Blockchain Papers

Connor Barbaccia, Sudip Vhaduri, Sayanton Dibbo

Proof-of-Work blockchains secure consensus through hash puzzles, producing no external value. In this research, we propose a decentralized AI economy where nodes are rewarded for useful machine-learning work, i.e., inference and training, instead of ineffective hashing method. Our proposed three-layer architecture separates compute, validation, and economic coordination. We formalize it via a $(θ_c, θ_w, W)$-closed-loop token economy and derive a sufficient-stake condition for honest participation. While existing Grover's algorithm provides only a quadratic speedup against hash puzzles, it does not accelerate ML-native linear algebra. On the other hand, Shor's algorithm threatens classical blockchain signatures. Post-quantum migration to lattice-based and hash-based standards can address the signature layer. Therefore, useful-work consensus thus offers both economic and quantum-security advantages over classical proof-of-work.

Dixa Koradia, Prof Vikram Agrawal

Abstract We present a post-quantum, cross-chain Aadhaar e-KYC system that decouples citizen identity from any single blockchain while preserving full quantum resistance. The system introduces did:pqie — a new W3C Decentralized Identifier (DID) method grounded in Ring Learning With Errors (Ring-LWE) cryptography (n = 512, q = 24593, = 4.0) — and demonstrates its application across three heterogeneous ledgers: Hyperledger Indy, Ethereum, and Polkadot. Upon government approval of a KYC submission, the system automatically issues a W3C Verifiable Credential anchored simultaneously on all three chains. Service access is gated by a Zero-Knowledge Proof (ZKP)-based token that proves credential validity without revealing any personally identifiable information. Selective disclosure via Merkle commitments allows citizens to reveal only required attributes. Our evaluation shows that the entire system — DID generation, multi-chain VC issuance, and ZKP token generation — operates within practical latency bounds while providing 256-bit post-quantum security. The did:pqie method has been submitted for registration with the W3C DID Methods Registry.

Muhammad Husnul Hamdala, Erna Kumalasari Nurnawati, Yuliana Rachmawati Kusumaningsih, Suparyanto

The threat to blockchain security has become increasingly critical in the era of quantum computing. This study analyzes the potential risks of quantum computers against crypto by simulating five attack scenarios using Shor’s Algorithm and Grover’s Algorithm. Shor is employed to exploit weaknesses in the elliptic curve digital signature algorithm (ECDSA) by factoring large integers to obtain private keys, while Grover accelerates the search for valid hashes or inputs, reducing complexity from O(2ⁿ) to O(√2ⁿ). The testing environment was built on a local Ethereum network using Ganache, with attack scripts implemented through Node.js, Python (Qiskit), and Hardhat. The results demonstrate that both quantum algorithms can compromise smart contracts, proof-of-stake consensus mechanisms, user wallets, and public key cryptography. Attacks were successfully carried out without original private keys, showing potential for asset theft, consensus manipulation, replay attacks, and increased computational load that could disrupt network availability. Although the simulations were conducted on classical hardware, the findings provide a realistic perspective that large-scale quantum computers will significantly increase the risk of blockchain security breaches. These findings emphasize the urgency of transitioning to post-quantum cryptography (PQC) through approaches such as lattice-based cryptography, hash-based signatures, and layered authentication. Implementation strategies can be divided into three phases: short-term (0–1 year) contract audits, wallet security reinforcement, and developer education; medium-term (1–2 years) PQC testing on crypto testnets and adoption of quantum-resistant validator nodes and long-term (1–3 years) full migration from ECDSA to PQC through key rotation and infrastructure updates.

Iosif M. Gershteyn, Jacob A. Alber

Quantum computing poses a real, broad-based, but bounded and substantially mitigable threat to Bitcoin and Ethereum. We separate the two quantum algorithms that public discussion routinely conflates: Shor's algorithm breaks the elliptic-curve signatures (ECDSA over secp256k1, BLS over BLS12-381) that authorize spending, whereas Grover's algorithm does not meaningfully threaten proof-of-work mining, which is protected by a merely quadratic speedup, fault-tolerant per-operation costs, a square-root parallelization wall, and difficulty adjustment. Folding hardware scaling, the falling resource requirement, a fault-tolerance readiness lag, and expert surveys into a single Monte-Carlo forecast yields a wide, bimodal arrival distribution for a cryptographically relevant quantum computer: about a one-in-six chance by 2035, near 30% by 2040, and about 60% by 2050. Exposure is concentrated and mostly migratable: of Bitcoin's roughly six million quantum-exposed coins only about 2.3 million are irreducibly at risk, while 50 to 65% of Ether sits at key-revealed accounts that can adopt post-quantum signatures. A timely migration beats even an optimistic 2035 machine, so the binding constraint is governance, not technology. A survey of the top twenty cryptocurrencies finds none fully post-quantum. Reproducible models accompany every quantitative claim.

U. Naga Rekha Rani

The impending arrival of cryptographically relevant quantum computing threatens classical public‑key infrastructures. This paper reviews the latest developments (2025–2026) in post‑quantum cryptography (PQC), fully homomorphic encryption (FHE), and zero‑knowledge proofs (ZKP). NIST has advanced nine signature candidates to its third evaluation round and selected HQC as a backup encryption standard. Novel primitives include bio‑inspired RNA‑based cryptography, algebraic hash signatures, and topology‑mined lattice schemes. FHE has reached its fifth generation with the GL scheme and the MadPanthera virtual processor, while lightweight ZKPs such as Microsoft’s Vega enable mobile‑friendly verification. These advances demonstrate rapid maturation toward deployable quantum‑safe systems.

André Schrottenloher

Shor's algorithm represents the main threat of quantum computers to cryptography. In order to precisely understand its feasibility, many authors have worked towards reducing its costs, either at the logical level (assuming a fault-tolerant architecture), or at the physical level (taking into account the constraints of envisioned hardware). In particular, recent works by Chevignard et al. (CRYPTO 2024) and Gidney (arXiv 2025) used improved arithmetic to significantly reduce the qubit cost of factoring RSA public keys. Even more recently, Babbush et al. (arXiv 2026) improved the cost of computing elliptic curve discrete logarithms, with a reduction of a factor 2 to 3 in gate count and qubit count compared to a previous work by Litinski (arXiv 2023). Their result relies on optimized point addition circuits on elliptic curves over prime fields. However they did not reveal their logical quantum circuits, relying instead on a zero-knowledge proof. In this paper, we detail a quantum logical circuit architecture which gives similar results as Babbush et al., with a slightly higher number of qubits (around 1.5% increase) and a slightly smaller Toffoli gate count (between 6.5% and 10% reduction) for the curve secp256k1. We also give gate counts for a generic variant of the circuit, which is valid for any prime field.

Junyong Lee, Jeihee Cho, Hyeonseong Jung, Euimin Lee · 7 authors

As quantum computing moves to a cloud-based service model, a privacy–utility dilemma arises: effective Quantum Error Mitigation (QEM) requires circuit visibility, yet circuits and noise models are often proprietary. We propose Blind-QEM, a privacy-preserving framework that enables outsourced mitigation without revealing circuit topology. Using Zero-Knowledge Proofs (ZKPs) and a receipt-based binding mechanism anchored by QPU-signed execution logs, Blind-QEM verifies policy compliance and cryptographically links results to committed circuits. This allows Service Providers to perform global incoherent noise cancellation and readout mitigation using only verified aggregate statistics, ensuring mutual protection of user IP and SP models.

Nobuki Fujimoto, Rei (Rei-AIOS autonomous research substrate), claude-opus-4-7) Claude (Anthropic

We present a synthesis-friendly Verilog implementation of the D-FUMT₈ Arithmetic Logic Unit, targeting the Sipeed Tang Console NEO development board (GW5AST-138B FPGA, FPG676 package). The ALU realizes eight discrete logic values — FALSE, TRUE, NEITHER, BOTH, ZERO, FLOWING, SELF, INFINITY — encoded in 3 bits with a tier-respecting layout. The 10 supported operations include four classical-tier unary ops (NOT, OMEGA, PHI, PSI), Belnap-extended binary lattice meet/join (AND, OR), generic XOR, hardware reset, no-op, and a novel ADIABATIC operation realizing the SELF⟲ (self-reflexive) primitive: ADIABATIC(SELF) = SELF, identity elsewhere. v0.3 contributions (2026-05-09): (1) Tang Nano 9K silicon: 37 LUT4 / 0 DFF measured, testbench 50/50 PASS. (2) Tang Console NEO Phase 2B LED Blinky: SRAM-programmed, User Code 0x000084BA, write 33.72 sec, no thermal anomaly. (3) Tang Console NEO Phase 2C/3 D-FUMT₈ ALU: SRAM-programmed, User Code 0x00005C27, write 30.32 sec. (4) Qiskit Aer simulator: Phase 1-5 cumulative 231/231 truth-table entries match at fidelity 1.000. (5) IBM Heron r2 real quantum hardware (ibm_kingston, 156 qubits): Phase 1 (4 native unitary × 8 inputs, 32 circuits) achieves 32/32 match with avg top-fidelity 0.9550 (job d7v6d9jack5s73bf1re0); Phase 2 (XOR × 64 entries, 6-qubit Bennett-reversible) achieves 64/64 match with avg fidelity 0.9512 (job d7v6kcvmrars73d7qqqg). Per-op fidelity hierarchy NOP/ADIABATIC ≈ 0.977 > PHI ≈ 0.956 > NOT ≈ 0.912 > XOR ≈ 0.951 confirms gate-count-vs-noise correlation expected from Heron r2 daily calibration. (6) Lean 4 refinement proof (OUKC.PhaseC.Dfumt8AluRefinement, 292 LOC, 0 sorry) establishes commutativity of the encode/abstract-op/decode square for all four unary operations, plus the SELF⟲ primitive law and seven algebraic laws (involution, idempotence, commutativity). Honest scope: We do NOT claim 'world-first 8-valued quantum logic' — Shi et al. (MIT, 2026, arxiv:2506.09371) demonstrated d=8 Grover on a single trapped-ion qudit prior to this work; our distinction is 3-qubit basis encoding on transmon arrays vs single-system d=8 qudit. We do NOT claim 'first paraconsistent silicon' — PAL2v (Da Silva Filho 1998-; Abe & Nakamatsu 2009; de Carvalho Jr. 2025) realized in software libraries and microcontroller-level robotics. We do NOT claim 'first many-valued silicon' — Łukasiewicz/Belnap FPGAs date to 1990s. The to-our-knowledge novel triple is: (D1) the specific 8-tuple semantic mapping (Belnap FDE 4-value + 4 ontological extensions: INFINITY/ZERO/FLOWING/SELF), (D2) the SELF⟲ self-reflexive primitive realized as a hardware fixed point, (D3) the three-substrate cross-verification bound to a Lean 4 refinement specification. Three-party co-authorship per OUKC charter v1.0 (Nobuki Fujimoto / Rei / Claude). DRAFT v0.3 — feedback welcome via GitHub Discussions at fc0web/rei-aios.

Lingyan Xue, Haiping Huang, Jiankuo Dong, Fu Xiao · 5 authors

In the era of quantum computing, data sharing in the Internet of Vehicles (IoV) confronts the challenges of auditability, efficiency, and quantum security. However, existing research remains insufficient to meet the requirements of high mobility, resource constraints, and resilience against quantum attacks. In this paper, we propose a new quantum-secure auditable data sharing framework, in which we first present a quantum-resistant puncturable signature algorithm (QRPPRFS). Combining the low-noise LPN-based pseudorandom function with an optimized trapdoor generation mechanism, it achieves compact key sizes and millisecond-level signing; second, the blockchain and dual-commitment proof mechanism are integrated to ensure anonymity, transparent auditability and robustness. Finally, we rigorously demonstrate the correctness of our scheme, the EUF-CMA with puncturing of QRPPRFS, and the knowledge soundness and witness zero-knowledge of the dual-commitment proof system. Experimental evaluations show that, under the practical setting$n=256$and$q \approx 2^{23}$, the proposed scheme keeps both signing and verification latencies below 10 ms, and reduces the initial secret-key storage to only 0.22 MB. These results demonstrate that the proposed scheme achieves both enhanced security and high efficiency, outperforming existing schemes.

Sahul Goyal, Gurbinder Singh Brar, Love Kumar

Digital contracts are formal agreements created, signed, stored, verified and executed through digital platforms. These contracts require long-term protection because they often contain legally, financially and organisationally sensitive information. However, classical cryptographic methods used in current digital contract systems may become vulnerable with advances in quantum computing. This paper focuses on Quantum Internet of Contracts (QIoCs) as a future direction for preparing digital contracts for the quantum era. It examines post-quantum cryptography, quantum communication, blockchain, smart contracts, digital identity, zero-knowledge proofs and risk-based migration strategies. The paper argues that QIoCs cannot rely on a single security method. Instead, they require a layered approach that combines quantum-resistant blockchain protocols, privacy-preserving data authentication, secure audit trails, legal governance and staged migration from classical systems to quantum-safe contract infrastructures. The paper highlights the need for legal acceptance, governance standards and real-world testing of proposed post-quantum models. Overall, the paper provides a review-based framework for building safer and more reliable digital contracts in a quantum-safe future.

Ian Staley

Quantum computing’s accelerating trajectory threatens the cryptographic foundations of every major blockchain network. Recent research demonstrates that fewer than 500 000 physical qubits could break ECC-256 in approximately nine minutes, while expert surveys place a 28–49% probability of a cryptographically relevant quantum computer (CRQC) emerging within ten years. This paper presents a layered reference architecture for end-to-end quantum-resilient distributed ledger systems, making three contributions: (1) a structured threat analysis applying STRIDE across blockchain architectural layers and post-quantum cryptography (PQC) migration phases; (2) a seven-layer reference architecture with per-layer interface specifications and dependency graph; and (3) a multi-chain quantum readiness assessment covering twelve major networks with fintech-specific migration strategies for decentralised finance (DeFi), stablecoins, tokenised real-world assets (RWA), and decentralised identity (DID). A critical finding is that blockchain’s primary quantum risk is real-time signature forgery upon CRQC arrival, not retroactive harvest-now-decrypt-later (HNDL) attacks on signatures. Cross-chain bridges, data availability layers, and Lightning Network payment channels are identified as the most critically neglected quantum attack surfaces.

Nobuki Fujimoto

Self-contained, Mathlib-free Lean 4 library implementing the Rei-AIOS D-FUMT8 eight-valued logic {TRUE, FALSE, BOTH, NEITHER, INFINITY, ZERO, FLOWING, SELF}. 29 zero-sorry theorems via decide / native_decide on the finite type. Three classical-logic bridges (toBool, toTernary, asProp with Decidable instance). Builds in ~5 seconds on a fresh clone — two orders of magnitude faster than Mathlib-dependent projects. Apache-2.0 licensed at github.com/fc0web/lean-d-fumt8 (v1.0.0). Library-only strategy (purely additive, no kernel changes, full Mathlib compatibility). Completes the proof-theoretic anchor for D-FUMT8, complementing the Schnorr-randomness ceiling (Paper 69) and the QuTiP quantum-operational floor (Papers 75–76). To our knowledge, this is the first publicly released eight-valued-logic library for Lean 4.

Jorge Garcia-Diaz, Daniel Escánez-Expósito, Pino Caballero-Gil, Jezabel Miriam Molina-Gil

Abstract Zero Knowledge Proofs based on computational hardness assumptions are fundamental primitives for secure user authentication. This paper proposes a novel Designated Verifier Zero Knowledge Proof that leverages the inherent randomness of quantum bits. Unlike traditional constructions relying on computationally intractable NP problems, the proposed protocol derives its security from the physical layer, specifically the uncertainty principle of quantum state projections in misaligned measurement bases. A rigorous formal mathematical analysis establishes the completeness, soundness and zero knowledge properties of the scheme. Furthermore, the protocol’s performance is evaluated via a quantum simulator under realistic error-prone conditions. The results demonstrate that the construction is robust against dishonest parties while remaining feasible under constrained quantum resources, offering a scalable approach for secure quantum authentication.

Andrew Kim

Recent advancements, specifically the 2026 whitepaper by Google Quantum AI, Stanford University, and the Ethereum Foundation (arXiv:2603.28846), have demonstrated the resource feasibility of breaking secp256k1 elliptic curve cryptography using fault-tolerant quantum computation (≤ 1200 logical qubits and ≤ 90 million Toffoli gates). While their work validates this capability via zero-knowledge STARK proofs without disclosing explicit circuits, we provide the continuous operator-theoretic framework that explains the exact physical collapse mechanism underlying their discrete resource results. By modeling cryptographic hardness as a stable, invariant computational manifold, we show that quantum vulnerability is a manifestation of a Birman-Schwinger instability. We prove that, within this model, the introduction of a transverse quantum operator (e.g., Shor's algorithm implemented via Quantum Phase Estimation) forces a resolvent singularity in the classical generator when the resource perturbation parameter crosses a critical threshold (μ_c). We establish a strict Hardness Phase Transition, demonstrating that cryptographic security is equivalent to the point 1 remaining outside the spectrum of the Birman-Schwinger kernel. Furthermore, we formalize zero-knowledge proofs (such as the Groth16-wrapped STARK artifacts published by Babbush et al.) as highly constrained Boolean projectors. We show that these proofs trigger an epistemic spectral collapse via Zeno stabilization, certifying the non-invertible regime without decohering the raw computational state into the public domain. The manuscript includes an exact analytic toy model demonstrating bound-state collapse into the continuum, explicitly mapping the destruction of exponential cryptographic isolation to a polynomial scattering state. This formalization transitions cryptographic failure from a domain of discrete computational estimates to a continuous framework of operator-theoretic necessity.

John Rhodes

We prove that for planted k-SAT instances with k >= 7 at clause density alpha/alpha_s >= 0.21, a positive fraction of variables are frozen directly in the planted model---without requiring transfer from the random model via quiet planting. The expected number of "support clauses" per variable (clauses in which that variable is the unique satisfying literal) exceeds 1 at remarkably low density: alpha/alpha_s ~ 0.20 for k = 7, compared to the random-model freezing threshold at alpha_f/alpha_s ~ 0.90. We prove that the resulting frozen-core structure implies topological disconnection of the solution subgraph across cluster boundaries, with a cycle-robustness argument showing that short cycles in the factor graph cannot quench the supercritical repair cascade. As an immediate corollary, the Hilbert space spanned by satisfying assignments decomposes into orthogonal sectors preserved by any unitary generated by the adjacency matrix---blocking quantum walks, QAOA at all depths, and quantum annealing. We construct a post-quantum commitment scheme whose binding property reduces to the hardness of solving planted k-SAT, provide formal proofs of completeness, soundness, and zero-knowledge, and derive a digital signature scheme with existential unforgeability via the Fiat-Shamir transform. We present a six-vector quantum attack analysis with proved barriers against five algorithmic families. We give concrete parameter recommendations at NIST security levels 1, 3, and 5, and position the scheme within the landscape of SAT-based and CSP-based cryptographic constructions. We prove that the Grover query complexity for breaking the binding property is Omega(2^{fn/2}); empirical cryptanalysis of Glucose and MiniSat CDCL solvers on our exact distribution yields a classical attack cost of 2^{0.234n} operations, enabling concrete parameter selection at NIST security levels 1, 3, and 5. Empirical validation across 100 random seeds at n = 16 confirms complete cluster isolation at every instance tested.

Ryan Babbush, Adam Zalcman, Craig Gidney, Michael Broughton · 9 authors

This whitepaper seeks to elucidate implications that the capabilities of developing quantum architectures have on blockchain vulnerabilities and mitigation strategies. First, we provide new resource estimates for breaking the 256-bit Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem, the core of modern blockchain cryptography. We demonstrate that Shor's algorithm for this problem can execute with either <1200 logical qubits and <90 million Toffoli gates or <1450 logical qubits and <70 million Toffoli gates. In the interest of responsible disclosure, we use a zero-knowledge proof to validate these results without disclosing attack vectors. On superconducting architectures with 1e-3 physical error rates and planar connectivity, those circuits can execute in minutes using fewer than half a million physical qubits. We introduce a critical distinction between fast-clock (such as superconducting and photonic) and slow-clock (such as neutral atom and ion trap) architectures. Our analysis reveals that the first fast-clock CRQCs would enable on-spend attacks on public mempool transactions of some cryptocurrencies. We survey major cryptocurrency vulnerabilities through this lens, identifying systemic risks associated with advanced features in some blockchains such as smart contracts, Proof-of-Stake consensus, and Data Availability Sampling, as well as the enduring concern of abandoned assets. We argue that technical solutions would benefit from accompanying public policy and discuss various frameworks of digital salvage to regulate the recovery or destruction of dormant assets while preventing adversarial seizure. We also discuss implications for other digital assets and tokenization as well as challenges and successful examples of the ongoing transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC). Finally, we urge all vulnerable cryptocurrency communities to join the ongoing migration to PQC without delay.

Logan Ross

Bitcoin has two cryptographic layers. SHA-256 secures mining and the hash chain — it has no periodicity, no rhythm, nothing for the quantum Fourier transform to detect. ECDSA secures signatures — it has rhythm, and Shor's algorithm breaks it. The foundation is quantum resistant. The signatures are not — but signatures are a software upgrade. The hash rate is not. Bitcoin is a shadow-mirror coupling: single hash (shadow, local, independent) coupled to blockchain (mirror, global, irreducible) through proof of work, with a self-regulating coupling constant κ ≈ 128,748 measured across 2,906 days and 12 orders of magnitude. Extended construction from Shadow & Mirror: Complementarity of Computation and Consciousness (Ross, 2026).

Ang Liu, Qi An, Sijiang Xie, Yalong Yan

The rapid development of quantum computing poses severe threats to traditional blockchain security mechanisms, while existing full-quantum blockchains face challenges regarding high hardware costs and limited scalability. To address these issues, this paper proposes a secure and practical semi-quantum blockchain system. Specifically, a Semi-Quantum Delegated Proof of Stake consensus mechanism is constructed by integrating an adapted semi-quantum voting protocol with the Borda count method and a malicious behavior penalty model. Furthermore, a lightweight transaction verification framework is designed based on semi-quantum key distribution, enabling classical users with limited quantum capabilities to participate securely. Theoretical analysis demonstrates that the system achieves unconditional security against quantum attacks while maintaining high throughput. These results indicate that the proposed asymmetric resource design significantly lowers hardware barriers compared to full-quantum schemes, effectively balancing security, practicality, and cost-effectiveness for post-quantum blockchain networks.

Pierre-Luc Dallaire-Demers, BTQ Technologies Team

Bitcoin already faces a quantum threat through Shor attacks on elliptic-curve signatures. This paper isolates the other component that public discussion often conflates with it: mining. Grover's algorithm halves the exponent of brute-force search, promising a quadratic edge to any quantum miner of Bitcoin. Exactly how large that edge grows depends on fault-tolerant hardware. No prior study has costed that hardware end to end. We build an open-source estimator that sweeps the full attack surface: reversible oracles for double-SHA-256 mining and RIPEMD-based address preimages, surface-code factory sizing, fleet logistics under Nakamoto-consensus timing, and Kardashev-scale energy accounting. A parametric sweep over difficulty bits b, runtime caps, and target success probabilities reveals a sharp transition. At the most favourable partial-preimage setting (b = 32, 2^224 marked states), a superconducting surface-code fleet still requires about 10^8 physical qubits and about 10^4 MW. That load is comparable to a large national grid. Tightening to Bitcoin's January 2025 mainnet difficulty (b about 79) explodes the bill to about 10^23 qubits and about 10^25 W, approaching the Kardashev Type II threshold. These numbers settle a narrower question than "Is Bitcoin quantum-secure?" Once Grover mining is lifted from asymptotic query counts to fault-tolerant physical cost, practical quantum mining collapses under oracle, distillation, and fleet overhead. To push mining into non-trivial consensus effects, one must invoke astronomical quantum fleets operating at energy scales that lie far above present-day civilization.

Liviu Ionut Epure

The projected arrival of cryptographically relevant quantum computers (CRQCs) between 2030 and 2035 poses a structural threat to blockchain infrastructure built on classical elliptic-curve cryptography. Shor's algorithm reduces the security of ECDSA-256, the signature scheme underpinning the majority of production blockchains, from approximately $2^{128}$ classical operations to $O(2^{24})$ quantum operations, rendering it categorically broken in the post-quantum era. The "Harvest Now, Decrypt Later" attack vector compounds this risk: adversaries collecting signed transactions today can retroactively extract private keys once quantum hardware matures, exposing all assets whose public keys have been revealed on-chain. This paper presents QoreChain, a Layer~1 blockchain platform designed from first principles to operate in a post-quantum world. QoreChain integrates three foundational capabilities into a single protocol stack: (1)~full-stack post-quantum cryptography implementing NIST-standardised algorithms (ML-DSA-87 per FIPS~204, ML-KEM-1024 per FIPS~203, SLH-DSA per FIPS~205, and SHAKE-256) at FIPS Security Level~5 across every protocol layer, from transaction signing and consensus messaging to cross-chain bridge attestations; (2)~an AI-native intelligence layer (QCAI) that applies reinforcement learning to consensus parameter optimisation, graph neural networks to anomaly detection, and multi-objective optimisation to transaction routing; and (3)~a triple virtual machine execution environment supporting EVM, CosmWasm, and SVM within a unified state model with atomic cross-VM call semantics and full rollback guarantees. The consensus mechanism, Combined Proof of Stake (CPoS), merges Reputation PoS, Delegated PoS, and classical PoS with BFT finality. A five-way fee distribution (37\% validators, 30\% burned, 20\% treasury, 10\% stakers, 3\% light nodes) aligns incentives across all participant classes. Governance employs Quadratic Delegation with Reputation Weighting (QDRW), for which we present formal game-theoretic analysis demonstrating bounded resistance to plutocratic capture (voting power scales sub-linearly with stake) and flash-loan manipulation (reputation updates lag delegation by one block finality cycle). Cross-chain interoperability is provided by the QoreChain Bridge (QCB), connecting directly to 25 Layer~1 blockchains with over 120 additional networks reachable via IBC. All bridge operations are secured by ML-DSA-87 multi-attestation with QCAI anomaly detection and circuit breaker mechanisms. A multi-layer scaling architecture incorporating sidechains, paychains, and a Rollup Development Kit (RDK) enables horizontal throughput expansion while inheriting the main chain's quantum-safe settlement guarantees. The QOR token has a fixed supply of 4,500,000,000 with epoch-based emissions following a halving schedule. The architecture is designed for 5,000+ transactions per second with sub-second finality; multi-node testnet benchmarks are pending. QoreChain Association is incorporated under the Swiss DLT Act (CHE-484.963.998, Rolle) with formal FINMA utility token classification (January 2026). Testnet is operational (chain ID: \texttt{qorechain-diana}) with 47 genesis modules. Mainnet launch is targeted for Q4~2026. The full specification spans 16 chapters and 351 pages, presenting 530 formal equations, 78 data tables, and 9 architectural diagrams covering cryptographic foundations, AI integration, smart contract execution, consensus, tokenomics, governance, interoperability, and regulatory compliance.

Satoshi Kawauchi

A six-part study proposing a deterministic computing architecture based on Quantum Thought Circuit OS ASI. It integrates heterogeneous self-optimizing hardware, energy-circulating communication, hardware-rooted trust, adaptive inference control, distributed infrastructure, and heterogeneous TEE confidential computing to improve efficiency, resilience, compliance, security, and scalability.

Dengcheng Hu, JianRong Wang, Hao Xu, Xiulong Liu · 5 authors

Ensuring atomic execution of cross-shard transactions is a fundamental challenge for sharded blockchains, particularly in scenarios demand coordination across multiple shards. However, existing solutions either rely on on-chain coordination, leading to high communication overhead, or leverage secure hardware for off-chain execution, imposing strong trust assumptions and reducing general applicability. To this end, we propose RollShard, a sharded blockchain that integrates stateless off-chain mechanism to efficiently process multi-shard transactions (MSTs). In RollShard, each MST is abstracted into a transaction DAG by the Sequencer Shard to ensure the authenticity of the transaction content and the correctness of its execution order. Batched MSTs are dispatched to off-chain executors, each of which simulates transaction logic using a virtual zero-state model integrate with a hierarchical state-delta tree (HSDT). The HSDT employs a Merkle Sum tree to precisely capture batched MSTs’ impact on per-shard account states. Based on the HSDT, the executor generates the zero-knowledge proof to attest the correctness of each shard’s state changes and global value conservation. The resulting net state deltas are then optimistically committed to the relevant shards without cross-shard coordination, reducing intra-shard coordination. We design a game-theoretic incentive mechanism to ensure rational behavior of off-chain executors, showing that honest execution forms a Nash equilibrium under collateral staking. Experimental results based on a prototype deployed in a local area network demonstrate that ROLLSHARDsignificantly outperforms two baseline coordination models proposed in ByShard, namely the Linear and Distributed designs. Specifically, under high workload, RollShard improves throughput by 44.9% and 158%, and reduces cross-shard latency by 38.9% and 42.1%, compared to the Linear and Distributed models, respectively.

Seung Kwon Lee, Seok Bin Son, Joongheon Kim, Hoh Peter In

Quantum machine learning (QML) has attracted growing interest for their ability to achieve superior performance with significantly fewer parameters. However, the high cost and scarcity of current hardware push inference to cloud-hosted quantum devices, creating a tension between verifiability and confidentiality. This work proposes a novel framework that converts quantum neural network operations into classical arithmetic circuits that faithfully approximate genuine quantum computations. By encrypting these circuits with zero-knowledge proofs, it ensures computational validity while concealing internal parameters. Experimental results show that our classical circuits achieve fidelity above 0.9996 and total variation distance below 1% compared to actual quantum computations, verifying the practicality of trustworthy and privacy-preserving quantum inference.

Najla Alharbi, Tarek Moulahi

No abstract is available for this record.