The origin of modern state is taxation.Tax state is a mixture of taxes in modern area which has the character of public price and non-profit-making,and democracy and rule-of-law of modern state.Tax state should be reflected in the aspects of public goal and national goal.If there is no tax state,the real state-ruled-of-law which takes economic liberty as its centre will be impossible.Tax state must build a structure which will complete the rule-of-law.Taking tax state's principle of legalism,egalitarian and human rights which stem from democracy of finance as a derivation,we should perfect the system of fiscal constitutionality,fiscal decentralization of authority and correlative procedures and set a basic boundary for the operation of tax state.
Informal payments are a frequently overlooked source of local public finance in developing countries. We use microdata from ten countries to establish stylized facts on the magnitude, form, and distributional implications of this "informal taxation." Informal taxation is widespread, particularly in rural areas, with substantial in-kind labor payments. The wealthy pay more, but pay less in percentage terms, and informal taxes are more regressive than formal taxes. Failing to include informal taxation underestimates household tax burdens and revenue decentralization in developing countries. We propose a simple model of information and enforcement constraints that parsimoniously explains the patterns in the data.
Both theory and experience in a variety of circumstances around the world suggest strongly that if fiscal decentralization is to produce sustainable net benefits in developing countries, subnational governments require much more real taxing power than they now have. Students of public finance have studied the subject, and practitioners in developing countries have installed many different versions of subnational government tax. In most developing countries there are potentially sound and productive taxes that subnational governments could use: personal income tax surcharges, property taxes, taxes on the use of motor vehicles, payroll taxes, and even subnational value‐added taxes and local “business value” taxes may all be viable options in particular countries. Still, there is no general consensus about what works and what does not. In this review paper, we try and pull together enough evidence to suggest the way forward. We also develop the argument that given political realities one cannot usually decentralize significant revenues to subnational governments without having in place an intergovernmental transfer system to offset at least some of the disequalizing effects that would otherwise occur. Nor does it make sense to think of decentralizing exactly the same package of tax choices to all subnational governments regardless of their scale and scope of operations.
This book analyzes political decentralization and fiscal federalism in Canada and Germany, both traditional federal countries, and in Spain, a unitarian country engaged in the last two decades in a process of decentralization. Three key issues required for a well designed financing system are analyzed in depth, namely: tax assignment, equalization grants – i.e. redistribution of money from the wealthy regions or the national government to poorer regions, and the role of local governments in the administration of taxes.
This book analyzes political decentralization and fiscal federalism in Canada and Germany, both traditional federal countries, and in Spain, a unitarian country engaged in the last two decades in a process of decentralization. Three key issues required for a well designed financing system are analyzed in depth, namely: tax assignment, equalization grants – i.e. redistribution of money from the wealthy regions or the national government to poorer regions, and the role of local governments in the administration of taxes.
This book analyzes political decentralization and fiscal federalism in Canada and Germany, both traditional federal countries, and in Spain, a unitarian country engaged in the last two decades in a process of decentralization. Three key issues required for a well designed financing system are analyzed in depth, namely: tax assignment, equalization grants – i.e. redistribution of money from the wealthy regions or the national government to poorer regions, and the role of local governments in the administration of taxes.
Paul Berg-Dick, Michel Carreau, Deanne Field, Mireille Ethier
This book analyzes political decentralization and fiscal federalism in Canada and Germany, both traditional federal countries, and in Spain, a unitarian country engaged in the last two decades in a process of decentralization. Three key issues required for a well designed financing system are analyzed in depth, namely: tax assignment, equalization grants – i.e. redistribution of money from the wealthy regions or the national government to poorer regions, and the role of local governments in the administration of taxes.
This book analyzes political decentralization and fiscal federalism in Canada and Germany, both traditional federal countries, and in Spain, a unitarian country engaged in the last two decades in a process of decentralization. Three key issues required for a well designed financing system are analyzed in depth, namely: tax assignment, equalization grants – i.e. redistribution of money from the wealthy regions or the national government to poorer regions, and the role of local governments in the administration of taxes.
This book analyzes political decentralization and fiscal federalism in Canada and Germany, both traditional federal countries, and in Spain, a unitarian country engaged in the last two decades in a process of decentralization. Three key issues required for a well designed financing system are analyzed in depth, namely: tax assignment, equalization grants – i.e. redistribution of money from the wealthy regions or the national government to poorer regions, and the role of local governments in the administration of taxes.
This book analyzes political decentralization and fiscal federalism in Canada and Germany, both traditional federal countries, and in Spain, a unitarian country engaged in the last two decades in a process of decentralization. Three key issues required for a well designed financing system are analyzed in depth, namely: tax assignment, equalization grants – i.e. redistribution of money from the wealthy regions or the national government to poorer regions, and the role of local governments in the administration of taxes.
This book analyzes political decentralization and fiscal federalism in Canada and Germany, both traditional federal countries, and in Spain, a unitarian country engaged in the last two decades in a process of decentralization. Three key issues required for a well designed financing system are analyzed in depth, namely: tax assignment, equalization grants – i.e. redistribution of money from the wealthy regions or the national government to poorer regions, and the role of local governments in the administration of taxes.
Sonia Esteban Laleona, Pablo de Frutos Madrazo, María José Prieto Jano
Traditionally, the academic debates about the benefits that the existence of multilevel government structures provide have been directly related to the gains in efficiency that derive from the processes of decentralization of the Public Sector. However, as of the last decades, the Public Finance has broadened its analysis towards other questions, one of them being if the fiscal decentralization influences positively in the economic growth of a country. The objective of this document is to provide a "reading guide" for this new line of investigation on the influence of fiscal decentralization on regional economic growth.
The book is divided into two parts. The \n first part macro federalism provides a fresh look at \n emerging constitutional challenges arising from \n globalization and the information revolution, as well as the \n dynamic-efficiency and growth implications of existing \n federal constitutions. Several aspects of these systems are \n examined: (a) institutional design to achieve internal \n economic union; (b) policies for regional development; (c) \n conduct of monetary policy; (d) coordination of fiscal \n policies, with a special emphasis on tax harmonization; and \n (e) management of risks of insolvency from sub-national \n borrowing. The second part of the book local finance \n provides a comparative perspective on local finances and \n measures the progress of decentralized governance reforms in \n developing countries.
This book analyzes political decentralization and fiscal federalism in Canada and Germany, both traditional federal countries, and in Spain, a unitarian country engaged in the last two decades in a process of decentralization. Three key issues required for a well designed financing system are analyzed in depth, namely: tax assignment, equalization grants – i.e. redistribution of money from the wealthy regions or the national government to poorer regions, and the role of local governments in the administration of taxes.
Contents:PrefaceNuria Bosch and Jose M DuranINTRODUCTION1. The Financing System of Spanish Regions: Main Features, Weak Points and Possible ReformsNuria Bosch and Jose M DuranPART I: TAX ASSIGNMENT2. Revenue Assignments in the Practice of Fiscal DecentralizationJorge Martinez-Vazquez3. Tax Assignment and Tax Autonomy in OECD CountriesHansjorg Blochliger4. Tax Assignment and Regional Co-responsibility in SpainJuan A. Gimeno UllastresPART II: FISCAL EQUALIZATION5. Fiscal Equalization: The Canadian ExperienceRobin Boadway6. Fiscal Equalization in GermanyThiess Buettner7. Fiscal Equalization in Spain Jesus Ruiz-Huerta Carbonell and Ana Herrero AlcaldePART III: TAX ADMINISTRATION8. Tax Coordination under the Canadian Tax SystemPaul Berg-Dick, Michel Carreau, Deanne Field and Mireille Ethier9. The Decentralisation of Tax Administration in Germany: ConsequencesAlexander Ulbricht10. Current Situation and Proposals for Reform of Spain's Tax AdministrationAlejandro Esteller MoreIndex
This book analyzes political decentralization and fiscal federalism in Canada and Germany, both traditional federal countries, and in Spain, a unitarian country engaged in the last two decades in a process of decentralization. Three key issues required for a well designed financing system are analyzed in depth, namely: tax assignment, equalization grants – i.e. redistribution of money from the wealthy regions or the national government to poorer regions, and the role of local governments in the administration of taxes.
Japans mid-nineteenth century opening-up to Western influence, the so-called Meiji Restoration, drove political leaders to form a politically modern centralized country. Although Japan experienced a number of major decentralization processes under the post World War II Allied occupation, the Japanese government reviewed these reforms after the occupation. In fact during the post WWII era, the centralized system played a major role in establishing a national minimum standard of living. While political trends in the 1990s favored government decentralization, promotion of decentralization became a challenge for successive Cabinets. In 1999, the Diet enacted the Package Promoting Decentralization Act; this law repealed the delegation system under which local governments are subordinate to the central government. In 2003, the Koizumi Administration created the Trinity Reform plan. Trinity means the decentralization reform process that involves three factors : 1) A local allocation tax grant; 2) A national subsidy for local governments, and 3) A local tax. The package included reducing national subsidies to local governments and transferring tax revenue sources from the central government to local governments. Both Japans central government and local governments are financially closely connected and both face severe fiscal conditions. Japan has an aging population and the coming increase of social security related expenditures is a huge fiscal challenge. It is financially questionable whether the central government can continue to provide the local allocation tax grants which guarantee financial resources to cover revenue shortfalls of local governments. The central and local governments have to review their budgets with a concerted effort to improve government efficiency. The theorem on fiscal federalism argues that local governments can provide public services more efficiently and be more responsible to their residents through competition among local governments. However, decentralization in Japan contains two fundamental challenges : heavy duplication of roles and ambiguous fiscal responsibility across levels of government. What is necessary for decentralization in Japan is to narrow the role of the central governments. Furthermore, the central government revenue guarantee function should be limited; it is imperative to establish hard budget constraints at the local government level. The author would like to emphasize decentralization should be compatible with reconstruction of the public finance system. In the first chapter, the author explores the historical background of the relationship between Japans central government and local governments. Then, in the second chapter, the author introduces the recent Japanese government promotion of decentralization. Thereafter, the author provides an overview of financial relationships across levels of government in the third chapter. In the fourth chapter, the author surveys economic theories on fiscal federalism, whereby the author would like to clarify the advantages of decentralization. Then, in the fifth chapter, the author summarizes the two fundamental challenges between the central and local government in Japan : duplication of roles and ambiguous expenditure responsibility. Finally, the author makes suggestions for promoting Japanese government decentralization mainly focusing on the use of fiscal instruments.
Abstract We present a spatial model of a city with two unequally productive jurisdictions. City residents bear a commuting cost to work in either of the two jurisdictions. Each jurisdiction must finance a public budget with a wage and a head tax. We compare the first best optimum to tax decentralization. From the total welfare viewpoint, tax competition is always inefficient. However, majoritarian local governments may prefer the inefficient tax decentralization to the first best.
The Supreme Court (hereinafter the Court) decision 93 nu 13162 (rendered on April 15, 1994) is about a case where a corporation (hereinafter the Corporation) established in Hong Kong moved its office to the Netherlands. In this decision, however, the Court decided that the Corporation was not a resident in the Netherlands as defined under the Korea - Netherlands Tax Treaty (hereinafter the Treaty) on grounds that its of effective was not located in the Netherlands. This decision is one of the rare cases where the Court actually dealt with interpretation of tax and probably the first and only case thus far where the Court issued an opinion on a transaction that could be called treaty shopping. In addition, the Court imposed on the taxpayer the burden of proof as to its eligibility to benefits, which is an exception to the general rule that the burden of proof in a tax litigation is in principle on the tax authorities, and ruled that, in this case, the appellant did not sufficiently fulfill its burden of proof. In the opinion, this decision accurately confirmed one of the basic principles regarding the interpretation of tax treaties, that the provisions of the Dutch domestic tax law is the controlling criteria as to the residence requirement which is the very first test for anyone to be eligible for benefits. Accordingly, the Court stated that the Dutch domestic tax law consider any corporation with its of effective as being resided in the Netherlands. The Court then interpreted the term place of effective management as the where its substantial business operation is conducted and its decisions are made. However, it was erroneous for the Court to raise such irrelevant facts that the Corporation had no fixed office or employee, or that the amount of the directors' fees were very small to support its decision. Nevertheless, we can easily understand that it would have been difficult for the Court to decide otherwise in this case, where the Dutch Ministry of Finance had never replied to the inquiry made by the Korean National Tax Service as to whether the Corporation was indeed a Dutch resident. As to the issue of burden of proof, it also seems plausible to put it on the side of taxpayer when benefits are at stake, because here it is clear that the relevant evidences are usually under the control of the taxpayers rather than the tax authorities. However, we should note that it may be too harsh a conclusion to put the obligation to pay the tax on the withholding agent when it had no means to easily identify whether it had any such obligation at the moment of payment and when the transaction has already been closed and it has fulfilled its contractual obligation to make the payment long before the tax assessment.
Purpose The purpose of this research is to show how the Slovenian government has recognised the need for local government fiscal autonomy and to enhance this has instigated the introduction of an ad valorem property tax. Since independence in 1991 Slovenia has embarked on a path of administrative and fiscal decentralization. Local government has been subject to significant reform in terms of the creation of additional municipalities and the allocation of devolved expenditure responsibilities. Design/methodology/approach The paper provides an in‐depth analysis of central and local government statistics to demonstrate the potential role of the property tax in any future decentralisation of responsibilities and funding to the local level. Findings This study finds that in terms of both municipal revenue and expenditure there remains a high degree of centralised control by the state. On the positive side with the introduction of the new property tax there is an expectation for greater local fiscal autonomy, however, on the negative side progess towards the introduction of the new tax has been extremely slow. The study concludes that while the proposals are likely to provide for a more stable and uniform local tax, there appears to be lethargy in implementing the property tax. Originality/value It is argued in this paper that accession to the EU has created pressures for Slovenia to adopt a financing model which gives greater fiscal autonomy to local government. Currently, the high level of centralization is seen as a barrier to greater devolution of powers which in turn has a negative effect on the introduction of the new property tax.
This article analyses the relationship between decentralization and the extent of fiscal discipline in the Swiss cantons between 1984 and 2000. From a theoretical point of view, decentralization and federalism can be associated with both an expansive and a dampening effect on government debt. On the one hand, decentralized structures have been argued to lead to a reduction of debt due to inherent competition between the member states and the multitude of veto positions which restrict public intervention. On the other hand, decentralization has been claimed to contribute to an increase of public debt as it involves expensive functional and organizational duplications as well as cost-intensive, often debt-financed, compromise solutions between a large number of actors that operate in an uncoordinated and contradictory way. Our empirical results show that in periods of prosperous economic development, the architecture of state structure has no impact on debt. However, the degree of decentralization influences debt in economically poor times: In phases of economic recession, administratively decentralized cantons implement a more economical budgetary policy than centralized Swiss member states.
The traditional theory of public finance has made a strong case for a major role for fiscal decentralization. This case is based on an improved allocation of resources in the public sector. And it has four basic elements. First, regional or local governments are in a position to adapt outputs of public services to the preferences and particular circumstances of their constituencies, as compared to a central solution which presumes that one size fits all. Second, in a setting of mobile households, individuals can seek out jurisdictions that provide outputs well suited to their tastes, thereby increasing the potential gains from the decentralized provision of public services (Tiebout 1956). Third, in contrast to the monopolist position of the central government, decentralized levels of government face competition from their neighbors; such competition constrains budgetary growth and provides pressures for the efficient provision of public services. And fourth, decentralization may encourage experimentation and innovation as individual jurisdictions are free to adopt new approaches to public policy; in this way, decentralization can provide a valuable Alaboratory for fiscal experiments. However, this basic economic rationale for decentralization of the public sector is not quite so simple and compelling as it appears. Some of the more recent literature provides, first, a thoughtful and provocative critique of the traditional view of fiscal decentralization, and, second, some new approaches that reveal its dark side, especially in practice. There is emerging, in short, a broader perspective on fiscal decentralization that raises some serious questions about its capacity to provide an unambiguously positive contribution to an improved performance of the public sector. My purpose in this paper is twofold. First, I want to review the basic theory of fiscal decentralization. There are some loose ends to the traditional argument that open up some intriguing issues. Second, I want to turn to some of new literature on fiscal discipline in multilevel government. This literature has focused attention on some basic and destructive forces that can undermine the economic performance of a relatively decentralized public sector. I find it helpful to begin by revisiting a Decentralization Theorem that I formulated long ago. As a point of departure, I want to explain briefly why I introduced the proposition and the rationale for its particular form and proof.
The current system of fiscal decentralization in China has a number of serious problems. Whereas it has clearly assigned revenues between the central government and provincial governments, the current system does not provide clear expenditure assignments for almost all levels of governments. In practice, the widely unfunded responsibilities have been taken up by local governments, in particular, by the governments at and under county level. Since 1994, the responsibilities for these local governments have continued to expand. On the other hand, the “tax sharing reform” of 1994 led to a very limited tax bases for local governments. In fact, a significant amount of local governments in China face serious fiscal crisis. First, the vertical and horizontal fiscal gaps are significant in China. The revenue assignments are highly centralized, however the expenditures are highly decentralized. In 2003, major taxes and 54.6% of total tax revenues belonged to the central government, but local government expenditures accounted for 69.9% of total government expenditures. Furthermore, total provincial own revenues only financed 57% of provincial expenditure.