The Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation, DAC8, and the OECD Crypto-Asset Reporting Framework together form an emerging normative ecosystem meant to bring crypto-asset activity within the reach of tax authorities. This study asks whether that ecosystem affords a coherent and complete framework for the international taxation of crypto-assets, or whether the heterogeneity of classifications between financial-market law and tax law perpetuates the conditions for an incomplete taxation that procedural transparency cannot, on its own, remedy. The study proceeds in two parts. Part I analyses the transparency framework. Its definitions are settled, but its reach is not: DAC8 and CARF render transactions visible only where a reporting intermediary exists, which places decentralised finance and self-custody outside the system altogether. Part II asks what becomes of the information once it has been reported. Comparing the substantive tax treatment of staking, mining, airdrops, non-fungible tokens, stablecoins and decentralised-finance income across the principal jurisdictions, it finds that visibility does not in itself produce taxation, because states do not qualify what they see in the same way. Beneath the divergence, the study identifies an uncoordinated drift toward functional treatment. It argues that hard substantive harmonisation is foreclosed in practice, globally for want of any authority empowered to impose it and within the European Union for want of the unanimity that direct taxation requires. What remains available is coordination rather than harmonisation: the neutralisation of cross-border mismatches on the model of the linking rules developed against hybrid mismatches, a technique that leaves each state in possession of its own classification. The central finding of the study is structural. The absence of an identifiable counterparty constrains transparency, substantive qualification, and any coordinated remedy alike, so that the framework is coherent across the intermediated crypto economy and structurally incomplete beyond it. The same limit that arises from the architecture of the technology arises, for reasons of its own, from the consent-based architecture of the international legal order, and together they mark the boundary within which the international taxation of crypto-assets can be made to work.
Purpose The purpose of this article is to critically analyse the value-added tax (VAT) levied in South Africa in respect of non-fungible token (NFT) transactions.Motivation NFTs represent a novel category of tradable digital assets that use blockchain technology. The South African Revenue Service (SARS) has not issued any guidelines on the VAT treatment of NFTs and therefore the VAT treatment is uncertain.Design/Methodology/Approach A doctrinal research methodology, which included a comparative study with other jurisdictions, was employed to critically analyse the VAT levied in respect of NFT transactions.Main findings This article found that an NFT transaction constitutes a “taxable supply” and that it can constitute the “supply” of “goods” or “services”. Although the VAT consequences of NFT transactions that constitute “goods” are easily established, the VAT consequences of NFT transactions that constitute “services” remain uncertain. The classification of whether the services qualify as financial services, electronic services or imported services remain uncertain.Practical implications The findings of this article accordingly suggest that legislative amendments be made to the VAT Act or that guidance be issued by SARS to clarify the VAT consequences of NFT transactions.Novelty/Contribution Academic research on the VAT treatment of NFTs is also limited. This was the first study in South Africa to critically analyse the VAT treatment of NFT transactions.
The increasing prominence of crypto asset transactions has brought their tax implications into focus. This thesis explores whether returns from Decentralized Finance (DeFi) transactions, particularly staking activities, can be classified as interest for tax purposes under South African law and international tax treaties, specifically the 2017 OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital (OECD Model). A comprehensive legal analysis, supported by an exemplar, is used to determine how these innovative financial transactions align with existing legal frameworks both domestically and internationally. South Africa, consistent with other jurisdictions, does not classify crypto assets as fiat currency or legal tender. Current guidance suggests that income derived from crypto asset transactions is subject to general tax rules, potentially taxed as ordinary income or capital gains. This paper assesses whether the returns from staking crypto assets resemble interest and could trigger the application of South Africa's withholding tax on interest (WTI). Section 24J of the Income Tax Act provides a non-exhaustive list of items considered as interest in relation to financial and lending arrangements, with the underlying principal in common law being that interest is compensation for the advancement of credit. Interestingly, across the definition under section 24J and the common law definition, the mutual understanding is that interest is not confined to arise from money or currency and can take various forms in substance. Under the OECD Model, interest is similarly defined as income from debt claims, with no explicit reference to money or currency. By contrast, the UK acknowledges similarities between DeFi returns and traditional interest but maintains that interest can only arise from money or currency, thus excluding DeFi returns from being considered as interest. This thesis examines whether staking returns from DeFi can be classified as interest under Article 11 of the OECD Model and whether tax treaties can reduce or eliminate South Africa's WTI on such returns. It concludes that staking returns could potentially be taxed as interest under South African law but underlines the need for clearer regulatory guidance at both national and international levels to address the growing complexities posed by DeFi.
Abstract Stablecoins are regulated in the European Union under Regulation (EU) 2023/1114 on Markets in Crypto-assets. That Regulation establishes a bespoke legislative regime for ‘asset-referenced tokens’ and ‘electronic money tokens’. Both are crypto assets, i.e., digital representations of a value or a right that can be transferred and stored electronically using distributed ledger technology or similar technology. Both aim to maintain a stable value by referencing another value or right, a specified asset, pool, or basket of assets. Finally, existing EU financial services legislation covers none of them. This work describes the main features of those crypto assets. Current rules seek to provide legal certainty for issuers of stablecoins in the UE (by imposing a common set of provisions applicable to all of them regarding their authorisation, governance requirements, etc.), give appropriate protection for holders of those crypto assets (by regulating their rights against issuers, the rules applicable to crypto-asset white papers or the marketing communications), or address potential financial stability and monetary policy risks that could arise from their use as a means of exchange (by monitoring or restricting the issuance).
We study a game-theoretic model for pool formation in Proof of Stake blockchain protocols. In such systems, stakeholders can form pools as a means of obtaining regular rewards from participation in ledger maintenance, with the power of each pool being dependent on its collective stake. The question we are interested in is the design of mechanisms, i.e., "reward sharing schemes," that suitably split rewards among pool members and achieve favorable properties in the resulting pool configuration. With this in mind, we initiate a non-cooperative game-theoretic analysis of the well known Shapley value scheme from cooperative game theory into the context of blockchains. In particular, we focus on the oceanic model of games, proposed by Milnor and Shapley (1978), which is suitable for populations where a small set of large players coexists with a big mass of rather small, negligible players. This provides an appropriate level of abstraction for pool formation processes that occur among the stakeholders of a blockchain. We provide comparisons between the Shapley mechanism and the more standard proportional scheme, in terms of attained decentralization, via a Price of Stability analysis and in terms of susceptibility to Sybil attacks, i.e., the strategic splitting of a players' stake with the intention of participating in multiple pools for increased profit. Interestingly, while the widely deployed proportional scheme appears to have certain advantages, the Shapley value scheme, which rewards higher the most pivotal players, emerges as a competitive alternative, by being able to bypass some of the downsides of proportional sharing in terms of Sybil attack susceptibility, while also not being far from optimal guarantees w.r.t. decentralization. Finally, we also complement our study with some variations of proportional sharing, where the profit is split in proportion to a superadditive or a subadditive function of the stake, showing that our results for the Shapley value scheme are maintained in comparison to these functions as well.
We compare the total capital efficiency of secure restaking and Proof-of-Stake (PoS) protocols. First, we consider the sufficient condition for the restaking graph to be secure. The condition implies that it is always possible to transform such a restaking graph into separate secure PoS protocols. Next, we derive two main results: upper and lower bounds on the required extra stakes to add to the validators of the secure restaking graph to be able to transform it into secure PoS protocols. In particular, we show that the restaking savings compared to PoS protocols can be very large and can asymptotically grow as a square root of the number of validators. We also study a complementary question of aggregating secure PoS protocols into a secure restaking graph and provide matching lower and upper bounds on the PoS savings.
This paper explores the principle of decentralization within the context of the 1923 Romanian Constitution and the subsequent challenges posed by the 1925 Administrative Unification Law. It examines the tension between centralization and decentralization, highlighting the evolving roles of prefects, sub-prefects, and notaries as representatives of central authority in local administration. The study argues that despite the constitutional emphasis on decentralization, the 1925 law reinforced centralization, leading to significant political and administrative controversies. Key debates from the period reveal how historical, cultural, and political factors influenced legislative decisions, particularly the preservation of Romania’s unitary state character. The article also discusses the implications of these administrative reforms on local governance, autonomy, and the efficiency of public administration. By analyzing parliamentary debates and legislative texts, the paper sheds light on the interplay between political power and administrative organization, emphasizing the need for a balanced approach to decentralization that accommodates local needs while maintaining national coherence. KEYWORDS: administrative reform, decentralization, local governance, Romanian Constitution (1923) J.E.L CLASSIFICATION: H11, H83, N44 1. INTRODUCTION The principle of decentralization has been a pivotal theme in public administration, serving as a mechanism for balancing local autonomy with national cohesion. The 1923 Romanian Constitution marked a significant step in embedding decentralization within the legal framework, emphasizing the need for administrative organization laws at county and communal levels to uphold this principle. However, the implementation of the 1925 Administrative Unification Law posed considerable challenges, as it leaned heavily towards centralization, undermining the spirit of decentralization envisioned in the Constitution. This paper delves into the historical and political context of these reforms, analyzing the roles of key administrative actors such as prefects, sub-prefects, and notaries. It explores the legislative debates and societal implications of these changes, highlighting the centralist tendencies that dominated the period. By examining the intersection of political power and administrative organization, this study provides insights into the complexities of governance in interwar Romania, raising questions about the efficacy and sustainability of centralization as a model for state administration. 2. THE PRINCIPLE OF DECENTRALIZATION IN THE 1923 CONSTITUTION Decentralization was perceived by the legislator "not as an autonomous administrative body like in the Middle Ages, disconnected from other administrative bodies, but in close and continuous collaboration." The 1923 Constitution stipulated in Article 108, paragraph (2), that the administrative organization laws of county and communal institutions would be "based on administrative decentralization," as opposed to centralization (1923 Constitution of Romania). A decentralized administrative organization can be identified when "… administrative organizations are recognized as having legal personality and assets (the commune and the county had legal personality), when these organizations have authorities that are not part of the central hierarchy, when they are subject to a specific form of control called administrative supervision, and when certain public services are detached from the competence of central authorities (Tarangul, 1944). Administrative decentralization can be broader or narrower depending on how its defining components are regulated by law. The degree of administrative decentralization essentially depends on the number of public services entrusted to decentralized authorities (territorial decentralization) and the manner of organizing and exercising administrative supervision." (ibidem) Under the new Constitution, which was based on "preserving the national and unitary character of the country in the application of administrative decentralization," the draft law and subsequently the law established the county and the commune as administrative units, endowed with legal personality (Articles 1 and 2), while the territorial subdivision, without legal personality (Article 7), included several communes "to facilitate supervision, ensure the enforcement of laws, and provide proper administrative guidance." (ibidem) Decentralization was not easy to achieve politically, as it had to be implemented without altering Romania's national and unitary state character, while also accounting for the fact that, at the time of Unification, various forms of decentralization coexisted within the four administrative regimes of the united provinces. (Monitorul Oficial, 1925) Regarding this "cultural mosaic," during the Parliamentary Debates in the Romanian Senate on March 31, 1925, opinions were fiercely contested:"For instance, adopting laws from Finland, where the cultural level of the population is almost uniform, and where there are no differences in mentality, customs, or traditions, is not a difficult task. But it is challenging in our case, where the gap between the primitive shepherd in the mountain depths and the highly educated intellectual is so vast, perhaps even greater than the gap between a toddler just learning to walk and speak and a fully grown adult. It is difficult to create laws because they must apply to everyone, and even more challenging is to introduce an administrative law designed to organize numerous issues concerning individuals and society." Political opinions were outright irreconcilable, especially when considering the administrative territorial architecture proposed by the Liberals on one side and the National Peasants' Party on the other. 3. CENTRALIZATION AND THE 1925 ADMINISTRATIVE UNIFICATION LAW The draft law, developed by C. Stere in 1929, envisioned broad local autonomy, limiting the central government's right to intervene in the internal affairs of communes and counties. It also proposed the establishment of a new administrative unit—the province (Scurtu, 1983). During the debates on the Liberal government's draft law, Ion Vescan, speaking on behalf of the National Party in the Senate on March 22, 1925, stated that the current government lacked the political and moral authority to present the country with an organic reform proposal for its administrative organization. He argued that the current legislative bodies were unfit to enact laws that concerned the very existence of the State and its permanent interests. The National Party opposed the administrative reform proposed by the Liberal government, deeming it flagrantly at odds with the principles of a modern administration rooted in the democratic idea of local autonomy, which was, in their view, "the only means to mobilize all healthy and honest forces across Greater Romania." (Monitorul Oficial, P. III, 1925) A Transylvanian senator criticized the substance of the Liberal draft law: "An administrative organization based on the old centralist framework, which for over half a century has stifled the development of county and communal institutions and the growth of civic awareness—the sole foundation of a conscious democracy—can only serve the interests of party absolutism and culminate in the despotism inaugurated by the current government and prepared by all its present legislation." (ibidem) Analyzing the parliamentary debates on the draft law, it can be stated that few laws voted by the Romanian Parliament sparked as much uproar and unleashed such political passions as the Law on Local Administration Organization. The reasons for this interest were manifold, most stemming from the relations and rivalries between the major political parties. Each party, considering its historical contributions to the Great Union, felt obliged to promote such an important law, foundational to the organization of the State's administrative life, rightly called the country's second Constitution.The democratic behavior of opposition parties was not met with understanding by the ruling National Liberal Party. The Liberals rejected any argument referring to realities in the historical provinces, where aspects of administrative organization were recognized by experts as being even more advanced than those outlined in the new administrative organization law. The lack of political compromise between the majority and the minority was evident in statements such as: "First, they have not yet become accustomed to the purpose, role, and power of majorities; they fail to understand that a country where the minority does not recognize the majority, does not recognize the laws and actions of the majority, is a country—or rather becomes a country—that forfeits its right to exist." The 1925 law sparked numerous controversies and even harmed the State by repealing partially better provisions, motivated purely by unjustified pride or the opportunism of unification. Enormous difficulties arose due to the lack of continuity in legal norms, the population's overt distrust in the authorities tasked with enforcing the law, and, not least, the negative atmosphere created by the provisional nature of the system, including the constant threat of abolishing the institutions established under this law. Even C.D. Dimitriu, as the Rapporteur, paraphrased his party leader, I.I.C. Brătianu, during parliamentary debates, acknowledging the project's shortcomings but refrained from amending any article or paragraph in line with the opposition's views, stating: "The law is not perfect; it is perfectible. Who could ever imagine, who could ever claim, that I would come forward with a perfect law?" (Monitorul Oficial, P.III, 1935) The 1925 Administrative Unification Law also conflicted with the provisions of the 1923 Constitution. The principle of decentralization, stipulated in the fundamental law, was not realized because the county prefect, as a representative of the central authority and simultaneously the head of the county administration, restricted the activities of local administrative bodies and even dissolved them with little procedural formality and even less scruple. In its effort to enshrine the unitary character of the State, the law largely continued the centralizing tradition of the Old Kingdom of Romania. Centralization became the administrative system throughout the country, representing a significant regression compared to the existing organization in the historical provinces. Local and county interests were governed according to regulations and financed by resources provided by the central authority, administered by officials directly appointed by the central government. It was well known that this outdated system, already contested in the Old Kingdom before 1918, was being adopted. "Centralism implies the necessity for the State to hold in its hands not only interests of a general nature but also those of a local character, whereas autonomy means that the management and administration of local interests are entirely entrusted to the locals, to those primarily concerned with these interests." (ibidem)The Rapporteur, aware of the advantages of local autonomy, emphasized that it "can yield admirable results when used wisely," but "not when it enables various territorial divisions of a State or various parts or cells of its political organism to develop at the expense of the State's general interests." (ibidem) 4. POLITICAL DEBATES AND LESSONS LEARNED C.D. Dimitriu insisted that it was appropriate for the State, "always vigilant," to ensure the timely oversight of "the proper and correct fulfillment of the functions of the various bodies called to work for the benefit of the entire organism." (ibidem) He agreed that "every commune and county should have as vibrant and prosperous a life as possible," but stressed, "let us always remember that the primary goal is the life and prosperity of the entire organism, the life of the State." This, he argued, must be ensured through effective control over the functioning of the State's components—communes and counties—a task that must be carried out by the central authority (ibidem). In the liberal legislator's vision, the transfer of authority and administrative and financial responsibility from the central level to local public administrations had to be carried out "within the limits of general interests." (ibidem) Under the spirit of the 1925 Law, three actors represented central authority within local administrations: prefects, sub-prefects, and notaries. The prefect—a Napoleonic creation originating from the eighth year of the Great French Revolution—was maintained in the exact form outlined in the Civil Code until the modification of the French Constitution in 1958. Before 1958, the prefect was the government's representative and the head of the administration in the department where they served. After 1958, in France, the prefect became primarily the representative of the State and national interests, followed by their role as the government's representative and head of the department. In Romania, according to the Law on County Councils, No. 396 of April 2/14, 1864, Article 91, the prefect was the "head of county administration, directing all works of this administration and executing the decisions of the County Council." The 1925 Law, Article 3, paragraph 2, described the prefect as the government's commissioner attached to the County Council. In this role, the prefect oversaw the legality of acts adopted by the County Council and the Permanent Delegation. If the prefect identified any illegality, they had the right and duty to appeal to the government within ten days of the act's adoption (if they were present at the meeting) or from the date they were informed. The appeal was suspensive of execution.In both the draft law and the 1925 Law on Legislative Unification, the prefect became a political official rather than an administrative one. During parliamentary debates, it was suggested that the prefect should "have a career background" or be accompanied by a second prefect elected to lead the County Council. Representatives of the National Party supported and argued for the proposal of having two prefects, "one administrative and one political." (Monitorul Oficial, P. III, 1925). The idea was rejected on the grounds that coexistence between the two prefects "would be absolutely impossible—detrimental to good administration." (The 1929 Law, discussed below, later regulated the institutions of the political prefect and the administrative prefect.) Regarding the career prefect, concerns were raised about the irresponsibility of recruiting such a public official. (This position would later be introduced in the 1938 Administrative Law, Article 97, paragraph 2). From the pool of county administrators in the Old Kingdom and the annexed territories, out of 351 prefects, 129 held university degrees, 35 were officers, 51 were former notaries, and 46 were appointed based on exceptional laws without any educational qualifications. In Bessarabia, out of 54 prefects, only 7 held academic titles, 24 had no formal education, and 23 were former active-duty officers. Considering the method of appointing prefects, it is evident that they were designated politically and represented the government in the county through the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The distinction between political, administrative, or career prefects is highly significant, as their legally conferred powers allowed them to politically influence local administration. In the 1925 legislator's vision, the prefect "represents the entire government, corresponds with other ministers, and may inform various departments of the issues they identify and the improvements that need to be made." At the same time, the prefect was the head of the police in urban communes and the head of the gendarmerie in the county (Anuarul pentru toți, 1929). The legal instrument through which the prefect imposed the will of the central authority on local interests was established by the provisions of Articles 78 and 333 of the law. According to Article 78:"The mayor and members of the Permanent Delegation may be removed by a motivated decision of the communal council, adopted with a two-thirds majority of the total number of councilors. The council may only pronounce removal for reasons of ‘poor administration, evident acts of incompetence, bad faith, or culpable negligence that compromise the commune's interests, acts against the order and security of the state, or criminal acts.’" The council was notified by a motivated proposal from the Minister of Internal Affairs for urban communes serving as county capitals and by the prefect for other communes, or by at least one-third of the councilors. Decisions of the communal councils concerning the removal of mayors and members of communal delegations were immediately communicated to the prefect for rural and non-county-seat urban communes, and to the Minister of Internal Affairs for other urban communes. These decisions became final if, within ten days of their they were not by the central removed had the right to within the same a decision could only be based on the of the County Delegation or the Administrative the mayor or members of the Permanent Delegation acts against the security and of the State or to by the central authority, they were removed even the council was not notified by the proper If there was with this is by based on the motivated of the Minister of Internal Affairs with the of the Administrative Council." Article 333 of the law the prefect a both a representative of the central authority and as the head of county administration. the head of county administration, the prefect was the of all they appointed and in with the Permanent Delegation of the County Council (Article The prefect also held authority over these The was a representative of the central authority and a to hold with all to with key and simultaneously to become with the needs of various (Monitorul Oficial, P. III, the prefect, the was a career could also be appointed as they had of and held an academic degree or a from a administrative The as the representative of the central authority in rural communes. the notaries were in the Kingdom without However, the law established four for notaries, followed by two by The law notaries two of and the under certain to become the was also as being "within the administrative the representatives of the central (Article Administrative decentralization the of the as an with legal The was to communal administration and in its (ibidem). In a administrative system, the was in to the principle of it was as a territorial without legal by a The directly to the prefect and carried out the decisions of the the County and any other through laws and The prefect could part of their through decisions, but not on a permanent principle of administrative decentralization, in the draft law and parliamentary debates, only on Under the 1925 Law, centralization became the administrative system, county or local interests were governed according to the and regulations established at the central by institutions by the central authority, administered by officials appointed by the central government, and through financial resources from the one of the project's the lack of decentralization, time will come when administrative decentralization can be in a Senate and just as discussed it in our (ibidem) The 1923 Constitution marked a pivotal in Romania’s administrative the for a governance model that It the of local administrations with legal autonomy, and the to their However, the subsequent adoption of the 1925 Administrative Unification Law the difficulties of constitutional into of decentralization, the law reinforced a administrative that the of local the central control over and communal interests. The implementation of the 1925 law was influenced by a of historical, political, and cultural At its was the to the unitary character of the Romanian state, particularly in the context of with administrative This with the principle of decentralization, in a governance model that leaned heavily on sub-prefects, and notaries, as representatives of the central authority, were in enforcing this undermining local autonomy in of Parliamentary debates during this period political divisions the appropriate between centralization and the Liberal Party centralization as a means of national and administrative the National Party and other opposition for greater local autonomy, rooted in democratic These into legislative and a lack of the implementation of The of the 1925 Administrative Unification Law is one of for balanced By local interests to central authority, the law the development of local institutions of the needs of their It also a on central which stifled and local the administrative of the on this historical period provides insights for The challenges in the interwar period the of decentralization in a manner that local autonomy while national modern this as a of the need to administrative that local authorities without the of the The principle of decentralization, can more and to the of modern governance, the of the interwar period highly The between central oversight and local autonomy a yet of effective administration. the and debates of the period a historical on how to achieve this that governance are not only legally but also and to the needs of 23 a pentru pentru toți, 1929 Oficial, a a 1925 Oficial, a a Oficial, 1925, a Oficial, a a 7 1925 Oficial, a a 1925
Over the last couple of years, an increasing number of organizations have arisen that are native to blockchain technology. Recent data shows that these decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) that are essentially ‘living on the blockchain’ are becoming increasingly popular. They are attracting substantial amounts of funds, operating both in the Web3 space and off-chain, and creating a significant source of novel tax issues. The existing tax academic research on DAOs is often limited to US domestic tax issues following from the DAO’s legal treatment. This article outlines (part of) the existing income tax landscape for the DAOs and some of the arising income tax challenges. The focus is on the general principles of domestic and international income tax systems. The authors argue that the DAOs create fundamental and practical tax issues potentially leading to income taxed ‘nowhere’. Existing tax frameworks cannot fully embed the DAOs and allow them to maintain their distinguishing features. The incorporation of DAOs does not necessarily solve the tax issues and even exacerbates them in certain cases. The authors call upon domestic and international legislators and policymakers to aim for more tax certainty for shareholders and further tax research of the DAOs.
The local government has the right and the ability to regulate and administer an essential part of public affairs under their responsibility and in the interest of the community and the right to plan, finance and organize the exercise of a function.One of the main aspects is the support of local government in finding possible solutions for the financing and implementation of capital investment projects, also through policy improvements at the local level advocated by local government associations.In our legal framework, it is provided that the financing of the local self-government units is made from the revenues provided by taxes, fees and other local revenues, from funds transferred from the State Budget and funds that come directly from the allocation of taxes and national taxes, local borrowing, donations, as well as other sources provided for in the law.On the other hand, this paper will highlight the importance of implementing the principle of equality from the central to the local level, so that the latter can fulfill its functions where one of these functions is the expansion of financing sources.The implementation of local government investment projects depends on their ability to find the necessary funds by combining their own resources and external financing.Debt financing enables municipalities to carry out more infrastructure projects in a short period of time compared to financing from their own funds.
We provide two novel block congestion attacks onEthereum that are applicable even in the presence of the EIP-1559 base fee mechanism, which aimed to make such attacksimpossible or highly costly. Unlike traditional block congestionmethods, our approaches allow the attacker to avoid paying largetransaction fees in case the attack is unsuccessful. Moreover, oursecond attack avoids an explosion in the block base fee and canthus be used for prolonged congestion of an interval of blocks.Finally, we provide real-world examples of contracts currentlydeployed on the Ethereum blockchain which are vulnerableto such attacks. Thus, block congestion is both possible andprofitable, even after EIP-1559.
[SPA] El objetivo perseguido con este trabajo fin de grado pretende abordar y analizar el tema del control tributario de las criptomonedas intentando así esclarecer y dar un poco de visibilidad sobre este tema. En los últimos años ha crecido de manera exponencial, atrayendo así la atención de inversores, reguladores y autoridades fiscales. Los dos primeros puntos del trabajo los usaré de forma introductoria para así poder tratar conceptos básicos para así poder sumergirnos de la manera más optima en el mundo del control tributario y de las criptomonedas, explicándose temas como: qué es y el por qué de la importancia del control tributario, que es una criptomoneda, bitcoin y un Exchange. Seguido del tema del control y vigilancia tributaria en España hablando así de las limitaciones que esté presenta seguido del sistema y organismos que se encargan de este control tributario continuando con una breve mención sobre la ley MICA. Los siguientes tres puntos son la parte más densa e importante del trabajo tratando temas muy relevantes como: la tributación fiscal de diversos impuestos adaptados a la posesión de criptomonedas, seguido de las obligaciones de los contribuyentes donde se mencionaran algunos de los nuevos modelos fiscales junto a las sanciones que estos usuarios poseedores de criptomonedas pueden llegar a tener si no cumplen correctamente sus obligaciones fiscales, y finalmente de los retos y desafíos del control tributario, que consistirá en una breve mención del por qué de la importancia actual de las criptomonedas junto a los problemas que estas causan en la actualidad. Finalmente llegamos al punto de la conclusión en el que se expondrá y reflexionará sobre todo lo aprendido a lo largo de la investigación de este Trabajo Fin de Grado junto a posibles escenarios futuros del desarrollo de la fiscalidad de las criptomonedas. [ENG] The aim of this final degree project is to address and analyse the issue of the tax control of cryptocurrencies in an attempt to clarify and give some visibility to this topic, as it is a very current issue, but at the same time quite unknown. In recent years it has experienced exponential growth, attracting the attention of investors, regulators and tax authorities. I will use the first two points of the paper as an introduction to deal with basic concepts in order to immerse ourselves in the most optimal way in the world of tax control and cryptocurrencies, explaining topics such as: what is tax control and why is it important, what is a cryptocurrency, bitcoin and an exchange. Followed by the topic of tax control and surveillance in Spain and the limitations that this presents followed by the system and agencies that are responsible for this tax control followed by a brief mention of the MICA law. The next three points are the most dense and important part of the work, dealing with very relevant issues such as the taxation of various taxes adapted to the possession of cryptocurrencies, followed by the obligations of taxpayers where some of the new tax models will be mentioned along with the penalties that these users holding cryptocurrencies may face if they do not comply correctly with their tax obligations, followed finally by the challenges and challenges of tax control, which will consist of a brief mention of why the current importance of cryptocurrencies together with the problems that they cause at present. Finally, we come to the point of the conclusions in which we will present and reflect on everything we have learned throughout the research of this Final Degree Project together with possible future scenarios for the development of the taxation of cryptocurrencies.
El presente estudio aborda la intersección entre los derechos de propiedad intelectual, derechos de autor y conexos y los tokens criptográficos gestionados por registros distribuidos. Con el objeto de examinar estas cuestiones, se adopta un enfoque particular de un subconjunto específico de tokens, los asset tokens o tokens de activos, que pueden representar una unidad de cuenta fungible o un bien único no fungible, non fungible tokens o NFTs. La investigación se centra en la clasificación y protección de estos activos únicos, escasos y criptográficos, que están vinculados a obras de arte tanto en formatos físicos como digitales. Se adopta una perspectiva de no fungibilidad para proporcionar un análisis exhaustivo de la materia.El objetivo principal es dilucidar cuestiones clave en el ámbito del derecho de autor y la propiedad intelectual relacionadas con los NFTs. Entre los interrogantes que se plantean se encuentran: la extensión de la protección de los derechos de autor sobre los NFTs, la relación entre la estructura interna del activo y su representación visual, la viabilidad técnica de retirar un NFT del mercado en caso de violación de derechos de propiedad intelectual y, finalmente, los derechos que posee el propietario de una obra de arte física para convertirla en un NFT. El análisis técnico detallado busca ofrecer respuestas a estas preguntas, contribuyendo así al entendimiento legal y académico de los activos digitales en el contexto de la propiedad intelectual.
The reality is that there are constantly lots of critiques and testimonials approximately any industrial product or situation at the community. Several crypto buying and selling groups offer a wealth of critiques approximately<strong> Ethereum Trader</strong> or different structures along with Quantum AI buying and selling platform or Bitcoin Edge, that's considerable there.For this reason, the usage of the buying and selling platform may be taken into consideration cost-unfastened. However, it ought to be maintained that they'll be capable of take a small percent of earnings to cowl their prices and pay the debts supervisor fee. https://www.theethereumtrader.com
The author argues that commentary on the Second Circuit's 1989 Lessinger decision involving section 357(c) has not clearly identified the tax logic issues that are at stake in the case. He agrees that the controlling shareholder's obligation is not section 351 "property" and should not be accorded basis in the shareholder's hands. Instead, the obligation should be treated as a purchase money obligation that affords basis in the shareholder's stock unless it is properly viewed as contingent. In any event, proper structuring of section 351 exchanges of property subject to debt in excess of the property's basis for stock in order to reflect an actual retention of liability on that debt by the shareholder should prevent shareholder gain recognition under section 357(c).
Judgment of 28 January 2021, Qualcomm v Commission, C-466/19P, EU:C:2021:76, and Judgment of 2 February 2021, DB v Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa (Consob), C-481/19, E EU:C:2021:84 The Court of Justice of the European Union conformed and clarified in Qualcomm, the well-established scope and application of the freedom from self-incrimination; in DB v Consob, it ruled that this principle is applied in conformity with case law of the European Court of Human Rights and made a distinction between undertakings and natural persons. On 28 January 2021 and 2 February 2021, the Court of Justice (CoJ) of the European Union (EU) ruled in two cases on the freedom from self-incrimination. The first case, Qualcomm, was an appeal case brought before the CoJ by the undertaking at stake, whereas the second case, DB v Consob, concerns a preliminary reference procedure. The Qualcomm case also touches upon other aspects, such as the right of the Commission to request additional information after the statement of objections has been issued (see in particular paras 66–70). The focus of this contribution will be on the implications of the two cases on the freedom from self-incrimination in EU competition law proceedings. In 2010, the Commission started an investigation into an alleged predatory pricing practice of Qualcomm. The Commission issued an infringement decision in this case in 2019 (Qualcomm (Case AT.39711) Commission Decision of 18 July 2019). The case at hand relates to a decision taken on 31 March 2017 ordering Qualcomm to provide certain information, after Qualcomm refused to comply with a request for information on the basis of Article 18(2) Regulation 1/2003. Qualcomm challenged the decision of the Commission before the Union Courts. In DB v Consob, the CoJ had to rule on the scope of the freedom from self-incrimination in proceedings relating to insider dealing and market manipulation. The Italian Companies and Stock Exchange Commission, Consob, started an investigation against a natural person for insider trading and fined the person concerned €50.000 for delaying to come to a hearing and for failure to provide certain information when he was present at the hearing. Since the investigation is based on national law implementing a Directive, the national court decided to refer questions to the CoJ on the scope of the freedom from self-incrimination. Both the General Court and the CoJ dismissed the arguments of Qualcomm relating to the freedom from self-incrimination by referring to the ruling in the (perhaps infamous) Orkem case. In Orkem, the CoJ ruled that the Commission may ‘compel an undertaking to provide all necessary information concerning such facts as may be known to it and to disclose to it, if necessary, such documents relating thereto as are in its possession, even if the latter may be used to establish, against it or another undertaking, the existence of anti-competitive conduct’ (Case 374/87 Orkem v Commission, EU:C:1989:387, para 34). By contrast, the Commission cannot order an undertaking to provide answers that may involve an admission of guilt (Orkem, para 35). The information that Qualcomm had to provide was merely of a factual nature (para 145; and General Court in: Case T-371/17 Qualcomm v Commission, EU:T:2019:232, paras 187–189). Qualcomm also had to produce documents containing some of the information requested by the Commission. According to the undertaking at stake, this would infringe the freedom from self-incrimination, since the Commission can only compel an undertaking to provide pre-existing documents and thus, a contrario, cannot compel an undertaking to create new documents. Both Union Courts rejected this argument (CoJ, paras 146–147 and GC, paras 192–193). It may be necessary for an undertaking to put factual information into writing and to send that document to the Commission in order to comply with the obligation to cooperate. The freedom from self-incrimination will only be infringed in those circumstances when an undertaking has to produce documents containing an admission of guilt. Qualcomm confirms and clarifies established case law of the Union Courts and is in that regard nothing new under the sun. However, the established application of the freedom from self-incrimination in competition law does become interesting in light of the possible consequences following from the DB v Consob ruling. In DB v Consob, the CoJ had to rule for the first time on the scope of the freedom from self-incrimination for natural persons. The CoJ referred to ample case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in order to explain the scope and application of the freedom from self-incrimination. This is a logical approach due to the requirement in Article 52(3) of the Charter to provide at least the same level of protection as the ECHR rights when those rights correspond with Charter rights. Even though the freedom from self-incrimination is not explicitly referred to in Article 6 ECHR, the ECtHR has regarded this freedom to be part of the right to a fair trial (ECtHR, Funke v France, CE:ECHR:1993:0225JUD001082884, para 44). This also means that the freedom from self-incrimination is part of the right of a fair trial under the Charter (para 37). The CoJ ruled that, with reference to case law of the ECtHR, the ‘right to silence cannot reasonably be confined to statements of admission of wrongdoing or to remarks which directly incriminate the person questioned, but rather also covers information on questions of fact which may subsequently be used in support of the prosecution and may thus have a bearing on the conviction or the penalty imposed on that person’ (para 40). This is a notable distinction with the approach taken in competition law proceedings initiated by the Commission. According to the CoJ, this statement does not necessarily conflict with that approach, since (1) the Commission cannot oblige an undertaking to provide an admission of guilt (para 47) and (2) the Orkem ruling is applicable to (associations of) undertakings and not natural persons (para 48). Both reasons are discussed below. It is not uncommon in EU law to make a distinction between natural and legal persons with regard to the scope and application of certain fundamental rights. In the 2003 Volkswagen case, AG Colomer made a distinction between safeguards in criminal law and in competition law by reference to the nature of the accused in both procedures. Applying the same safeguards for individuals in criminal law proceedings to ‘powerful corporations with significant resources’ in competition law proceedings would, amongst others, be a ‘mockery’ to individuals (Opinion of AG Colomer in Case C-338/00 P Volkswagen v Commission, EU:C:2002:591, para 66). Directive 2016/343 also makes a distinction between natural and legal persons when it comes to the scope and application of the freedom from self-incrimination (Directive (EU) 2016/343 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on the strengthening of certain aspects of the presumption of innocence and of the right to be present at the trial in criminal proceedings [2016] OJ L65/1). The Union legislator decided to limit this directive to natural persons, since there are ‘different needs and levels of protection of certain aspects of the presumption of innocence as regards natural and legal persons’ (Directive 2016/343, Preamble, Recital 13; the freedom from self-incrimination is regarded to be part of the presumption of innocence, see Preamble, Recital 25). Reference is also made to case law of the CoJ that ‘recognised that the rights flowing from the presumption of innocence do not accrue to legal persons in the same way as they do to natural persons’ (Directive 2016/343, Preamble, Recital 13). In legal literature, however, different views exist as to whether the scope and application of freedom from self-incrimination can differ depending on the nature of the accused (see, for a short overview, Marc Veenbrink, Criminal Law Principles and the Enforcement of EU and National Competition Law: A Silent Takeover? (Wolters Kluwer 2020), 22–23). In DB v Consob, the AG made a distinction between the natural person in the case at hand and legal persons in competition law proceedings (DB v Consob, AG Pikmäe, para 96), whereas the CoJ correctly points to the difference between natural persons on one hand and (associations of) undertakings on the other (DB v Consob, para 48). It is clear that an undertaking can be a natural person as well. The ruling in DB v Consob, therefore, leads to the question whether a natural person, acting as an undertaking, should be treated differently from a natural person acting in a different capacity. Should the Commission then apply ECtHR case law or Orkem when it orders a natural person, being the undertaking, to provide information in a competition law procedure? It is, furthermore, not clear as of yet whether the ECtHR would actually make a distinction between the scope and application of the freedom from self-incrimination in light of the nature of the accused. Although, the ECtHR did rule in Sa-Capital Oy that it is ‘mindful’ that in competition law proceedings, fines are generally imposed upon ‘corporate entities’ and not on natural persons and took this into account as a factor to determine whether the rights of defence were compatible with Article 6 ECHR (see ECtHR, Sa-Capital Oy v Finland, CE:ECHR:2019:0214JUD000555610, para 78). The practical solution of the CoJ in DB v Consob to distinguish between natural persons and undertakings is perhaps a bit short-sighted. Nevertheless, the CoJ also mentioned that Orkem, on its substance, does not necessarily conflict with ECtHR case law, since undertakings cannot be compelled to provide answers that might involve an admission of guilt (DB v Consob, para 47). This seems to be in contrast with the statement of the CoJ that the ‘right to silence cannot reasonably be confined to statements of admission of wrongdoing or to remarks which directly incriminate the person questioned, but rather also covers information on questions of fact which may subsequently be used in support of the prosecution and may thus have a bearing on the conviction or the penalty imposed on that person’ (DB v Consob, para 40). In order to determine whether the freedom from self-incrimination is infringed, and thus, whether there is improper compulsion, the ECtHR will examine four criteria, namely ‘the nature and degree of compulsion used to obtain the evidence, the existence of any relevant safeguards in the procedure, and the use to which any material so obtained was put’ and the public interest (ECtHR, O’Halloran and Francis v United Kingdom, CE:ECHR:2007:0629JUD001580902, para 55; for a discussion of these factors, see Veenbrink, cited above, p. 24–31). The nature of the evidence requested can be a factor that should be taken into account to determine the degree of compulsion that may be used against a person. There are some cases in which the ECtHR allowed authorities to obtain factual information from a person (see e.g. ECtHR, Weh v Austria, CE:ECHR:2004:0408JUD003854497, paras 52–56; and O’Halloran and Francis v United Kingdom, para 62). These are cases concerning traffic violations in which the owner of the car was obliged to inform the authorities who drove the car. The owner of the car could, obviously, also be the driver of that particular car. Answering the question could therefore lead to the driver’s conviction. The ECtHR used, amongst others, the nature of the evidence obtained and the general interest at stake as relevant factors to conclude that the obligation to state this simple fact did not infringe the freedom from self-incrimination. On the basis of these cases, it could be argued that a request for factual information in competition law proceedings does not necessarily infringe the freedom from self-incrimination. On the other hand, the obligation on undertakings to provide factual information goes further than merely stating a simple fact. Therefore, it cannot be ruled out that the ECtHR will find this obligation to be an infringement of the right to silence and thus an infringement of a core aspect of the freedom from self-incrimination. Still, the Strasbourg Court has shown that it takes into account the particularities of competition law proceedings when it determines whether there is an infringement of Article 6 ECHR (Sa-Capital Oy v Finland, cited above, paras 78 and 85). The ECtHR is probably more lenient when it comes to an obligation to provide documents that are already in existence, as long as the Commission does not engage in fishing expeditions and as long as the request is sufficiently specific for the undertaking to determine which documents it needs to hand over (see, respectively, ECtHR, J.B. v Switzerland, CE:ECHR:2001:0503JUD003182796, para 69 and Funke v France, cited above, para 44). It is clear from the Qualcomm case that the Orkem approach is still alive and kicking. This begs the question whether that approach is indeed, as the CoJ held in DB v Consbob, Strasbourg-proof. The answer to that question remains in a similar state as Schrödinger’s cat. Hopefully, the ECtHR will be presented a possibility in the near future to finally open this box.
There isn´t general consensus concerning the tools for evaluating of decentralization and public administration reforms. Comparison of impacts and tools for the evaluation of decentralization process is complicated mainly by a different arrangement of public administration, researching only partial aspects of decentralization or lack of key data. The aim of this paper is to legitimize the innovative approach of evaluation of the decentralization reforms through an analysis of subnational units´ staff. This consideration is based on correlation which suggests that countries with a higher degree of autonomy of subnational units usually have a wider bureaucratic apparatus of self-governments. In this context we answer whether the evaluation of Czech decentralization is relevant through an analysis of self-governmental staff and under which methodological preconditions. We worked with fragmented statistical unique and unpublished primary data about the self-governmental staff obtained from registers of the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Finance and the Czech Statistical Office.