Nydia REMOLINA LEON, Aurelio GURREA-MARTINEZ, Daniel LIU
This article provides a comprehensive analysis of the treatment of digital assets in insolvency. Given that cryptoassets can be the subject of various transactions—including purchase, sale, custody, and lending—understanding their nature and implications in insolvency is relevant for any firm, not just cryptoexchanges. The article begins by offering a general overview of the world of cryptoassets. It then examines the nature of cryptoassets from accounting, financial, and legal perspectives. While much of the literature on insolvency and cryptoassets has primarily focused on the analysis of whether cryptocurrencies constitute property of the estate, this article explores additional issues, such as the treatment, role and rights of tokenholders in insolvency, the initiation of insolvency proceedings by cryptolenders, and the valuation, recovery, and realization of digital assets in bankruptcy. Such analysis is conducted from a comparative perspective, examining how jurisdictions around the world have addressed some of those issues and how cryptoassets have been used to engineer innovative solutions in restructuring agreements.
Zero-knowledge privacy protocols let users hide transaction details on public blockchains. Systems like Tornado Cash, FixedFloat, and the Houdini Private Swap feature recently added to Jumper rely on cryptographic techniques that unlink sender and receiver addresses. These constructions give legitimate users meaningful protection for their financial activity. They also create a straightforward dual-use dilemma. The February 2025 Bybit incident supplies a clear example. Thieves stole $1.5 billion in ETH, the largest cryptocurrency theft on record. The FBI linked the attack to North Korea’s Lazarus Group. The stolen funds moved quickly through Tornado Cash. The resulting lack of transparency triggered a wave of customer withdrawals. Bybit responded by securing loans of several hundred million dollars from other institutions to keep its operations running. Cases like this demonstrate that zk-based privacy tools, when used at large scale for illicit purposes, can accelerate liquidity crises and place costs on market participants who had no involvement in the original theft. The real problem is not the underlying mathematics that delivers privacy. It lies in the missing mechanisms that could impose accountability on criminal actors while leaving the privacy protections for everyone else intact.
Abstract The modern single monetary real-value system suffers from long-term monetary alienation. Currency has evolved from a transaction tool into the ultimate target of wealth pursuit, triggering structural economic and social problems including capital hoarding, wealth polarization, economic involution, and class solidification. Based on the theoretical framework of The Symbiotic Order 1.0, this paper proposes a virtual-real dual-value hedging system consisting of currency and points. Without abolishing the existing monetary system or denying market division of labor and competition, the system establishes a positive-negative mirrored balance mechanism through the zero neutralization rule. The reverse hedging of currency income/expenditure and point increment/decrement eliminates the infinite hoarding attribute of currency and restores currency to its original instrumental positioning as a transaction medium. The system adopts a dual-track operation mechanism: the external monetary track encourages incremental economic expansion, technological progress and cultural export to maintain market vitality; the internal virtual-real hedging track reconstructs the allocation logic of stock resources and fundamentally restrains stock games and capital monopoly. Supported by basic point rules and cryptography technologies including homomorphic encryption and zero-knowledge proof, the system realizes rigid technical operation and avoids arbitrage by capital or power. This paper clarifies the institutional logic of competition motivation, verifying that the system corrects alienated monetary accumulation competition into original competition centered on experience right exchange, value creation and spiritual transcendence, rather than suppressing innovation and competition. Finally, it reflects on the institutional limitations and implementation thresholds. As a practical and targeted correction scheme for the dual contemporary dilemmas of capital concentration and nuclear deterrence deadlock, the system will become the optimal institutional choice when social predicaments reach critical thresholds. Key words: Symbiotic Order; virtual-real hedging; dual value system; monetary alienation; economic involution; institutional equilibrium
Yuanyuan Zhang, N. J. Lord, Stephen Chan, Jeffrey Chu · 5 authors
This study examines the relationship between global phishing crime and cryptocurrency-market conditions, with a specific focus on Ethereum. Using monthly data from January 2016 to December 2022, we analyse the returns of global phishing crime numbers together with six Ethereum financial metrics relating to transactions, trading volume, and price impact. We employ quantile regression, quantile-on-quantile regression, and Granger causality in quantiles to examine whether the relationship between Ethereum market indicators and phishing activity varies across different market states. The results reveal a state-dependent relationship. Large increases in phishing crime numbers are strongly associated with large increases in Ethereum transaction activity, average transaction price, and transaction quantity, while implicit transaction cost is predominantly negatively associated with phishing activity, particularly at the upper quantiles. These findings suggest that phishing risk is most pronounced during extreme market conditions and may be shaped by both reward-enhancing market activity and cost-enhancing transaction frictions. To interpret these patterns, we develop an incentive-based criminogenic mechanism in which Ethereum market conditions affect phishing activity through offenders’ expected payoff. We identify two mediating channels: a monetisation-frictions channel, operating through liquidity, price impact, slippage, and transaction costs; and an attention/information-asymmetry channel, operating through volatility, speculative attention, fear of missing out, and user vulnerability. The findings provide initial evidence that cryptocurrency-related phishing is not only a technical cybersecurity issue, but also a market-sensitive phenomenon shaped by financial incentives, liquidity conditions, and behavioural vulnerability. These insights can support regulators, law enforcement agencies, and cryptocurrency platforms in developing adaptive early-warning and prevention strategies.
The concept of alternative finance is explored from a narrow and broad perspective. The latter defines it as segments of "gray" financial markets, outside the scope of regulation and traditional finance. "Dark" liquidity pools—trading transactions of major players in securities and currencies, operating anonymously, opaquely, and hidden from the public in the over-the-counter space through automated digital trading platforms—are presented as one element of the alternative finance system. The advantages and disadvantages of "dark" pools for financial market participants and exchange infrastructure are discussed. The problem of liquidity fragmentation caused by "dark" pools is highlighted, a problem inherent in decentralized finance, where liquidity is not concentrated on a single platform or trading system, but distributed among many. Emphasis is placed on the insufficient or complete lack of oversight and regulation of this alternative financial market segment. Examples of legislative and regulatory acts in a number of countries are provided.
Brandon Dulisse, Chivon H. Fitch, Nathan T. Connealy
Cryptocurrency fraud represents one of the fastest-growing financial crimes worldwide, yet the psychological mechanisms that enable these scams remain understudied. Drawing on 282 verified victim narratives from California and Wisconsin state crypto scam trackers (2023–2024), this study systematically coded the use of seven psychological tactics (PTacs) and seven psychological techniques (PTechs) previously validated in cyber social engineering research. Fraudulent trading platforms (51.5%) and pig-butchering schemes (33.7%) dominated the sample. Across all cases, scammers relied overwhelmingly on impersonation and persuasion techniques paired with fit-and-form and familiarity tactics. On average, 1.77 tactics and 1.86 techniques were deployed per incident; higher psychological complexity (4–6 combined elements) was significantly associated with greater financial losses in fraudulent trading platform scams ($135,346 vs. $63,034, p =.029). These findings demonstrate that cryptocurrency fraud resembles more of a repeatable, psychologically-engineered “playbook” rather than random opportunism by unorganized actors. By revealing consistent patterns of manipulation that scale harm, our study provides an evidence-based roadmap for prevention: psychologically informed user education, platform-level disruption of scripted interaction sequences, standardized narrative reporting in complaint systems, and proactive regulatory alerts keyed to emerging PTac/PTech signatures. Implementing these targeted interventions can materially reduce both victimization rates and aggregate financial losses in digital asset markets.
The cost of convenience. Cryptocurrencies are becoming more and more ubiquitous in the financial markets but have also become a basis for all crimes. It would be quite interesting to note this work follows a research field that focuses on crimes relating to cryptocurrencies and, more particularly, market integrity and investor trust implications. We examine how common types of offenses, such as fraud, money laundering and hacking, are presented in practice and consider practical examples which illustrate how strategies associated with cybercrime are constantly evolving. An evaluation of the degree of response from regulators and the effectiveness of measures already in place is used to provide a spotlight into the challenges experienced by the law enforcement and policymakers. We’ll plead for effective cooperation concerning advancements of the technology, frameworks of legislation, and awareness by the public for enhancing security in the cryptocurrency market. From this in-depth analysis, we hope people will become more sensitive to possible risks in using digital currencies and push harder for stricter safeguards for investors and the entire financial system. DOI - https://doi.org/10.65525/SVUP.9788199651524.2026.95-105
On May 26, 2026, Strategy Inc. (MSTR) began selling Bitcoin for the first time since 2022, disposing of 32 BTC (approximately $2.5 million, or 0.0038% of its holdings) to fund preferred stock dividend payments. This transaction directly contradicted the company's long-standing public commitment to HODL, a foundational cryptocurrency acronym meaning "Hold On for Dear Life" that reflects an unyielding, long-term asset retention strategy. Using an event study methodology with the S&P 500 as a benchmark, we find a cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of-16.2% for Bitcoin over the subsequent six trading days (p = 0.012). MSTR stock experienced an even larger CAR of-20.3%, consistent with its beta of 3.02 relative to the market. Despite the trivial sale volume, the market interpreted this transaction as a negative signal about future treasury policy. Our results challenge the "inoculation" hypothesis suggested by Executive Chairman Michael Saylor, who stated that selling a small amount would "send the message" and prepare the market for potential future distributions. The magnitude of the market reaction suggests the inoculation was incomplete, demonstrating that breaking a core narrative carries outsized signaling value that significantly impacts asset valuations.
This study focuses on cryptocurrencies. At the beginning it explains what cryptocurrency is, its main features and main areas of its significance for the economy. In this section it deals with the possibility of cryptocurrency one day replacing traditional money, trading opportunities cryptocurrencies offer, possibility to finance a business with digital coins and its availability to people without the access to banking services. A brief overview of cryptocurrency history and a definition of the technology of blockchain are also provided. The practical part of the thesis is analysing cryptocurrencies Bitcoin, Ethereum and Litecoin. Firstly, these are described in terms of their origin, emission, circulation, price development and process of mining. Secondly, the impact of selected factors on the price fluctuation of selected cryptocurrencies is evaluated using statistical methods and econometric models. The analysis showed the cryptocurrency prices are more dependent on the internal factors such as the transaction volume, transaction fee, total supply, demand and hashrate, than on the external factors such as interest rates, exchange rates, stock prices and the price of gold.
This report examines the convergence of generative artificial intelligence, cryptocurrency laundering infrastructure, and cross-border social engineering in the evolution of romance scam-enabled financial crime affecting Canadian institutions. Drawing on reporting from the Federal Bureau of Investigation Internet Crime Complaint Center (FBI IC3), the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC), the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), and blockchain analytics firms Chainalysis and TRM Labs, the analysis identifies a measurable transition from opportunistic, manually-operated fraud schemes toward industrialized transnational operations. The report documents how AI-generated personas, deepfake impersonation tools, and multilingual automation systems have reduced operational costs for fraud actors while increasing victim acquisition at scale. Particular attention is given to cryptocurrency laundering pathways — including stablecoin conversion, decentralized finance (DeFi) layering, cross-chain transfers, and over-the-counter (OTC) broker off-ramping — that exploit the opacity of digital asset ecosystems and exceed the detection capabilities of traditional threshold-based anti-money laundering (AML) monitoring systems. The report further assesses Canada's specific vulnerability profile, attributing heightened exposure to widespread Interac e-Transfer adoption, high public trust in digital financial systems, and fragmented cross-border compliance coordination. Three systemic risk vectors are identified and analyzed: the industrialization of victim acquisition, increased laundering opacity through decentralized cryptocurrency infrastructure, and the systematic exploitation of Canadian digital payment rails. Recommendations are directed at the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), Nigerian financial intelligence agencies, and Canadian financial institutions and cryptocurrency platforms.
The choice-of-law solutions governing the proprietary aspects of bearer financial securities were long marked by great simplicity. When securities were embodied in a paper instrument, applying the law of the place where that paper instrument was located gave the conflict of laws a foreseeable and internationally uniform solution. The dematerialisation of these securities and the advent of distributed ledger technology have rendered that solution obsolete, while the new connecting factors based on the location of the account-keeping intermediary afford no real satisfaction. This article takes stock of these connecting factors and proposes another : that of the securities delivery system operated by the central securities depository.
<b><i>Traditional financial audits</i></b> have long served as the primary instruments for oversight, disclosure assurance, and risk assessment in regulated financial systems. These mechanisms, however, were designed for centralized institutions, periodic reporting cycles, and human-paced transaction environments. In blockchain-based systems—particularly those supporting stablecoins, tokenized real-world assets (RWAs), and decentralized finance (DeFi)—risk materializes continuously and often irreversibly. This paper presents a structural comparison between traditional audit models and the Crystal Validator™ (CV), a pre-execution enforcement architecture designed for real-time regulatory compliance. We demonstrate that post-fact auditing is structurally incapable of preventing modern on-chain failures, regulatory breaches, and systemic collapses. We argue that effective blockchain regulation requires a shift from retrospective verification to deterministic, pre-transaction authorization enforced at the protocol level.
The GENIUS Act's prudential framework protects against systemic risk that flows in one direction: from stablecoin failure into traditional banking risk. The empirical record of crosstagion, the bidirectional contagion between traditional finance and decentralized finance, demonstrates that the transmission channel runs the other way as well. When traditional financial stress destabilizes payment stablecoin reserves, as occurred when Silicon Valley Bank's failure briefly unpegged USD Coin in March 2023, the cascade into decentralized markets falls into a jurisdictional gap that neither GENIUS nor the CLARITY Act resolves. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency owns the stablecoin issuer; the Commodity Futures Trading Commission owns the derivative markets where the cascade lands; and a depegged stablecoin may simultaneously fall under the Securities and Exchange Commission's jurisdiction as a potential investment contract under the Howey test. No statute allocates liability or mandates coordination among these three agencies when the transmission crosses their respective boundaries, and no mechanism exists for assigning jurisdictional primacy before all three assert competing claims. DAO governance failure compounds the problem by creating a distinct transmission mechanism operating at blockchain speed, with no identifiable counterparty and no circuit breaker. This Article argues that closing the crosstagion gap requires not new prudential requirements but a designated tri-agency coordination mechanism, triggered by observable stress indicators, that assigns jurisdictional primacy and activates a classification standstill before a crisis rather than after.
Tokenisation has made substantial technical progress, yet tokenised securities remain peripheral to mainstream capital markets. This paper argues that the central problem is not whether distributed ledger technology can record and process issuance, transfers, pledges or lifecycle events. It can. The harder question is whether the resulting instrument is institutionally usable: capable of being held, settled, financed, serviced, risk-managed, reconciled and relied upon by issuers, investors, dealers, custodians, central securities depositories, auditors and market authorities. The paper develops a market-structure framework distinguishing four levels of record: technical state, operational record, authoritative market record and market utility. Technical state is what the ledger says. The operational record is what a platform or institution administers. The authoritative market record is the record that market actors can rely on for entitlement, transfer, custody, collateral and asset servicing. In legal language, this often corresponds to the legal register or account record; the broader market term is used here because capital-market adoption depends on more than formal legal validity. Market utility asks whether the instrument creates economic value at scale. The paper introduces the concept of Institutional Finality: the condition in which a financial record is not only technically valid, but relied upon across the full capital-market chain. Institutional Finality is broader than settlement finality. Settlement finality asks when a transfer is irrevocable and unconditional. Institutional Finality asks whether the relevant record can be used without bespoke reconciliation or exceptional explanation by the institutions through which markets operate. The paper analyses a recurring architecture in which a distributed ledger platform seeks to operate the primary digital record while an incumbent market infrastructure participates as access layer, validator, custodian, investor central securities depository or distribution channel. Such arrangements raise a record-authority problem: if the incumbent must enforce ledger state, the ledger has market-infrastructure consequences; if it need not, the ledger remains an operational record rather than the authoritative one. The paper labels the unstable form of this arrangement borrowed trust: a configuration in which the platform claims master-record status while the incumbent supplies institutional credibility without acquiring institutional control. The paper proposes a collateral-recognition test: where an asset is pledged or locked on-ledger, will the institutions controlling transfer, custody and settlement prevent inconsistent disposition of the asset? If yes, the ledger has genuine market effect. If no, or if the answer is uncertain, the tokenised asset may be useful for workflow automation but has not achieved Institutional Finality. The conclusion is asset-class specific. Tokenisation is most credible where it is anchored in an accountable record operator and where the authoritative record can be redesigned without disrupting established market infrastructure. Funds, loans and private credit are therefore more natural early candidates than mainstream bonds or listed equities. For mainstream securities, distributed ledger technology may add substantial value as workflow, lifecycle and collateral infrastructure, but claims to master-record status require a much stronger institutional and economic case.
The tokenization of real-world assets (RWAs) has emerged as a transformative application of blockchain technology, with market projections estimating trillions of dollars in tokenized assets within the coming decade. However, a fundamental challenge remains unaddressed: physical assets such as precious metals, stored commodities, and warehoused goods incur structural negative carry -- custody, insurance, and audit costs that accumulate over time. While existing tokenization models have successfully established the market for digital gold and treasuries, they typically manage operational costs at the issuer level. The FRS introduces a framework to bring these economics directly on-chain, avoiding mechanisms such as token rebasing that compromise fungibility and composability with decentralized finance (DeFi) protocols. This paper proposes the Fungible Reserve Standard (FRS), a deterministic token design framework that encodes carrying costs transparently into on-chain logic. The FRS introduces an asset-per-token variable q(t) that decreases according to a predefined annualized carrying cost rate, coupled with a supply reconciliation mechanism that preserves holder balances and ERC-20 composability. While mathematically inspired by the daily expense ratio accrual in traditional asset management -- which often embed centralized profit margins -- the FRS design specifically encodes actual operational carrying costs to provide pure institutional-grade accounting clarity without compromising DeFi compatibility. The framework is asset-agnostic and applicable to any real-world asset with positive, predictable holding costs.
The legal nature of tokens, cryptographic assets recorded on distributed ledgers and capable of performing multiple economic functions simultaneously or successively, remains one of the most contested and consequential unresolved questions in contemporary financial law. The dominant regulatory response, principally the application of securities law analysis through the investment contract test established in SEC v W J Howey Co , has generated a body of case law characterised by inconsistent outcomes, pervasive uncertainty, and perverse incentives to structure token offerings so as to fall outside the regulatory perimeter. The property law, monetary law, and contractual rights frameworks each capture an important dimension of the problem, but none is adequate, standing alone, to provide a comprehensive and coherent account of the legal nature of tokens across the full range of contexts in which that question arises. This article advances the thesis that the persistent attempt to assign a fixed and singular legal nature to tokens is both theoretically unsatisfactory and practically counterproductive. It is theoretically unsatisfactory because it seeks a degree of ontological stability in an asset class whose defining characteristic is functional versatility; it is practically counterproductive because it produces regulatory arbitrage, legal uncertainty, and market fragmentation. The appropriate response, it is submitted, is a dynamic functional typology: a framework that determines the legal nature of a token by reference to the economic function it performs at any given moment in its lifecycle, payment, investment, access, governance, or representational, and that assigns legal consequences in property, contract, insolvency, and regulation accordingly. Drawing on doctrinal analysis, comparative law, and normative legal theory, the article establishes five economic functions as the organising categories of the framework, proposes four criteria for the identification of the operative function in any given case — the reasonable expectations of the acquirer, the observable economic characteristics of the token, the degree of decentralisation of the network, and the stage of the token's lifecycle — and demonstrates the framework's application to the principal categories of token and to the hardest contested cases, including non-fungible tokens, algorithmic stablecoins, decentralised autonomous organisations, hybrid tokens, and decentralised finance protocols. The comparative analysis examines the regulatory frameworks of the European Union (MiCA), the United States (the Howey test and the proposed FIT21 Act), the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Singapore, and Japan, demonstrating that the functional approach is not merely a theoretical construct but the direction in which the most sophisticated legislative initiatives are converging. The article culminates in the articulation of a five-stage Dynamic Classification Framework, comprising preliminary identification, function determination, consequence assignment, lifecycle monitoring, and reclassification, supported by a Dynamic Classification Matrix that maps the legal consequences of each operative function across property, insolvency, and regulatory dimensions. Two regulatory safe harbours are proposed: a transitional safe harbour for issuance-stage tokens and a decentralisation safe harbour for tokens that have achieved sufficient network decentralisation. The article further proposes a token register as the international harmonisation instrument through which the framework's outputs are made publicly accessible across jurisdictions. The framework is designed to be jurisdiction-neutral and compatible with the principal existing legislative architectures, including MiCA, MiFID II, the UNIDROIT Principles on Digital Assets and Private Law, and the UK Law Commission's recommended data object category. Note: A slightly shorter Spanish version is currently under review for the edited volume "Los bienes digitales", led by the PRIVATECH Observatory, Universidad Externado de Colombia.
Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs) face a fundamental decentralization paradox: the characteristics that make them theoretically superior to existing hierarchical structures simultaneously undermine their practical effectiveness. This thesis investigates whether and how this paradox can be addressed through a multi-level analysis that encompasses price stability, market performance, and philanthropic implications. In doing so, this thesis aims to provide critical insights into DAOs, which are considered a new form of digital enterprise that facilitates collective action in managing digital commons. The thesis comprises three interconnected essays, each underpinned by a specific research question.<br><br>The first essay investigates how non-traditional performance indicators impact DAO volatility. Unlike some DAOs, which issue decentralized stablecoins to maintain stable token prices, most DAOs are built on a native token basis, whose value depends entirely on the effectiveness of governance and the protocolâs future adoption. This means their prices are more exposed to speculative trading, making volatility a central concern for these DAOs. Under these circumstances, native DAOs that are not built on a stable mechanism must rely on relevant performance indicators to assess token price stability from an investment perspective. However, non-traditional performance indicators, such as social media and wealth inequality, are not typically included when measuring the riskiness of crypto assets. Based on several econometric models and robustness checks (e.g., MM-type, GMM, and entropy balancing), the findings show that both social media dominance and wealth inequality significantly reduce DAO volatility. Drawing on herding behavior and equity theories, the concepts of digital elites and stability pacts demonstrate that strategic recentralization enhances price stability and enables the development of novel DAO risk assessment frameworks. This essay recognizes the relevance of social media dominance and wealth inequality as non-traditional performance indicators for predicting DAO volatility and can help establish a risk assessment framework that crypto investors can rely on when making informed decisions. <br><br>The second essay examines the impact of ownership concentration and duration on the performance of DAO markets. Using several econometric models and robustness checks (e.g., GLS, GMM, and PSM), the findings reveal a positive and significant impact of ownership concentration and duration across categories on DAO market performance. Furthermore, the findings indicate that the average ownership duration has a significant positive impact, whereas ownership concentration has a significant negative impact on DAO market performance. Drawing on participatory governance and social exchange theories, this essay proposes an optimal governance equilibrium model to enhance and sustain DAO market performance. Overall, this essay offers novel insights into how the token-holdersâ commitment mitigates decentralization's operational inefficiencies.<br><br>The third essay examines the application of DAOs in the charity sector and aims to deepen the understanding of crypto donors' perceptions of this technology. Improving transparency and trust in the charity sector is crucial, as donors increasingly seek new ways to monitor and verify their contributions. Specifically, this essay examines Maxity, the world's first Web3 Social Impact protocol that contributes to the 17 UN SDGs. By adopting a netnography approach and using UMAP, HDBSCAN, and BERTopic â three unsupervised machine learning models â this essay identified four latent dimensions related to DAO-based charitable activities. These findings reveal how donors perceive DAO as an effective channel for contributing to charitable causes, enabling greater transparency, faster donation delivery, cost-effectiveness, and increased trustworthiness. Furthermore, the concept of sociotechnical governance was introduced to theorize how DAO-enabled NFTs reshape institutional trust and refine traditional charity governance paradigms. This essay contributes to the expanding discussion on DAOs as an innovative channel for organizing and responding rapidly to humanitarian crises.
This paper examines the recurring dynamics of financial crises through a comparative case study of the Dotcom bubble, the 2008 global financial crisis, and the ongoing cryptocurrency era. The objective is to investigate whether cryptocurrencies represent a genuine financial revolution or a repetition of past speculative manias. Using a qualitative methodology, the study applies a behavioral finance framework to analyse biases such as herding, overconfidence, and FOMO, and combines this with the evaluation of market data, including IPO trends, interest rates, and volatility indices. The results reveal strong equivalents across all three cycles. In each case, investor sentiment amplified volatility, and speculative assets obscured true risk. Weak regulation left markets vulnerable to collapse. Today’s ICOs are a reflection of IPOs in the Dotcom bubble, meanwhile the regulatory faults in 2008 find similarities in decentralized finance (DeFi). Moreover, the evidence challenges the Efficient Market Hypothesis, which markets illustrate collective perceptions instead of objective fundamentals. The findings suggest that financial markets repeat inefficiencies in new forms. Cryptocurrencies risk becoming another phase in the history of financial instability without coordinated regulation, investor education, and macroprudential monitoring.
The integration of Bitcoin into corporate treasuries constitutes a critical strategic choice, motivated by its capacity to bolster liquidity and serve as an inflation hedge, while simultaneously being encumbered by pronounced financial volatility and regulatory ambiguity. This investigation examines sectoral variations in Bitcoin adoption, with particular attention to the manner in which financial risks, regulatory structures, and decentralized governance mechanisms shape corporate conduct across the technology, cryptocurrency mining, retail, healthcare, and e-commerce sectors. Drawing on a cross-sectional dataset encompassing 102 publicly traded firms collectively holding 1,001,861 BTC, the analysis employs MAD-based volatility, Firth logistic regression incorporating a U.S. regulatory dummy to account for the BITCOIN Act of 2025, and heatmap visualization to evaluate risk profiles and adoption patterns. Results demonstrate marked sectoral disparities: the technology and mining sectors command predominant holdings yet confront heightened risk exposure, whereas retail and healthcare sectors proceed with greater caution, guided by considerations of cost-value efficiency and regulatory adherence. The U.S. regulatory dummy is significant, indicating the BITCOIN Act facilitates high Bitcoin adoption, while recent transactional activity is marginally significant. The heatmap accentuates the technology sector’s pre-eminence in aggregate Bitcoin reserves and illuminates the differential influence of regulatory frameworks in non-U.S. jurisdictions. Anchored in Institutional Theory, the Technology Acceptance Model, and Transaction Cost Economics, the study advances the field by quantifying sector-specific risks and visually representing regulatory impacts, thereby furnishing actionable insights for treasury risk management and regulatory policy formulation within a decentralized financial ecosystem.
Ovaj završni rad bavi se analizom utjecaja regulatornih okvira na tržište kriptovaluta, pri čemu se posebna pozornost posvećuje razlikama u zakonodavnim pristupima pojedinih država i nadnacionalnih tijela. U fokusu rada su Europska unija, Sjedinjene Američke Države, Kina te druge značajne jurisdikcije koje kroz različite modele regulacije pokušavaju odgovoriti na izazove koje donosi brzo rastuće i tehnološki kompleksno kriptotržište. Istraživanje je provedeno kroz pregled relevantne literature, analizu zakonodavnih dokumenata i komparativnu analizu pravnih okvira, a rezultati upućuju na niz ključnih problema s kojima se regulatori suočavaju. Među njima se ističu pravna nesigurnost, nedovoljna zaštita potrošača, visoki rizik od zloupotrebe u svrhu financijskog kriminala, te fragmentiranost regulacije na međunarodnoj razini. Posebna se pažnja pridaje europskoj regulativi MiCA (Markets in Crypto-Assets), koja predstavlja prvi pokušaj stvaranja sveobuhvatnog zakonodavnog okvira za kriptoimovinu unutar Europske unije. Također se razmatra uloga samoregulacije i potreba za ravnotežom između podrške inovacijama i osiguravanja stabilnosti financijskog sustava. Na temelju analize, rad nudi preporuke za daljnji razvoj regulatorne politike u području kriptovaluta, s naglaskom na važnost usklađivanja zakonodavnih rješenja, institucionalne suradnje i prilagodljivosti pravnog okvira u skladu s dinamičnim razvojem tehnologije. Zaključno, ističe se važnost izgradnje dosljednog, transparentnog i učinkovitog sustava regulacije, osobito u kontekstu Europske unije i Republike Hrvatske.
With the emergence of the metaverse, some problems relating to trader responsibility, which had previously long been addressed, have now resurfaced and come back to life. One of these problems is the question of who should be held accountable for harm inflicted by defective or counterfeit products sold by third-party vendors in metaverse marketplaces. Under the common law, liability for defective or counterfeit products rests with the immediate seller of the product. But, unique aspects of the metaverse may make holding sellers liable unwise, difficult, or even impossible. The law confronted a similar question after online platforms emerged. Currently, common law principles of negligence and product liability still assume liability rests with the seller. But, in some cases, courts have modified the law to impose contributory liability on online platforms in addition, as these platforms are viewed as the cheapest cost avoiders and are in the best position to distribute the damage. As the metaverse, an augmented reality platform, gains momentum, it poses new problems for products liability. Imposing liability on these augmented reality platforms does not necessarily follow the same rationales as imposing liability on e-commerce platforms. This is because, unlike traditional e-commerce platforms, metaverse platforms are operated on the blockchain and are governed by decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) enabled by algorithms. Metaverse platforms do not reside on a single server. Instead, content is distributed across an infinite number of servers in a peer-to-peer network. This means metaverses have no single point of authority making it essentially impossible to assign liability to the platforms. Even if it were possible to assign liability to individual DAO members, there would be tenuous economic justification for assigning such liability, as members on the metaverse lack the ability to monitor transactions on the platform. As such, unlike typical online platforms such as Amazon, metaverse members are likely not the cheapest cost avoiders. Applying the law for e-commerce platforms to metaverse platforms risks generating an accountability gap resulting from diffusion of responsibility where many entities are involved in a transaction and none of them act to prevent harm. This also risks leaving victims of defective products or fraudulent transactions without recourse. For these reasons, holding metaverse platforms responsible for the merchandise sold on them may be undesirable as a policy matter. In this Article, we propose a “know your trader” rule for marketplaces. Under this new approach to the long-standing financial trading rule of “know your customer,” traditional online marketplaces and innovative metaverse marketplaces would have to verify the identity of their traders before the traders could enter the system. The marketplace would confidentially maintain traders’ identities to protect the anonymity that draws many to the metaverse in the first place. However, a plaintiff could pierce the veil of anonymity when they present prima facie evidence that their case could survive a motion to dismiss. This idea builds on several statutory proposals and laws in the European Union and the United States that require online marketplaces to identify and verify traders. The Article explains why this rule would be more effective and more efficient than the current application of the rule. Finally, the Article addresses potential free speech objections based on trader anonymity, concluding that the proposed framework is permissible under the First Amendment.