Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) represents a pivotal challenge within the Ethereum ecosystem; it impacts the fairness, security, and efficiency of both Layer 1 (L1) and Layer 2 (L2) networks. MEV arises when miners or validators manipulate transaction ordering to extract additional value, often at the expense of other network participants. This not only affects user experience by introducing unpredictability and potential financial losses but also threatens the underlying principles of decentralization and trust. Given the growing complexity of blockchain applications, particularly with the increase of Decentralized Finance (DeFi) protocols, addressing MEV is crucial. This paper presents a comprehensive survey of MEV mitigation techniques as applied to both Ethereums L1 and various L2 solutions. We provide a novel categorization of mitigation strategies; we also describe the challenges, ranging from transaction sequencing and cryptographic methods to reconfiguring decentralized applications (DApps) to reduce front-running opportunities. We investigate their effectiveness, implementation challenges, and impact on network performance. By synthesizing current research, real-world applications, and emerging trends, this paper aims to provide a detailed roadmap for researchers, developers, and policymakers to understand and combat MEV in an evolving blockchain landscape.
Abstract Existing models for non-interactive MPC cannot provide full privacy for inputs, because they inherently leak the residual function (i.e., the output of the function on the honest partiesâ input together with all possible values of the adversarial inputs). For example, in any non-interactive sealed-bid auction, the last bidder can figure out what was the highest previous bid. We present a new MPC model which avoids this privacy leak. To achieve this, we utilize a blockchain in a novel way, incorporating smart contracts and arbitrary parties that can be incentivized to perform computation (âbounty hunters,â akin to miners). Security is maintained under a monetary assumption about the parties: an honest party can temporarily supply a recoverable collateral of value higher than the computational cost an adversary can expend. We thus construct non-interactive MPC protocols with strong security guarantees (full security, no residual leakage) in the short term. Over time, as the adversary can invest more and more computational resources, the security guarantee decays. Thus, our model, which we call Gage MPC, is suitable for secure computation with limited-time secrecy, such as auctions. A key ingredient in our protocols is a primitive we call âGage Time Capsulesâ (GaTC): a time capsule that allows a party to commit to a value that others are able to reveal but only at a designated computational cost. A GaTC allows a party to commit to a value together with a monetary collateral. If the original party properly opens the GaTC, it can recover the collateral. Otherwise, the collateral is used to incentivize bounty hunters to open the GaTC. This primitive is used to ensure completion of Gage MPC protocols on the desired inputs. As a requisite tool (of independent interest), we present a generalization of garbled circuit that are more robust: they can tolerate exposure of extra input labels. This is in contrast to Yaoâs garbled circuits, whose secrecy breaks down if even a single extra label is exposed. Finally, we present a proof-of-concept implementation of a special case of our construction, yielding an auction functionality over an Ethereum-like blockchain.
It is crucial that smart contracts are tested thoroughly due to their immutable nature. Even small bugs in smart contracts can lead to huge monetary losses. However, testing is not enough; it is also important to ensure the quality and completeness of the tests. There are already several approaches that tackle this challenge with mutation testing, but their effectiveness is questionable since they only considered small contract samples. Hence, we evaluate the quality of smart contract mutation testing at scale. We choose the most promising of the existing (smart contract specific) mutation operators, analyse their effectiveness in terms of killability and highlight severe vulnerabilities that can be injected with the mutations. Moreover, we improve the existing mutation methods by introducing a novel killing condition that is able to detect a deviation in the gas consumption, i.e., in the monetary value that is required to perform transactions. This paper has a replication package at https://github.com/pieterhartel/Mutation-at-scale