NGOs Funding Trust, Blockchain and RedChain Prof. Victor Alvarez, MBA ORCID iD: 0009-0001-7933-3830 Department Research in Economic , IEBS Business School, 08840 Barcelona, Spain Department of Humanitarian Economics and NGO Management ETU Institute, Birkirkara, Malta Abstract Persistent trust deficits between donor agencies and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) continue to undermine the efficiency and effectiveness of humanitarian and development assistance, particularly in low-income and institutionally fragile environments. Concerns regarding fund diversion, beneficiary duplication, limited transparency, and weak accountability mechanisms have intensified demand for innovative governance solutions. This paper explores the potential of blockchain technology to strengthen trust in NGO funding through two complementary models: (1) a permissioned blockchain framework for beneficiary verification and aid tracking, and (2) RedChain, a privacy-preserving blockchain infrastructure for humanitarian assistance developed by the Spanish Red Cross. The proposed NGO Trust framework utilizes a distributed ledger to maintain immutable and auditable records of beneficiary registration and fund allocation. By recording encrypted identity credentials and digitally signed transactions, the system reduces the risk of duplicate beneficiary claims, fraud, and reporting inconsistencies across participating organizations. A participation and penalty mechanism further enhances network integrity by incentivizing honest behavior among stakeholders. RedChain extends this approach by integrating blockchain-based transaction recording with zero-knowledge proof technologies, enabling transparent aid distribution while preserving beneficiary privacy. With nearly one million registered transactions, the platform demonstrates the operational viability of blockchain-enabled humanitarian governance at scale. By synthesizing these approaches, this paper proposes an integrated framework for transparent NGO funding, combining beneficiary integrity verification, transaction traceability, privacy protection, and donor accountability. The findings suggest that distributed ledger technologies can significantly improve trust relationships between donors, NGOs, and beneficiaries, while supporting more efficient, transparent, and equitable aid distribution systems. The study contributes to the emerging literature on digital governance, nonprofit economics, and technology-enabled development finance by identifying blockchain as a foundational infrastructure for next-generation humanitarian and social-impact ecosystems. Keywords Blockchain; NGO governance; Humanitarian aid; Trust; Transparency; Beneficiary duplication; Zero-knowledge proofs; RedChain; Donor accountability; Privacy-preserving technology; Smart contracts; Aid distribution JEL Classification G30 – Corporate Finance and Governance: General L31 – Nonprofit Institutions; NGOs; Social Entrepreneurship O33 – Technological Change: Choices and Consequences; Diffusion Processes F35 – Foreign Aid H84 – Disaster Aid and Relief 1. Introduction Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) play a central role in delivering humanitarian assistance, poverty alleviation programs, disaster relief, education, health services, and sustainable development initiatives worldwide. According to the United Nations and international development agencies, NGOs have become increasingly important intermediaries between donors, governments, and beneficiaries, particularly in regions where state capacity is limited or institutional trust is weak. Despite their growing influence, concerns regarding transparency, accountability, and the efficient allocation of resources continue to challenge the nonprofit sector (Edwards & Hulme, 1996; Ebrahim, 2003; Najam, 1996). The economics of nonprofit organizations has long emphasized the importance of trust as a mechanism for overcoming information asymmetries between donors and service providers (Hansmann, 1980). Donors frequently lack direct information regarding how funds are allocated, whether intended beneficiaries actually receive assistance, and whether reported outcomes accurately reflect project performance. This information gap creates principal-agent problems in which monitoring costs are high and opportunities for misreporting, inefficiency, or fraud may arise (Pratt & Zeckhauser, 1985; Tirole, 2006). As charitable donations and development aid increasingly flow through complex international networks, maintaining donor confidence has become a critical governance challenge. A substantial body of research has documented accountability deficiencies within humanitarian and development organizations. Ebrahim (2005) argues that traditional accountability systems often emphasize upward reporting to donors while providing limited mechanisms for beneficiary participation and verification. Similarly, Gugerty and Prakash (2010) note that transparency initiatives frequently rely on self-reported information that is difficult to independently audit. In international aid programs, concerns have emerged regarding duplicate beneficiary registrations, diversion of funds, weak recordkeeping systems, and fragmented information sharing among organizations operating in the same geographic areas (World Bank, 2016; OECD, 2021). Digital technologies have increasingly been proposed as tools to address these governance challenges. The broader literature on e-governance and digital accountability suggests that information systems can reduce transaction costs, improve record accuracy, and strengthen institutional transparency (Heeks, 2002; Cordella & Tempini, 2015). Among emerging technologies, blockchain has attracted considerable attention due to its capacity to create immutable, distributed, and verifiable records without requiring centralized trust authorities (Nakamoto, 2008). Since the introduction of Bitcoin, blockchain applications have expanded far beyond digital currencies into supply chain management, public administration, healthcare, identity systems, and humanitarian operations (Tapscott & Tapscott, 2016; Casino, Dasaklis & Patsakis, 2019). Scholars have argued that distributed ledger technologies may improve transparency and accountability by creating tamper-resistant transaction histories accessible to multiple stakeholders (Swan, 2015; Treiblmaier, 2018). Within development economics, blockchain-based systems have been proposed to improve aid distribution, reduce corruption, facilitate identity verification, and enhance financial inclusion in underserved regions (Kshetri, 2017; Saberi et al., 2019). Recent humanitarian applications provide evidence of growing institutional interest in blockchain-enabled governance. The United Nations World Food Programme's Building Blocks initiative demonstrated the feasibility of blockchain-based refugee assistance by facilitating aid transfers while reducing administrative costs and improving transaction traceability. Similarly, studies by Juskalian (2018), Mikhaylov et al. (2020), and Wang et al. (2022) suggest that distributed ledger technologies may strengthen accountability mechanisms in humanitarian environments characterized by weak institutional infrastructure. Nevertheless, important challenges remain. Public transparency requirements often conflict with the need to protect sensitive beneficiary information. Humanitarian organizations must balance donor demands for accountability with ethical obligations regarding privacy, dignity, and data protection. The emergence of privacy-enhancing cryptographic techniques, particularly zero-knowledge proofs, offers a potential solution to this dilemma by enabling verification without revealing underlying personal information (Goldwasser, Micali & Rackoff, 1989; Ben-Sasson et al., 2014). These technologies have increasingly been incorporated into blockchain architectures seeking to combine transparency with confidentiality. This paper contributes to the growing literature on nonprofit governance and development finance by examining two complementary blockchain-based approaches to strengthening trust in NGO funding systems. The first is a permissioned blockchain framework designed to prevent beneficiary duplication and improve donor oversight through cryptographically verifiable registration and transaction records. The second is RedChain, a privacy-preserving humanitarian aid platform developed by the Spanish Red Cross that combines blockchain technology with zero-knowledge proofs to support transparent aid distribution while safeguarding beneficiary privacy. By integrating insights from these models, the study proposes a comprehensive framework for Transparent NGO Funding that addresses four persistent governance challenges: beneficiary verification, transaction traceability, privacy preservation, and donor accountability. The analysis contributes to the fields of nonprofit economics, digital governance, and development finance by demonstrating how blockchain technologies may reduce information asymmetries, lower monitoring costs, and strengthen trust among donors, NGOs, and beneficiaries. Ultimately, the paper argues that distributed ledger systems can serve as foundational infrastructure for a new generation of accountable, transparent, and privacy-respecting humanitarian ecosystems.
Traditional philanthropic organizations often suffer from lim ited transparency, where donors have minimal visibility into how their contributions are utilized after donation [1,14]. To addressthisissue, this paper presents NGO-Chain, a hybrid Web3 platform designed to im prove accountability and transparency in charitable fund management. The proposed system utilizes a milestone-based conditional escrow mech anism in which donated funds are locked within blockchain smart con tracts and released incrementally only after administrative verification of uploaded proof documents stored on the InterPlanetary File System (IPFS) [4,5]. The architecture combines React-based frontend interfaces, Spring Boot middleware, decentralized IPFS storage, and Ethereum/Polygon smart contracts to create a scalable hybrid infrastructure capable of supporting real-time public transaction monitoring [14,12]. In addition, the platform integrates donor reputation tracking and blockchain-backed transaction auditing to strengthen trust between donors and NGOs [6,7]. By com bining decentralized financial management with milestone verification workflows, NGO-Chain provides a secure and transparent framework for milestone-driven charitable donations while reducing dependency on cen tralized trust mechanisms.
Decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) are designed to disperse control, yet recent evidence shows that effective governance is often concentrated in a small number of participants. This note studies one simple mechanism behind that pattern. Because decentralized governance is monitor-intensive, rising proposal flow may eventually outpace the capacity of broad-based participation. Using a DAO--quarter panel, I estimate a fixed-effects kink model with DAO and quarter fixed effects and find a statistically significant decline in the marginal responsiveness of active voters once proposal activity crosses an interior threshold. I then study realized voting concentration using kink specifications with data-driven cutoffs. Across specifications, decentralization gains do not persist indefinitely once governance workload becomes sufficiently high, and load-based measures show especially clear evidence of a transition toward more concentrated realized control. The results provide reduced-form evidence consistent with a ``too big to monitor'' mechanism in DAO governance: when proposal flow grows faster than broad participation can keep up, effective control may drift toward a smaller set of highly active participants.
This paper aims to explore the key elements of transformative leadership skills of women servants to accelerate and impact activities related to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Content analysis and qualitative interviews with case research on applying the latest technology with distributed trust networks to provide traceability in science, technology, engineering, mathematics (STEM), and sports event management in Hong Kong for primary and secondary school students were conducted in April–July 2024. The attributes of transformative leadership of women servants with innovative ways to track students’ sports competition are seldom studied for improving the quality services of sports and STEM service providers in the post-COVID-19 periods. According to the results, it is expected to have an ongoing study on innovative and sustainable ways of applying transformative leadership of women servant leadership with non-fungible tokens (NFT) and blockchain application in SDGs via strengthening the partnership of academia, researchers, business, and industry with SDGs and NFT community projects for sustainable development (SD).
In 2000, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation tackled an issue concerning the American education system: unsatisfactory high school graduation rates and college entry rates, especially in urban school districts (Ravitch, 2011). Between 2000 and 2008, this foundation donated more than $2 billion to 2600 schools across 45 US states. Bill and Melinda Gates's aim was clearly spelled out: they saw the K−121 education system as “obsolete”2 and in need of drastic reforms (Ravitch, 2011). The Gates Foundation's leaders observed that some schools in the United States could host up to 4000 or 5000 pupils, leading to the neglect of a portion of students who needed extra attention. Based on contemporary research and already-existing movements in civil society,3 they concluded that smaller schools were the key to students’ success. In a context of public budget cuts, not many school boards could refuse a multimillion-dollar philanthropic donation. Hence, the Gates Foundation started to distribute money all over the United States, tying its gifts to conditions that would promote an effectiveness-based conception of education. At first, schools were asked to restructure and split themselves into independent units of no more than 400 students. Later, performance-based pay for teachers and national-standards tests, serving as effectiveness yardsticks, became mandatory for funding. Although this system benefited some schools, it created more problems than it solved in the great majority of cases. For example, the fragmentation of large schools into small autonomous units increased conflict and competition for resources and deprived students of a significant range of activities that were only provided in larger institutions. Praised in the beginning, the Gates program was sharply criticized in 2005 when the first evaluations came out. In 2008, the foundation's directors recognized the bad start of their program and mostly put the blame on the lack of receptivity of the schools they helped or on teachers’ lack of competence. A few months later, the foundation decided to all but shut the program down. In a democracy, there are good reasons to believe that the making of collectively binding decisions about such public goods as school infrastructures, education programs, and teachers’ salary should be carried out by citizens or people who speak in their name. However, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation's case shows a sense in which some people or organizations, by virtue of their private resources, have an additional and sometimes larger say on such questions. This raises the question whether the logics of democracy and philanthropy are compatible. The question is more pressing because philanthropic donations are generally tax subsidized, representing therefore a redirection of public money (Pevnick, 2013) toward aims likely to advance donors’ personal interests. Political philosophers have debated the role that philanthropy should have in liberal democratic states. On the one hand, a good amount of work argues that philanthropy should not assume a role in distributive justice, as private and voluntary redistribution of basic goods is too unreliable (Beerbohm, 2016), might affect egalitarian values (Cordelli, 2012), reinforces power asymmetries (Lechterman, 2021), and constitutes a paternalistic type of assistance (Saunders-Hastings, 2022). On the other hand, philanthropy may help promote social innovations (Reich, 2018), foster a vibrant cultural life (Pevnick, 2013), serve as a means for intergenerational justice (Cordelli & Reich, 2016), uphold public institutional action (Ceva, 2021), or supplement the provision of goods unrequired by justice (Lechterman, 2021). All in all, philanthropic actions have been praised for allowing a variety of interests to be included in collective decision-making while being criticized for the unequal manner by which it includes them (Saunders-Hastings, 2022). While many political philosophers have thus discussed the normative question of why philanthropy might or might not be desirable in a democracy, few have paused to address the prior and more fundamental analytical question of what, if anything, makes philanthropy inherently specific in such a way that it may raise issues of compatibility with democracy. I argue in this paper that, although philanthropy and democracy aim at the same goal, they instantiate two distinct forms of political authority. Political authority is the morally and legally legitimate power of an individual or institution to give direction to public In a democratic such a of is carried out by collectively binding I while democratic people to binding decisions philanthropic them to give direction to public decisions and actions on their on this basic I argue that philanthropic donations may be of and when they they a specific of authority that that the democratic of authority. This paper in the I start with a of democracy as a of authority I a of it be of as an authority I an of of the philanthropy and democracy I of philanthropy as an by the of first & and of The aim of this work is Hence, when I to a the democratic and philanthropic logics of I not one the as is the case in political analytical and work may serve to normative For example, that the analytical that philanthropy and democracy are decision-making which the normative question of a should that the would for or the of the in In this while in the paper is the I normative of the role of philanthropy in a democracy. This paper into philanthropy a of social and political democracy. a of I when I to a the democratic and philanthropic logics of I the I on and paper and the of which a of democracy. and the basic of the of democracy. not reasons why should democracy over other of political they themselves with democracy. aim is to making democratic decisions and decisions For and democracy is a social and political means that democratic are by a of that instantiate actions and that only means that who in the democratic are specific in the of normative power and in a way that is to this of & 2021). of the specific by democratic is that of of collectively binding decisions & 2021). the authority to decisions or by and decisions citizens to a specific of and and this authority other of decision-making power as or is the of that the of the democratic In and are democratic authority is & 2021). to the democratic authority is means that the democratic and the decisions that is by all that this is makes citizens of the and (Beerbohm, This for example, with the power of a who that people but not democratic are & 2021). The of to the of an that the reasons that is the that action is as in an because of the specific type of that are this are a who this of they are the specific the for example, that I an this specific type of and with a the to for a that by a to give at the of the I have the to and be the only to the to give The of democracy citizens in their of power in the same all democratic citizens are they are This means that, for example, when citizens on a it them the authority to collectively the of a and it citizens to the of the decided because of them a and a toward the by virtue of their in the democratic citizens the and of and This and to that democratic a a collective of in that and no other as the on their and the democratic authority is by all while the of for action and I a of democratic authority to and it the This an authority its I to the resources that the authority in the making of collectively binding is to about the of an authority as a In a democracy, citizens may only of one specific type of This which is at the of all democratic is the democratic citizens the democratic decision-making they are as the basic of a system: they are at the same and are because of their all are in the sense that they are the same amount of a a they no more authority than of their only have the democratic decision-making not prior or the democratic not have this type of authority over is this of authority by virtue of For example, it is not that a of in of a for other people in the to to the its binding on a only if carried out a institutional it is democratic when this other as they are in and I the of democracy in when I their of I that, I the of that the of this work been I with a of This to the conception of philanthropy as a social and political of philanthropy not such as and the action or context of For and this is because philanthropy is a and is because it is of being by that of its and in while its is by the the as as the competition that the normative of philanthropy of the many of philanthropy it as a voluntary of private resources but goods or for public and for which the not in the sense may or of other to voluntary may be by or as as by (Saunders-Hastings, philanthropy be as the voluntary of private for public as a social and political that is by and (Lechterman, 2021). this philanthropy private to have a say in is of public this I of philanthropic it only be by private or it be by the or its A philanthropic but it give money or goods in a philanthropic that, a to an money to their this the to extra the be that the people by this benefited the this money a with democratic they have a to which a for action by the This philanthropy actions by public such as as in this case the to resources public While be and of only private and philanthropic to be as an action aim at public For I this as a public many However, not be as to the way that a is to with the means to pay for a the way that are to all of a as as and would to In this or private would to their gifts one makes to one of or or donations to of which one is a The of is that philanthropic aims at the means that it should be to donations to research which may a of would as philanthropic this of may be in the context it is that philanthropy should an philanthropy be as not being be as philanthropy because the its power to citizens to pay they and they are to pay & philanthropy is with the of private money is the first type of that to when one about philanthropic it is being the only and may all be donated as While philanthropy is by the amount of money that such as 2021), is the of institutions. be provided on a large and may a of but their are not In philanthropy be of as a social and political as being only by private at a public being and being with the of private it is to a is that the philanthropy the for of This to the conception of philanthropy as a of or for the good of in or of a more (Saunders-Hastings, as as with they are However, I to argue that the as as are not to a political of have their reasons for in a they it because they it is morally because their are too to the that they are good or to is is that whether the is for or not the of power one when authority philanthropic In the case of the Gates it been that its to promote and in schools (Ravitch, 2011). all, it is that philanthropy not only but may be an of private political or (Reich, However, this of philanthropy should not be as in liberal The all, a conception of education that was by many other US citizens at that as citizens the are to for their conception of education. the by this case the way this specific conception of education was to the it is one to a for in the education and to democratic by and the political of a education because one the resources to as Bill and Melinda Gates the reasons one may have to the of authority that it the that the of philanthropy as a is that philanthropy and democracy to some public are to give direction to actions that may advance social justice, foster a vibrant cultural basic and democratic of a or Hence, philanthropy and democracy be as and decision-making for public way to the competition is that democratic in may of resources, and a may have to be public and private of goods and A the one I in the of philanthropy and democracy for the making of collectively binding For many the of philanthropy is that it to a of power that resources (Beerbohm, & Reich, & Reich, Reich, that of them argue that philanthropy is at in democratic decisions in be collectively and For philanthropy and in public life and over public and the to (Saunders-Hastings, to in a as they and of political for philanthropy is a of private power with have in a of normative However, the issue in the that the not about inherently philanthropy in a way that might raise its compatibility with democracy. is a analytical that the fundamental philanthropy and democracy concerning their in making collectively binding an in this In work and while the that philanthropy democratic in this is I to the philanthropy and democracy by a of the role philanthropy might in a (Pevnick, this by the role of philanthropy in two distinct of democracy and democratic democracy and democratic in fundamental liberal in their of individual and of the role philanthropy should assume democratic as a and justice toward to reasons of and (Pevnick, of democracy thus philanthropy as in and democratic individual citizens as in a a democracy, and justice by liberal While of this democratic might philanthropy it might the of a by argues that democratic should philanthropic for cultural This the to that although philanthropy and democracy may in democratic this not them The of compatibility on the specific type of democracy, such as its conception of or However, while this work the philanthropy and democracy it in a analytical of the This because on normative of democracy. to this issue could a that of democracy, the role philanthropy should in and might a of democracy by a analytical of and of democracy this and is therefore the for of a of philanthropy as an by of this analytical to philanthropy in its to sense of the philanthropic that For a that political might the and of this in the with the the of in more and This is especially they their of which the private foundation is the This is when that philanthropy be or in its (Saunders-Hastings, that while philanthropy generally with democracy, more issues in philanthropic donations to individual While I believe that that when may as many issues as is that of philanthropic action their basic democratic For to the of small and philanthropy is it is only because of the of the of authority that philanthropy In a in which the the more one the more one Bill and Melinda Gates's power is than that of a who to the only at who the power the of the democracy and The fundamental philanthropy and democracy and they give direction to political action and they authority is and in the of the of this authority be that which democratic which is and personal and in which is to the decision-making when one to a school one may power than one who in an this authority is democratic authority. In this although a small not the of of a they the of authority that them to give direction to is of public therefore to the of the in in a way that a democratic way of of analytical in its to two for making collectively binding which in are and for the tax for issue with such is that they to the public and private are by to to to money to specific or philanthropic in such they are to a portion or the of their donations would have been their tax The tax but political generally that are to a tax in to the of social goods and the of life by in its (Reich, it to argue that philanthropy a distinct of private power democratic when by public in democracy. However, tax which philanthropic are they not philanthropy more democratic in of an authority that is and is to the decision-making For an at be as an to or as a of not a of and two as is observed in by if philanthropic are by public they distinct democratic This to a of which is their of a by This their and the as as one of the of democracy, would the the In democracy its democratic only when the type of authority by and an philanthropic authority democratic authority in this I to the that the of philanthropic In the two I a of the of philanthropy and a of democracy as a with a of authority is In this I the of philanthropy as authority and by a of In this by the of the of philanthropy of the of democracy, I argue that the philanthropy and democracy is that they instantiate two logics for the making of collectively binding its authority is its of authority is at the same and and its its is to the of the first philanthropic authority is be as a specific of and as authority that is on a and at in the first one their authority in the of to with or the of who be to the to the Gates Foundation example, Bill and Melinda Gates a of decisions in a way that could have a democratic of For example, all by they the American education system and its aim should be and they would to than that, the foundation conditions that schools in to funding. In this Bill and Melinda Gates their authority. as the have been by not the of their their democratic is that the was in their this would have if the or However, as this paper aims at being I not whether the legitimate in to their provided that the aims were not the or on This is thus I by than being and decisions one individual or a of to This the of democracy, in which no of democratic authority their decisions on as the democratic collective is the are the in and when citizens they not an individual but their portion of normative that only to the in with the same of by other This is not to say that decisions a philanthropic context are For example, as as the Gates Foundation may have that that the decisions are the of an of power all of the Bill and Melinda Gates may have the same decision-making power as the who to the American school as to democratic as they may to the making their authority to that of a or a in the a of private at the making of collectively binding private and promote and in that their conception of about may with good but they However, this is an to as it to private public by for public However, that this good is by the small of who in and not by the public as a The of the of philanthropy is the and of its authority. to an of that is on and that are to normative reasons reasons that give reasons for for to way to it would be to to reasons that are to For example, could that on and that would to this This might and that should not be This is a in the sense that it to to whether to way would be to to reasons to or not For example, could a and to if not to because of is by a that is to it a this case a could to on have an on to In would give a to This is because it as a for In this the of is for action an but the and a of is and and that have a of the of to the philanthropic of authority. is and This authority two forms of and not the because the philanthropic is a type of the be as a to reasons when to for a public they are to reasons that are to reasons many education for people in of the and the or cultural is specific with reasons is that their a of is not to the of to have because are into the democratic this means that Bill and Melinda of authority is to be in their that they not because they were asked to would they decided to the American school system on their of the on their conception of the authority is it an of to who be to making one on their their of public should be money to put a conception of to the school Bill and Melinda Gates reasons for and students to in a The resources they to a of the conditions of in schools by to to and is for with the of for normative reasons that were to the by by the In that democracy means that citizens the authority to other citizens for is to Hence, the philanthropic of decision-making this of as the authority over their and this philanthropy is at the same and as a reasons for action in their reasons and as reasons for that not on their in the help to why of philanthropy such as by tax not philanthropic authority distinct democratic Although philanthropy to could be as a the of their authority and because of their reasons for in the sense that it is not a by is in the sense that the way give direction to public activities are not in a of of authority. This the type of that philanthropy a the to give direction to on the of their reasons for However, authority the of citizens for reasons that are to reasons for as in democratic may be because of their of and they citizens in a way than philanthropy citizens that and public action is for reasons with which they are The and and could be as should public are out of their for or all citizens a collective system on of on the of authority to in of the For example, one system on and one on voluntary donations not the same and social if the is In the first the resources who have benefited more social to who benefited is the that some citizens to In the are to the to their of to the more the of its authority. that by I to the resources that the authority to collectively binding In the case of its in donations the of and This is why philanthropy is generally as a of the of its authority is This makes which to its power social resources such as of and social democracy, philanthropy its prior to and its decision-making for example, is a that and they to in a philanthropic This is in a democracy. that of one citizens have unequal amount of as legitimate the authority resources, philanthropy a of as the of this or some have more of resources than the decisions of philanthropic resources prior to and the decision-making the may be with more than democratic of on or philanthropy might and I two for the a could money and it could resources to that are an of a cultural life and that the should The are not the as the first one would the with more decision-making power over the but the shows the of authority on In on philanthropic resources to public than on the democratic large and small philanthropic clearly in resources action is that the Bill and Melinda foundation of more resources to the American system than a smaller philanthropic However, it should not be that the political authority are more or distinct democratic authority on the they have on or public is democratic as as the of authority by at the same and its is the of resources at direction to public decisions and actions be the of instantiate by such democratic forms of In this I have that philanthropy a specific of authority. authority is allowing the to have a and individual say in public its a of and to reasons that are not to of the of its to the decision-making than being created as in a authority philanthropic is that democratic which is by the of and of of philanthropic authority is in at two it to clearly philanthropy for public decisions and it to democracy. This thus shows should be into when which of decision-making should be for public two logics of authority to it might be to philanthropy in a democracy for or the of by of philanthropy to its inherently political that philanthropy is not it be as a to affect the making of public that it is at the of A manner in which this is significant is that of making sense of the philanthropic that on the of authority that philanthropy to a of forms of philanthropy the to the by the This paper shows that is not and if the of two decision-making may be the or if their action power is the the of the by the an of or such as when philanthropy is tax that by them be by a the of that In this it is not to philanthropy more democratic by it a public or normative concerning philanthropy a democracy. the of philanthropic desirable or in a democratic be specific For the of philanthropy is on its democratic However, the normative reasons or of philanthropy in a democracy not the analytical of the authority is first and reasons for and its is to the collectively binding decision-making it the philanthropic authority and other forms of private might For a a and I to a of philanthropy to a The authority as a could that of decision-making to the and the in personal reasons for and with an on citizens the that philanthropic and activities but their in their public as to However, and actions was the of this I to a of that philanthropy and democracy two distinct forms of authority not inherently or philanthropic actions in public aim in philanthropy is to the of making collectively binding decisions this and its for democracy. is not to argue for or the normative values of as by the political in this on democratic some might the of philanthropy of this the of philanthropy over public might believe that by resources, a range of to the This with of the for philanthropic However, other may that the first and of philanthropy citizens to the of their I have that there is a philanthropy and democracy. as two for the making of collectively binding they instantiate two forms of authority by their of authority is and its citizens are and of philanthropic authority is in the sense of being on the of democratic authority is reasons for action in the they all In philanthropy is and that reasons for action are to themselves while an of in to who be to of authority is created the decision-making philanthropy its authority resources that are to the and This paper on philanthropy and democracy as forms of authority if they aim at the same public analytical of philanthropy of the should be into in normative of the of decision-making to for making collectively binding The of this work to a of forms of philanthropy the to the I to and for their The research for this paper was carried out the of the the of research by the Foundation is a in Political at the of research interests are in the normative political of philanthropy and organizations, with to issues of democracy and
The rapid evolution of blockchain technology and its offshoots like decentralized finance (DeFi) is redefining the internet's utility, paving the way for an infrastructure not bound by centralized control. This paper addresses the critical juncture at which the United States stands in the face of this global shift towards a web3 paradigm. It highlights the country’s current trajectory towards falling behind in the blockchain and web3 sector, primarily due to the migration of blockchain projects and decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) abroad, prompted by regulatory ambiguities and the inconsistent application of U.S. securities laws. Nevertheless, it underscores the U.S.'s unique position to lead the web3 revolution, given its stable legal system, a high number of developers, and a growing need for data sovereignty. The paper examines congressional and executive efforts to embrace web3 growth and argues for the necessity of state-level legislative support to maintain the U.S. as a tech hub. It delves into the challenges DAOs face in legal entity formation, concluding that the unincorporated nonprofit association (UNA) offers the most viable solution to these challenges. It also discusses the limitations of existing UNA statutes and the hesitancy of DAOs to adopt this structure due to the lack of clarity and long-term certainty. In response, Part III of this series proposes the Model Decentralized Unincorporated Nonprofit Association Act (Model DUNAA), designed to integrate into existing business organization codes and to cater specifically to the needs of decentralized organizations. The paper outlines the benefits for states adopting the Model DUNAA, such as fostering innovation, attracting economic growth, and having a hand in shaping consistent legal frameworks. The Model DUNAA is constructed based on principles that ensure minimal deviation from existing laws, avoidance of conflicts of law, technological neutrality, suitability for decentralized organizational structures, and maximal flexibility to accommodate future legal and technological developments. This proposed legal framework aims to provide a stable, clear, and adaptable legal entity option for DAOs, which could solidify the U.S.’s position in the forefront of web3 innovation.
Sanjaya Kuruppu, D.M.R. Dissanayake, Charl de Villiers
Purpose The purpose of this paper is to explore how blockchain and triple-entry accounting technologies may improve non-governmental organisation (NGO) accountability by amplifying the social and economic outcomes of aid. It also provides a critique of these technologies from an accountability perspective. Design/methodology/approach An in-depth case study of a large NGO, relying on semi-structured interviews, document analysis and non-participant observation, provides an understanding of current issues in existing NGO accountability and reporting systems. A novel case-conceptual critical analysis is then used to explore how blockchain and triple-entry accounting systems may potentially address some of the challenges identified with NGO accountability. Findings An empirical case study outlines the current processes which discharge accountability to a range of stakeholders, emphasising how “upward” accountability is privileged over other forms. This provides a foundation to illustrate how new technology can improve upward accountability to donors by enabling more efficient, accurate and auditable record-keeping and reporting, creating space for an NGO to focus on horizontal accountability to partner organisations and downward accountability to beneficiaries. Greater accountability exposes NGOs to diverse views from partner organisations and beneficiaries, potentially enhancing opportunities for learning and growth, i.e. greater impact. However, blockchain and triple-entry accounting can also create “over-accounting” and further entrench the power of upward stakeholders, such as donors, if not implemented carefully. Research limitations/implications A novel case-conceptual critical analysis furnishes new insights into how existing NGO accountability systems can be improved with technology. Despite the growing excitement about the possibilities of blockchain and triple-entry accounting systems, this paper offers a critical reflection on the limitations of these technologies and suggests avenues for future research. Practical implications Examples of how blockchain and triple-entry accounting systems can be integrated into NGO systems are presented. This research also raises the importance of creating a strong nexus between humans and technology, which ensures that “socialising” forms of accountability that empower vulnerable stakeholders, are embedded into international aid. Originality/value This research provides insight into present challenges with NGO accountability, using empirical evidence, furnishing potential solutions using novel blockchain and triple-entry accounting systems. Greater accountability to partner organisations and beneficiaries is important, as it potentially enables NGOs to learn how to be more impactful. Therefore, this paper introduces rich, contextually embedded perspectives on how NGO managers can exploit such technologies to enhance accountability and impact.
This paper presents a literature review on the role of the distributed ledger technology in promoting stakeholder trust for charitable organisations. The purpose of this review is to capture existing knowledge on the relationship between the following key variables: charity, trust and accountability, and distributed ledger technology – with emphasis on blockchain technology as a primary example of this technology. After shortlisting the discovered literature pool to 35 papers, the following three themes were identified. The first theme presents the various definitions of key concepts in crypto-philanthropy literature. The second theme captures existing views on why stakeholder trust is declining in charitable conduct. These views include: (1) organisational boundary shifts; (2) monitory complexity; and, (3) poor regulatory design. The third and final theme presents a hypothesis on how the distributed ledger technology can promote trust for charities. The technology is hypothesised to promote trust by drawing on the following three elements: (1) decentralisation; (2) provenance; and, (3) rule-enforcement. A number of shortcomings are then highlighted in the literature pool. The first shortcoming pertains to the inconsistent treatment of key concepts in crypto-philanthropy studies. The second shortcoming pertains to the lack of discussion on whether the distributed ledger technology may potentially decrease stakeholder trust if implemented irresponsibly by charities. In conclusion, a series of future research pathways are provided. These recommendations include: (1) clarifying key concepts; (2) suggesting “crypto-philanthropy” as a formal disciplinary title; (3) highlighting under-researched areas; and, (4) recommending strategies for building a new crypto-philanthropic theory. From an academic perspective, the findings contribute to literature by bridging the gap between crypto-economic, institutional governance and nonprofit accountability theories. The findings may also guide charity managers, regulators and policy-makers in understanding the capacities of the distributed ledger technology in legitimising charitable conduct.
Abstract The smart partnership framework introduced in this article is derived from extensive, on-site interviews with nonprofit and public contract managers conducted in several grounded research projects between 2011 and 2015 and from the research literature on contracting. The framework demonstrates the continuing explanatory power of resource dependence theory that disentangles the formidable influence of the public policy environment on organizational action. It is intended to provide a coherent guide for practice by enabling nonprofit managers in the social services field to navigate the current intense environmental uncertainty in which cross-sector contracting relationships between government agencies and nonprofit organizations are embedded. By providing an accessible way to understand an extraordinarily complex set of inter-organizational dynamics, the model offers a research-based definition and clear visualization of what it means to be a smart partner. It highlights the necessity of understanding the norms, expectations, structures, processes, and culture within which sector counterpart contract managers operate. Fundamental to the range of managerial strategies that the framework calls for is the need explicitly to attend to relationship building, to patterns of variation in relationships over time, and to their probable consequences. The integrative model consists of three inter-related organizational competencies and a number of secondary competencies. Competency 1: understand the dynamic nature of contracting relationships; secondary competencies: recognize predictable variations in relationships; comprehend the importance of multiple institutional logics. Competency 2: develop and sustain capacity for strategic adaptation; secondary competencies: build external and internal learning capacity; discern power shifts in inter-organizational relationships; maintain capability for strategic repositioning. Competency 3: participate proactively in shaping policy change; secondary competencies: attend to relationship development and nurturance; build trust and credibility.
The American social welfare field is best characterized as a highly decentralized sphere of activity in which autonomous organizations define and pursue their goals in a fairly independent fashion. The complex nature of modern social problems, however, requires concerted action by a variety of organizations if effective solutions are to be developed. This conflict between the structural nature of the welfare field and the demands of the problems to be addressed has meant that social welfare planners have had to be concerned with the conditions affecting the willingness of independent organizations to engage in cooperative activities with each other. The purposes of the present paper are twofold: (1) To identify some of the major variables that affect the interorganizational activities of social welfare organizations; and (2) to describe the actual interorganizational patterns of one such organization, a county board of public assistance.