Post-Bayesian G2: Meta-Constraint Constitution — Formal Boundaries of Self-Evolving Governance Systems and DAO Governance Architecture Design

Abstract

Decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs), while gaining the ability toautonomously amend governance rules through proposal-voting mechanisms, simultaneously expose a fundamental design problem: when the object of modificationextends to the decision-making procedures themselves, the governance system risksfalling into value drift, procedural disintegration, or malicious capture during recursive revisions. This paper starts from the traditions of constitutional politicaleconomy and mechanism design to propose a hierarchical meta-constraint framework grounded on a gradient of engineering costs. The framework organizes governance rules into three tiers of decreasing rigidity: system consistency constraints,procedural virtues, and value homeostasis. Its highest tier relies not on prohibitionsderived from logical laws, but on the global state re-verification costs triggered byamendment behaviors to serve as a credible commitment device. The paper furtherpresents a technical path for compiling meta-constraints into descriptive assertionsverifiable by satisfiability modulo theory (SMT) solvers, delimits the decidabilityboundary of formal verification, and designs a dual-track adjudication mechanismthat structurally separates deterministic machine execution from deliberative socialconsensus. On this basis, the paper discusses the controlled evolution procedures ofmeta-constraints, the progressive decentralization of amendment procedures, andthe engineering limitations of the framework. The entire framework does not designate the correct option for any specific DAO decision; rather, it ensures thatwhatever direction the community chooses, the selection process itself will not losemeaning due to the self-destruction of its own rules.