Bitcoin is defined as digital money within a decentralized peer-to-peer payment network. It is a hybrid between fiat currency and commodity currency without intrinsic value and independent of any government or monetary authority. This paper analyses the question of whether Bitcoin is a medium of exchange or an asset and more specifically, what is its current usage and what usage will prevail in the future given its characteristics. We analyse the statistical properties of Bitcoin and find that it is uncorrelated with traditional asset classes such as stocks, bonds and commodities both in normal times and in periods of financial turmoil. The analysis of transaction data of Bitcoin accounts shows that Bitcoins are mainly used as a speculative investment and not as an alternative currency and medium of exchange.
This paper explores the recent development of digital currencies—currencies which are creatures of the Internet, self-authenticating, and usable worldwide by members of the general public to engage in the same types of direct, one-to-one transactions that daily occur using government-issued currencies. At present, the most developed digital currency measured by market capitalization is Bitcoin, which will be used as a proxy for the general phenomenon. Not surprisingly, as Bitcoin’s circulation and visibility has increased, so have the number of practical and legal issues surrounding its use. Some of these will be explored in this paper, with a view to considering the utility and viability of such currencies for widespread, global use.
We present an agent based stock flow consistent macroeconomic model with heterogeneous agents interacting through a decentralized matching process across multiple markets with multiple assets. The model is consistent across both the micro and macroeconomic levels, by providing a detailed, comprehensive, and rigorous accounting of real and financial flows and stocks. We implement the model using a brand new Java programming platform, explicitly designed for AB-SFC models.
In the history of money bitcoin represents an outstanding medium of exchange, independent from central authorities. Therefore, it has experienced impressive demand which, combined with inelastic supply, has led to huge price appreciation. Nonetheless, transaction volume has not been increasing accordingly. At the core of this conundrum is the very poor performance of bitcoin as unit of account: dramatic deflationary price instability makes bitcoin just impractical for commerce, but completely unserviceable for salaries, mortgages, and deferred payments in general. Ametrano (2014a) has championed as Hayek Money the proposal to engineer cryptocurrencies with fully automatic algorithmic non-discretionary elastic supply: the monetary rule of pegging to a price index would dynamically rebase the outstanding amount of money and achieve price stability. It is proposed here to implement Hayek Money as multiple coexisting units of account wrapped around the unmodified bitcoin (or any other cryptocurrency). Prices would be stable in terms of these rebased-bitcoin units of account: different coexisting cryptocurrencies all backed by the same bitcoins, each one with its own floating bitcoin-equivalent rebasing index. These cryptocurrencies would define a new monetary standard, with striking resemblance to the gold standard as improved by the compensated dollar proposed by Fisher (1913). In this Fisher Money scenario bitcoin would be digital crypto-gold and exchange rates would be floating, not fixed, being just the relative prices of the respective cryptocurrency price indexes.
In the present paper we remark that the absence of an intrinsic or fundamental value represents a problem for the stability of the bitcoin’s price as an asset. In addition, we consider some …nancial stability concerns that derive from the hypothesis that the bitcoin will survive as an asset subject to high speculation.
Bitcoins have emerged as a possible competitor to usual currencies, but other\ncrypto-currencies have likewise appeared as competitors to the Bitcoin\ncurrency. The expanding market of crypto-currencies now involves capital\nequivalent to $10^{10}$ US Dollars, providing academia with an unusual\nopportunity to study the emergence of value. Here we show that the Bitcoin\ncurrency in itself is not special, but may rather be understood as the\ncontemporary dominating crypto-currency that may well be replaced by other\ncurrencies. We suggest that perception of value in a social system is generated\nby a voter-like dynamics, where fashions form and disperse even in the case\nwhere information is only exchanged on a pairwise basis between agents.\n
This paper considers whether the stability of Bitcoin in the market as a method of payment using a dual currency money-search model. In the model, there is traditional money and Bitcoin. The two currencies are classified by the storage cost and the probability that sellers accept particular money for payments. Agents are randomly matched for transactions. To consider substitution effect between monies, we allow new entries every period. In the beginning of each period, new entrants come into the matching process with a unit of money of their choice. A certain number of sellers also come into the same process to maintain the population share of sellers at a constant level. With appropriately chosen parameters, the author finds that there can be stable and unstable equilibria of the share of bitcoiners. In this case, a stable equilibrium is a success (bitcoiners take a large share) while the other (unstable) is a failure (bitcoiners take a marginal share or vanish). However, if the inflation rate of traditional money decreases, the successful equilibrium disappears to start approaching the failure even if Bitcoin is currently widely accepted. Furthermore, welfare comparisons suggest that an increase in the share of bitcoiners has a negative effect; hence, the benefit from reductions in the transaction costs must compensate for the welfare erosion if Bitcoin is accepted as a new kind of payment system. If the author is to succeed, the Bitcoin community or the public authorities need to be prepared for protecting the system from several illicit activities.
We present a highly stylized agent-based computational model (ABM) of an artificial economic and monetary union. Contrary to other current macroeconomic ABMs, it focuses on the relations/consequences of credit-financed, high-leveraged economies, conspicuous consumption within and across borders and a monetary and economic union of individual countries. The model includes a number of boundedly rational agents of the following types: a central bank, states & governments, banks, firms and households. In summary, it enables simulations of interacting political economies within a monetary union, entailing complex interactions and interdependencies between centralized governments/central banks and decentralized markets for goods (regular and status), labor, loans as well as bonds from the bottom up. Through its modular structure, we are able to apply dynamic comparative institutional analysis by investigating medium and long-run economic effects.
Five years after the introduction of the peer-to-peer payment system and digital currency bitcoin, cryptocurrencies have flourished and become a global phenomenon. Concerns regarding the impact of cryptocurrency on financial stability and the conduct of monetary policy have drawn regulatory scrutiny and formal policy stances on this emerging phenomenon. The main purpose of the present research is to determine whether cryptocurrencies are scarce and can, by this virtue, be regarded as money. Cryptocurrencies such as bitcoin and litecoin are programmed to have supply scarcity, however the fact that myriad digital coins can be created effortless by emulation raises the question of whether the total combined supply of this potential money is indeed scarce or not. The primary focus of the paper is to determine empirically if the two main cryptocurrencies, bitcoin and litecoin are actually perceived by the market as being different. In order to determine whether bitcoin and litecoin are perceived as similar or not by the market, I conduct an empirical analysis using daily closing price and trade volumes data from major exchanges Bitstamp and BTC-e. I calculate correlations on a monthly and weekly frequency to investigate price co-movement and its dynamics. Complementarity and substitutability for the entire sample and for 4 separate subsamples is formally analyzed through the calculation of direct price elasticities and of cross-price elasticities of volume. I show that in spite of negligible fundamental differences that would lead us to believe that the two cryptocoins are interchangeable and fungible to a great extent, the empirical landscape is more complex, with fair evidence in favor of substitutability, i.e. them being effectively perceived as different monies. The implication of this finding is that the supply scarcity of any individual coin is not placed under question by the potentially infinite aggregate supply of all cryptocurrencies. Cryptocurrencies can posses scarcity, and, other properties left aside, can be regarded as money.
The bachelor thesis deals with potential of digital currency Bitcoin to become universally accepted medium of exchange and with advantages, which its usage would bring to economy. In the thesis there are analysed factors important for its future progression. There are identified both positive and negative factors. Among the positive ones there is pseudonymity, low transaction costs, protection against government actions and inovative potential in the field of financial services. Among the negative ones there is the question of the system security, network effect, the risk of government against Bitcoin itself and high volatility. Volatility of bitcoin valu is identified as the major disadvantage of the currency. Next part of theoretical part deals with the confusion about virtual currencies and regression theorem. Logical analysis suggests that this confusion is caused by wrong interpretation of regression theorem, which is mostly caused by improper understanding of the term direct use. In the next part, Bitcoin is analysed from the view of the Austrian business cycle theory. Because of the inability of performing credit expansion, Bitcoin is identified as currency significantly limiting the strenght of business cycles. Practical part analysis the developement of volatility in time and its dependence on events and spekulative demand. The hypothesis, that high volatility of bitcoin value is caused by immaturity of the technology is not confirmed.
This work presents an economic analysis of virtual currency and a system of payment known as Bitcoin. From many goals of this work, the main is to answer a question, whether the Bitcoins are to cause revolution at financial markets. To solve this I applied theoretical knowledge of Austrian school on the Bitcoin currency. Given this facts it has turned out, that the nature of Bitcoin truly is revolutionary. However, it would be wrong to assume, that the Bitcoins are to actually spark significant changes in current monetary system. For a better understanding of all circumstances, the development of an exchange and the evolution of money was involved in this work. From an economical perspective, it is obvious, that the Bitcoins certainly are a new kind of currency that flows beside money but also cannot replace it. It is the specificity of the system what creates barriers preventing Bitcoins from becoming more widespread and used more often. The benefits of this thesis lie in a complex economic analysis of Bitcoin currency and a prediction of its future development.
The main objective of this diploma thesis is to find out the potential of digital currencies to replace contemporary fiat currency. Specifically, the thesis is focused on cryptocurrency Bitcoin, which currently has the highest market value. The thesis is divided into three main chapters. The first one focuses on money itself and its function, not only today but also throughout the history. Second chapter explains substance and functioning of Bitcoin, as well as its role in the current monetary system. Likewise the question of regulatory measures and competition of altcoins is being examined. Final part analyses the future of digital currencies and it compares pros and cons of Bitcoin and money we use today. Furthermore, it is discussed whether Bitcoin is the next bubble in the financial market. In the end, main problems which Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies deal with are mentioned and a possible future development is outlined.
This thesis aims to completely map the problem of new forms of money, called cryptocurrency. It explains the economic principles of functioning these decentralized currencies, particularly emitting (the mining), amount of fees and functioning of the payment system. The work is focused on the currency Bitcoin, for which it describes in detail its origin and development, possibility of simultaneous use (in many examples) as well as possible future scenarios of these currencies. In conclusion, the work describes role of Bitcoin in the current banking system and risks of the Bitcoin.
Syftet med denna uppsats är att undersöka Bitcoins egenskaper och funktioner samt diskutera dess eventuella påverkan på dagens ekonomiska system. Den forskning som publicerats på ämnet undersöker främst tekniska och säkerhetsmässiga detaljer, det är därför intressant att analysera ur en ekonomisk synvinkel. Genom att använda makroekonomisk teori ska jag försöka klargöra om Bitcoin kan konkurrera med dagens valutor. Bitcoins volatilitet i värde gör det tvivelaktigt, en volatilitet som inte kan kontrolleras. Bitcoin uppfyller delar av de funktioner och egenskaper som definierar en valuta enligt makroekonomisk teori, men inte lika många som fiatpengar och Bitcoin bör därför inte kunna konkurrera med dagens valutor. Fiatpengar är att föredra även i andra områden som acceptans och säkerhet. Bitcoin är bättre ur ett kostnadsperspektiv, dock under specifika omständigheter som sällan uppfylls. Bitcoin kommer därför tills vidare fungera som ett alternativ betalningssystem och valuta för personer och företag som är villiga att ta de risker som medföljer.
This paper uses a contract theory framework to analyze the mechanisms of eurozone financial governance, with a focus on centralization vs. decentralization and incentive problems. By constructing a Stackelberg game model with n Ministries of Finance as the first movers and the European Central Bank as the second mover, we show that each government can create growth in its own country (self-benefit) by increasing government spending, but that this will increase inflation, resulting in a decrease in the value of the euro. As these effects are shared equally by eurozone countries (cost sharing), an incentive to free-ride at the expense of other countries is present. We then analyze a penalty-based solution to the free-rider problem and derive a second-best solution where a commitment not to renegotiate penalties ex-post is impossible. The optimal solution shows that ¡°limited sovereignty, ¡± that is, substantially constrained fiscal sovereignty, should be imposed as a high marginal cost for the issuance of public debt. Finally, we close the paper by discussing the possibility of Fiscal Integration (Fiscal Union).
Existing centralized digital currency systems derive value from assets backing the digital units. Bitcoins have no assets backing the units. They are valued from being traded in public online market. In previous digital currency systems units were non-negotiable. Bitcoin units transfer value with each transaction and hold more obvious cash-like features than previous digital currency products. Bitcoin transactions are pushed from a user account, opposite of bank checks and credit cards that are pulled out by someone other than the account owner. These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
This paper uses simple monetary economic theory in order to extract implied BTC interest rates from exchange rates, interest rates and monetary supply data. Uncovered interest rate parity permits to derive a theoretical risk free BTC interest rate that is supposed to apply in a no arbitrage environment with rational expectations. Application to BTC/US$ exchange rates, Libor and Money supply US M2 data on the period September 2010 to January 2014 provides estimates, which illustrate what a risk free BTC interest rate could look like.
The considerable diffusion of bitcoins over the Internet that took place in the last two years has highlighted some important issue about the use of anonym tools of payment in e-commerce. Even though bitcoins are largely considered to be a digital currency, the legal and economic analysis draws the attention to a concomitant structure of financial commodity with risky features related to derivative instruments making the possibility of a bubble a case to consider. The significant growth in value and the intense volatility characterizing bitcoins are more likely to be the consequence of remarkable investments made by hedge funds and the effect of specific Institutional measures, than the outcome this efficient instrument has achieved on the Internet. The following article is analyzing bitcoins in their twofold nature: the structural considerations we will express are referred to virtual coins in general, whereas the financial evaluation is related to the specific volatility of our analysis target.
The aim of this thesis is to provide a holistic analysis and an economic understanding of Bitcoin, answering two key questions: (i) Why do bitcoins have value? (ii) Why and how will governments seek to regulate the use of bitcoin? To answer these questions, the thesis begins with a discussion of money itself, developing a framework of different types of monies in terms of their uses and properties that will form the basis of the analysis. Based on the technical properties of Bitcoin the framework developed above is then applied to identify bitcoin as a digital commodity money. Following this identification, potential uses of bitcoin supporting its value will be discussed, drawing particular attention to Bitcoin s resilience to regulation. In addition, real world examples of other commodity monies will be used to support the claim that bitcoin may circulate without use value and state backing. Governments tend to seek economic control through controlling money, and it will be argued that there are good reasons to expect governments to be hostile towards widespread use of bitcoin. This is to be expected, as use of bitcoin undermines governments capacity to control money.
This working paper presents a simple model for the macroeconomic behavior of bitcoin based on the economic equation of exchange. According to this model, the value of bitcoin is determined largely by the willingness of bitcoin holders to save bitcoin and not by its transactional use. This model therefore predicts that increased use of bitcoin will not cause its value to rise, but that the value of bitcoin in terms of fiat currency will be almost solely determined by the willingness of bitcoin holders to pull bitcoin out of circulation. This model suggests that bitcoin will not fall victim to a liquidity trap as suggested by some economists.
When processing transactions in a block, a miner increases his reward but also decreases his probability to earn any reward because the time needed for his block to reach consensus depends on its size. We show that this leads to a game situation between miners. We analytically solve this game for two miners. Then, we show that miners do not play a Nash equilibrium in the current Bitcoin mining environment, instead, they should not process any transaction. Finally, we show that the situation where no transaction is ever processed would stop being a Nash equilibrium if the transaction fee was multiplied or, equivalently, the fixed reward divided by a factor of about 12.