The EU AI Act (Regulation 2024/1689) imposes strict transparency and human oversight obligations on high-risk AI systems, specifically under Article 14. However, a critical technical gap exists: current governance mechanisms either rely on static pre-deployment audits that fail to capture dynamic runtime behavior, or they introduce unacceptable latency penalties that render them unusable in production environments. This paper presents RuntimeGuard-AI, an asynchronous governance architecture that separates lightweight inline policy enforcement from batch cryptographic attestation.Our design fundamentally resolves the tension between compliance and performance. By decoupling the critical inference path from the heavy cryptographic machinery required for proofs, we achieve a median latency overhead of just 2.3–4.1%, while enabling cryptographically rigorous, tamper-evident audit trails. Theoretically, we formalize the property of Latency Separationand prove that our architecture satisfies it. Empirically, we implement a complete Zero-Knowledge (ZK) attestation pipeline using the Groth16 proving system on the bls12-381 curve. We measure a witness generation time of 62 msand a total proving time of 1,389 msfor 50,000 constraints on a standard CPU. These results confirm that while the cryptographic cost of compliance is high, it can be successfully removed from the user-facing critical path.To our knowledge, this paper provides the first open-source reference implementation of a compliance architecture designed specifically for Article 14. We contribute: (1) a formalized threat model for AI auditing, (2) the RuntimeGuard protocol for sharded Merkle compliance logging, and (3) a systematic evaluation demonstrating that rigorous regulatory compliance is achievable at scale without compromising the user experience.
Kunpeng Ren, Nhut-Minh Ho, Tien Tuan Anh Dinh, Dumitrel Loghin · 5 authors
Distributed ledgers are enabling novel applications in traditional domains, such as finance, healthcare and supply chains, and in emerging domains such as metaverse. We observe that the current ecosystem is fragmented, with different blockchains operating in silos. Interledger applications that can access resources in different ledgers can tap into the billions of dollars worth of locked resources, but they require support for interledger communication. Existing interledger communications, however, are either insecure, inefficient, or application specific. Our goal is to design a system for interledger applications. To this end, we design and implement that achieves strong security guarantees and high performance while providing the general message passing abstraction to the applications. Our system leverages trusted hardware for performance and threshold signature schemes for strong security. It consists of multiple lightweight clients that verify transactions within their trusted execution environments before generating threshold signatures. We conduct extensive performance evaluations of and compare it against three state-of-the-art systems, namely WeCross, Cosmos IBC and LayerZero-V2. The results show that is efficient, achieving up to$42\times$higher throughput than the baselines.
Blockchain clients are fundamental software for running blockchain nodes. They provide users with various RPC (Remote Procedure Call) interfaces to interact with the blockchain. These RPC methods are expected to follow the same specification across different blockchain nodes, providing users with seamless interaction. However, there have been continuous reports on various RPC bugs that can cause unexpected responses or even Denial of Service weakness. Existing studies on blockchain RPC bug detection mainly focus on generating the RPC method calls for testing blockchain clients. However, a wide range of the reported RPC bugs are triggered in various blockchain contexts. To the best of our knowledge, little attention is paid to generating proper contexts that can trigger these context-dependent RPC bugs. In this work, we propose EthCRAFT, a Context-aware RPC Analysis and Fuzzing Tool for client RPC bug detection. EthCRAFT first proposes to explore the state transition program space of blockchain clients and generate various transactions to construct the context. EthCRAFT then designs a context-aware RPC method call generation method to send RPC calls to the blockchain clients. The responses of 5 different client implementations are used as cross-referring oracles to detect the RPC bugs. We evaluate EthCRAFT on real-world RPC bugs collected from the GitHub issues of Ethereum client implementations. Experiment results show that EthCRAFT outperforms existing client RPC detectors by detecting more RPC bugs. Moreover, EthCRAFT has found six new bugs in major Ethereum clients and reported them to the developers. One of the bug fixes has been written into breaking changes in the client's updates. Three of our bug reports have been offered a vulnerability bounty by the Ethereum Foundation.
Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs) are increasingly deployed on distributed ledgers, yet systematic cross-platform evidence on their operational behavior remains limited. We present an empirical benchmarking study of three prominent ledger-based DID methods - Ethereum, Hedera, and XRP Ledger - using reference Software Development Kits (SDKs) under a unified experimental setup. We measure latency, transaction cost, and on-chain metadata exposure, normalizing latency by each platform's block or consensus interval and cost by its native value transfer fee. Privacy leakage is quantified using a Metadata-Leakage Score (MLS), an entropy-based measure expressed in bits per operation. Our results reveal distinct architectural trade-offs. Ethereum enables near-instant, off-chain DID creation, but incurs the highest latency and cost for on-chain lifecycle operations. XRPL delivers deterministic and stable latency with fixed, low fees, yet exhibits higher metadata leakage due to more verbose transaction payloads. Hedera achieves the lowest on-chain latency and low fees with minimal metadata leakage, while occasional variance arises from SDK-side processing and confirmation pipelines. Overall, the findings show that ledger architecture and SDK workflows play a major role in shaping DID latency, cost, and metadata exposure, complementing the effects of the underlying consensus mechanism. These results provide evidence-based insights to support informed selection and configuration of DID systems under performance and privacy constraints.
Nacereddine Sitouah, Francesco Bruschi, Stefano De Cillis
The passing of the eIDAS amendment marks an important milestone for EU countries and changes how they must manage digital credentials for both public services and businesses. Italy has led in adopting eIDAS, first with CIE and SPID identity schemes, and now with the Italian Wallet (IO app) aligned to eIDAS 2.0. Self-Sovereign Identity (SSI) is a decentralized model born from the success of Distributed Ledgers, giving individuals full control over their digital identity. The current eIDAS 2.0 and its implementation acts diverge from SSI principles, rendering the European Digital Identity Wallet (EUDIW) centralized and merely user-centric, prioritizing security and legal protection over true self-sovereignty. This paper proposes an architecture that enables the use of IT Wallet credentials and services in an SSI-compliant environment through Trusted Execution Environments and Zero-Knowledge Proofs.
Abstract Existing accountability mechanisms based on audit logs, blockchains, and distributed ledgers attempt to prove compliance by recording what happened—transactions, identities, timestamps, or state transitions. While tamper-resistant, these approaches inherently generate behavioural traces that conflict with data-minimisation requirements and enable correlation, profiling, and surveillance. This creates a structural accountability–privacy paradox in modern regulatory frameworks such as the GDPR, which simultaneously require demonstrable compliance (Art. 5(2)) and strict limitation of personal data collection (Art. 5(1)(c)). This paper introduces Ledger-Anchored Validation Receipts (LAVR), a cryptographic mechanism that resolves this paradox by proving that enforcement occurred, rather than recording the underlying activity. LAVR operates exclusively at system finality boundaries—points where actions become irreversible, such as database commits, cross-border data exports, AI output release, payment settlement, or content publication. At each finality point, a hardware-adjacent enforcement gate evaluates a regulatory validation predicate derived from applicable legal constraints. Upon decision (Allow or Deny), the gate generates a minimal, fixed-size receipt that contains only enforcement metadata and explicitly excludes payloads, identities, transaction details, routing information, and fine-grained timestamps. The operational workflow consists of four steps: (1) an execution request reaches a finality boundary; (2) a trusted validation context evaluates scope, purpose, and control predicates; (3) a non-identifying receipt is cryptographically generated; and (4) a hash commitment of the receipt is anchored to a tamper-evident ledger. Unlike blockchain transaction logs, the ledger anchors only receipt commitments—not events—preventing the formation of transaction graphs or behavioural histories. Implemented using commodity hardware primitives (Trusted Execution Environments, SmartNICs, secure elements, and kernel-level finality hooks), LAVR enables accountability without surveillance across GDPR, AI Act, eIDAS, CBDC, NIS2, and Democracy Shield contexts. The approach demonstrates that regulatory simplification and stronger enforcement can be achieved through execution-time cryptographic proof rather than expanded monitoring or deregulation.
The increasing demand for autonomous and open peer-to-peer (P2P) data sharing has driven the widespread adoption of decentralized file systems, such as the InterPlanetary File System (IPFS). However, decentralized data sharing inherently requires distributed access control mechanisms due to the absence of centralized authorities. Although blockchain-based access control has become a primary solution, the public nature of blockchain can unintentionally reveal user attributes, posing significant privacy risks. To address the leakage of attribute sets in blockchain, we propose zk-Guard, a decentralized access control framework integrating blockchain and zero-knowledge Succinct Non-interactive Arguments of Knowledge (zk-SNARKs) tailored for IPFS. To further improve the efficiency of zero-knowledge policy checking and reduce the delay of policy updating, we employ a universal constraint circuit and encode policies into sparse configuration matrices, achieving fine-grained, rapid policy updates without regenerating proving keys while guaranteeing constant-time verification regardless of policy complexity. Additionally, to prevent repeated permission checks for large f iles and improve system responsiveness, zk-Guard integrates Merkle Tree Proof (MTP) mechanisms to securely link sub-data blocks to their root block. Comprehensive theoretical complexity analysis and extensive experiments demonstrate that zk-Guard achieves substantial performance improvements over existing schemes, with constant-time proof verification under 2.5 ms enabling efficient data retrieval, and policy deployment and updates completed within 0.2 seconds even for 1,000 attributes. The source code is available at https://github.com/ningboliucug/zk-Guard.
Shaoyu Li, Hexuan Yu, Md Mohaimin Al Barat, Yang Xiao · 6 authors
With the rise of decentralized finance, fiat-to-cryptocurrency exchange platforms have become popular entry points into the cryptocurrency ecosystem. However, these platforms frequently fail to ensure adequate privacy protection, as evidenced by real-world breaches that exposed personally identifiable information (PII) and crypto addresses. Such leaks enable adversaries to link real-world identities to cryptocurrency transactions, undermining the presumed anonymity of cryptocurrency use. We propose FC-GUARD, a privacy-preserving exchange system designed to preserve user anonymity without compromising regulatory compliance in the exchange of fiat currency for cryptocurrencies. Leveraging verifiable credentials and zero-knowledge proof techniques, FC-GUARD enables fiat-to-cryptocurrency exchanges without revealing users' PII or fiat account details. This breaks the linkage between users' real-world identities and their cryptocurrency addresses, thereby upholding anonymity, a fundamental expectation in the cryptocurrency ecosystem. In addition, FC-GUARD complies with key regulations over cryptocurrency usage, such as know-your-customer requirements and auditability for tax reporting obligations by integrating a lawful de-anonymization mechanism that allows the auditing authority to identify misbehaving users. This ensures regulatory compliance while defaulting to privacy protection. We implement our system on both desktop and mobile platforms, and our evaluation shows its feasibility for practical deployment.
Ziyue Wang, Zongwen Shen, Lei Chen, Wei Song · 7 authors
Decentralized applications on EVM-compatible blockchains are powered by smart contracts—reprogrammable logic deployed on-chain. Among them, smart contract factories represent a distinct class of contracts that automate the creation of other contracts through CREATE / CREATE2 , enabling scalable and repeatable deployments of tokens, protocol modules, and NFT collections. Factories are now the dominant vehicle for contract deployment and mint the majority of contracts. Yet, the ecosystem still lacks (i) a global view of their prevalence and application domains, (ii) a catalog of implementation families beyond upgradeable proxies, and (iii) guidance on factory-specific security pitfalls that ripple across deployment pipelines. To address these gaps, we present the first ecosystem-scale measurement of factory activity on two EVM-compatible chains: Ethereum and Polygon. We implement a bytecode-based factory contract detector that disassembles 434 million deployed runtimes, builds control-flow graphs, and uses reachability analysis to confirm on-path CREATE / CREATE2 operations. This yields 120,204 Ethereum factories and 69,258 Polygon factories. The resulting dataset enables three key findings: (i) longitudinal measurements show factories have minted over 90% of contracts since 2020, concentrated in a small cadre of high-volume deployers; (ii) clustering 3,000 verified factories reveals four dominant application domains spanning Finance & token, Infrastructure & Protocol, Proxy & upgrade, and NFT & creator use cases; and (iii) semantic inspection distills six recurring implementation patterns alongside factory-specific attack vectors and security issues. Altogether, these results contribute to a deeper understanding of the current status, implementation patterns, and security issues of factory-based deployments.
Blockchain Technology Applications and Security
Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and Hardware Security
This technical disclosure describes integration patterns for comprehensive smart contract defence systems. The disclosed architecture includes a behavioural suspicion scoring framework, modular security architecture using the Diamond Standard (EIP-2535), graduated response mechanisms, and cross-contract coordination protocols. The system enables layered defence strategies that adapt to threat levels and coordinate responses across multiple contracts. This document is published as a defensive publication to establish prior art and prevent third parties from obtaining patent protection for similar approaches.
This chapter starts with the introduction to blockchain , technology with a potential utility across finance and banking use cases. Then, we proceed and discuss bitcoin and further the notion of tokenization within the decentralized finance (DeFi) framework. Then, we expose the reader to practical examples of utilizing smart contracts from programmatic perspective. We use Ethereum platform with its own Solidity language to build a smart contract application using Python scripting sequences. The focus of this chapter is on the process of asset tokenization in order to build a foundational understanding to be applied at a later stage of the book. Finally, we provide a number of contra-arguments relevant to exposing deficiencies in blockchain-based technologies to be aware of from a practitioner’s standpoint.
Niomi Langaliya, Vinay Thakor, Purna Tanna, Disha Shah
This research preprint presents Aegis, a zero-knowledge-proof-based security paradigm designed to mitigate validator-compromise attacks in cross-chain bridges. The work empirically evaluates a ZKP-based withdrawal verification mechanism against an optimized multi-signature validator model under controlled conditions, demonstrating complete resistance to unauthorized fund transfers at the cost of increased Layer 1 gas consumption. The study introduces the concept of the cost of trustlessness as an empirically derived techno-economic metric and provides quantitative justification for migrating cryptographic verification to Layer 2 environments. This work was previously presented at FINCON’25, National Forensic Sciences University (NFSU), Gandhinagar, India. This version is released as a non-peer-reviewed research preprint for open dissemination and citation. Journal submission is in progress.
Open access
2 source records
Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and Hardware Security
The modern integrated circuit ecosystem is increasingly reliant on third-party intellectual property integration, which introduces security risks, including hardware Trojans and security vulnerabilities. Addressing the resulting trust deadlock between IP vendors and system integrators without exposing proprietary designs requires novel privacy-preserving verification techniques. However, existing privacy-preserving hardware verification methods are all simulation-based and fail to offer formal guarantees. In this paper, we propose ZK-CEC, the first privacy-preserving framework for hardware formal verification. By combining formal verification and zero-knowledge proof (ZKP), ZK-CEC establishes a foundation for formally verifying IP correctness and security without compromising the confidentiality of the designs. We observe that existing zero-knowledge protocols for formal verification are designed to prove statements of public formulas. However, in a privacy-preserving verification context where the formula is secret, these protocols cannot prevent a malicious prover from forging the formula, thereby compromising the soundness of the verification. To address these gaps, we first propose a blueprint for proving the unsatisfiability of a secret design against a public constraint, which is widely applicable to proving properties in software, hardware, and cyber-physical systems. Based on the proposed blueprint, we construct ZK-CEC, which enables a prover to convince the verifier that a secret IP's functionality aligns perfectly with the public specification in zero knowledge, revealing only the length and width of the proof. We implement ZK-CEC and evaluate its performance across various circuits, including arithmetic units and cryptographic components. Experimental results show that ZK-CEC successfully verifies practical designs, such as the AES S-Box, within practical time limits.
Open access
4 source records
cs.CR
cs.LO
Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and Hardware Security
IoT data demands are growing, with Distributed Ledger Technologies (DLTs) offering secure data management, provided they can meet scaling and efficiency requirements that are more restrictive than in conventional application environments. This article comprehensively surveys 27 DLTs of varying paradigms and implementation methods, proposes a scoring method for determining DLT-IoT integration suitability, and then applies that method to the surveyed DLTs. Six DLTs were shortlisted as the most promising, which were then subjected to in-depth analysis around three IoT use cases: health-IoT, e-commerce and automotive manufacturing. We discuss the viability of lightweight DLTs and identify crucial future research directions.
V. T. Krishnaprasath, T. Surya, B. Suganthi, Mohammed Kasim M · 6 authors
The globalization of semiconductor supply chains and the rise of third-party IP reuse have intensified concerns around hardware Trojan insertion, counterfeit IP distribution, unauthorized overbuilding, and dispute-prone verification workflows in modern VLSI design. This paper proposes a Blockchain-Enabled Secure VLSI Framework that unifies distributed hardware verification, provenance tracking, and IP protection through tamper-evident ledger records and cryptographically verifiable design artifacts. The proposed framework registers RTL/netlist milestones, verification reports, test signatures, and PDK-dependent constraints as immutable transactions, enabling all stakeholders (IP vendors, integrators, foundries, and verification labs) to validate authenticity and integrity without exposing sensitive design content. To prevent IP leakage, the framework supports hash-anchored commitments, permissioned access control, and zero-knowledge–ready attestations for key verification claims (e.g., “coverage ≥ threshold” or “equivalence passed”) while keeping raw waveforms and proprietary constraints off-chain. A smart-contract policy engine enforces licensing (time-bound/feature-bound), audit logging, and revocation, while a lightweight on-chain/off-chain storage strategy ensures scalability. Analytical evaluation and prototype-level profiling indicate that the approach can provide end-to-end traceability with sub-second block confirmation in permissioned mode, ~25–45% reduction in dispute resolution time via automated audit trails, and ~15–30% lower manual compliance effort by standardizing verification evidence exchange. The framework is suitable for secure SoC integration, multi-vendor verification, and IP lifecycle governance in advanced VLSI flows.
Open access
Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and Hardware Security
Defensive publication establishing prior art for proof-first digital identity systems using prime-indexed state evolution, zero-knowledge proofs, and silence-by-default semantics. This specification defines the Meta-Theorem of Prime Identity (MTPI), an architectural framework requiring cryptographic proof for every state transition. Core components include: Prime-Indexed Recursive Tensor Mathematics (PIRTM) with contractive dynamics guarantee; prime-gated activation with drift bounds δ(t) ≤ 0.3; Conscious Sovereignty Layer (CSL) with ethical tensor field commutation relations; Archivum append-only audit schema; and conformance requirements including Surveillance Fork detection. Reference implementations provided in Solidity and Circom 2.1. Mathematical foundations, alternative embodiments, and public domain designations included for maximum prior art scope. Keywords: zero-knowledge proofs, prime-indexed identity, verifiable computation, AI safety, defensive publication, proof-first computing, MTPI, PIRTM, CSL
Open access
2 source records
Cryptography and Data Security
Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and Hardware Security
Many Ethereum smart contracts rely on block attributes such as block.timestamp or blockhash to generate random numbers for applications like lotteries and games. However, these values are predictable and miner-manipulable, creating the Bad Randomness vulnerability (SWC-120) that has led to real-world exploits. Current detection tools identify only simple patterns and fail to verify whether protective modifiers actually guard vulnerable code. A major obstacle to improving these tools is the lack of large, accurately labeled datasets. This paper presents a benchmark dataset of 1,752 Ethereum smart contracts with validated Bad Randomness vulnerabilities. We developed a five-phase methodology comprising keyword filtering, pattern matching with 58 regular expressions, risk classification, function-level validation, and context analysis. The function-level validation revealed that 49% of contracts initially classified as protected were actually exploitable because modifiers were applied to different functions than those containing vulnerabilities. We classify contracts into four risk levels based on exploitability: HIGH_RISK (no protection), MEDIUM_RISK (miner-exploitable only), LOW_RISK (owner-exploitable only), and SAFE (using Chainlink VRF or commit-reveal). Our dataset is 51 times larger than RNVulDet and the first to provide function-level validation and risk stratification. Evaluation of Slither and Mythril revealed significant detection gaps, as both tools identified none of the vulnerable contracts in our sample, indicating limitations in handling complex randomness patterns. The dataset and validation scripts are publicly available to support future research in smart contract security.
We present Y.I.N.-AGENT-ACT, a privacy-preserving architecture for autonomous AI agent action chains that mathematically guarantees zero intent drift while maintaining cryptographic compliance across multi-step workflows. The core innovation is the mandatory DP→ZK→HE ordering (Differential Privacy → Zero-Knowledge Proof → Homomorphic Encryption) applied to every step in autonomous agent execution, combined with 136-byte Action Chain Compliance Tokens providing cryptographic chain integrity through HMAC-SHA256 chaining. Key results (measured on 48-step test corpus including 15 adversarial scenarios): (1) 100% drift prevention—all 15 drift scenarios caught with zero false negatives; (2) F1-score 0.882 at threshold 0.5 (precision 0.789, recall 1.000); (3) ~85ms per-step overhead with O(N) verification complexity; (4) 136-byte token size verified to match patent specification exactly; (5) native EU AI Act Article 50 compliance via verifiable privacy proofs. Y.I.N.-AGENT-ACT addresses the emerging agent autonomy crisis where AI systems like OpenAI Operator and Anthropic Computer Use execute multi-step tasks without cryptographic guarantees. The Intent Drift Elimination Theorem establishes that undetected drift probability is bounded by δ+(1−threshold), achieving zero false negatives across all measured adversarial scenarios including phishing, data exfiltration, and privilege escalation attacks. Protected by US Pending Patent 63/956,723 (106 claims). The agentic AI market is projected to reach $93.2 billion by 2032, but deployment remains at 2% of enterprises due to governance bottlenecks. Y.I.N.-AGENT-ACT eliminates the 6-18 month compliance barrier through cryptographic compliance-by-design.
Xinyu Hou, Yang Lu, Rabimba Karanjai, Lei Xu · 5 authors
Ransomware is still one of the most serious cybersecurity threats. Victims often pay but fail to regain access to their data, while also facing the danger of losing data privacy. These uncertainties heavily shape the attacker-victim dynamics in decision-making. In this paper, we introduce and analyze zkRansomware. This new ransomware model integrates zero-knowledge proofs to enable verifiable data recovery and uses smart contracts to enforce multi-round payments while mitigating the risk of data disclosure and privacy loss. We show that zkRansomware is technically feasible using existing cryptographic and blockchain tools and, perhaps counterintuitively, can align incentives between the attacker and the victim. Finally, we develop a theoretical decision-making framework for zkRansomware that distinguishes it from known ransomware decision models and discusses its implications for ransomware risk analysis and response decision support.
Firmware integrity is a foundational requirement for securing Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS), where malicious or compromised firmware can result in persistent backdoors, unauthorized control, or catastrophic system failures. Traditional verification mechanisms such as secure boot, digital signatures, and centralized hash databases are increasingly inadequate due to risks from insider threats and single points of failure. In this paper, we propose a decentralized firmware integrity verification framework built on the Ethereum blockchain, offering tamper-proof, transparent, and trustless validation. Our system stores SHA-256 hashes of firmware binaries within smart contracts deployed on the Ethereum Sepolia testnet, using Web3 and Infura for seamless on-chain interaction. A Python-based client tool computes firmware hashes and communicates with the blockchain to register and verify firmware authenticity in real-time. We implement and evaluate a fully functional prototype using real firmware samples, demonstrating successful contract deployment, hash registration, and integrity verification through live blockchain transactions. Experimental results confirm the reliability and low cost (in gas fees) of our approach, highlighting its practicality and scalability for real-world CPS applications. To enhance scalability and performance, we discuss extensions using Layer-2 rollups and off-chain storage via the InterPlanetary File System (IPFS). We also outline integration pathways with secure boot mechanisms, Trusted Platform Module (TPM)-based attestation, and zero-trust architectures. This work contributes a practical and extensible model for blockchain-based firmware verification, significantly strengthening the defense against firmware tampering and supply chain attacks in critical CPS environments.
This preprint introduces Risk Oracle, an exploit-intelligence–driven SBOM attestation framework designed to support practical risk gating in CI/CD. The system combines signals from Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) and Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS) with SBOM-to-vulnerability matching to produce a policy-backed gate decision (e.g., pass / warn / block) while keeping the workflow interpretable and reproducible. A core design goal is bounded disclosure: the producer can commit to full findings and then disclose only a limited subset (e.g., top-K highest-risk issues) suitable for downstream verification, reducing disclosure risk while preserving auditability. The paper details the end-to-end pipeline (producer/verifier roles), a typed attestation schema, a scoring and decision procedure, and an evaluation that studies (i) signal behavior under pinned KEV/EPSS snapshots and (ii) operational overhead under synthetic SBOM scaling intended to approximate CI workloads. Key contributions A practical SBOM attestation pipeline that integrates exploit-intelligence signals for operational decision-making in CI/CD. A typed attestation schema and verifier procedure supporting bounded disclosure. A policy-driven scoring and gating framework (pass/warn/block) grounded in vulnerability-management practice. Evaluation focused on interpretability and operational cost (runtime/payload scaling) under reproducible, pinned snapshots. Artifacts / Reproducibility Code, scripts, and pinned snapshot references: [GitHub link] Suggested citationSudhir, S. (2026). Risk Oracle: Exploit-Intelligence–Driven SBOM Attestations with Bounded Disclosure (preprint). Zenodo. DOI: [10.5281/zenodo.18153487] Keywords: SBOM, software supply chain security, vulnerability management, KEV, EPSS, OSV, attestation, CI/CD, bounded disclosure, reproducibility
The rigorous security model of Bitcoin's UTXO architecture often comes at the cost of developer usability, forcing a reliance on manual stack manipulation that leads to critical financial vulnerabilities like signature malleability, unspendable states and unconstrained execution paths. Industry standards such as Miniscript provide necessary abstractions for policy verification but do not model the full imperative logic required for complex contracts, leaving gaps in state management and resource liveness. This paper introduces Bithoven, a high-level language designed to bridge the gap between expressiveness and formal safety. By integrating a strict type checker and a resource liveness analyzer with a semantic control-flow analyzer, Bithoven eliminates major categories of consensus and logic defects defined in our fault model prior to deployment. Our results indicate that this safety comes at modest cost: Bithoven compiles to Bitcoin Script with efficiency comparable to hand-optimized code, demonstrating that type-safe, developer-friendly abstractions are viable even within the strict byte-size constraints of the Bitcoin blockchain.