This article examines how Switzerlandâs decentralized welfare structure shapes the outcomes of Basic Income reforms. Using SWISSMOD, a static microsimulation model based on EUROMOD, we simulate unconditional transfer schemes of varying generosity at federal and cantonal levels, combined with alternative financing. Our results show that Basic Income reduces poverty and inequality across all scenarios, but effects differ by implementation level: federal schemes achieve stronger redistribution and uniformity, while cantonal schemes produce heterogeneous outcomes and maintain interregional disparities. Progressive taxation enhances equity but risks excessively high marginal rates; wealth taxation offers fiscal relief but does not automatically enhance poverty reduction or social protection in a decentralized setting. Thus, centralized implementation enhances uniformity and equity across regions, while decentralized administration preserves local differentiation but risks perpetuating spatial inequalities. These findings underscore the importance of aligning social policy design with fiscal federalism when considering unconditional transfers and equitable access to income security.
Inter-local cooperation (ILC) has long served as a pragmatic governance response in the Philippines, enabling local government units (LGUs) to address policy challenges that transcend administrative boundaries. Yet national experience under Section 33 of the 1991 Local Government Code shows that cooperation has often remained voluntary, procedurally thin, and dependent on Memoranda of Agreement rather than on institutionalized legal personality, pooled fiscal authority, and durable governance systems (Republic of the Philippines 1991; DILG, NEDA, and GIZ 2010; Miels and Mayer 2025). This article examines the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) as a case of subnational legal innovation following the enactment of the Bangsamoro Local Governance Code (BLGC) in 2023 (BAA 49, 2023). Drawing on documentary analysis and national ILC experience, the study analyzes how the BLGC reconfigures statutory authority for interâLGU cooperation and why BLGCâaligned institutions have not yet consolidated in routine practice. The findings show that the BLGC provides one of the most explicit statutory foundations to date for horizontal cooperation â authorizing joint organizations, shared authority, and multiâstakeholder participation â yet interâlocal cooperation in BARMM remains largely MOAâbased at present, reflecting an early, preâinstitutionalization stage (BAA 49, 2023; Miels and Mayer 2025). Interpreting this as reform sequencing rather than policy failure, the article demonstrates that rulesâinâform are in place while the rulesâinâuse required for implementation â procedural clarity, pooled fiscal systems, organizational capacity, and integration into regional governance â are still being developed (Ostrom 1990; Pierson 2000; Mahoney and Thelen 2010). In doing so, the study reframes early implementation gaps as expected features of institutional transition and highlights the BLGCâs broader contribution to modernizing the legal foundations of interâlocal cooperation beyond Section 33, offering insights relevant to decentralization reform and intergovernmental governance in the Philippines.
This article explores the phenomenon of the decentralisation defence, which refers to instances where âdecentralisationâ is invoked either as a shield against liability or as insulation from the reach of the law. This defence is rooted in the technological features of distributed ledger technology and smart contracts built on the blockchain settlement layer, including pseudonymity, programmability, immutability and decentralisation. Together, these features enable transactions while reducing reliance on centralised intermediaries. Although major decentralised finance (DeFi) applications, such as decentralised crypto exchanges, are not harmful per se, their misuse by bad actors creates risks for market participants. The recent cases of Uniswap Labs and Tornado Cash illustrate that the decentralisation defence can result in unaddressed harms and produce other negative externalities. These outcomes have prompted efforts to identify regulatory hooks along the centralisation vectors. The search for a responsible party in blockchain-enabled decentralised arrangements resembles processes observed with two other key technological advancements in the digital space â the internet and artificial intelligence. Drawing inspiration from the modern EU regulation of these transformative technologies, this article focuses on the role of user interfaces as DeFi gatekeepers, and software developers engaged in the creation of smart contract code and blockchain protocols.
In accordance with the Imperial Constitution of 1871, the German Empire of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was a federal state. The governments of the center (the Reich) and the federal states pursued a fiscal policy that had some features of âproto-competitiveâ federalism. Over the subsequent fifty years, however, German federalism evolved toward fiscal federalism. This transition was finally consolidated during 1919 and 1920 due to some endogenous factors and even more to exogenous ones. The article is based on statistical material as well as research from various studies, including those available from the library of the Goethe-Institut. The article compares the extent to which there were indications of proto-competitive federalism in the German budgetary system prior to Matthias Erzbergerâs (finance minister of the German Empire) financial reforms (1919â1920) and indications of fiscal federalism after them. The transformation in both the distribution of power and responsibility as well as in provision of resources by various levels of the budgetary system to support those changes during the transition from proto-competitive to fiscal federalism is analyzed. The attempt to strike a balance between the fiscal interests of the center, federal states, and municipalities is explored; and equalization is singled out as a new function of the empireâs budget process. The creation of a so-called self-sufficient economy in the empire just before the First World War and its subsequent survival under pressure from sanctions and international isolation demanded a flexible balance between centralization and decentralization of spending powers along with an appropriate allocation of resources. Fiscal federalism through centralization of funds allowed Germany to begin recovery from geopolitical and socio-economic challenges, while maintaining decentralization primarily in non-tax revenues encouraged local governments to continue developing their economies. The logic derived from this historical study of the changing models of German fiscal federalism is also applicable to Russia: the reduction of revenues and growth of expenditures in the Russian Federationâs federal budget in recent years makes centralization of fiscal resources at the federal level more important, and the growth of expenditures in the regions and municipalities necessitates transfers and equalization measures.
The Doctrine of Anchored Decentralization constitutes the first comprehensive constitutional and statutory framework capable of reconciling decentralized digital architectures with the legal, regulatory, and jurisprudential structure of the United States. Developed within the broader scholarly series <i>The Republicâs Conscience</i>, this thesis represents the second installment in that corpusâbuilding directly upon the constitutional and structural principles articulated in the inaugural paper and extending them into the domain of digital-asset governance, administrative delimitation, and federal statutory coherence.This work advances the nationâs first universal, architecture-based commodity-versus-security classification framework designed for deployment across American constitutional, statutory, and judicial systems. By replacing rhetorical claims of decentralization with empirically verifiable and legally cognizable structural tests, the Doctrine furnishes courts, Congress, and administrative agencies with a coherent, adjudicable methodology capable of withstanding scrutiny under established Supreme Court jurisprudence, including <i>Howey</i>, <i>Reves</i>, <i>Forman</i>, <i>Marbury</i>, and the post-<i>Chevron</i> administrative landscape.The Doctrine challenges the prevailing assumption that blockchain-based ecosystems may operate as âstatelessâ economic systems while still participating in markets governed by constitutional law. Through sustained analysis of constitutional text, statutory construction, cryptographic system design, and post-Chevron administrative jurisprudence, the work demonstrates that decentralization cannot acquire legal legitimacy unless it remains anchored to the Chain of Consent â the constitutional requirement that all economic power be traceable to accountable authority.Drawing upon Article I, § 8 (monetary and commercial power), Article I, § 9 (appropriations and fiscal discipline), and the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, the Doctrine establishes that most contemporary decentralized systems operate within a constitutional vacuum: they perform value transfer, economic coordination, and pseudo-monetary behavior without satisfying the representational prerequisites of the American constitutional order. This analysis is further grounded in <i>Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward</i>, <i>Gibbons v. Ogden</i>, <i>Wickard v. Filburn</i>, <i>United States v. Lopez</i>, <i>NFIB v. Sebelius</i>, and the postâ<i>Loper Bright</i> landscape of statutory interpretation, revealing how modern digital governance architectures strain the boundaries of jurisdiction, accountability, and enforceability.At the systems-engineering level, the Doctrine reframes decentralization not as a monetary phenomenon but as a cryptographic lineage derived from Haber and Stornettaâs foundational timestamping architecture. This lineage demonstrates that Bitcoinâs core innovation was not the creation of new money, but the operationalization of a distributed verification engine. The work therefore distinguishes decisively between decentralization as architectural substrate and cryptocurrency as asset behavior, establishing that most digital tokens cannot qualify as commodities under the Commodity Exchange Act absent a constitutionally anchored framework for origin accountability, managerial neutrality, and market integrity.The Doctrine exposes structural defects in modern legislative approaches â including H.R. 3633 â demonstrating how contemporary statutory efforts misapply classical commodity theory, create jurisdictionally unanchored digital entities, and institutionalize anonymity architectures that undermine due process, enforcement capacity, and market legitimacy. In response, this work develops the Anchored Decentralization Test, the first system-level doctrine to allow Congress, courts, and regulators to classify digital assets based on verifiable architectural behavior rather than semantic self-description.The Doctrine further introduces the novel concept of Autonomous Commodity Primitives (ACPs) â a sovereign-grade digital infrastructure class designed not as speculative instruments but as immutable, cryptographic attestations of real-world sovereign reserve assets. ACPs are engineered to function as Treasury-grade verification rails, enabling real-time auditability, ledger-level integrity, and constitutionally compliant Asset-Backed Digital Currency (ABDC) architecture. Unlike cryptocurrencies, ACPs do not manufacture value; they attest to value that already exists within sovereign reserve systems.To harmonize privacy with constitutional accountability, the Doctrine integrates Zero-Knowledge Proofs, privacy-preserving audit layers, and non-custodial verification mechanisms, allowing digital systems to preserve Fourth Amendment-equivalent privacy while maintaining lawful traceability through institutional channels. This design restores the Chain of Consent without creating surveillance architecture.The Doctrine concludes that decentralization without accountability constitutes a structural form of constitutional evasion â an economy operating beyond representation. By restoring constitutional anchoring to distributed architectures, the Doctrine preserves innovation while reaffirming the Republicâs foundational principle: that economic power is legitimate only when traceable to those whom the Constitution recognizes as sovereign.Ultimately, The Doctrine of Anchored Decentralization provides a constitutional roadmap for the next century of digital infrastructure. It is <i>not a rejection</i> of decentralized technology, but a <i>restoration</i> of its lawful purpose: to function as a verifiable architecture of trust, anchored to the constitutional principles that have sustained the United States for more than two centuries.
Abstract Spainâs system of governance is characterized by a complex web of vertical and horizontal intergovernmental relationships, reflecting its unique historical evolution from centralized authoritarianism to decentralized democracy. The continuous evolution of this framework aims to balance regional autonomy with national and European unity, ensuring effective governance in a diverse political landscape. Horizontal coordination refers to the cooperation between different levels of government, sectors, and organizations to achieve coherent policy outcomes. This approach is crucial in managing the complex administrative structure, which includes autonomous communities with significant powers. Effective horizontal coordination ensures consistent policy implementation, reduces redundancy, and promotes innovation through shared resources and knowledge. Experience with horizontal coordination highlights the importance of clear communication channels, joint decision-making processes, and the integration of different perspectives. However, regional disparities and political tensions can hamper these efforts, requiring continuous dialogue and adaptability of coordination mechanisms.
Abstract This chapter focuses on the diversities within the Spanish State of Autonomies, shedding light on the asymmetrical nature of the devolution process, with an emphasis on the transformation of the constitutional framework concerning tax and finance power decentralization, juxtaposing Spanish Fiscal Federalism within the broader context of the European Union. An exploration of intergovernmental tax relations uncovers the limited efficacy of mixed commissions, leading to an assessment of the Spanish Constitutional Court's central role in mediating conflict. The analysis concludes by looking forward, speculating on the potential future trajectories of Spanish fiscal federalism.
Abstract In this chapter, the historical development of the relationship between the central and local governments in Japan will be analyzed in terms of three aspects â administration, finance, and politics â and the characteristics of the relationship between the central and local governments in Japan will be clarified by setting a framework of interfusion and separation. When modernizing, Japan studied the local government systems in place throughout the European continent and chose to adopt the interfusion model of the relationship between central and local governments, whereby the central government delegates its policies to local governments to ensure their implementation. The relationship between the central and local governments in Japan has undergone changes through functional centralization during the wartime regime, decentralization through reforms implemented during the Occupation, and decentralization reforms that have been taking place since the 1990s. However, the characteristics of interfusion have been maintained and reinforced through municipal mergers and the development of a system of fiscal adjustments. While Japan has a high ratio of local government to total government activities relative to other countries, this characteristic of Japan is supported by an interfusion-type relationship between the central and local governments.
Abstract Canada has evolved into one of the most fiscally decentralized federations in the world. Provinces enjoy considerable autonomy and play a central role in designing and implementing economic and social policies. This chapter outlines key features of Canadian fiscal federalism, especially the extensive decentralization of legislative responsibilities and taxation powers to provincial governments, the wide-ranging intergovernmental transfer system designed to maintain fiscal balance between orders of governments and among provinces, as well as the mechanisms in place to promote some harmonization of policies and cooperation among provinces. Current challenges to Canadian fiscal federalism are outlined including pressures on horizontal and vertical fiscal balance associated with demographic changes, rapidly increasing costs in the public health care system which have been intensified by the Covid-19 pandemic, persistent tensions associated with the geographic concentration of natural resources, as well as pressures on municipal finance resulting from ongoing urbanization and growing infrastructure needs, among others.
Abstract Fiscal federalism in Ethiopia has been implemented within a unique political context. The adoption of a multiethnic federal system has reshaped the fiscal and economic landscape of the country since 1991. Following the political restructuring towards federalization, the culture of centralization of fiscal powers and responsibilities, which had been witnessed for more than half a century, has significantly been altered. Yet, Ethiopia is a highly centralized federation, both in design and practice. The division of powers favors the Federal government in legislation and policymaking. The provision of most public services is, however, significantly decentralized. The lucrative sources of revenue are assigned to be either exclusive federal powers or concurrent. As a result, Ethiopiaâs fiscal federalism has been characterized by a high degree of fiscal imbalances, the Federal General-Purpose Grant (FGPG), an equalization transfer, being the dominant mechanism to bridge the imbalances. Revenue sharing and specific purpose transfers constitute only a very small proportion of Subnational finance. Statesâ borrowing rights are limited to internal sources and are subject to stringent preconditions set by the federal government.
Spain is a country where the nationalist cleavage has a fundamental importance to understand the party systems and the dynamics of electoral competition in some Autonomous Communities. This article analyzes the electoral bases of the main regionalist parties in Spain and, specifically, it focuses on the electoral bases of Canary Coalition (CC). Despite its importance at the regional level, this party has received little attention by the academic literature. This article confirms the idea that CC is a party able to mobilize an electorate whose preferences are for a more decentralized territorial organization than the current one. However, the key finding is that, unlike what happens with the main regionalist parties in Spain, the identity associated with the Autonomous Community is not an explanatory factor of the vote for CC, what shows that the Canarian identity is not politically activated.
The article considers the Swiss model of fiscal municipalization from the ideological and methodological positions of the anthroposociocultural approach. Such components of this approach as historical and genetic methods together with the method of system-structural analysis were applied especially thoroughly and consistently. By means of them it was found that the Swiss model of fiscal decentralization is an attributive part of the construction of public power in Switzerland â municipalization from bottom to top. Special attention is drawn to defining the basic legal features of the Swiss model of fiscal municipalization. It is argued that subsidiarity does not paradigmatically coincide with decentralization: the principle of subsidiarity postulates the sovereignty of the basic territorial collectives and considers the possible conditions for its limitation for general social needs and values. On the contrary, the principle of decentralization has the national level of governance as the starting point and considers the conditions of delegation of certain tasks and competences by the state to the lower levels of public power hierarchy in the principal frames of state sovereignty. Specificity of the principle of subsidiarity in Switzerland is that cantons play dual role from the standpoint of administrative federalism. On the one hand, they are the bearers of sovereignty of public power, including taxation. On the other hand, they are the sole bearers of administrative authority and are obliged to serve national interests, that is, the needs of the entire Swiss Confederation. Paradox is that this service function of the cantons gives them considerable benefits in the inevitable opposition to the Union state, when it comes to provision of services of the entire fiscal system and the entire system of public finance.
This chapter discusses the factors, other than the socio-economic ones, involved in the distribution of intergovernmental transfers in Russia in the 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s. Vladimir Popov agrees that political factors played a significant role in the process of redistribution of federal financial support in the 1990s and at the beginning of the 2000s. Before 2005, only one instrument of long-term territorial support existed in Russia, namely federal programs. Russian society did not express an interest in the discussion of intergovernmental finance, nor in the problems of Russian federalism at large. Russian regional policy is clearly oriented at equalizing the budget capacities of economically lagging subnational units with the rest of the country. The special economic zones laid the foundations for forming new points of growth that could accelerate the economic development of both a given region and the whole country. The economic dimension of territorial development has never been on the shortlist for the presidential agenda.
This book is about why and how central and local governments clash over important national policy decisions. Its empirical focus is on the local politics of Japan which has significantly shaped, and been shaped by, larger developments in national politics. The book argues that since the 1990s, changes in the national political arena, fiscal and administrative decentralization, as well as broader socio-economic developments have led to a decoupling of once closely integrated national and local party systems in Japan. Such decoupling has led to a breakdown of symbiotic relations between the centre and regions. In its place are increasing strains between national and local governments leading to greater intra-party conflict, inter-governmental conflicts, and more chief executives with agendas and resources increasingly autonomous of the national ruling party. Although being a book primarily focused on the Japanese case, the study seeks to contribute to a broader understanding of how local partisans shape national policy-making. The book theorizes and investigates how the degree of state centralization, vertical integration for party organizations, and partisan congruence in different levels of government affect inter-governmental relations. Japanâs experience is compared with Germany, Canada, and the UK to explore sources of multi-level policy conflict.
Against the backdrop of the financial and economic crisis, federal and regional States are engaging in several reforms. The financial constitutional design and institutional setting in the area of fiscal and financial matters are being revised in order to better adapt to the current challenges, which result both from the supranational sphere of economic governance and the domestic one. The rationale behind these reforming processes lies in the struggle between the apparent needs to re-centralize while accommodating decentralization claims. The paper focuses on federal and highly regionalized European States by adopting a comparative domestic perspective and investigates reform processes in the area of fiscal matters and financial intergovernmental relations. It explores the most significant features that permeate the various legal orders, trying to single out the different trends in shifting powers in favour of either (re)centralization or decentralization. To this extent the recognition of autonomy on the revenue side and the accommodation of autonomy and solidarity within the new fiscal regimes will be analyzed. Moreover,intergovernmental cooperation in fiscal and financial areas will be scrutinized trying to point out crucial characteristics from a comparative perspective. To this regard particular attention will be given to major recently established bodies and procedures in the fiscal and public finance area as well as to their role within domestic economic governance.
The inclusion of structural minorities and disadvantaged groups looms large in the study of democracy. There is ample recognition that âsimple political egalitarianism on which the institutions and mechanisms of modern representative democracy were established has given way to increasing demands for group recognition as well as for forms of equality related directly to people's needs, characteristics, identities and conditions.â (Castiglione and Warren 2005: 2) There is also ample recognition that the standard liberal and majoritarian model of democracy is frequently unable to safeguard the most vital interests of structural minorities and disadvantaged groups. Several representation models and institutional devices have been proposed in order to advance the interests of minorities and disadvantaged groups. In the past decade, however, the study of inclusion and representation has increasingly taken a deliberative turn (Williams 1998; Urbinati 2000; Mansbridge 2003; 2009; Dryzek and Niemeyer 2008). Rather than focusing on formal and institutional means of inclusion (such as proportional representation, minority veto, or re-districting), deliberative approaches take an informal and dynamic view on inclusion and representation. In their mainstream and Habermasian-inspired version, deliberative approaches entail the idea of equal participation and symmetric dialogue, reasoned argument, common good orientation, serious and respectful listening (and responding) to other participants' claims, as well as mutual agreement based on the âforceless force of the better argumentâ. With their focus on equality, symmetry, serious listening, and respect, deliberative approaches spark hope to be susceptible to the interests of structural minorities and disadvantaged groups. Yet, despite tremendous interest in deliberative approaches in recent years, the exact specification and empirical translation of deliberative ideals in the context of minority and group inclusion has lagged behind. This may not be so surprising, given the fact that deliberative approaches are far from being fool-proof devices for the inclusion of disadvantaged groups. The major problem is that mainstream and Habermasian-inspired forms of deliberation might actually hamper inclusionary goals. On the one hand, feminists and difference democrats have argued that many disadvantaged people do not engage in rationalistic forms of deliberation, which may suit only a privileged few. On the other hand, why should disadvantaged groups respectfully listen to privileged groups or even transcend their interests in the light of the âbetterâ argument, especially if they have experienced inequality or if their vital interests are at stake? As Williams (1998) has noted, requiring selflessness and self-transformation of the disadvantaged is deeply unfair. These are two valid objections, not easily addressed by the mainstream deliberative approach. Therefore, we propose a deliberative approach with âfriendly amendmentsâ. Our approach focuses on two central principles of deliberation, equality of participation and reciprocity, but it does so with a twist for reciprocity. First, equality of deliberation requires that all affected are included and âthat no one person or advantaged group completely dominate the reason giving process, even if the deliberators are not strictly equal in power and prestige.â (Thompson 2008: 507). Second, reciprocity means that discourse participants should listen and respond to each other and do so in a respectful way (Chambers 1999). However, the trick here is to put the âburdenâ of reciprocity primarily on majorities and privileged groups: it is mainly their obligation to seriously listen and respond to the demands and arguments of minorities and disadvantaged groups and show a willingness to respect and accommodate these interests. Conversely, structural minorities and disadvantaged groups are not fully held accountable to these standards. They may be deliberative, but they may also adopt a more adversarial stance towards majorities and privileged groups. This relaxation is conditional though: the less inequality structural minorities and disadvantaged groups have experienced and the less their vital interests are at stake, the more we expect them to converge to the standards of majorities and privileged groups (and the more privileged groups are dispensed from taking a deliberative attitude vis-a-vis the disadvantaged). Finally, contrary to standard models of political inclusion and representation, our deliberative approach focuses only on the horizontal relationship among different (group) representatives and the ways they interact â rather than on the vertical relationship between representatives and constituents. We think that the former aspect of representation is critical though: it is the moment when inclusion and representation are in action and when constituent interests are turned into binding decisions. So far, there has been little empirical and systematic examination of deliberative forms of inclusion in the context of structural minorities and disadvantaged groups. In this study, we investigate equality of participation and reciprocity in the context of linguistic minorities in Switzerland (French, Italian and Romansch-speakers). To be sure, linguistic groups in Switzerland do not directly qualify as âdisadvantagedâ groups (such as Blacks in the United States), since they have not experienced deep inequality or oppression in the past. However, when their vital interests are at stake, they do not have formal means of veto power to prevent unwanted legislation but are generally dependent on the decisions of the German-speaking majority to realize their interests (both in representative and direct democracy). Moreover, there have been recurrent complaints of linguistic minorities of being marginalized and ignored by German speakers. As such, an empirical investigation of deliberative inclusion of linguistic minorities in Switzerland is far from being misdirected. At the same time, the institutional architecture of the Swiss political system is also conducive to deliberative forms of policy-making: it involves a consensus system with non-parliamentary features, enabling political actors to engage in consequential deliberation (see Steiner et al. 2004). Moreover, the party system is not organized along linguistic cleavages reducing partisan incentives to politicize linguistic conflicts. This combines with a specific motivation on part of the German-speaking majority to be receptive to the demands of linguistic minorities (Bachtiger and Steiner 2004). Thus, favorable institutional conditions and appropriate actor motivations should provide fertile ground to see our conception of deliberative inclusion âin actionâ. Put differently, the Swiss case enables us to explore how well the ideals of equality of participation and reciprocity are realized in practice when conditions are fairly ideal. In concrete, we focus on two Swiss parliamentary decision cases that deal with linguistic issues and directly concern linguistic minoritiesâ vital interests (language article and language bill); in addition, we focus on a contrast decision case, the labor law revision which does not touch upon vital interests of the linguistic minorities. For the three cases, we explore patterns of participation and reciprocity in the committees of the first and second chambers of parliament. With regard to equality of participation, we analyze how often linguistic minorities speak up compared to the German-speaking majority. With regard to reciprocity, we analyze how often linguistic minorities are referred to, how often linguistic minorities refer to other actors, and whether this is done in a respectful and disrespectful way. Furthermore, we also perform an in-depth analysis of reciprocity and explore how often arguments of linguistic minorities are referred to by the German-speaking minority and whether this is done in a respectful (or, disrespectful) way. Our empirical analysis of deliberative inclusion draws from Steven Levittâs (2004) analysis of discrimination in the United States. We calculate frequencies for participation and reciprocity rates as a function of the speakers status â linguistic minority or linguistic majority -, controlling for other characteristics of the speaker (such as gender, role, or partisan affiliation) as well as characteristics of the context (different issues or first vs. second chamber). The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents our model of deliberative inclusion. Section III provides background on deliberative inclusion in the context of linguistic groups in Switzerland, discusses the methodological approach, and presents the empirical results. Section IV concludes.
The author explores distinctiveness of the regional state mostly in Spain as third model of territorial organization. Unlike unitary and federal, regional state is not wide-spread and broad accepted concept of vertical organization although modern Spain and Italy represents examples of good practice. Having in mind diversity of regional identities and strong cultural distinctiveness in Catalonia, the Basque Country, Galicia and other areas, author is wondering if any other model of territorial organization could be sustainable in such socio-cultural environment. After the period of Franco?s dictatorship, which had been trying to exterminate cultural and historical particularities among Spanish nations, decentralization demands have become more stronger resulting with the new constitution adopted in 1978. This act has set the corner-stone of modern Spanish democracy based on Autonomous Communities as specific forms of decentralized state and territorial autonomy.
The European Union (EU) is built on the federalist principle of subsidiarity, which we consider in the policy field of financial reporting. We attempt to answer the question, whether the current accounting regulation in Europe is sensibly balanced between centralized and decentralized decision making. Drawing on comparative accounting research to identify criteria for âlocal preferences,â we conclude that local solutions currently remain preferable for small and medium-sized companies. For them, a centralized solution would result in additional costs for at least some member states and their residents. Large international firms, in contrast, face an increasingly integrated capital market and rather need a central solution as currently implemented by the EU. However, recent developments in corporate finance may align local preferences on accountancy in the future.
Three years ago, a process of reform to the Statutes of Autonomy of some of the 17 Autonomous Communities that make up the model of politically decentralized State, designed by the Constitution of 1978, begun in Spain. Doubtless, the one that has sparked off more controversy in the legal and also the political grounds has been the Statute of Catalonia, approved since 2006. The subjects of greatest relevance have been those related to the incorporation of a Letter of Rights; the material and functional determination of the competences for the exercise of the self-government, as well as the relationships with the State, the European Union, and the financing system.
âFront-loadingâ primaries and caucuses - the movement of state delegate selection contests to the beginning of the nomination calendar - is problematic for the integrity of the presidential nominating system. Because it results from decentralized decision making by self-interested states, front-loading also poses a problem for federalism. Indeed, most proposed remedies for front-loading would impinge on federalism in some manner. In analyzing those remedies, one must assess their interaction with federalism both procedurally and substantively. For example, a federally imposed national primary would be harmful to federalism on both dimensions; regional primaries negotiated among states would be best for federalism procedurally but are of dubious efficacy; the national parties have an ambiguous relationship to federalism; and a change in federal campaign finance rules would seek to combine a centralized process with a decentralized result. The best solution might be to use available central levers to try to change campaign dynamics and thus the incentives for states to schedule their primaries early.
This article analyses the relationship between decentralization and the extent of fiscal discipline in the Swiss cantons between 1984 and 2000. From a theoretical point of view, decentralization and federalism can be associated with both an expansive and a dampening effect on government debt. On the one hand, decentralized structures have been argued to lead to a reduction of debt due to inherent competition between the member states and the multitude of veto positions which restrict public intervention. On the other hand, decentralization has been claimed to contribute to an increase of public debt as it involves expensive functional and organizational duplications as well as cost-intensive, often debt-financed, compromise solutions between a large number of actors that operate in an uncoordinated and contradictory way. Our empirical results show that in periods of prosperous economic development, the architecture of state structure has no impact on debt. However, the degree of decentralization influences debt in economically poor times: In phases of economic recession, administratively decentralized cantons implement a more economical budgetary policy than centralized Swiss member states.
This dissertation explores the politics of fiscal decentralization in comparative perspective. Case studies of Argentina and Spain are used to provide insights into the way that the distribution of institutional and economic resources in multitiered polities shapes the extent to which the policy of transferring revenue and revenue authority to subnational governments can be exploited for political gain. This approach draws attention to the political conditions that inhibit the coordination of fiscal reform efforts between the different levels of government and perpetuate the financing of subnational spending with revenue collected by the national government. This political context undermines national fiscal adjustment efforts and leads to economic catastrophes such as those experienced in Argentina throughout the last two decades. Specifically, this study uses statistical analyses and empirical institutional theory to show how patterns of territorial representation and bargaining strategies hindered revenue decentralization in Argentina but advanced it in Spain.The research suggests, first, coalition-building goals drive national executives in Argentina to reach out legislators of the opposition by means of allocating larger shares of federal transfers to the provinces the latter belong to. However, all else equal, legislatively overrepresented, i.e. economically marginal and sparsely populated, provinces will be targeted first. Second, the increasing role of regionalist parties in Spanish national politics and their acceptance in joint-policy mechanisms tilts the allocation of chosen federal transfers slightly in favor of economically developed and densely populated autonomous communities, which are generally governed by regionalist forces. Third, whereas Argentine subnational interests are "locked-in" at the Senate level and intergovernmental negotiations are conducted bilaterally, open-ended institutional arrangements and a relatively impotent senate in Spain boosted the redressing of regional concerns through informal intergovernmental fora and increasing multilateral collaboration Fourth, such differences in patterns of institutional representation and bargaining strategies explain the paucity of fiscal decentralization in Argentina and its relative progress in Spain.