My technical work and my STS research are both fundamentally centered on the advancement of modern flight systems, though they approach the field from distinct perspectives. While my technical project focuses on the engineering requirements, mechanical design, and integration of a hypersonic reentry vehicle to achieve mission success, my STS research examines the need for transparency and risk assessment in these complex technologies. This research explores the moral failings in the design of active flight-control software and how a lack of professional virtue can lead to catastrophic failures in aviation. So, while my technical work and my STS research approach flight systems from different angles, one through the lens of mechanical reliability and the other through the lens of ethical oversight, the theme of advancing safety and accountability in aerospace engineering is consistent across both projects. My technical work explores the design of the Hypersonic ReEntry Deployable Glider Experiment (HEDGE-2). HEDGE-2 is a deployable flight vehicle designed as proof of concept for low-cost hypersonic test vehicles capable of collecting aerothermal data at hypersonic speeds during atmospheric reentry. As the Structures and Integration Lead and Deputy Project Manager, I focused on designing and building a hypersonic test vehicle. Additionally, I designed the deployment mechanism to eject the vehicle from within a NASA RockSat sounding rocket to an aerodynamically stable reentry flight state. The goal of the project was to successfully survive the high-G launch environment, suborbital space and atmospheric reentry conditions to reenter Earth’s atmosphere at Mach 5+ speeds, while transmitting data to our ground station. My STS research also explores flight systems but through a normative ethical lens. My research focuses on the Boeing 737 MAX crashes and investigates the systemic failure of the organization to practice core professional virtues. I employ virtue ethics as a conceptual framework to argue that the disasters resulted from a deficiency in prudence, honesty, and moral courage among the project's key actors. My claim is that Boeing’s internal culture prioritized commercial interests, specifically the "Common Type Rating" and schedule adherence, over the ethical requirements of engineering integrity. By misclassifying the risks of the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) and withholding technical details from pilots, the organization failed to uphold its duty to public safety. Working on these two projects simultaneously added significant value to my development as an engineer. My technical work on HEDGE-2 provided me with a grounded understanding of how small design decisions, such as sensor placement or mass distribution, dictate the safety and stability of a high-speed vehicle. This technical context enriched my STS research by allowing me to evaluate Boeing’s "single-point-of-failure" design through a more critical and practiced lens. Conversely, my research into virtue ethics prompted me to reflect on my own responsibilities as a lead for a NASA-supported project. It reinforced the importance of technical honesty when mission-critical safety is at stake. In summary, these projects together have provided a holistic view of aerospace engineering where technical precision must be balanced by an unwavering commitment to professional ethics.
Scott D. Sagan, Benjamin Valentino, Charli Carpenter, Alexander H. Montgomery
Our 2015 survey experiment—reported in the 2017 International Security article “Revisiting Hiroshima in Iran”—asked a representative sample of Americans to choose between continuing a ground invasion of Iran that would kill an estimated 20,000 U.S. soldiers or launching a nuclear attack on an Iranian city that would kill an estimated 100,000 civilians.1 Fifty-six percent of the respondents preferred the nuclear strike. When a different set of subjects instead read that the air strike would use conventional weapons, but still kill 100,000 Iranians, 67 percent preferred it over the ground invasion. These findings led us to conclude that “when provoked, and in conditions where saving U.S. soldiers is at stake, the majority of Americans do not consider the first use of nuclear weapons a taboo and their commitment to noncombatant immunity is shallow.”2By 2015, we had been researching American public opinion on the use of nuclear weapons and the ethics of war for several years. Many of our previous findings about the U.S. public's hawkish attitudes had been unsettling. Nevertheless, the levels of public support we found in this study for a strike that so clearly violated ethical and legal principles on the use of force were deeply troubling.We proposed, therefore, that future research on the nuclear taboo and the noncombatant immunity norm focus on interventions that might blunt these disturbing instincts of the American public. We are gratified that Charli Carpenter and Alexander Montgomery have taken up that challenge and are contributing to the emerging debate on this important subject.3 A number of the ideas they advance are important: scholars should study the sources and kinds of information and arguments that citizens would likely receive in real conflicts; the influence of historical analogies; and the differences and similarities among civilian elite attitudes, military views, and public opinion.4Nevertheless, we find Carpenter and Montgomery's main critiques unconvincing. We remain deeply skeptical about how much stopping power legal and ethical norms are likely to exert on the U.S. public if it is ever faced with the kind of terrible dilemmas that can emerge in the crucible of war. We believe that the unsettling findings of our experiments make the effort to understand public opinion, and to discover how to influence it, particularly urgent. Our common goal is to create experiments that illuminate how the public would react in real-world crises, maximizing what is called the “external validity” of experiments. In this response, we propose some novel ways to realize that common objective.We applaud Carpenter and Montgomery's efforts to replicate our findings and assess the degree to which legal and ethical norms affect public opinion. We wish we could replicate their findings in turn to examine related questions, confirm the accuracy of measures, and assess alternative interpretations. Unfortunately, we are unable to do so. For despite agreeing to this debate, and despite us sharing our data with them, Carpenter and Montgomery declined to share their replication data or even their online appendix with us before publication.Nevertheless, a careful reading of their article reveals important reasons to be skeptical of their central conclusions. Carpenter and Montgomery's main claim is that the scenarios we used were “psychologically stacked in favor of atrocity” because we chose “not to mention international law or norms.” They argue that omitting references to law or norms constitutes “priming by omission.”To test this argument, they begin by replicating the conventional attack condition from our 2015 experiment. They report that 57 percent of subjects indicated that they preferred the air strike, 10 percent less than we found. As they acknowledge in footnote 55, however, this difference is not statistically significant. Therefore, they clearly state that “we do not dispute Sagan and Valentino's overall finding.”Carpenter and Montgomery then ran several experiments using an altered version of our original conventional weapons scenario that substituted the words “Iranian Civilians” for “Iranian City” in the headline (a change that might have led some subjects to believe that the United States would target all civilians in Iran).5 In these experiments, subsets of subjects were asked to consider international law and ethical norms before indicating their preference for the air strike or ground war in the Iran scenario, and in others after they indicated their preference. Surprisingly, Carpenter and Montgomery do not report the results of the two direct experiments comparing the pairs of conditions in which subjects were primed or not primed on legal knowledge and ethical sensitivity. They do not report the results from the two groups that received the law question before and after the air strike question at all. They do report a decline in preferences for the strike (from 54 percent to 46 percent) when subjects received the ethics prime before the Iran question, but this decline refers to a comparison between one group that received the ethics prime before the air strike question, and subjects pooled from two different subgroups that did not, although the different treatments these pooled groups received is unclear (Carpenter and Montgomery never explicitly describe each of their nine different treatment groups). In footnote 63, nonetheless, Carpenter and Montgomery acknowledge that even this change is not statistically significant at the conventional p < .05 level.One of the core tenets of experimental research is that researchers manipulate only one variable between any two comparison conditions. Carpenter and Montgomery repeatedly violate that rule in reporting their results. For the sake of transparency, in their reply, Carpenter and Montgomery should report the means and standard errors of their key experimental conditions (at least groups 1, 2, 6, and 7) separately and the results of the direct comparisons between their primed and unprimed conditions for law and ethics.Even if some of Carpenter and Montgomery's results are statistically significant, the effect is substantively small. Unlike Carpenter and Montgomery, we do not find it reassuring that 46 percent of respondents preferred the strike even after being primed to consider the ethics of targeting civilians. Nor are we reassured to read that 39 percent of respondents who “strongly agreed” that killing civilians was wrong nevertheless preferred the strike that would kill 100,000 of them. We were even less comforted after reading in footnote 62 that an additional “80 percent of those who only somewhat agreed with the ethical norm supported the strike.” For the sake of transparency, in their reply, Carpenter and Montgomery should report the total percentages of respondents who supported the strike and clarify which groups received the questions about law and ethics, and in what order, before or after answering the question about Iran.Carpenter and Montgomery do report that subjects who agree that it is never legally permissible to target civilians are less likely to prefer the air strike. They acknowledge, however, that 45 percent of subjects who agreed that targeting “the civilian population” violates international law nevertheless supported doing just that. Indeed, if we include the percentages of subjects who answered the law question incorrectly and preferred the strike, it appears that a majority or near majority of all subjects primed on international law actually preferred the strike. We do not understand how these results make Carpenter and Montgomery “far less pessimistic” about the public's apparent willingness to violate the noncombatant immunity principle.6The relatively small effect of priming subjects on considerations of law is mirrored in studies of torture and drone strikes that Carpenter and Montgomery cite for support. Geoffrey Wallace, for example, finds that telling subjects that torture violates both U.S. and international law reduced support by 6 percent, a drop he describes as “a systematic but substantively modest effect.”7 Sarah Kreps and Wallace report that priming subjects that certain U.S. drone strikes were illegal decreased support by between 6 percent and 8 percent. They acknowledge, however, that “over 40% of the public approves of the strikes even when told they would violate international law, almost twice as many subjects as opposed the strikes,” and that legal priming “does not make the public more willing to put their own troops in harm's way.”8According to Carpenter and Montgomery, our article understated the true force of ethics and law because a “framing effect was created through the either/or structure of the Iran scenario question.” They call this effect “the tyranny of closed-ended questions.” In one “Revisiting Hiroshima” experiment, however, we provided respondents with a third option—a diplomatic settlement in which Ayatollah Ruhollah Khamenei was permitted to remain as a spiritual leader under a democratic government. Forty-one percent of our subjects chose that option, but 40 percent still preferred to launch a nuclear strike.The basic closed-ended design that we have used in many experiments is routinely employed in public opinion experiments, however, including many of those cited favorably by Carpenter and Montgomery. It also forms the foundation of the famous “trolley car” experiments, designed by moral philosophers to assess moral intuitions about killing.9 Closed-ended questions are particularly helpful for testing the strength of competing norms because they force respondents to confront difficult dilemmas. Carpenter and Montgomery, however, argue that this kind of question produced “moral confusion” and exaggerated “public antipathy” to noncombatant immunity.We do not think that subjects who expressed a desire for a third option in their open responses are suffering from “moral confusion.” Instead, they are (understandably) seeking to avoid the moral dilemma that they confront. Carpenter and Montgomery claim that “because norm conflicts can reduce support for prohibition norms in warfare, pitting the protection of Iranian civilians against the protection of U.S. troops could have biased Sagan and Valentino's experiment in favor of striking the city.” Yet, that is exactly what researchers testing for the stopping power of norms should do: “stress test” norms to determine how much they constrain behavior when other values are at stake.Carpenter and Montgomery repeatedly claim that our Iran scenario is a “tough test” for the power of norms. Nevertheless, it is a realistic and relevant test, for it is exactly in such scenarios that the United States might be tempted to violate the principle of noncombatant immunity. As history has shown, and as our experiments have repeatedly found, it is easier for people to voice support for an abstract normative principle (such as whether they believe killing civilians is always wrong or illegal) than it is to uphold that principle when it conflicts with other core values. Violating such principles may produce distress and a sense of tragedy, but for many Americans, these emotions do not possess “stopping power” when U.S. soldiers' lives are perceived to be at risk.We disagree with Carpenter and Montgomery that studies that do not prime subjects on ethics or law are guilty of “priming by omission,” or that this concept constitutes a useful critique of any survey experiment. Although we did not prime subjects to consider ethics or law, neither did we prime them to consider the potential environmental effects of a strike; provide graphic images of the Iranian victims; or discuss the potential that a nuclear or conventional attack would create a horrible precedent, increasing the likelihood of similar attacks against the United States. It that these considerations would support for of noncombatant immunity as much as or more than priming on law or and Montgomery claim that our scenario subjects to target civilians the is not Our did not report that Iran had supported or did not read that were military in the or that the civilians might be contributing to the war effort by to Iranian These considerations would likely support for of noncombatant immunity. are not Carpenter and Montgomery also guilty of “priming by all survey experiments, considerations that might have public opinion one or only that “priming by could be to our results would be if it could be that the of all considerations that citizens would in the real to the air strike. Carpenter and Montgomery have of how these competing considerations would therefore, to claim that our experiment was any less than their believe that Carpenter and Montgomery are to argue that legal and moral considerations would be in real-world public in military We also believe that such would produce competing about the and of different military examine this in we a survey experiment, by to a representative sample of subjects were to one of experimental conditions. condition the main of the 2015 “Revisiting Hiroshima” nuclear In a the was to that the of had that the nuclear attack would violate international of that the U.S. has which have war attacks on In the third the that the about whether the attack violate international of that the U.S. has of the that which have war attacks on civilians. of the however, the strike would be legal is a Iranian military the city and the strike could be against that We believe that this is and and that such an attack would be Nevertheless, it because this kind of has been in the to attacks on the of Hiroshima and and the and results are in As in “Revisiting subjects were asked whether they preferred the nuclear air strike or of the ground war. They were then asked whether they the strike violate the international of Fifty-six percent of subjects the strike would be and percent of subjects preferred the air strike in the percent of subjects who read that the that the strike would be illegal but 40 percent of respondents who read that nevertheless preferred the strike. 8 percent drop in support was not statistically significant When subjects read that the about whether the strike was however, that the strike would be illegal to percent, and preferences for the attack to percent, although the change in preferences also was not statistically significant experiment also the of Although neither our experiments Carpenter and Montgomery's or by the that the of the decline in support from 2015 and was a decreased willingness of in to support a strike they was by In our original 2015 percent of and percent of they preferred the strike by on In however, only percent of supported the strike, percent of still in the survey were percent more likely to support the strike, even when for other such as and would the many that the public would in the real-world Carpenter and Montgomery are that some respondents the to when their but this only the of our experiment, for such would likely in real-world about military It is that the who as in the from to both for an illegal war against and that and to the by the the of the under law in is still and some legal scholars argue that even if a war might still be as the the When with about law and ethics, the U.S. public not always with who an is if those are the of the stopping power of norms is public to the in that the United States had been a as after the the a think the use of torture against in to important information can be percent that torture was never In Americans were to including that was illegal and and that U.S. did not to torture or were even if they As found that support for torture actually after in 2015 when the the used that many consider to be torture on people of these or not percent that they were only percent that they were in 2015, the could still be or the repeatedly that the United States much than In a in we asked a sample of Americans whether they agreed or with the that “the United States should use much than to information from percent for Americans, moral and legal arguments against did not have “stopping strikes such as those in our experiments should never be They would be and the principles of and in the to the and by the United States as They would not and could even increasing among and a for future by Our research however, that it would be to that the majority of Americans, or even all American agree with that and Montgomery claim that they find of the kind of instincts we among some subjects in “Revisiting they have not their we on their of We however, against using as the of these In our 2015 experiment and our support for the for was among the of preferences for the strike against Iran that support for war and that for they support using force this of or it people the of they actually favor for just war and the law of not to the public's ethical which are all not We just war and the law of to constrain common We these to the of is important for scholars to their open to common and not to Carpenter and Montgomery that deeply about the civilian immunity norm and the Americans, however, do not have a what these and find that percent of Americans report that they these but not what they percent a about what they only percent a about what they and percent never of such a previous Carpenter and Montgomery that any key from both the study and that we more on the We agree with that We just disagree about how this Sagan and for their to our We their sharing their 2015 data with us after of their which we are in a to of We them and other scholars to the online data and researchers to to this by studies that include direct of the power of we were to that Sagan and do just that in their Although they deeply skeptical about how much stopping power legal and ethical norms are likely to exert on the U.S. we found it that the they in their Iran a change in the of that the is still stacked against these much so that we might have the we of debate between Sagan and and We then discuss their findings and some of our additional research this debate is about how scholars think about the study of norms in international We do not to Sagan and Valentino's findings so much as to to and the important research they have We agree with Sagan and on the of research in this We also agree that attacks on civilians are and and should never be We however, in key we on an about the of in that norms have Sagan and Valentino's original findings support for air strikes against civilian led them to conclude that to noncombatant immunity is we argue that the of ethical norms against nuclear use and civilian one would support for the Indeed, we find that only 54 percent of Americans would even such an and priming with a question ethical norms support to 46 percent, which is a majority and a Sagan and Valentino's results that less than percent of Americans would support such an with a similar of about 8 percent when to information international we disagree on how and how much to on to moral For example, Sagan and that the drop we from 54 to 46 percent support for is not statistically one the for at the of p < As we in our we find a drop of percent p < for the effect of the question and the from to In it sense to and at results if they do not this and them if they we that in our only percent of Americans to the study of questions may be an for survey not only because citizens and are with only two but also because they can their own and moral of might the likelihood that international norms would the of because it is not the public that whether the of war be we disagree with Sagan and on in survey and We agree with them that our study is more or less than that both studies were on a representative this is a should also to be experimental be representative of real-world conditions under which a would be We think that Sagan and Valentino's on the survey to the of these in what can be from survey experiments about the power of were after we our findings at the for International Security and at in Sagan and their own in which the of civilians is at least called question by the of a in our of any on international law Yet, we think that Sagan and Valentino's also and our Sagan and find an 8 percent drop in support for the strike in the condition where the acknowledge it would be a mention of international law in any “stopping power” that legal considerations can have an even in scenarios where one might the Indeed, this a the other forms of we remain the in Sagan and Valentino's experiment, including the of the of relevant and even when the agree that the strike would be they are still it as an to respondents that military believe that international law may be or when than moral a key of the original as citizens from the only voice the is the a war on the this is less an of the norm than of the and to We would any drop in support to be small in such a if not to opinion in the other the of the We were both that strike support and that it as much as 8 the of the in Sagan and Valentino's with to In a real-world scenario, we would such as the United and and to the that it is illegal to target citizens under the Indeed, the might much more in the than the as we have it is that the would make such an and even less likely that they would make an illegal even the of the and even with the of about moral Sagan and Valentino's still an that would the war. As we describe in our the of this experiment is on respondents as the claim that of civilians can It is to that the U.S. military It would still be even if the from the also information that the of the was by the structure of Sagan and Valentino's experiment a for these effects and those that we discuss in our which all the of about real-world public opinion that could be from this We would be to a more version of the experiment where the did not from the at but from the or a where about and were expressed by at least some than the and where it is that the the are than and to the by the of public opinion on that public opinion has not always been by moral We think the they also actually our about the of and in survey questions about to norms. They cite results from a survey question that think the use of torture against in to important information can be their which we argue respondents about the of the torture survey question they cite the claim that is at In each citizens are asked by a or to believe these as a for in It is that they would do forms of can have effects as Charli Carpenter and that and of in of this in can be if those are to A article by Alexander Montgomery, and finds for these respondents to war respondents more likely to believe that international law such in certain those who of studies support for war are to also favor such war such as these are not only of public they are where public of international norms are Although study is we think the use of and the of their results in the are of what the apparent of American public to norms such as the torture are deeply that the could through of civilian the nuclear or other questions, on how they are such as Sagan and and goal is to determine how norms can be than to think about these of this is to that experimental are not one of many useful ways to important questions at the of and moral We this is only the of a on how to this Sagan and and for on of their
Abstract The nature of Kant’s criticism of his pre-Critical ‘possibility proof’ for the existence of God, implicit in the account of the Transcendental Ideal in the Critique of Pure Reason , is still under dispute. Two issues are at stake: the error in the proof and diagnosis of the reason for committing it. I offer a new way to connect these issues. In contrast with accounts that locate the motivation for the error in reason’s interest in an unconditioned causal ground of all contingent existence, I argue that it lies in reason’s interest in another kind of unconditioned ground, collective unity. Unlike the conception of the former, that of the latter directly explains the problematic ontological assumption of the possibility proof, the existence of intelligible objects as the ground of possibility. I argue that such Platonic entities are assumed because they are amenable to the kind of unity prescribed by reason. However, since the interest in collective unity has a legitimate regulative use when applied to the systematic unity of nature, the conception of God entailed by the possibility proof is retained as a regulative idea of reason.
I INTRODUCTION The principle of subsidiarity has a logic of legitimacy that strives to allocate responsibility at the national level in order to bring decisionmaking closer to those affected by it. Legitimacy is not the only reason for allocating competence to the national level. In some cases, such as the United Nations Security Council's (UNSC) schemes to prevent terrorist financing and the proliferation of chemical, biological, and nuclear (CBN) weapons, decisions about where to allocate responsibility are made for reasons of effectiveness. Treating these security threats as weakest-link goods, (1) the UNSC has aimed to decenter the administration of collective security away from itself by harnessing individual nation-states so as to create a completely regulated international sphere in which terrorists and proliferators are starved of means and opportunities to perpetrate attacks. In pursuit of this goal, the UNSC has sought to create shared frameworks for action by carving out a new quasi-legislative power. In an attempt to quell criticism of this move, the UNSC reassured states that they will retain national control over the implementation of their obligations, thereby satisfying the principle of subsidiarity. In effect, however, subsidiarity has been sidelined by the UNSC's strategy of implementation. The UNSC's strategy employs disciplinary power to generate an infra-law at the level of technical detail and to normalize states according to it. (2) Discipline shares the UNSC's logic of effectiveness and subsidiarity's preference for national responsibility, but it operates below the surface of the formal law and out of the reach of subsidiarity. It offers a notion of national responsibility shorn of national control. The argument proceeds as follows. Subsidiarity's logic of legitimacy is briefly considered in part II, which concentrates on the logic of effectiveness underlying the UNSC's schemes. The disparity between the open-textured norms on the face of the UNSC's quasi-legislative resolutions and the disciplinary work of its subsidiary bodies is the focus of part III. The Financial Action Task Force's (FATF) recommendations on money laundering and terrorist financing are shown to constitute disciplinary infra-law of the legislative resolutions in part IV, which also offers an illustration of discipline's negative effect on national control. A. Logics of Effectiveness and Legitimacy Whereas the principle of subsidiarity has a logic of legitimacy, the UNSC's approach to the prevention of terrorist financing and CBN proliferation has a logic of effectiveness. These logics are incompatible. The UNSC's reasoning is totalizing; it treats the international realm as a bounded space that transnational threats cannot escape as they can the boundaries of nation-states. If this bounded space can be controlled, then, the logic continues, it may be possible to deprive terrorists and proliferators of the conditions they need to succeed, such as financial support, manpower, open borders, lax import-export controls, and corrupt or incompetent criminal-justice systems. The Council has framed the problem of preventing these threats as a weakest link good that makes every gap, deficiency, and malpractice a potential, however remote, impediment to achieving a totally regulated space and thereby preventing international terrorism and CBN proliferation. (3) Achieving this in practice is no easy task. The UNSC cannot regulate the international realm on its own, as it is dependent on UN member states to carry out its decisions. (4) Given this setup and the UNSC's unrepresentative post-World War II composition, it has adopted a strategy of using UN member states as nodes in a decentralized scheme of administering the entire international-- not global--space. Total regulation of aspects of this space is needed to deprive terrorists and proliferators of means of operation and opportunities to operate. …
International legal positivism in some of its radical forms in the 21st century operates as theological voluntarism. It is the ambition to translate an overwhelmingly practical art into a general theory of law that has squeezed these theories into a theological structure of thought. If such a thing could ever exist, a general theory of law ought to reveal the role played by morality in the normative pronouncements about law. However, a general theory can only emerge at the expense of taking the existential decision about identifying law with morality or severing law from morality.2 Hans Kelsen writes that ‘law is an order of human behaviours’.3 But is this order founded upon morality or not? This very question articulates a fragmented view of reality falling between fact (morality) and value (law) that we have learned to take for granted.4 Practitioners know that the correct professional approach is to be interested in the legal aspects of a case and not in its moral aspects. Moreover, both in theory and practice, one can often limit oneself to act as a morally responsible person.5 There are, however, several sensitive areas in which even minimal theoretical work calls for the adoption of a moral-normative standpoint.6 However, the ‘general theory’ type of thinking urges the theological question7 – will the law punish my immorality or not?8 The theoretician devising a general theory will lay out the question of morality and law in absolute terms. Independently of the answer, articulating this question involves the assumption that the lawyer should take a theological approach, which is also reflected in the non-neutral outcome of the following two absolutist approaches.9 If law is to prescribe what is moral, every legal judgment is a moral judgment about good and evil. Law is endowed with power in order to apply a moral code, and secular law becomes superfluous. The second approach, based on the separability of law and morality, denies that the normativity of law makes claims connected with morality. What is at stake is not whether law ignores or refrains from expressing whether a particular behaviour is moral or not but, rather, the assertion of the idea that no violation of the law is a moral evil and no legal judgment is a moral condemnation. Morality is irrelevant to this approach. Both types of general theory work in the realm of the ideal with an a priori type of human being. The sinner belongs to the first category; the god to the second.10 In both cases, the theologian-theoretician devising a general theory employs law that works in history in order to model behaviour in practice. In the first case, the human being becomes absolutely dependent on the ideal type to which she has to conform, the supreme legislator (presumably representing God) being in charge of its implementation. As if in parallel, in the second choice, the morality of human beings is considered to be autonomous from that of the supreme legislator (embodied by the people, the consent of the state and so on). A theory of law that demarcates strictly legal norms declares that moral normativity in its varied forms, including reason, nature, justice, politics, the real world or humanity, never comes into contact with legal judgments.11 A human being’s behaviour ought to be examined through law without this type of considerations. Law as ideality is, as it were, enclosed – it is disconnected from any claim to substantive moral content, but, more importantly, it is also disconnected from the sphere of practical action in which the legal actor takes a moral decision when necessary. The troubled history of natural law theories proves that the first option described above has never been attempted, let alone implemented.12 Moreover, there is no moral code that can produce a complete system of (international) law – not even Sharia does that.13 Equally, the few alleged attempts made in the realm of theory to produce any form of neutral normativity, independent from morality, have failed with similar regularity. The (healthy) inconsistency of the formulations attempted to this end has been laid bare by the fact that their authors have introduced rational considerations of morality and justice when this was felt to be necessary or unavoidable.14 The condition of voluntarism concerns a classical position of Western theology that differentiates between the absolute power of God to adopt any possible course of action without contradiction and the divine ordained power by which God is committed to act in a certain manner. While we are moving within the realm of strict theology, the voluntarist element appears when emphasis is placed on all of the logical possibilities open to God to create different worlds. Everything from the beginning is considered to be contingent (‘it could have been otherwise’) and therefore no rationality can bind the will of God.15 Instead of observing the reality around him, the 14th-century voluntarist theologian felt compelled to focus his epistemological view on the normative character of God’s command. He accordingly focused on the idea that God’s command was binding even though he considered it to be, logically speaking, deprived of inherent rationality, morality and so on – or in modern formalistic terms, empty and neutral.16 In his book, Pure Theory of Law, Kelsen sketches a similar type of theological voluntarism with some wit: From the point of view of a theory of positive law, there is no fact that by itself – that is, regardless of a consequence stipulated by the legal order – is a delict. There are no mala in se, but only mala prohibita. This is only the consequence of the principle, generally recognized in criminal law: nullum crimen sine lege, nulla poena singe lege; and this principle which is valid not only for criminal law, not only for criminal but for all delicts, not only for punishments but for all sanctions, is merely a consequence of legal positivism.17 Kelsen continues by explaining that it was self-evident that certain behaviour was criminalized when the legal authority regarded it as ‘harmful to society’. However, ‘from the point of view of an analysis of the immanent meaning of the legal order, this circumstance is irrelevant for the concept of delict’.18 The invocation of the positivist principle nullum crimen sine lege makes Kelsen’s thought look voluntarist it a of the nullum crimen sine lege and nulla poena sine lege that in to limit the power of the and the of the crimen sine lege a from all that is morally The idea was to the of a as a criminal only on the of what has been as law. Kelsen made his claim to that there was no that this principle to that there are no that are not or only have been by law. it does not as that when one human behaviour from a positive law one a the principle of nullum crimen sine lege the lawyer to to positive law, if there is In the principle to law in criminal law of any but it is not its to morality from a legal point of in his to Kelsen articulates his theory with all the in law of a voluntarist in law is not by any particular rationality or Law could have The two in International A and and the of International A Theory of the of in the epistemological of theological voluntarism. The legal theoretical ambition of the two appears to be to one should of an law that state consent at the that morality be placed law. In a similar to century legal the existential by these is by not by Moreover, the two authors to apply the radical of a positivist general theory of law to this theory but, rather, it – Kelsen’s this both the by their legal theoretician the of in Kelsen’s normativity of law. In the and theoretical first by of normativity by to without about its However, it is no that several of to legal In the of and this theory appears to a of power to the law to which have an of in which legal are being the of of law, one with and of the between the of law and and of the of law to some of the in this law is connected to such a theory the of in of from the of law. However, the theory type of normativity of in International Law and and the of International Law an ideal for law, it to its The of its politics, not to its morality, makes the – the theological type of thinking as Kelsen law is and ought not to be with of morality. as was the case with this type of theory to with to the What are the of the of law the can legal to that and all of the of the to an ideal of law and morality has never of the theoretical of law, and of such as or one to whether be the to take such a However, this is not to that the not and and that in some the modern The International in a a of around the general of positivism and legal theory by and is by a different theoretical In the of the of the two which is that the authors are the of this the a positivist and a and with the of and – and the also in their of the the power of the for law or attempts to the between natural and positivist law. In this the of the of both expressing the in law – which is, in their positivist – and the of positivism in The forms a of with the which this for its to through the the in upon this Moreover, not only is the an independent but of the also form of their that that one can with is that are about law. the theological of positivism are in the the of the in the the adoption of a moral point of view in law, with the of substantive by which the of law can be In morality is with what the of the century has to their in radical positivism in their and have in or even Kelsen’s and – does as with a minimal of natural of the adopt the with to the of However, one the in the on this particular the that the to the several of the in to theological voluntarism are In the one does not that is about the to be a in to the theories of that made claims The of legal is but are with the of with a world in which is to be in of legal In this the legal of the century works in with what is in reality and is not on of of legal theory or – the as on the through This about is with to Pure Theory is to legal theory in in International A In the is often with the legal theory of to a decision of the authority is as as a legal In the have Kelsen’s Pure Theory as both of more to of Kelsen’s work and articulating the of and the law to Kelsen with the create Kelsen this idea Moreover, the of to Kelsen’s legal thinking is not to the emphasis on the of in law. In Kelsen’s was the very question that ought to in the of law. on the of was to whether the to and Kelsen that it was that the itself its to be that the of could be when the felt to be open the question of – the state or the itself was also and Kelsen The question of be by no decision necessary. But such a does not in law. There are no in only by the The is the can never be only two of Kelsen’s one his in to and his in the of the law to be by the are in order to that is not a particular from the of the of the legal the of is and is in the 21st a when several of legal Kelsen have legal and have to and in of It is only natural that the is to be no a in the of law. While there is in law, the century have law itself as the to the state of in In the of law as a to the fact that it was considered to be the when thinking in of book, however, with type of This is one to and to epistemological as Kelsen’s theory within the of theological as of the theory of the is founded on the from no from an of the Pure Theory does not that law is an legal order or that is not by It is in this that in International Law with the of that and of the in of to the that has to and as as the of in International Law is about to itself as both an and a about the of valid law without the of morality and state the of at thought that in he on in the as we as being that which is of have both and aspects take the in the be by the described the of an act of as being on the He that is to the to with so that the act of is from all the of the which are about the or the This in which is about thinking with and about thinking with is in of the idea of voluntarism as an epistemological in in International A as to the Pure Theory will that and are in in International The to a Pure Theory to law calls for to a priori the between and to the The to this in the in which he his work on legal theory to in the very in the to the made the book, in which the Pure Theory is as both and does in theoretical or a of what in the 21st in to law. Moreover, very in the the that is and a in the classical – a to one will not be he to and of when the adoption of the Pure Theory is as an act of one a as to the thought it a on that particular this at the end of the is an of existential to and is Kelsen’s also be as through an act of in the Pure However, he never attempted a of the Pure Theory to of law. This is from of International Law, which is a of the law of his It be the case that he not to to the law of his – which from the – or he felt the was not for that through he his in of law, as to the of the between and law the that in the of the Pure Theory is a in a as as refrains from any of Kelsen’s to of the of a theory of law that was to be to above in of of from the and the regarded that as the only to However, in his theory of law, Kelsen the There is to that his that as a of principle it was a to moral and judgment in law. In the of the of the committed by the Kelsen made no about the and and to the morality of the However, we can only with on the the of his What is is that Kelsen’s theory of law in of Pure from The of to through Law and of International Law the real of of International A is that it what Kelsen never In this its is at the very of The a very to the thought of and the few to work on his and moral However, the and analysis of Kelsen’s – the of The of taking Kelsen’s work and as a that Kelsen in these and of Kelsen’s legal theory on the of the two the only The the Pure Theory to law in International Law is a and from which any interested in legal theory will Moreover, in of the substantive it with – law and and of – the a of thinking that through the of legal the of the Pure as a for the of in its to the of the law, its in the of law, and its to the of and in the case of to the approach of radical This approach, to to with the Pure and that is a valid and through to the of is the of is as the between and to legal makes possible the of norms as is in the as the to every theoretical and even are to for to that In one a with This is in the which are more with legal of the normative to be the of the to apply and law as it is in the of the However, the in no that this to the to what the to the Pure should not act with in of This is for from the of the law of of the in The with a on the different of within the and law legal the for to have to such as or that positive law. on that are open to to in the of the of of the of law to in the of in It is not so an inherent of that the but an of to the for the of both theoretical and practical on the on the of or of laid in of the which in to by in this case to the in the the from which an in of the general of the The idea is to to what the law and the of But law on the of be but as and the of for or for have their and that the of can be also This look However, what is of is that he the – to and through law. on the of normativity was an in the of the century by legal In so the of the of to that a has law. The in legal theory is in the in which this is is the between Kelsen law as and the in at a when law was and could not have been to the and to He was thinking of the when the of law which was the of the and the by the of It is for to know or this to be so in the history of legal However, was in a that the of of law that – that of with the of the about law being law and a in which the an in the normativity of law. and the of International Law belongs to this of the to the of is, one of the one from the appears more to a epistemological for (international) law. This works in with the that the to a in his all the to but, to the between a and a of the of that law is what the makes the of However, it is on the He to in – that is, the idea that have of their – as principle of of The by and the that it – by as and – is what the to on the of in that law be he on the of and the the to this type of theory of of which was a makes more the that the at the As the the of natural law and of the will of the state the to the of law. The on a of natural law and state will the the as being As an natural law can be and – from of natural to the of the or the of law, the of law and the the or will of the state – that – also when as a of of is the of a normativity in of the in the book, Kelsen’s theory is all in the very of and the of International Law in of the by and that their meaning through a in the that in the of the of a theory of law, as the of legal is the makes the question of of the legal order as a and his theory to the and Kelsen the of through the of law is the of the theory in the However, even though the claims that he is not in devising a general theory of law this does not that the does not one – to a of the particular theory introduced in this is Kelsen’s even – it is The of and the of International Law does not merely to a theoretical of but also to produce a theory of in the of the of of Moreover, one can on the of one the of theories that could the work that has the fact that the several and a legal the of theory and is by the of the of theory in the This that the of can be by of such a formalistic However, this is the general of radical and the of International Law is at and to The is to know more about the of this theory in practice, and the at the end of the about only on the of the that in calls for the and of his never at the of to idea idea in such a that we at but legal Moreover, their work about legal and this in their of the works of and and What is in this is the fact that the authors generally adopt to the with to The are and for a and point of In are with the in which law the real world and The the that the the of positivism is to a by the fact of and by the that can into the power to apply law. In this the the classical of law between and are more to the are with the The of the between positivism and in the of the system of law is reflected in the of the to a this is with legal The that for the radical positivist position a good of its more in a Kelsen’s as the assumption of the and the of the he that is at a – this is what when a as a on his a more role in his in the and on the of legal and the of the of the lawyer the of In an the of a at the that be as act of in the of a morality, could the lawyer whether she or he has a responsible In a different that the of law should of professional that the in its form of This and such as on legal analysis of legal on a for positivist legal thinking and on the of positivism and through its as the general of the is the of such legal thinking is by about the of a of authors in legal thinking for their of the power of the has to it is to that he appears to be to an of the the This was by the but is in the several authors and on and to this it have been a good idea to have it in the In the a of natural law. As as this is to of his an question open at the end of the What be the in as which is the of the natural law he law with a theology in the at the beginning of this or is it an of the human necessary to in the more the of the positivist of and for his the classical legal in in his state consent several legal The that more with the with the as to the to which morality is with law. the of of a fragmented view of human beings based on different of ideal normativity with no – morality As it is a that the theological of a theory of law is in its to the between morality and law. This is not to that the authors a the the involves an of the of But of the both at the that work in the legal sphere is with a of morality. is at to the of the positivist principle nullum crimen sine However, his that what is at stake in the of this principle in the case of criminal law is that the by which the or of an is is and does not in a about human but, rather, human are in by positive law. He that human are the of divine a but a of some for which the consent of is therefore the beginning and the the of law when norms to normative considerations and any to be in violation of the the she the of law to forms of law in a general manner. However, analysis also moral-normative considerations as a of course in the of law. The by and is on the law to the of and is the on the of when and moral are at In one could the with in several of the in this without of The following is a good of what have in is by no that positivist to legal should be an when the to a different In this case as by is to upon a or a or a or a such as this the at the beginning about the of the of a general theory of law in to a practical art such as law. the general of the in this on positivism in a world a for responsible by and in different to that the of of If there be to be it be and not very to the to claim that was the There is no that this is However, this position does not to be the in this The from some of only two of the are an fact that one for thought. one can about with some the of in a on an analysis of the of a with law is this of what is a of the in this has to what is are and and one should the for a not only of law but also of some of the from which it with legal or for that with law will from the with to the of and and in law and will from to it from to have in this that theological about morality and law to the that ought to be autonomous or that ought to history and and from the from legal history at two about the between morality and law. both in the in the legal the in with one at the normative of the first of what makes a good or of the of what makes good law and the of we are thinking in of practical it is in that practical law has its in a and The of International in International Law of International Hans Kelsen in International in International Kelsen and on International and Law International and International and International and to International Law International Law International law in and from a International Law International Law and of
Kant's example of lying to the murderer at the door has been a cherished source of scorn for thinkers with little sympathy for Kant's philosophy and a source of deep puzzlement for those more favorably inclined. The problem is that Kant seems to say that it is always wrong to lie—even to a murderer asking for the whereabouts of his victim—and that if one does lie and despite one's good intentions the lie leads to the murderer's capture of the victim, then the liar is partially responsible for the killing of the victim. If this is correct, then Kant's account seems not only to require us to respect the murderer more than the victim, but also that somehow we can be responsible for the consequences of another's wrongdoing. After World War II our spontaneous, negative reaction to this apparently absurd line of argument is made even starker by replacing the murderer at the door with a Nazi officer looking for Jews hidden in people's homes. Does Kant really mean to say that people hiding Jews in their homes should have told the truth to the Nazis, and that if they did lie, they became co-responsible for the heinous acts committed against those Jews who, like Anne Frank, were caught anyway? Because this is clearly what Kant argues, the critics continue, his discussion of lying to the murderer brings out the true, dark side not only of Kant's universalistic moral theory but also of Kant himself. We get the gloomy picture of a stubborn, old academic who refuses to see the inhumane consequences of his theory, and instead grotesquely defends the inhumane by turning it into an a priori, moral command. In this paper, I argue that Kant's discussion of lying to the murderer at the door has been seriously misinterpreted. My suggestion is that this is primarily a result of the fact that the Doctrine of Right with its conception of rightful, external freedom has been given insufficient attention in Kant interpretation. It is in the Doctrine of Right that Kant discusses rightful interaction in the empirical world. Hence it is in this work we find many of the arguments needed not only to understand his analysis of lying to the murderer in “On a Supposed Right to Lie from Philanthropy,” but also to analyze the added complexity the Nazi officer brings to the example. When we interpret lying to the murderer in light of Kant's discussion in the Doctrine of Right, we can make sense of why lying to the murderer, although a wrong, is not to wrong the murderer, why we become responsible for the bad consequences of the lie, and finally why lying is to do wrong in general. The account of rightful freedom provided in the Doctrine of Right also makes it possible to see why replacing the murderer with a Nazi officer adds philosophical complexity rather than just one more reason to reject Kant's view. The introduction of the Nazi officer requires us to consider the role of a public authority in ensuring rightful relations in general and what happens to the analysis of lying when rightful interactions as a matter of fact are no longer possible. We will see that the only time doing wrong in general by lying is legally punishable is when we lie to or as a representative of the public authority. The Nazis, however, did not represent a public authority on Kant's view and consequently there is no duty to abstain from lying to Nazis. Two further strengths of Kant's account, I propose in the final sections of the paper, lie in its ability to critique how European legal systems aimed to deal with the Nazis after the and in its to our of the of Kant's “On a Supposed Right to Lie from Right to is a to a by in Kant by to The moral is a duty to the if and make We have of this in the consequences from this by a who as to that it be a to lie to a murderer who us a of is has in our It is a duty to the The of duty is from the of duty is that on the of one to the of there are no there are no the truth is a but only to one who has a to the no one has a to a truth that against Kant that if it is always wrong to lie, then is by I that it be to against In or not lying is wrong on the that to we are do not have a to the truth and no one has the duty to the against lying to should not be a The of Kant in the introduction is in line with general on In of it Kant's to in the Right to as more for the if one were to a of Kant's that to the one is to the if have by a lie just on from the then are legally for the consequences that from if have to the then public can against the consequences It is possible after have to the murderer's as to his is at the has out that not the murderer and the not be but if and that is not at and has out are not of that the murderer and his on then can by be as the of his if told the truth to the of then have and the murderer the for his and the have been one who a lie, be responsible for its consequences even a and the for they have for is a duty that be as the of to be on the of is made and if even the to it is be in is a of reason one not to be by to the we should view Kant's to the provided for his account of the moral in In this we that moral be on a that can be and that we do the it is the to from When this the Right to like the one is as it how one to lie as the of lying be and it out the of this moral with to people's and against one Because lying is not a Kant is as lying to the murderer is a of it is this mean not only that one lie to a of the murderer at the but also not to the of as the Nazis. to Nazis is also a are no to the truth be make even in the Kant can be as that if lie despite the of doing are also legally responsible for the bad consequences of the for if the hiding in out are lying to the and as the Nazi from the then are partially responsible for what happens to the even if it not this analysis is clearly absurd and If this is Kant has to say the the critics then the with of reason is the of the of Kant's argument in the Right to and despite the of I it be it seems that an that on of general is wrong, Kant the that is the argument to a discussion of or what Kant in the in the Kant discusses only how lying to the murderer should be from the of view of how public should to Kant discusses and from in this In the only Kant to and to that is not with but only with or in The of Kant of and of and the that is an of general in the and the Kant as with people's of and of their in the people's of on from is to what can in be of external and in the is to what in be of what is one to do although external freedom and freedom freedom as for the view that is an of our or a of our one example of example I to the of lying is not Kant the that not lying or truth as is an duty of the reason is that do in have the fact that and the make Kant as an also a if Kant is wrong, it is that of philosophy that the as a of his theory as The will be to Kant an interpretation. is there an more of Kant on the of turning to what I is the and also and more of Kant's on why of Kant's account of the problem of lying to the murderer are by the one that on Kant's account have to people's just they is to from the the murderer to as it is of his who is in his The is that Kant's account of truth that one has a duty to to just to and that one has no to it is to to the problem by that on Kant's account we can is in the but are not into The then by that if the murderer has with the and the matter of in a public of it is that do not us to that we can lie to the murderer at the are out by the in Kant the example. Kant the at when an of or has the to be The is is to be in a is to make by an in to a to or to Kant that is in is into to to or and in the the door does not have the of asking the murderer to also of to get out of the problem to the that one does not the is in the After one be the is in the and one argue that one can say that one does not Kant also out this in the of the Kant that at is not a to the as this is to that it is a matter of one's will a given is to be or is what is at is or truth to the of if to the of the is in then the is that the is in We that Kant's analysis of lying to the murderer at the door in the Right to is an analysis of the problem from the of view of or and not from that of or and in sense does Kant mean that lying is wrong and punishable from the of view of see us attention to the in lying is and is not a wrong to Kant's Doctrine of In this Kant that is with a to or a to from by another's as it of external can with the freedom of in with a Kant's theory of to is to and one's in and with to do the on Kant's account, to lie as is not to wrong from the of view of do not have a against that the if they they have an to what is and this is with to in to what Kant the that a has a against that the against Kant that with to the of or not a has a against that the it is or not the truth does not have a against that the In the to the Doctrine of Kant the by that the to freedom is to be to do to that does not in what is as they do not to as his to or what is and or and for it is to they to or in general do not have on Kant's view. we will to the general is that I to by I can say I a lie, by I of what is they after what I a and the of view of do not wrong by to of or by lying to it is to what to with and in what say is or as in the of the murderer at the if into a from this not the is why Kant in the Right to as that the of the murderer at the door one to It is an the murderer at the door does not have a to and to get it lie as is not to wrong from the of view of lying as is not a as a of external freedom ability to and of with In lying does not that to and it does not of external is also from the of view of the only lying as is a wrong against are when the lie of rightful and when it is of a In the lie to of that to or that not be to in are acts of as they of the that is to the external In a of a is of rightful by public for the has are to or has are the the or as if it were in the of instead of a or the liar it as of is to and not only the but also is a punishable In light of the we can in the Right to Kant does not argue that lying to the murderer at the door is a it the of Kant's Kant that lying to the murderer is to a against the the murderer does not have a to by into the of the murderer and the the murderer is the one the not the Kant's account does not for the liar does do wrong, even it is not against the Kant that the liar when The duty not to lie is not a duty of we against say the murderer, but a duty one of us has Kant this also by that by lying in fact wrong no I the of with respect to in general do wrong not I do not wrong in but I wrong by a of rightful interaction in than this lying from the of view of however, Kant it as it more by lying one does not wrong but by in a with rightful interactions as makes it to in a with rightful and and also it the even interaction or people and on are with rightful interactions on truth lying is wrong in general as it is with a of rightful even is the is not a wrong of against this it is to one more of Kant's analysis of the murderer at the is to how a public of should consider in the truth or lie to a The is not to as those Nazis and but on how a just legal should an of a to a is that if a to out of the interaction the murderer and his by the truth to the murderer, then a public of for In only the murderer can be the is only to In when a to with to his of the empirical and in this a of the The is punishable for the bad consequences of the the of Kant's us consider a of lying not to a murderer, but to to if for and lying into an is then are partially responsible for the despite no or of the have to with to the of the in and this in what the to are responsible for the bad consequences of as this example to the of lying to the murderer at the it is to not to what Kant is we should that Kant's analysis as on the that a in The in to be a legal to lie to who has in even into have a legal against the that they be in their truth on the of the out of be If this were the then be as the to to into they lie to rather than the to out of it by the Kant that have an to a public can of its a against to be in this can to respect people's to interactions by the a be as a against a hiding in if refuses to in the lying interaction with the In and this is the by to in the by lying the of the victim, the also responsible for the bad consequences of the The reason is that by lying to in a of by a in is to when lie to the murderer, it is not to the murderer capture the the if makes it possible for the murderer to get to his victim, then are legally responsible can by be for bad It after be the that the who into is on to the and the murderer is the to make to to a for the murderer and his victim, even the of the of by that for the bad see more clearly Kant is we the of the who has in from to lie is not a of the consider the in the can in and will lie for to but in fact have do not to lie for In this become an in the when the murderer lie to one's that one will lie to the the truth to the murderer the and then that one told the truth to the murderer, one is not legally responsible for the bad consequences of the lie to one's is not a in one's to out of a be for there be truth the in to out of as that the that will lie, but as a matter of it out to with the murderer, are that the I that Kant say that are not to be also in this to lie on of a be as legal have the against that that are wrong in as even if not be to with the lie is a that by asking even if to do not legal and final the that and and with the by lying to the despite to the to out of the and is caught by the In this the reason why is is not lie, but to to what the of to do or to despite by to the the and the of The reason I attention to is to that in the Kant is only how a public should analyze a in into to and are what to do as the murderer is on the Kant that if to in what by the fact that do it from a good does as for bad consequences from the in do not in the but it what will the the and to or the murderer as is or the in time to the In if to lie be to the legal consequences if is and lie the murderer capture the victim. I Kant's discussion in Right to is primarily aimed at how a public authority should deal with who have from I do not it the analysis of of In it does not the in the murderer at the door is a Nazi In to deal with this we to arguments in the Doctrine of In the on Kant that to in the of is not to wrong but it always in the In light of this account, we will see on Kant's account, the only general by lying can be legally punishable when we lie or public In the on public Kant that the public although is not Kant's conception of the why we the Nazi officer into the the it is one in rightful interaction is no longer possible at The Nazis did not represent the public but its no one an to the truth and the Nazis did not have the to The of rightful did not the European were to and I will argue that Kant's account seems for their the of those who in the Nazi us with the argument the of in the of In the of the Doctrine of Right, Kant an account of the of the of as the Kant that we are the to freedom us a to our In however, that we an account of how we can of as our to and have empirical as our it is to and of our in the to be Kant of external of of and The general in the of the Doctrine of Right how to an account of the and of external of that is with to Kant's rather is that it is to of the of the of we Kant that to and the and of the of in be in the of by the of a public or is it possible to an account of rightful and the of external of Kant the account of by that we have an duty to and that as one to in the of one does wrong in the Because in the of and the of a public authority is of rightful interaction in the empirical world. by a public we we rightful interactions in the world. for our analysis of the Nazi is that just is in the of is no public authority with to and consequently no rightful can there is why Kant does not as of his of just is in the of is also why Kant's analysis in the Right to the of how an public should the problem of lying when the added complexity when the murderer is a it is also to Kant's that to in the of is to do wrong in the Because rightful is as in the of the of is a of wrongdoing. to in this is to reject the of rightful interaction and is why can be to the of it is to that if of the to then they do not wrong one by to in this Because no to with the they to in that are at of is to if happens to on and is then their interactions are of if they do on and to their with then there is of or not there are and by to in rightful by to a public they the of to do the of rightful to do wrong in the if but one to and the one is to the to do then those who to wrong the one and do wrong in the the the to be and to in the of is not as the one does not have the to be or to in this The one to but In this the one does not have for one is to against who with The final of needed we can to the of the Nazi officer Kant's account of public The in the public of the Doctrine of Right is to the of and the in Kant's account of does not result in an conception of Kant that the public authority be as the of public for on the do the is as a authority and the the of on the and finally there be a to the rightful on with the of by public on their public the for its and it and systems that can systems as and It is to how this account of the of a public authority has for when lying legal that in Right to Kant is how public should who lie to is not how a public should deal with lie to public in to the or to in as a public is also not how public should deal with the from people in their as public are the we should from Kant's account of the public authority with respect to of if one is lying to a representative of the public one is not lying to a but to a public The public authority of us and no one in it is not a but a that we have we a to if one to a public officer or one in then one to and not to in or one a rather than if a in as a public in that then a wrong in doing to represent and no one in lying and the people with respect to the of public the public by and to how the public authority should a can no longer be with a public and can be for the public of the in the fact that no longer does the public represent but only the the on this account lying that that is a in is punishable when the lie from the public authority or when the is to the public authority. the lie one a public against the rather than a against I it that the analysis of the Nazi officer is from that of the general of the murderer in that the Nazi officer to be the public authority or the we are legally to abstain from lying to public if the Nazi the public authority on Kant's then one be to abstain from lying to the Nazi even one is to lie to the is not for the Nazi not as a public authority. see why the Nazi be to represent the public authority on Kant's we by Kant's the and the to Kant the of the the and the the of the public of and the in the is by the of public The is a public authority on a to of its to the in of their to their their and their In the of the public authority as a is made with the of The Nazi not a on it and public to of the the it to a legal that not only the of but also the of to their The Nazi did not represent but no one in by on the the and as it not a public authority. is to Nazi not but at Kant in the from a of the or is with freedom and in is and Nazi at its this in to be to the Nazi Kant further from an even is freedom and that the Nazi after the not only not a but is than the the Nazi but aimed at the of rightful for the is not a of one a against as those who in the Nazi in an to rightful relations as It an to a in there is no to freedom at on the is at its as the Nazis were in the of and the European not only in a of but in a of the lying or not to wrong is in fact than the of rightful in by the Nazis in fact of or like the Nazis The analysis does not however, as it is to be that from the of view of the Doctrine of Right the rightful of the of European by the Nazis the that the even the of the of the the were the that interactions the of that the European their rightful in the the of the European legal systems to the of by those who the The and to the were the as those that been and the of the analysis is that it the for a critique of what the European legal systems aimed to the to the of by the committed this by Nazis or as those who in the Nazi and committed public against the the one a Nazi or be legally for committed against the in line with Kant's account the European legal systems did not the Nazis as the and consequently the of against were as of one against the those in the Nazis were punishable for in a against the is to say that they were also to be with their public against the Because the public of in a to the rightful is the of public Kant it for the is no European legal after of its responsible for not in the against the Nazis, for not lying to Nazis. who to out of it by the truth when were and to Kant should not have The reason those who to by were not is that people be legally to to or for to do that are wrong in as lying and I like to by out what I to be further of Kant's our of It is to that there is no to by moral is an of and a duty of and not a duty of to the of however, of acts against a the of as a The people in the in were their by against the Nazis in an to the that rightful were possible in the this is a duty of a duty of to a is not can be legally or to is why many of those who in the were of of after the Kant's account makes sense of why we see as or and that this analysis brings to light an of that more to make good sense to more to are and to capture the moral or those who against it is a fact that of with and and on in the more this is at the After did what they by the on the more it seems that or even to good what one has a of people as good as they or In the view I have can make sense of this to the a of reason why of find their to deal with from their of committed against the Nazis, the did not wrong the Nazis, but they did wrong in the by against rightful interaction and rightful as by a public authority and public they were in their only to with a rightful although they no or for their as they were into their by the Nazis the is at a in the sense of we can be into from there are no even if we to by the there is a moral as it in with rightful many of the their to with is not a of their of but rather a of their to and in rightful interaction I like to and the at the for for their on the and of this also to the at the and to the and at the for their to of this