Why a corpus that must be authoritative in its own language cannot normalise toward someone else's — and what that made of one man's work in Cambodia between 1929 and 1969. It is widely assumed, and rarely stated, that digitising a language is a tooling problem — better optical character recognition, better fonts, better models. This paper argues that for one class of corpus it is not, and that the constraint is upstream of any tool. We begin from a claim that turns out to be false: that a machine-readable corpus requires the language to have a standardised orthography. Swiss German and the Arabic dialects refute it. Both lack standardised spelling; both have substantial corpora, speech systems, machine translation and dedicated benchmarks. Corpora can be and are built for languages whose spelling is unsettled. What the refutation reveals is the mechanism by which those corpora are possible: they normalise toward a standard the variety itself does not have. Swiss German normalises to Standard German. Dialectal Arabic normalises to Modern Standard Arabic, or to a convention created for the purpose. The corpus is about the variety and encoded in a target borrowed from elsewhere. That move is available to most languages and unavailable to a specific and important minority: a corpus that must be authoritative in its own language cannot normalise toward another. A Khmer canonical text rendered in Thai orthography is not a Khmer witness to anything; it is a Thai rendering, and the distinction is the entire content of a critical apparatus. For such corpora, native standardisation is a genuine precondition, because the borrowing that substitutes for it is disqualified by what the corpus is for. We then examine the Cambodian case, which is unusual in that the precondition has a name, a date and a documented programme. Between the 1930s and 1967 Chuon Nath led the standardisation of Khmer orthography, compiled the dictionary that fixed its lexicon, and led the translation of the canon into it. ⭐ But the case also contains its own counterexample, and this is the paper's second contribution: standardisation is necessary and not sufficient. Khmer's orthographic layer was settled by the 1960s; its encoding layer was not, and the volumes this project transcribes carry five mutually incompatible legacy font encodings in a single book, one of them apparently custom and undocumented. Seventy years separate the solution of the first layer from the ongoing repair of the second. We state the claim in falsifiable form, name the comparison class against which it should be tested, and concede three limits — including that standardisation was contested, that its politics are not innocent, and that this paper is not an argument for it. --- Provenance. This paper is part of the THonly research corpus, dedicated to the public domain under CC0 1.0. The canonical version is at https://thonly.org/research/the-borrowable-standard. Its SHA-256 is a5774b3c66dc801f125d4f6712b054ee83d10c9e86b6ec3c35e7f3e0be4ba715, independently timestamped to the Bitcoin blockchain via OpenTimestamps and signed under RFC 3161 by three trust authorities, one of them eIDAS-qualified. AI co-authorship is disclosed. Miss Aquarius is the consistent name used for the AI collaboration across all venues.
Since the 2021 military coup, Myanmar has been trapped in complex tri-polar power competition among the military junta, the National Unity Government (NUG) together with its People's Defense Force (PDF), and diverse ethnic-armed organizations. Existing literature frequently adopts binary deterministic forecasts, expecting either enduring military authoritarian rule or comprehensive national fragmentation. Such perspectives often overlook layered relationships between short-term battlefield capabilities and long-run political legitimacy, alongside pragmatic strategic logics held by major ethnic-armed groups. This paper argues that battlefield strength represents only a limited factor in regime transition, while popular mandate, nationwide governance ambition, and geopolitical constraints function as more structural determinants. Although the NUG-PDF bloc lacks immediate military capacity to seize central state authority, it constitutes the most plausible civilian successor, enjoying broad Bamar public support and institutional aspirations for national governance. Ethnic-armed organizations prioritize institutionalized regional autonomy rather than full secession. Under China's conditional geopolitical hedging strategy, Myanmar is likely to evolve toward a decentralized loose-federal equilibrium featuring weak central authority and highly autonomous ethnic regions. While large-scale infrastructure such as the China-Myanmar Railway faces substantial operational and fiscal uncertainties, strategically critical energy facilities including the Kyaukpyu Port and cross-border oil-gas pipelines may sustain stable operations via multi-stakeholder benefit-sharing arrangements.
Centralized governance frameworks in developing economies frequently generate a fundamental tension between national policy coherence and the operational responsiveness required by diverse local labor markets. In Laos, this tension is acutely manifest within the administration of Vocational Education (VE), where provincial and district authorities bear expanding implementation responsibilities without commensurate transfers of fiscal authority, administrative capacity, or technical expertise. This study critically examines the administration models operationalized within local VE governance in Laos, identifies the structural constraints limiting their effectiveness, and proposes an evidence-grounded five-component governance reform framework. Employing a sequential explanatory mixed-methods design, the study integrates quantitative survey data from 781 stakeholders across all provinces, comprising local government officials, VE administrators, educators, and industry representatives, with semi-structured qualitative interviews and systematic policy document analysis. Quantitative findings reveal that administrative model typology (centralized, decentralized, hybrid) accounts for less than 2% of the variance in perceived governance effectiveness, whereas process-level governance qualities, institutional autonomy, stakeholder participation, decentralization depth, and resource adequacy jointly account for 56% of the variance in perceived suitability. Public-Private Partnership (PPP) strength emerges as the strongest predictor of institutional effectiveness. Qualitative findings illuminate the mechanisms underlying these patterns: local authorities function as pragmatic brokers, navigating structural rigidities through informal networks and discretionary project-based initiatives that remain institutionally unsustainable and inequitably distributed. The study identifies a centralization-responsiveness paradox wherein ceremonially adopted decentralization policies coexist with functionally centralized operations, generating accountability ambiguities and inequitable governance costs. Grounded analytically in institutional theory, decentralization theory, and human capital theory, the proposed framework integrates reconstituted multi-level governance architecture, institutionalized demand-side engagement, equitable financing, systematic capacity development, and rigorous performance accountability. Implications are discussed for policymakers, development partners, and VE administrators in comparable transitional economies.
This article explores how Thai men construct and perform masculine identities through cryptocurrency trading, using the concept of crypto-masculinity to examine how digital finance becomes a site for gendered self-making. While existing scholarship on masculinity in financial contexts often centers on transnational business masculinities in Western corporate settings, little attention has been paid to how masculinity is enacted in decentralized, digital financial spaces, particularly in non-Western contexts. Addressing this gap, this article draws upon in-depth interviews with 21 male traders in Thailand to analyze how masculinity is shaped by the internal instability of masculinity and local cultural norms. This study identifies three key themes through which Thai men's subjectivity is negotiated: valorizing failure, homosociality, and ‘becoming a good Thai man.’ As a result, this article challenges assumptions about the naturalized links between men and finance, suggesting the need for further research on how exclusions within digital finances are taking place to better support equality on crypto platforms.
This study analyzes the two-tier local government models in France, Japan, Germany, and the United States to draw lessons for reforming the organization of state apparatus in Vietnam. Based on the theoretical foundations of local government organization, it clarifies the principles of decentralization, autonomy, accountability, and effective public governance. International experience highlights the importance oftransparent institutions, financial autonomy, competent personnel, and the application of technology in governance. In Vietnam, the two-tier model has been implemented since July 1, 2025, under Law No.72/2025/QH15, replacing the traditional three-tier structure. The article examines the challenges during the transition and proposes solutions to improve the legal framework, ensure substantive decentralization, enhance implementation capacity, reform public finance, strengthen oversight, and promote accountability - thereby contributing to building an effective, modern, and democratic local government.
India’s federal structure is unsuited to the localized demands of climate governance. It is highly centralized, with a federal government that enjoys fiscal, bureaucratic, and jurisdictional powers greater than in more classical, decentralized federations. Indian states, however, are responsible for several areas crucial to climate action, from water and health to the emissions-intensive electricity sector. This makes elaborate forms of cooperation between the two levels essential. In this chapter, we show that the federal system has organically begun evolving some institutions and practices to keep up with the demands of climate change, including climate-specific financing and capacity flowing from the centre to the states, and instances of bottom-up experimentation and learning. But these developments are uncoordinated and lack strategic direction; policies appear and fade away with regularity, unpegged to long-term goals or a plan to rectify top-heaviness in Indian climate federalism.
Abstract The authority of political leaders in Bangladesh rests on diverse qualities, not least of which are the muscle and finance they can mobilize, and the relationships they can craft with senior party members. These are utilized to confront rivals both within and outside their own party. In some instances, the intensity of intra-party competition can be so severe that a further quality emerges: the capacity to find allies among enemies. Building local inter-party alliances can bolster the authority of politicians, yet be to the detriment of party coherence. This argument is developed through an analysis of mayoral and parliamentary elections held in the past decade in a small Bangladeshi city, where a ruling party member of parliament (MP) and opposition mayor appear to have developed such a relationship. This has thwarted the electoral ambitions of their fellow party members and has posed a serious challenge to party discipline. While political competition is often seen as being either inter- or intra-party, here it is focused around inter-party alliances. This portrayal suggests we need to give greater emphasis to the decentralized and local character that political authority can take in Bangladesh.
Changing the formal structure of Indian federalism may have been difficult, given that altering the Indian constitution requires super-legislative majorities which are harder to mobilize in a fragmented party system than in a one party dominant one. The dynamics of Indian federalism underwent significant change due to the transformation of the Indian party system and economic liberalization. Decentralized spending with centralized financing through grants, from a public finance perspective, serves to help central governments implement redistributive programs. The effect of party politics on federalism is felt most intensely in those sectors of government which are open to direct party political influence. Economic liberalization built on central deregulation and party system fragmentation is likely to generate centrifugal tendencies. With it comes the expectation of more policy divergence across the states.
Support for integrated capacity building focusing on learning support for government organizations, communities, networks and small business is the most important contribution foreigners can make to local development.Excessive equipment and action assistance with minimal learning support, is more likely to create dependence.However learning support without locally financed working resources and improved motivation is hardly effective.Decentralization of authority requires decentralization of skills.Learning support focusing on specialist and management training without integrated courses for all staff limits organizational effectiveness.Aid/ cooperation should be much better integrated.This can only be achieved through deeper dialogue and better strategies.To seek a reasonable future for the region
Participatory development activities at local level in a sub-district located in the Central Plain of Thailand were studied employing the theoretical concept of the "linking loops" to analyze the related interactions among target group members and between the local level and superordinated organizations.The participatory development planning approach was first introduced in Thailand through her Fourth National Economic and Social Development Plan (1977-1981) as a strategy to apply the bottom-up concept.The qualitative, in-depth study covers nine projects at different stages of the planned development process alternatively covering the stages of initiation, implementation and completion. Despite the variety of projects involving different groups of the local population within the three case study villages in close vicinity, all these are set in the same socio-cultural context which allows direct comparison.Drawing on selected theoretical sociological explanations of the dimensions and determinants of people's participation, the conceptual and analytical framework is focussed on an actor-oriented approach using the theoretical concept of the "linking loops" to explicate the complex dynamics evolving in Thai rural society when engaged in local-level planning.By their mechanism of initiation, as explained in terms of the "linking loops" concept, three categories of projects are distinguished including village initiated projects (VIP) and government initiated projects (GIP) as well as projects initiated by villagers with a view to securing government support (V/GP). The comparison of hypothesis test results by project category leads to their classification as explanations of narrow range pertaining to one project category only, of medium range covering two out of the three categories, or of wide range rendering explanations valid for all three project categories.Six general hypotheses and their sub-hypotheses addressing as many stages of the project cycle are tested. The results of hypothesis testing vary by project category as summarized hereunder.VIP were effective owing to people's involvement in setting the project objectives, despite differences and conflicts; utilization of local knowledge in data collection and analysis; broad formal consensus on project design; active involvement in project approval; active involvement in implementation; and involvement in project evaluation through participatory monitoring and evaluation.V/GP differ substantially because the test results show that local-level projects initiated by villagers and obtaining resources from on-going government programmes were of limited effectiveness. The constraints include lack of people's involvement in the formulation of objectives, thus reinforcing dissent and conflict; differences in perception between local people and government agents with regard to data collection and analysis; lack of people's involvement and formal consensus on project design; lack of local interest in project approval due to complicated procedure followed by several government organizations involved; lack of people's participation in on- going project implementation due to changed circumstances and reassessment of the erstwhile situation; and lack of involvement in project evaluation, in the absence of participatory monitoring and evaluation.GIP implemented at local-level were found ineffective as a consequence of lack of local people's involvement in the specification of objectives and formulation of projects, aggravated by conflicting priorities among local people; differences in perception between local people and government agents regarding data collection and analysis; limited extent of people's participation in designing activities and weak consensus; lack of interest among local people not involved in project approval; discontinuation of people's participation in on-going implementation due to new perception after reassessment of the erstwhile situation, poor organizational set-up by the implementing agency, disagreement between local people and government agent, and conflict among local people; and lack of people's involvement in project evaluation, in the absence of participatory monitoring and evaluation.Overall, it is concluded that local-level plans are, indeed, of interest to local people. They tend to become ineffective, however, at any of the various stages of the planned development process, if people's participation is lacking in the formulation of project objectives, complicated by differing and conflicting objectives among local people; if differences in perception prevail between local people and government agents with regard to data collection and analysis; if deficiencies in project design are aggravated by the exclusion of local people from endorsing projects and procedure is complicated engaging several government organizations at the approval stage; if discontinuation of people's participation jeopardizes on-going implementation; and if project performance and outcome are assessed without participatory monitoring and evaluation.Recognizing certain existing deficiencies with a view to people's participation in the planned development process of local-level projects, policy recommendations are made focussing on suitability, design and intervention, taking into account local socio-economic, cultural and political factors. Moreover, the necessity of decentralization is stressed so as to strengthen people's participation in the planned development process. This means that wholesome delegation of responsibility in terms of decision-making power and budget allocation as well as finance control to the local level of development administration is essential to facilitate and foster participatory planning.