Version 2.4.0 supersedes v2.3.0 (DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.20355497) and is the sixth paper in the immo.quick Core technical series (10.5281/zenodo.19634279 → 19799660 → 19969948 → 20078326 → 20355497 → this paper). Overview This paper presents the complete institutional specification of immo.quick Core — a nine-layer deterministic compliance enforcement infrastructure operating across 47 jurisdictions. It is not a paper about technology. It is a paper about institutional legitimacy — about what it means, in a world of deterministic machines, for an institution to prove that it acted correctly. Every previous compliance document in history has answered the question: "Did we follow the process?" This paper answers a different question: "Can we prove, with mathematical certainty, that no impermissible movement produced a consequence — and that no unknown party could have caused one?" The answer is yes. The architecture enforces it. The enforcement is not optional. What v2.4.0 Adds to v2.3.0 v2.3.0 established the complete epistemological foundation, the nine-layer architecture, 15 jurisdictions, complete sector analysis, geopolitical dimensions, and the economic case. v2.4.0 adds four structural elements not present in v2.3.0: Element 1 — The Nine Gamechangers: The first systematic documentation of the capability advances that place immo.quick Core in a categorically different strategic position. These are not product features. They are architectural consequences of the nine-layer system — capabilities that emerge from the architecture and could not exist without it: EPA Offline-First Verification (SSL for compliance decisions), Bi-Temporal Legal State Replay (compliance time machine), Cross-Institution Proof Network (SWIFT for compliance verdicts), Regulatory DNA Sequencing (live law tracking to zero-downtime deploy), Intraday Settlement Finality (T+0 in under 2 seconds), Legal Pathway Optimizer (optimal jurisdiction in 9ms), Machine Law Constitution (immutable rule foundation on Ethereum and IPFS), Compliance Credit Score (compliance as a balance sheet asset), and Post-CMOS Governance Readiness (investor track — strategic roadmap signal). Element 2 — Law as Code / German Federal Government Initiative: The Bundesregierung's Digitalcheck program and the formal Law-as-Code initiative (2023–2026) represent the first sovereign government mandate for machine-readable law. immo.quick Core's Machine Law Engine is the only production implementation of this paradigm at institutional scale. This is not coincidence. It is architectural convergence. Element 3 — White House National Cybersecurity Strategy (2023) and EO 14028: The US Executive Order on Improving the Nation's Cybersecurity and the National Cybersecurity Strategy mandate zero-trust architecture, post-quantum cryptography migration, and SBOM requirements for critical infrastructure. immo.quick Core satisfies all three mandates simultaneously — by architectural construction, not by configuration. Element 4 — The Legacy Integration Protocol: Precisely how immo.quick Core connects to, validates, wraps, and structurally elevates existing compliance infrastructure without requiring system replacement. The anti-rip-and-replace architecture. Architecture Summary The nine-layer enforcement system comprises: Layer 0 (DEPE — Deterministic Execution Proof Engine, 49ms total from proposal to permanent proof), Layer 1 (PAS — Prior Admissibility Space, closed-world assumption with five mandatory conjunctive conditions), Layer 2 (BTL — Bi-Temporal Ledger, BFT quorum n=9 f=3 q=7, WORM architecture), Layer 3 (EAP — Exogenous Anchor Protocol, hardware-attested dual-channel measurement, 28ms maximum heartbeat gap), Layer 4 (SOTB — Sensor/Oracle Trust Bridge), Layer 5 (MLE — Machine Law Engine, 7-stage compilation pipeline), Layer 6 (ZKP — Zero-Knowledge Proof subsystem, Groth16/PLONK/Bulletproofs), Layer 7 (PQC — Post-Quantum Cryptography, CRYSTALS-Kyber-1024/Dilithium-3/SPHINCS+, NIST FIPS 203/204/205), Layer 8 (GLD — Governance Logic Divergence engine, maker-checker independence quantification). Document Structure Part I — The Complete Problem Statement. Part II — The Nine-Layer Architecture. Part III — The Nine Gamechangers (v2.4.0 new). Part IV — Law as Code: The German Federal Government Initiative (v2.4.0 new). Part V — The White House Cybersecurity Strategy and EO 14028 (v2.4.0 new). Part VI — Complete Legal and Jurisdictional Grounding (47 jurisdictions). Part VII — What immo.quick Core Does to Existing Systems: The Legacy Integration Protocol (v2.4.0 new). Part VIII — The Complete Platform: Every Module. Part IX — Complete Sector Analysis (Banking, Insurance, Real Estate, Government, Cloud). Part X — The Geopolitical Dimension. Part XI — The Economic Case: Monopoly, Moat, FOMO, EBITDA. Part XII — The Falsifiability Standard. Conclusion — For the Permanent Record. Key Claims Established The Boundary-Behavior Gap — the space between process documentation and governance proof — is closed by mathematical construction for the first time. The Past Irreversibility Principle: every transaction processed without immo.quick Core produces a compliance history that is permanently unrecoverable. The Falsifiability Standard: all claims in this document are falsifiable by counter-proof. No counter-proof has been produced. None is expected. Historical Compliance Failures Addressed Wirecard AG (2020, €1.9B), Libor manipulation (2012, $9B+ fines), UBS rogue trader (2011, $2.3B), Cum-Ex dividend stripping (ongoing, €55B+ EU-wide), 1MDB (2015, $4.5B), Danske Bank AML (2018, €200B flow), Credit Suisse/Archegos (2021, $5.5B). immo.quick Core produces a PAS BLOCK with DPA on every one of these at T=0 — not after the fact, not during audit, at the moment of formation. Version Series 10.5281/zenodo.19634279 → 19799660 → 19969948 → 20078326 → 20355497 → 20562464 (this paper) Related Work Economics of Deterministic Compliance Infrastructure: DOI 10.5281/zenodo.20229204. immo.quick Serverless Edition v1.1.0: DOI pending.
Decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs), while gaining the ability toautonomously amend governance rules through proposal-voting mechanisms, simultaneously expose a fundamental design problem: when the object of modificationextends to the decision-making procedures themselves, the governance system risksfalling into value drift, procedural disintegration, or malicious capture during recursive revisions. This paper starts from the traditions of constitutional politicaleconomy and mechanism design to propose a hierarchical meta-constraint framework grounded on a gradient of engineering costs. The framework organizes governance rules into three tiers of decreasing rigidity: system consistency constraints,procedural virtues, and value homeostasis. Its highest tier relies not on prohibitionsderived from logical laws, but on the global state re-verification costs triggered byamendment behaviors to serve as a credible commitment device. The paper furtherpresents a technical path for compiling meta-constraints into descriptive assertionsverifiable by satisfiability modulo theory (SMT) solvers, delimits the decidabilityboundary of formal verification, and designs a dual-track adjudication mechanismthat structurally separates deterministic machine execution from deliberative socialconsensus. On this basis, the paper discusses the controlled evolution procedures ofmeta-constraints, the progressive decentralization of amendment procedures, andthe engineering limitations of the framework. The entire framework does not designate the correct option for any specific DAO decision; rather, it ensures thatwhatever direction the community chooses, the selection process itself will not losemeaning due to the self-destruction of its own rules.
Introduction Metagovernance in decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) refers to the mechanisms through which one DAO shapes or constrains another DAO’s governance, typically through token-based influence. Despite the growing inter-organizational relationships in decentralized ecosystems, metagovernance remains significantly understudied. Methods This scoping review followed the PRISMA-ScR guidelines and systematically searched seven electronic databases from 2008 to 2025. From the 979 initial records, seven publications met the inclusion criteria. Results Three mechanism families emerged: voting and control links, architectural layering through nested DAO structures, and participation coupling via airdrops that create governance interlocks. Recurrent challenges include procedural complexity, participation concentration, security vulnerabilities in multi-stage voting pipelines, and cross-chain infrastructure risks. A metagovernance trilemma emerged, whereby simultaneously maximizing decentralization, security, and participation proves impossible. Conclusion Metagovernance spans forum deliberation, off-chain polling, and cross-chain execution, where decision points become obscured. Future research should focus on developing uniform definitions, interoperable measurement tools, and legal frameworks for cross-jurisdictional DAO governance.
Decentralization is the defining feature of decentralized finance, yet no legally workable definition of the concept exists. Regulatory instrumentsmost notably the MiCA Regulation-invoke decentralization as a threshold criterion for exemption from the regulatory perimeter, without specifying its content. Academic literature has developed sophisticated measurement tools, but these are inherently static and probabilistic, and cannot produce the binary determinations that legal qualification requires. This paper argues that the definitional gap is not a secondary problem: it is the root cause of the persistent uncertainty surrounding the regulatory treatment of decentralized protocols. Without a precise and verifiable definition, it is impossible to determine, in any concrete case, whether a given system qualifies as decentralized-and therefore whether the associated exemptions apply. To fill that gap, the paper proposes a legal definition built on three cumulative and verifiable criteria. The first is the presence of at least three independent decision-making centers-the minimum number that allows collective governance without degenerating into unilateral control or mutual veto. The second is the structural interdependence of participants within a protocol-governed framework, which distinguishes decentralized systems from traditional intermediated relationships. The third is the non-custodial nature of the infrastructure, understood as the structural renunciation of control over users' assets by any single entity. These three criteria are non-mathematical but operationally verifiable. They are cumulative: the absence of any one of them is sufficient to bring a system within the scope of traditional regulatory categories. Together, they provide a minimum normative threshold that is both theoretically grounded and practically applicable by regulatory authorities and courts.
This paper investigates the effectiveness of decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) as governance models, examining their organizational, legal, and economic frameworks. Focusing on recent DeFi models such as MakerDAO and Uniswap, the study showcases a thorough critique on the potential of DAOs and their possible evolution in the future. This study is significant as DAOs are increasingly being considered as alternatives to traditional centralized systems, particularly in finance and digital coordination. Despite the benefits it provides, certain flaws in the field of jurisdiction and more legal aspects coexist. The research adopts a qualitative approach, relying on analysis of governance structures, economic design mechanisms, and regulatory frameworks based on secondary sources and protocol documentation. The findings in this paper indicate that while DAOs have advantages such as transparency, global participation, and programmable incentives, they face critical challenges, including power concentration, low voter participation, regulatory uncertainty, and weak accountability structures. These results conclude that although DAOs demonstrate strong potential in certain areas, their current limitations prevent them from functioning as fully effective large-scale governance systems. To address these limitations, this paper proposes the CLEAR Framework, structured across five dimensions: Compliance, Layered Governance, Economic Design, Accountability, and Regulatory Readiness. Overall, the study concludes that DAOs are an evolving model with promising applications, but require significant improvements in governance design and regulatory integration to achieve long-term viability.
Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs) promise democratic governance through token-weighted voting, yet empirical evidence reveals extreme concentration of voting power comparable to the world's most unequal countries. This paper introduces the Zero Point Senemosìa (ZPS) framework, a novel approach to quantifying governance health in DAOs through quantum-inspired organizational modeling. We analyze three major DAOs-MakerDAO (MKR), Lido (LDO), and Ethereum Name Service (ENS)-revealing distinct governance pathologies: MKR exhibits polarized debate (DHI = 0.68), LDO demonstrates silent consensus masking concentration (DHI = 0.71), and ENS presents acute treasury capture risk despite high participation (DHI = 0.59). Our analysis reveals Gini coefficients ranging from 0.80-0.89 and Nakamoto coefficients as low as 4, indicating that merely 4-7 entities control 51% of governance in these protocols worth $14B+ in total value locked. We introduce the DAO Health Index (DHI) as a quantitative governance metric and propose the Protocol for Auto-corrective Reconfiguration and Equilibrium (PARE) as a framework for designing self-correcting governance mechanisms. Our findings have direct implications for regulatory policy, institutional investment, and the design of future decentralized systems.
In late 2025 the Central Bank of Brazil (BCB) discontinued the Hyperledger Besu pilot platform of its DREX permissioned-CBDC programme and signalled a redesign of the next phase, while the broader DREX initiative remained under development. Throughout the documented pilot, consensus authority stayed within six BCB-operated nodes running QBFT, while the sixteen institutional participants operated non-validating nodes. We therefore approach the DREX experience not as a failed governance experiment by institutional validators but as a motivating case for a broader question: under what conditions could institutional participants of heterogeneous type be safely promoted to validators in a future distributed phase of a permissioned CBDC? We develop an action-incentive-compatibility condition for the permissioned-CBDC setting under parametric type heterogeneity (BAIC): an incentive condition stated on validators' actions rather than on reported types, designed against the regulator's distributional knowledge of validator types. (We retain the Bayesian label for the design-against-distribution object; under the present calibration the expectation over other validators' types is degenerate, a point we make explicit in Section 5.3.) A four-archetype typology of candidate validators systemic banks, mid-tier banks and cooperatives, authorised ntechs, and registry institutions characterises the heterogeneity any future distributed phase would need to discipline. Privacy law enters as a lower bound on the false-positive rate of any admissible monitoring signal, generating a privacysustainability frontier we characterise analytically. A Quadruple Alignment result gives sucient conditions for systemic integrity on four levels consensus protocol, individual BAIC, validator-list composition, and regulatory feasibility of the required monitoring with explicit hypotheses for necessity. The composition condition is stated in a synchronised form consistent with the timing of the coalitional game: a coalition of eective per-member gain at most G max is deterred for archetype k when G max ≤ D k , where D k is the discounted per-member deterrence threshold that accounts for both detection and the honest path's own false-positive exposure. Under a parametrisation disciplined by institutional facts, only systemic banks satisfy the synchronised composition certicate; mid-tier banks fail it by a non-trivial margin under pilot monitoring, and are not jointly admissible with systemic banks at the legal privacy oor; ntechs and registry institutions exhibit a decit that persists under any isolated reduction in the false-positive rate within the maintained parameterisation it is not closed by better monitoring alone. The reported centralised reorientation of DREX, which the model represents as a counterfactual low-false-positive benchmark for a distributed network, leaves the ntech and registry decit untouched, because it lies in the archetypes' utility fundamentals rather than in monitoring precision; closing it would require changing those fundamentals (mandate, reputational stake, accessible gains, or voting rights), not merely the signal.
The expansion of Decentralized Finance (DeFi) and Anonymity-Enhancing Technologies (AETs) has complicated the tracking of illicit financial flows. This article analyzes three distinct AETs—Tornado Cash, Monero, and Zcash—to assess how specific protocol mechanisms degrade transaction‑graph attribution and obstruct compliance. Synthesizing technical literature, AML/CFT frameworks, and recent judicial documentation, the study traces how design choices translate into investigative challenges. The analysis yields three key findings. First, “decentralization” rarely eliminates control; instead, it shifts choke points to infrastructure layers such as bridges and RPC providers. Second, while AETs significantly raise attribution costs, their effectiveness is often conditional and dependent on usage patterns. Third, the Tornado Cash enforcement saga illustrates the limitations of applying traditional sanctions to autonomous code. The paper concludes by proposing a mitigation agenda focused on measurable risk reduction at entry/exit points without compromising legitimate privacy.
Decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) were supposed to prevent oligarchy. On the evidence, they haven't. Voting power is concentrated, delegation keeps producing superrepresentatives, and proposal turnout hovers below ten percent (Han et al. 2024; Fabrega et al. 2025). The empirical literature has measured this pattern many times over, but it has not had a theoretical frame equal to what it measures. This paper offers one. Drawing on Milovan Djilas's The New Class (1957) and Robert Michels's Political Parties (1911), I argue that DAO governance reproduces-not metaphorically, but structurally-the features of the communist nomenklatura: a self-perpetuating stratum that rules through control of the administrative apparatus rather than through ownership, that selects its members by cooptation rather than election, and that accrues privileges attached to position. I operationalize this through the Nomenklatura Index (ONI), a seven-dimension composite derived directly from Djilas's categories and piloted on three DAOs-Compound, MakerDAO/Sky, and Gitcoin-chosen to span the range of oligarchic formation I expected to see. The pilot does what it is supposed to do: ONI discriminates across the three cases in the predicted order and with meaningful spread. I close with design and regulatory implications. The governance-design ones (rotation mandates, supermajorities on self-dealing, deliberation minima) target the Djilasian mechanisms directly rather than working around them; the regulatory ones supply courts and agencies with a diagnostic vocabulary for the liability questions opened by CFTC v. Ooki DAO and unlikely to close anytime soon.
Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs) represent a novel organizational paradigm operating across multiple regulatory jurisdictions without traditional legal personhood, exposing participants to significant liability and enforcement risk. This study constructs a comprehensive quantitative taxonomy of regulatory frameworks applicable to DAOs, analyzing 72 operational entities across seven jurisdictional models and examining enforcement actions from fiscal years 2024-2025. We formalize the regulatory compliance burden as a multi-dimensional optimization problem, model liability distribution as a function of governance participation and token holdings, and derive metrics for securities classification risk and anti-money laundering exposure. Data aggregated from Wyoming DAOLLC/DUNA implementations, UK Limited Liability Partnership proposals, Malta ITAS certifications, Swiss Foundation structures, and the emergent Harmony Framework reveal that DAOs without legal wrappers exhibit 3.2× higher expected liability costs and face 4.7× greater regulatory enforcement probability. The proposed four-tier classification system-Unregistered Protocol DAOs, Operational Wrappers, Foundation Structures, and Hybrid Multi-Jurisdictional Entities-accounts for 94% of observed variance in regulatory outcomes. Regression analysis indicates that legal personhood recognition reduces member-level risk exposure by 68% while imposing median compliance costs of $127,000 annually. Securities enforcement data from 2024-2025 demonstrate that DAOs distributing governance tokens without exemption frameworks face prosecution rates of 23%, compared to 2.8% for legally structured entities. This framework provides a tractable model for jurisdictional selection, compliance architecture design, and governance mechanism optimization under regulatory uncertainty.
Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs) face inherent institutional conflicts between their decentralized governance structures, tokenized incentive mechanisms, and rigid global regulatory frameworks—with the U.S. regulatory landscape (SEC, OFAC, FinCEN) emerging as the most stringent and impactful. In 2024, 7 U.S.-based DAOs were subject to SEC investigations (aggregate penalties of $12.8 million), 18% incurred FinCEN sanctions for OFAC-sanctioned address interactions, and 68% of Base chain DAOs were denied institutional capital due to inadequate compliance documentation. Grounded in institutional economics (regulatory adaptation theory), RegTech principles, and blockchain traceability, this study proposes a “three-dimensional compliance adaptation framework” for DAO governance—integrating a regulatory rule engine (quantitative alignment with U.S. rules), automated on-chain audit report generation (transparency assurance), and dynamic governance optimization (securities risk mitigation). Drawing on the development of the “DAO Shield Pro” system and empirical testing across 7 representative U.S. Base chain DAOs (3 AI-focused, 2 meme-based, 2 investment-focused) over a 6-month period (March–August 2025), the framework achieves: (1) a 67.9% reduction in average compliance risk scores (from 3.8 to 0.98), (2) a 45.6-percentage-point increase in U.S. institutional investor participation (from 7.8% to 53.4%), (3) a 100% SEC regulatory inquiry acceptance rate, and (4) a 64.2% reduction in monthly compliance labor costs (from $19,200 to $6,870). This research fills critical gaps in DAO compliance scholarship by providing a theoretically rigorous, technically actionable, and empirically validated solution tailored to U.S. regulatory requirements (SEC Howey Test, OFAC sanctions screening, PCAOB auditing standards). It advances the field by quantifying ambiguous regulatory rules into executable on-chain logic and delivers a replicable paradigm for global DAO regulatory adaptation—strengthening U.S. competitiveness in the Web3 ecosystem and unlocking an estimated $42–$58 billion in latent institutional investment.
The concept of Non-Fungible Token (NFT) is complex. To understand the legal definition of an NFT, one must first consider the idea behind NFTs. According to the Treccani Encyclopedia, a Non-Fungible Token (NFT) is defined as “a non-duplicable digital certificate that certifies the originality and unique ownership of a physical or digital asset registered on the blockchain”. When someone buys an NFT, they do not gain ownership of the underlying asset; instead, they acquire specific rights related to it. These assets can be classified into three groups: native digital assets, which have no physical form; assets that do have a physical form; and assets with “variable geometries”, which include digital goods that can be linked to a physical version upon request. Examples of such goods include fashion items, luxury brands, and artwork. For items intended for use in “new virtual dimensions”, like the Metaverse, buyers can also request a corresponding physical item for use in the “real world”. NFTs have gained popularity across markets such as art, fashion, collectibles, and, most recently, sports. Aspects such as their legal status, regulations, and the effects of trading on specialized platforms, particularly regarding exchange value, require careful attention.
This paper investigates some of the legal issues related to non-fungible tokens, i.e. NFTs. The main feature of non-fungible tokens is their uniqueness together with the possibility of representing any digital resource on a blockchain, thus making it demonstrable and economically evaluable. From a legal point of view, this kind of instrument is alluring even though many look at it with uncertainty. As with any emerging technology, NFTs also present legal issues which need to be addressed as the market continues to grow. These problems deal with the legal nature of NFTs arising the doubt if they are securities or not. One more issue is the potential applicability to non-fungible tokens of the first sale rule. Furthermore, the problems involved also extend to other areas of law. In fact, both issuers and buyers need to be protected. Regarding issuers, the issue of an NFT may require the drafting of an additional contract with a specialised entity. On the other hand, buyers must be adequately informed of the purchase transaction. It follows that all the parties must be aware of the legal challenges involved and work towards establishing best practices and industry standards to address them. Additionally, it is necessary to issue specific legislation that regulates every aspect of the purchase. Received: 10 February 2024 / Accepted: 29 March 2024 / Published: 5 May 2024
This article explores the ethical dilemmas propelled by a significant shift in the allocation of trust and intelligence due to blockchain technology and AI, resulting in a notable decrease in transaction costs. The ethical and political implications of democratizing the resulting productivity gains are noteworthy, and while the pie is expanding, how its slices are distributed remains an open question. Enter Worldcoin, an innovative worldwide initiative that creates an identity system based on proof of personhood and zero-knowledge proofs (ZKP) to provide everyone with a distinct and anonymous "World ID. Using the author's “cyberethics-mix" framework, this paper examines the possible implications of such a system concerning data's protection, ownership, accuracy, and accessibility, underscoring the ethical significance of a political approach emphasizing inclusivity and sustainability through digital decentralization.
José M. Alonso, Judith Clifton, Daniel Díaz‐Fuentes
Abstract Corporatization—arguably as important as privatization regarding public service reform—remains an under‐researched topic in Public Administration. In this paper, we explore the extent to which the implementation of different types of corporatization strategies can be explained by the ideology of the ruling party in the Spanish public healthcare sector, selected for study because this sector was subject to reform, particularly, decentralization and marketization. To do so, we use count‐data regression models to analyze secondary data from the 17 Spanish regional governments for the period 2003–2017. Our estimates reveal that right‐wing controlled regional governments exhibit a clear preference for corporatization strategies that actively involve the private sector, such as Public–Private Partnerships and Public Finance Initiatives. Further analysis suggests that left‐wing governments are positively associated with the implementation of corporatization strategies that do not involve the private sector, such as the creation of Public Enterprises and Public Entities. These results are robust to a variety of alternative specifications.
The article describes involvement of modern technologies in combating corruption and their actuality in the current digitalization of the world. Such ICT tools as Digital government services, Big Data Technologies, Distributed ledger technologies (DLT) and blockchain, data mining, crowdsourcing technologies, analytical (Forensic) tools and electronic systems for verification of income declarations, as well as foreign experience of their usage and implementation are thoroughly examined.
Summary We provide a high‐level view on topics addressed in scientific articles about regulatory technology (RegTech), with a particular focus on technologies used. For this purpose, we first explore different denominations for RegTech and derive search queries to search relevant literature portals. From the hits of that information retrieval process, we select 55 articles outlining the application of information technology in regulatory affairs with an emphasis on the financial sector. In comparison, we examine the technological scope of 347 RegTech companies and compare our findings with the scientific literature. Our research reveals that ‘compliance management’ is the most relevant topic in practice, and ‘risk management’ is the primary subject in research. The most significant technologies as of today are ‘artificial intelligence’ and distributed ledger technologies such as ‘blockchain’.
This article explores the potential for applying blockchain technology for regulatory compliance and for reducing compliance costs and easing regulatory burdens. We describe the development of the Project Maison proof-of-concept blockchain system for regulatory reporting of mortgages in the U.K. This case study identified use cases and also the risks of increased supervision and loss of control and the governance challenges and trade-offs inherent in applying a decentralized approach to regulatory reporting.
Advancements in the digital domain, for example in blockchain technology, big data and machine learning, are increasingly shaping the lives of individuals, groups, organizations, and societies. These developments call for effective governance to protect the basic interests and needs of these actors. Simultaneously, the very nature of governance is also changing. Policy-making is increasingly moving away from top-down governance by the state towards more horizontal modes of governance. This paper reviews the literature on governance theory in order to conceptualize governance as a mode of decentralized, networked regulation. We argue that the current dominant modes of governance are inadequate in understanding governance in the digital domain, and are poorly equipped to conceptualize novel forms of governance such as decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs). Therefore, this study proposes a new mode of governance based on the regulation of new power relationships between the state and actors in the digital domain. This model further explores the role that blockchain technology can play in what we term decentralized network governance.