The literature is still undecided on whether sub-state elections conform more to a national or regional logic of voting. In this article, I argue that the impact of national politics on regional elections is contingent upon the level of decentralization. I hypothesize that the greater the number of policy areas and resources in the hands of regional governments, the lesser the influence of national coat-tails on regional elections. Using the electoral results of the Spanish Socialist Party in national and regional elections from 1979 to 2009, the empirical analysis shows that regional politiciansâ electoral performance is correlated to that of their national counterparts. However, this correlation has weakened as regional governments have gained greater decision-making and financing powers. This has been particularly evident in elections when the regional branch of the party rules a single-party government and competes against strong regionalist parties.
Abstract Political decentralization has been promoted as a way to devolve responsibility, bring government closer to citizens, and improve accountability. The shift prompted new local elections, but were the elected officials responsive to citizens or to national party elites? This study examines unique survey data from 125 Colombian mayors to identify the factors they believe were critical in their victories and thereby to identify the people to whom they believe they owe loyalty: citizens or party leaders. Examining the relative value mayors assign to their own actions versus those of the party, combined with information on how they financed campaigns, sheds important light on subnational electoral dynamics in Colombia.
Abstract A vast territory, deep regional and linguistic differences, and a diverse population pose a challenge to the administration of elections and the determination of voting behavior. Election management in Canada has changed in recent years. Campaign financing is more strictly controlled that ever, advance voting and same-day registration have been introduced to facilitate easier voting, and fixed-term elections have been introduced. This article discusses the changes and challenges faced by the Canadian elections and voting system. Among the challenges faced are the efforts to enhance the equity and fairness of the electoral process. These efforts are seen as conflicting with the right of freedom of expression guaranteed by the Canadian Charter. Among the changes Canadian electoral processes have undergone are the emergence of campaigns, the pervasiveness of media coverage, decentralized federalism, and the introduction of a single-member plurality electoral system. Some of the topics discussed in this article include: managing elections, voter registration, distribution of seats, and anomalies in the Canadian electoral system.
This article addresses the relationship between political decentralization and the organization of political parties in Great Britain and Spain, focusing on the Labour Party and the Socialist Party, respectively. It assesses two rival accounts of this relationship: Caramani's `nationalization of politics' thesis and Chhibber and Kollman's rational choice institutionalist account in their book The Formation of National Party Systems. It argues that both accounts are seriously incomplete, and on occasion misleading, because of their unwillingness to consider the autonomous role of political parties as advocates of institutional change and as organizational entities. The article develops this argument by studying the role of the British Labour Party and the Spanish Socialists in proposing devolution reforms, and their organizational and strategic responses to them. It concludes that the reductive theories cited above fail to capture the real picture, because parties cannot only mitigate the effects of institutional change, they are also the architects of these changes and shape institutions to suit their strategic ends.
In this article, I develop three measures of party organization in multi-level systems: vertical integration, influence and autonomy. I assess these in 27 parties in Canada, Australia, Germany, Austria, Switzerland, the United States and Spain and investigate how parties respond to the incentives and opportunities created by their institutional environment. Clear patterns emerge between the form of federal state design and the predominant form of party organization: in decentralized federations with low coordination requirements between federal and state-level governments, a tendency can be found towards highly autonomous state parties. Where resources are centralized and intergovernmental coordination requirements are high, integrated parties with low autonomy can be found. However, neither aspect of institutional design has a significant relationship with `upward' influence of state-level parties in the governance structure of federal parties.
Charles R. Hankla Assistant Professor Department of Political Science Georgia State University PO Box 4069 Atlanta, Georgia 30302-4069 chankla@gsu.edu Phone: 404-413-6172 Fax: 404-413-6156 Abstract What political factors influence the allocation of economic patronage in democracies? Answering this question is vital to improving our knowledge of how states and markets interact. In this paper, I argue that changing levels of party centralization can drive important changes in the allocation of state largess. When governing parties are centralized, national party leaders will control sources of patronage, targeting benefits to particularly influential regions and industries. By contrast, when governing parties are decentralized, influential sub-national party leaders will advocate for their constituents, allocating patronage evenly through a national logroll. I find evidence for these relationships by comparing Indiaâs distribution process for industrial licenses and government finance under a decentralized Congress Party (1954-61) to its distribution process under a centralized Congress Party (1969-75).
âFront-loadingâ primaries and caucuses - the movement of state delegate selection contests to the beginning of the nomination calendar - is problematic for the integrity of the presidential nominating system. Because it results from decentralized decision making by self-interested states, front-loading also poses a problem for federalism. Indeed, most proposed remedies for front-loading would impinge on federalism in some manner. In analyzing those remedies, one must assess their interaction with federalism both procedurally and substantively. For example, a federally imposed national primary would be harmful to federalism on both dimensions; regional primaries negotiated among states would be best for federalism procedurally but are of dubious efficacy; the national parties have an ambiguous relationship to federalism; and a change in federal campaign finance rules would seek to combine a centralized process with a decentralized result. The best solution might be to use available central levers to try to change campaign dynamics and thus the incentives for states to schedule their primaries early.
Two candidates compete for elective office. Each candidate has information she would like to reveal to the voters, but this requires costly advertising. The candidates can solicit contributions from interest groups to finance such advertising. These contributions are secured by promises to perform favors for the contributors, should the candidate win the election. Voters understand this and elect the candidate they like best, taking into account their expectations about promises to special interests. There is an incumbency advantage in fundraising, which is sometimes so great that the incumbent faces no serious opposition at all. Introducing partial public financing through matching funds improves voter welfare in districts that have advertising under the decentralized system, while it can reduce welfare in other districts. The optimal policy must strike a balance between these two effects.
Even in the wake of the most sweeping campaign finance reform law to be enacted in three decades, further significant reform is inevitable. Special interest money continues to flow through loopholes in the Act, and the Presidential Election Campaign Fund is near collapse. The next reform should encourage broader participation in the political process by individual citizens, both to dilute the power of special interests and to serve independent democratic values that recent Supreme Court jurisprudence has identified as vital to meaningful reform. We propose adopting a refundable tax credit of $100/taxpayer for political contributions to federal candidates and national parties; the credit would be targeted to lowerand middle-income Americans. A refundable tax credit is equivalent to giving each eligible citizen up to $100 annually to use for political contributions. We also present data about the relative importance of political contributions by special interests (corporate, labor and other PACs) and individuals that undermine many of the assumptions on which past reform has been based and that have not been discussed in the legal literature. The data clearly show that small contributions by individuals are the dominant source of money in campaigns, and that the influence of special interest money is subtle, appearing to âpurchaseâ benefits like access, a place on the agenda, and minor policy details. Working from an accurate picture of who really pays for politics, and drawing from the experience at the federal and state levels with similar tax refund programs, we present the tax credit as a reform that is simple, easy to administer, and likely to improve political participation by average Americans. Thus, our proposal, unlike the complicated voucher plan with anonymity put forward by Ackerman and Ayres, is likely to be adopted by Congress; moreover, it will appeal to a bipartisan consensus because it mixes public funding with a decentralized allocation mechanism using a tax subsidy.
Vertical fiscal imbalance, decentralized responsibility of spending with centralized financing, creates a common pool problem with spending pressure towards central funds. A model of decentralized government spending under vertical fiscal imbalance is developed, and the importance of national political characteristics for internalization of costs and spending level is investigated in an econometric analysis of Norway during 1880â1990. We argue that in a parliamentary democracy, the internalization of costs is influenced by the party fragmentation of parliament. This is confirmed by the econometric analysis using a Herfindahl index as a measure of fragmentation and political strength.
Abstract. This paper examines the process of mass democracy as the fundamental cause of transfer seeking and the centralization of governance, using Austrian-school theory and methodology such as decentralized knowledge, disaggregated phenomena, and the structure of capital goods. The alternative of decentralized, small-group gov-ernance reduces the demand for campaign financing and makes more effective use of decentralized knowledge. In addition, when public revenues originate in the local districts and are passed on to higher levels of governance, it provides incentives for revenue sources which do not have an excess burden on production. The governance struc-ture of cellular, bottom-up, multi-level voting, with public revenue flowing up from the lower to the upper levels, provides a contrast for a comparative systems analysis that can yield insight into the transfer seeking endemic in mass democracy.
The author focuses on the link between local government decentralization and democracy in Eastern Europe. It is shown that decentralization is a multidimensional concept and that actual local government systems can be positioned differently on each dimension (functions, control, and finance) depending on the implicit model of local government. Formal and substantive definitions of democracy are distinguished and some conventional measures examined; it is concluded that decentralization and democracy do not necessarily go together. The degree of decentralization and implicit models of postsocialist local government in Eastern Europe are then outlined, with a focus on the contrast between Budapest and Moscow. The development of social movements in the two capitals is taken as an index of substantive democracy and is shown to be influenced not only by the extent of decentralization but also by other features of the local political context. This illustrates the earlier argument that the relation between decentralization and democracy is an empirically variable one rather than a necessary one.
Following the Republican victory in the 1994 mid-term elections, the balance of power in the US House of Representatives between committees and central party leader shifted decisively in favour of the latter. The central thrust of the procedural and personnel changes instituted under Newt Gingrich in 1994 and 1995 was to consolidate party government. This article reviews these important changes and analyses their impact on the legislative process. The return to party government is explained as a product of Gingrich's partisan vision of legislative organization, the destabilization of existing institutional relations as a consequence of the shift in partisan control, the unusual conditions of the 1994 elections, and the strong team spirit and high levels of Republican party support. The article speculates that a return to more autonomous, less party-dominated committee system is unlikely given strong Democratic support for robust centralized party leadership, important changes in Congress's policy agenda, high membership turnover, and the probable continuation of split-party government, but the potency of these centralizing forces will probably be mitigated by familiar decentralizing pressures in contemporary American politics.
Democratic and Republican efforts at party renewal have differed in approach, but both can be recognized as intergovernmental phenomena having significant implications for American federalism. The Democratic Party's national charter and delegate selection rules, for instance, have federalized the governing structure of the party. The national Republican Party organization has developed such a large base of financial resources andcampaign services that state Republican parties and candidate committees have begun to accept national party authority along with its money. Moreover, as national, state, and local parties and candidates increasingly coordinate their delegate selection, finance, and other campaigh activities, they may transform the decentralized party system that has been a protector of state and local influence within the federal government. National ideological constituencies within both party organizations may rival territorial and functional constituencies for the attention of federal elected officials.