte das oportunidades de lucro.<br>
O presente artigo analisa a dicotomia entre descentralização teórica e descentralização real em redes blockchain, com foco nas métricas de distribuição de nós validadores e de poder de voto. O objetivo é investigar em que medida os fundamentos técnicos e econômicos dos mecanismos de consenso refletem, de fato, uma distribuição ampla de controle, ou se concentram poder em poucos agentes, contrariando as promessas de infraestrutura verdadeiramente distribuída. A metodologia adotada baseia-se em revisão bibliográfica de trabalhos recentes sobre descentralização em consenso Prova de Participação (Proof-of-Stake – PoS) e Prova de Trabalho (Proof-of-Work – PoW), em estudos de caso empíricos que medem coeficiente de Nakamoto, índices de Gini e Herfindahl-Hirschman (HHI), além de relatórios sobre distribuição geográfica e por provedores de validadores em redes como a Solana. Os resultados obtidos indicam que métricas superficiais, a exemplo da simples contagem de nós, podem mascarar riscos sistêmicos: em diversas redes PoS, um conjunto relativamente pequeno de validadores, países e provedores de infraestrutura controla fração substancial do stake, de forma que poucas entidades seriam suficientes para censurar transações ou comprometer a liveness da rede. Estudos recentes sobre consenso PoS mostram ainda que modelos de ponderação de stake alternativos – como Square Root Stake Weight (SRSW) e Logarithmic Stake Weight (LSW) – podem melhorar, em média, 51% e 132% as métricas de descentralização (Nakamoto, Gini, HHI), sugerindo caminhos concretos para tornar a distribuição de poder mais equitativa. Conclui-se que a descentralização real exige métricas multidimensionais que incorporem stake, geografia, infraestrutura e diversidade de clientes, e que o desenho de protocolos e políticas de governança precisa considerar explicitamente esses indicadores para alinhar a prática ao ideal normativo de descentralização da Web3.
Abstract: This paper examines how national cryptocurrency regulations affect cross-country Bitcoin price segmentation, local prices, and traded volumes. Using daily data for 22 countries since 2013, we apply a dynamic fixed effects framework to deviations from the law of one price (LOP), controlling for country-specific barriers and global shocks. We distinguish between regulatory frameworks that enhance market functioning (e.g., securities laws, payment system integration, regulatory sandboxes), pro-innovation policies, restrictive measures (e.g., banking bans), and anti-money laundering/countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) rules. Our results show that comprehensive and pro-innovation frameworks reduce price deviations from the USD benchmark, lower local prices, and increase traded volumes, while banking bans fragment markets, depress prices, and reduce volumes. AML/CFT laws exert a consistent downward effect on prices regardless of global conditions. Threshold Auto-Regressive (TAR) models further reveal that highly regulated countries—whether supportive or restrictive—are more sensitive to macro-financial factors such as capital account openness, inflation, relative traded volumes, and remittances, indicating tighter links to the broader financial system. These findings suggest that regulation not only shapes domestic market conditions but also alters the transmission of global and macro-financial shocks into cryptocurrency markets.
Yield-Aggregatoren automatisieren den Prozess des Yield-Farming im Bereich des Decentralized Finance (DeFi), indem sie Nutzerkapital bündeln und über verschiedene Protokolle hinweg einsetzen, um Renditen zu optimieren. Aufgrund ihrer hohen Komplexität sind ihre Funktionsweisen jedoch schwer nachzuvollziehen, und die Forschung zu ihren internen Mechanismen sowie den Interaktionen mit anderen Protokollen ist bislang begrenzt. Diese Arbeit adressiert diese Forschungslücke durch die Analyse zweier Ethereum-basierter Yield-Aggregatoren: Yearn Finance und Cian Yield Layer. Hierzu wurden Blockchain-Daten über einen Zeitraum von einem Jahr (4. Mai 2024 bis 3. Mai 2025) erhoben und ausgewertet, bestehend aus 2.459 Yearn-Transaktionen mit 5.575 Token-Transfers sowie 921 Cian-Transaktionen mit 1.963 Token-Transfers. Die Arbeit kombiniert eine operative Analyse, eine Netzwerkanalyse der Kapitalflüsse und einen Vergleich der Plattformmerkmale. Die Ergebnisse zeigen unterschiedliche Strategien: Yearn investiert Kapital überwiegend in Lending-Protokolle, indem es Liquidität zur Verfügung stellt, während Cian auf gehebeltes, rekursives Staking unter Einsatz von Flash-Loans setzt, um Restaking-Erträge zu erhöhen. Yearn hat eine breite Nutzerbasis mit vergleichsweise kleinen Einzeltransaktionen, während Cian eine kleinere Nutzerbasis besitzt, die von einem höheren Anteil großer Einzahlungen geprägt ist. Auf Grundlage der Analyse wurde ein konzeptionelles Modell entwickelt, das aus zwei miteinander verbundenen Lebenszyklen besteht: dem User-Lifecycle (Einzahlungen, Halteperiode, Auszahlungen) und dem Strategy-Management-Lifecycle (Kapitalallokation, Strategieausführung, Umschichtung). Dieses Modell erfasst die grundlegenden ökonomischen Funktionen von Yield-Aggregatoren unabhängig von ihrer technischen Implementierung. Die Arbeit liefert empirische Einblicke in die Funktionsweise von Yield-Aggregatoren, identifiziert DeFi-Protokolle als Investitionsziele und stellt ein konzeptionelles Modell zum Verständnis der Mechanismen von Yield-Aggregatoren vor.
Markets for cultural goods require intermediaries who construct the shared conventions, quality signals, and reputational infrastructure through which cultural value is assessed and stabilized. Non-fungible token (NFT) platforms assumed intermediary functions without this institutional apparatus, a condition we term unconventionalized intermediation. Drawing on cultural production scholarship and paradox theory, we analyze Reddit discourse related to NBA Top Shot, a prominent NFT platform, to examine how NFT cultural markets persist under this structural condition. Our analysis reveals three aggregate paradoxes structuring collector participation – precious precarity (disrupted value construction), enslaved freedom (disrupted governance), and resonant isolation (disrupted meaning circulation) – each arising from a specific failure of the cultural production processes that conventionalized intermediaries normally perform. We further identify six management mechanisms through which collectors and platforms collaboratively navigate these tensions. Our findings extend strategic marketing scholarship on digitally mediated cultural markets and offer practical implications for artists, art market institutions, and platform operators.