Decentralised Autonomous Organisations (DAOs) raise fundamental questions for private law. While scholarly and regulatory attention has primarily focused on the legal status and governance of DAOs, comparatively little consideration has been given to how disputes involving these organisations should be resolved. This article examines the suitability of dispute resolution mechanisms for DAO-related disputes. Analysing the principal categories of disputes that have emerged in practice, the article critically evaluates blockchain-based dispute resolution mechanisms alongside traditional arbitration, in light of due process, enforceability, party autonomy, and the unique features of decentralised governance. It argues that neither purely code-based dispute resolution nor conventional litigation provides a satisfactory response to the complexity of DAO disputes. It concludes that arbitration, appropriately adapted to the technological and organisational realities of DAOs, offers the most promising framework for balancing decentralisation, legal certainty, and procedural fairness within the evolving Web3 ecosystem.
The rise of cryptocurrency has revolutionised value exchange and contractual execution in international trade. This article assesses whether existing legal and arbitral frameworks adequately ensure certainty, fairness, and enforceability in international cryptocurrency contracts. Employing doctrinal and comparative legal analysis, it examines the legal and regulatory framework of crypto-assets and smart contracts across jurisdictions in both the Global North (including the UK and the EU) and the Global Majority (such as India and Iran). Within some evaluations of regulatory approaches, such as UNIDROIT and MiCA, the research finds that while some jurisdictions in the Global North have made progress in establishing regulatory frameworks that recognise crypto-assets as property and promote the enforceability of smart contracts, they still face significant challenges. These obstacles are even more pronounced in Global Majority countries, where regulatory strategies tend to be prohibitive or fragmented. Decentralised innovations like Decentralised Finance (DeFi) and Decentralised Autonomous Organisations (DAOs) further complicate governance and cross-border recognition. The article also investigates the impact of international arbitration, particularly under the New York Convention and UNCITRAL Model Law. The findings reveal that, while these instruments support cross-border enforcement, they face challenges inherent to cryptocurrency, including issues with arbitration agreements, pseudonymity, public policy objections, and the volatility of damages. Blockchainâs decentralised structure further complicates the determination of an arbitral seat. Although crypto arbitration platforms are emerging as an innovative potential, their lack of connection to national legal systems renders them largely unenforceable. Integrating digital currencies into domestic legal frameworks may mitigate these concerns; however, effectiveness hinges on global acceptance, which remains fragmented across jurisdictions. In conclusion, the findings submitted that, despite notable progress, considerable gaps remain in both legal and arbitral frameworks concerning cryptocurrency. The key recommendations are to harmonise international legal and arbitral frameworks, establish more explicit rules for blockchain evidence, enhance privacy protections, and adopt hybrid arbitration methods that combine decentralised approaches with established practices. These measures aim to strengthen regulatory cooperation and ensure stability in cross-border cryptocurrency transactions.
The emergence of Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs) represents a paradigm shift in organizational governance, replacing traditional corporate structures with algorithmically governed models on blockchain networks. This article provides an analysis of the private international law (PIL) challenges posed by the BRICS Pay Consortium, a proposed decentralized payment messaging system for BRICS member states, modeled on DAO principles. The BRICS Pay Consortium DAO highlights a fundamental tension between the transnational and often decentralized nature of blockchain and conventional territorial legal frameworks. The Consortium is designed to operate without a central headquarters or legal personality, thus undermining traditional PIL connecting factorsâsuch as domicile, registered office, and principal place of businessâused to determine jurisdiction and applicable law. The article examines divergent global framework for the regulation of DAOs. By evaluating current responsesâincluding statutory legal wrappers and on-chain dispute resolutionâthis article demonstrates that existing doctrines are inadequate for decentralized entities. It concludes that existing frameworks on jurisdiction and choice of law are currently inadequate for the complexities of the BRICS Pay Consortium DAO. Ultimately, the article argues that resolving these challenges requires a transition from traditional territorial models toward regulatory innovation, contractual best practices, and cross border cooperation.
The decentralized exchange (DEX) leverages smart contracts to trade digital assets for users on the blockchain. Developers usually develop several smart contracts into one project, implementing complex logic functions and multiple transaction operations. However, the interaction among these contracts poses challenges for developers analyzing the state logic. Due to the complex state logic in DEX projects, many critical state derailment defects have emerged in recent years. In this article, we conduct the first systematic study of state derailment defects in DEX. We define five categories of state derailment defects and provide detailed analyses of them. Furthermore, we propose a novel deep learning-based framework StateGuardfor detecting state derailment defects in DEX smart contracts. It leverages a smart contract deconstructor to deconstruct the contract into an abstract syntax tree (AST), from which five categories of dependency features are extracted. Next, it implements a graph optimizer to process the structured data. At last, the optimized data is analyzed by graph convolutional networks to identify potential state derailment defects. We evaluated StateGuardthrough a dataset of 46 DEX projects containing 5671 smart contracts, and it achieved 94.25% F1-score. In addition, in a comparison experiment with state-of-the-art, StateGuardleads the F1-score by 6.29%. To further verify its practicality, we used StateGuardto audit real-world contracts and successfully authenticated multiple novel common vulnerabilities and exposures.
DAOs (Decentralized Autonomous Organizations) are fundamentally changing how companies are run in several key ways, through decentralized decision-making, social audibility, and limited liability principle. The following research examines the changes that DAOs bring to conventional corporate governance and analyses how they are being implemented worldwide. DAOs have advantages that include the decentralization of power, and the ability to improve the speed with which innovation occurs. However, they present obstacles that include legal uncertainty, problems of governance, and security vulnerabilities. This research comprehensively examines how DAOs could disrupt corporate processes such as decision-making, stakeholdersâ interactions, and power relations. It then reviews the current legal and regulatory environment for DAOs across different legal systems and considers the notion of liability issues. The research also presents a checklist of strengths and weaknesses for DAOs in emerging markets based on considerations such as technology adaptation, regulatory definition, and community engagement. When the trends of socioeconomic impacts are unveiled, it will be possible for lawmakers, managers, and investors to adapt to new conditions and utilize the evolved concept of corporate governance through DAOs.
Abstract An inevitable consequence of technological advancement is that it triggers regulatory challenges for law and policymakers. The regulation of digital assets has generated much debate in this regard. The central objective of this article is to examine the regulation of one particular type of digital asset, NFTs, through an international investment law lens. The international investment regime offers investors high levels of protection against breaches of obligations by host states for covered investments. The aim of the article is to determine whether NFTs can be considered as covered investments for the purposes of the application of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and treaties with investment provisions (TIPs), and further to examine whether that regime would provide an appropriate regulatory framework for investment in NFTs.
Jan 1, 2024·XXI meÄunarodni nauÄni skup âPravniÄki dani - Prof. dr Slavko CariÄâ, Odgovori pravne nauke na izazove savremenog druĆĄtva - zbornik radova
Artificial intelligence (AI) and distributed ledger (DLT), although technically diametrically opposed technologies, have many common features in international trade relations (MTO). The mentioned technologies are at the same time emerging technologies and disruptive technologies. On the other hand, MTO consists not only of entities, but also concrete business relationships, ie business operations. In this sense, AI and DLT are the subject of both international economic law and international trade law. Both technologies are viewed in the light of the digitalization of trade (economy) with the aim of automating it as much as possible. Automation is one of the key features that AI and DLT have in common. Preoccupied with AI and DLT, UNCITRAL, UNESCO, the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the European Union (EU) have made significant contributions to the regulation of these technologies, among which the EU has gone the farthest with the adoption of the ,,Artificial intelligence Act'' (P9_TA(2024)0138). Within the framework of their powers, the aforementioned entities offered areas of application of AI and DLT, but also provided specific normative solutions either in the form of "technology in trade" or in the form of "technology for trade". Therefore, these technologies are found in sources of international trade law of different hierarchies, but also in legal documents that will be the basis for creating new normative solutions in the future. This paper will focus on the international trade aspects of these technologies by analyzing the work of UNCITRAL, UNESCO, WTO and EU in order to show the basics but also the trends in the international trade relations of AI and DLT.
The rapid advancement of digitization and decentralization is heralding a new era in social and economic organization. As nation-states grapple with the impact of (post-)globalization and technological innovation, increasing attention is being paid to blockchain technology's potential to enable the emergence of new governance structures, such as decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) and network states. This chapter analyzes whether DAOs could provide a viable framework for addressing the needs of future societies while maintaining fundamental principles such as democratic processes and the rule of law.
Intellectual property protection is a right that must be granted by the state to the holder of a work and the increasing number of intellectual property rights problems such as theft of a work or indirect theft, for example, plagiarism, means that it is very necessary to protect every work produced. This research uses a literature review. This research aims to provide information on the results of analyses related to the protection of intellectual property which has caused many problems related to intellectual property. The results of this research show that the blockchain system must also be utilized by the Indonesian Government to become a central database for virtual intellectual property and public domain collections. Legal protection in Indonesia still needs to be strengthened on the law enforcement side to provide legal certainty for stakeholders so that public confidence arises in registering their intellectual property. Legal protection in Indonesia still needs to be strengthened on the law enforcement side to provide legal certainty for stakeholders so that public confidence arises in registering their intellectual property.
Merger regulation is a fundamental instrument by which competition authorities control the structure of an industry. Despite its relevance, the EU Treaties contain no rules on merger control. From the Commissionâs first initiative to regulate concentrations at the EU level in 1966, it has taken more than 20 years of negotiations between the Member States and the European Commission to reach an agreement on EU legislation to control concentrations. The history of the European Merger Regulation reflects differing national views of the Member States and EU institutions on the necessity or the rejection of controlling concentrations and positions its legislative process and the various contradicting national interests of Member States against the apps and flows of EU integration throughout the 1960s, 70s, and 80s. At the core of this âprotracted trench warfareâ2 lied the delegation of enforcement powers to an already-powerful Commission, which the Member States initially opposed to. Capturing or delegating jurisdiction, hence, the distribution of administrative and enforcement authority between the national and EU authorities remained one of the most contentious issues during the bitterly fought negotiations. A similarly fierce and heated discussion on the distribution of administrative and enforcement powers across national authorities and the EU Commission has surfaced since the adoption of the European Commission Guidance on the referral mechanism under Article 22 in 20213 and the General Courtâs judgment in Illumina/GRAIL4 and the Commissionâs prohibition decision in 2022. Article 22 is a corrective mechanism of the Merger Regulation, which allows for one or more Member States to request the Commission to examine, for those Member States, any concentration that does not have an EU dimension but affects trade between Member States and threatens to significantly affect competition within the territory of the Member State or States making the request. This article assesses the distribution of enforcement powers across national authorities and the European Commission, in light of the Commissionâs Guidance on the referral mechanisms under Article 22 in 2021 and the General Courtâs judgment in Illumina/GRAIL1 and the Commissionâs prohibition decision in 2022. The Article shows how the issue of delegation of enforcement powers between the Member States and the EU institutions has always been at the heart of the negotiation processes of the Merger Regulation, and though implemented through compromises, such as Article 22, this question may not have been entirely resolved. The article critically analyses two specific consequences of the way the Commission re-prioritised cases eligible for Article 22 referrals: the consequences of the Commissionâs new policy for third parties and the principles of effective competition law enforcement including the principle of loyal cooperation and mutual trust. Born out of a political compromise, Article 22 of the European Merger Regulation has been characterised as a âlate bi-product of the negotiations to create a merger control regimeâ at the EU level and as âa mechanism riddled with gaps and uncertaintiesâ. 5 After more than 20 years of low enforcement and largely decreased relevance of what has been initially nicknamed the âDutch-clauseâ, these gaps and uncertainties are at the centre of extensive and heated debates about the way the Commission has announced to revigorate this enforcement mechanism. In this article, I first show how the issue of delegation of enforcement powers between the Member States and the EU institutions have always been at the heart of the (difficult) negotiation processes of the Merger Regulation, and though implemented through compromises, such as Article 22, this question may not have been entirely resolved. Second, I analyse the underlying rationale and development of the enforcement mechanism of Article 22 from the adoption of the first Merger Regulation in 1989 until the recently adopted Guidance of the Commission and the Courtâs judgment in Illumina/GRAIL to provide a deeper interpretation of the referral mechanism laid down in Article 22 and to show the policy shift from discouraging to encouraging referrals. Third, I discuss two specific aspects of the new policy as enshrined in the 2021 Guidance and the mechanism currently underlying referrals under Article 22 EUMR that have so far been overlooked: the consequences of the radical re-prioritisation of referrals and the Commissionâs policy under Article 22 for third parties and for the effective functioning of the (close) cooperation between the Commission and the NCAs. I argue that on the one hand, the Commissionâs re-prioritisation of cases eligible for Article 22 referrals has re-written and largely eliminated procedural rights for third parties as established in the EU Merger Regulation. On the other hand, by re-activating the referral mechanism of Article 22, the Commission needs to reconsider the mechanism currently enshrined under Article 22. These procedures and mechanisms follow the enforcement logic and jurisdictional principles laid down in Regulation 1/2003, and accordingly, the same principles of effective enforcement including the General Courtâs recent Sped-Pro6 ruling should to these the principle of loyal cooperation and mutual trust. The of merger control in the EU not a has been one with the between Member States and EU institutions at of the integration The regulation of has first been by the of in for the and the implemented by the of remained on merger control. In the years the the Member States national merger control In the in those years that and Member States or of of as a for national to the of and the of merger control rules in the Treaties the of the of as a law that out the and but not down a agreement to the European Commission to a merger and an authority within the jurisdictional of the EU The first of this its on the of in the the Commission its that merger should of the Commissionâs as an of This the first of what the Commission as the between its competition authority and merger control. The Commission that it to the powers to it by Regulation at that extensive enforcement powers to for of the Commission by it as a In the European Commission, out other of its and the it on the in the the a policy and the Commission not to for the controlling and to authority of to the it to the from a that authority on and one through as authority to to and to the of for the of the European as a of throughout the and the about the of Member States no to in any during the The in the history of merger control the Commissionâs decision in it and an interpretation of Article Article In its on the Commission that Article it to in cases of concentrations which from a of and which The Commission, by its authority and hence, a merger control on Article In to these the Commission the of legislative The first for a Regulation by the Commission in in which it to its authority to through legislative The of merger control the reach of its control against which a merger to with the on principles on on and the of which the Commission The fierce in the on various from Member The two most issues the of the regulation and the distribution of administrative and enforcement authority between the national and and the opposed the and of its that the of merger rules the to national or opposed of a to to the in of the as it the that its merger but it to authority to the such as the no legislation to low as no national at of the negotiations the between the European and enforcement powers to those by Regulation for the enforcement of and and authority to the Commission opposed by Member States, such as and that the Commission that a the legislation After this first it years to reach agreement on the merger control and in the largely and the and across these remained the issues of and administrative authority to on The Commissionâs for a merger regulation in the and to the new and political of the that The to the in the the Commissionâs merger control a merger control to the of a a in Commission The to create the European of the Merger Regulation not in the on the two to in of the EU and as the and and the most of the that by the than the referrals that in its The of at the in to the of the by the of a it for the to with the merger for the to the regulation of more it the relevance of competition policy to the that the rationale the of this new European the to more competition within the this of competition at the same The for a European competition policy as as the that the European Commission for and The Merger Regulation on 1989 and as Regulation The Regulation has been in and the new Regulation as Regulation From its in the Regulation laid down rules for for controlling between Member States and the EU Commission by to In cases these are the merger has a and within the of the Commission and Member States not national competition the Commission has no under the Merger Regulation the concentration does not have a This principle a of a a as in Article of the Regulation, and this merger has a the Regulation The which remained throughout the the to provide and between the and that of the Member This of to between the EU and national to Article of the Regulation, the of powers is on the principle of this of is to corrective mechanisms and the in Article of the Regulation and referrals and the Member States under and 22. In the the article on Article 22, the Article of Regulation out for referral of a concentration from a Member State to the the referral request by one or more Member the that is the of that request the of concentration out in Article of that regulation the for a European dimension laid down in Article of that the concentration affect trade between Member the concentration to significantly affect competition within the territory of the Member State or States that the referral request. to the third a concentration this to the that it is to have on the of trade between Member to the a Member State or States in to on a is a that the may have a on competition and that it may in the of of such a but to the of a In the of Regulation the Commission to of the the Member In for to than it the Commission a Member State to a merger on a within a Member This with one for those that the remained The Article 22 Member States to the Commission to that the This in cases national competition merger such as the in this of or than those at the European level or national authorities from Article 22 a âlate of the to the of an EU level merger control Article 22 out of a compromise, which such as the to the mechanism in to as an and hence, no to the way Article 22 in the adoption of the Regulation, most Member States have adopted national merger control and the for Article 22 has been enforcement under Article In of Article 22 has been a cases as of it has been that its to to and the Commission to that the of merger control as a and the the Commission, by making of its in and Article 22, a of discouraging referrals from to the In its the Commission has out that the for of Article 22 in its to the that most Member States adopted legislation on merger control the Commission the of Article but has to to for the that with the adoption of the new Merger Regulation in the of Article 22 the of on trade between Member States as a for one or more Member States to to request the Commission to a concentration that does not have an EU dimension and threatens to significantly affect competition within the territory of the Member making the Second, Article the the Commission the to one or Member States that a concentration the out in Article and the Commission may those Member to a referral through a In the the Commission in with and third parties the of powers between the Commission and national competition the Commission that the the and jurisdictional of merger control in the the of cases between the Commission and the Member and in most been effective in cases that have a relevance from those with a national in about the to the in light of the Commissionâs of that of but to the the Commission similarly that no for In the Commission to on its of on of for in the and that have but to the or in the and hence, In the Commission adopted a Guidance which its policy discouraging Article 22 referrals. on to discuss the Guidance more a on the and referral request that the Commission in After an the Commission the between and the Commission Member States by an in with Article of the Regulation for A referral request by by the and to the of by under the EU Merger Regulation. The not the of the EU Merger Regulation, and not in any Member but the for referral under Article 22 of the EU Merger Regulation. The Commission that the affect trade within the and to significantly affect competition within the territory of the Member States that the referral request and that a referral is not in its the Commission decision the referral in by that the Commission not a referral request from an in a merger law but the does not the for that the Commissionâs interpretation to the principle and the principles of and On the General these and an extensive of the and of Article 22 In its the the Guidance as a which the adoption of the Merger Regulation and hence, not to the interpretation of that regulation to the of the the that Article 22 of Regulation at making the referral more and effective in to that a concentration with by the authority to analyse its to effective of the principles of and the as as to the The General that from the the legislative and the of Article 22 of the Merger Regulation, as as from the Commissionâs enforcement it that Article 22 is to referral may for a concentration that does not within the of the merger control rules of the Member State that its In the Courtâs interpretation of Article 22, the Commission may a concentration that threatens significantly to affect competition within the territory of a Member State and affects trade between Member States, which not to any by the national authorities or by the Commission and hence, an that by the Member In that it is to at the EU in of Regulation Article 22 an effective corrective mechanism in the light of the principle of by the interests of the Member In light of that principle and in with of that Regulation, a with by the most by the principle of of should to competition authority in the is the more for with a to the specific of the as as the and to the should to the of any on competition from the the referral of cases of aspects of the of the principle of including the in a and the of with to to to or to a the Commission and Member States should in the to effective of competition in by the The General that in which concentrations are not but to the Member State not within the of that or no such within Article 22 Article of Regulation a Member of the of its national merger control to to the Commission concentrations that not the in Article of that Regulation, but that may have the General that referral mechanisms are an instrument to control in a on of its is not of concentrations that at the European mechanisms as by the in of Regulation a of the Commission that on it the to the of that which is to the control of concentrations significantly to effective competition in the The 2021 Guidance is an of the Commissionâs administrative it policy to the General in Commission a in control competition in with to referrals under merger the that the Commission has as to or not to a to of the on the Commission and Member States a of in to cases within or to to with cases not within to Article 22. The Guidance these and procedural on the of Article 22. The Commissionâs to the of Article 22 EUMR has been that the Commission is its a for Member States merger control legislation in to the of the in merger control more than years and that the Guidance is âa law that the Regulation or at the of the In the I discuss two specific aspects of the Guidance and the mechanism currently underlying referrals under Article 22 that have so far been I argue with the adoption of the the Commission has not significantly re-prioritised cases eligible for Article 22 referrals and its established policy on discouraging but it has re-written the procedural rights for third parties as established in the Merger Regulation. administrative authorities to with principles of EU law and principles of that of powers by administrative Second, by re-activating the referral mechanism of Article 22, the Commission should reconsider the enforcement currently enshrined under Article 22 This on the of and between the Commission and the to Article of the Merger Regulation. and between the Commission and the and between the are in the referral out in the Merger Regulation. and on the of to the Merger Regulation, a of in these procedures and mechanisms the of cooperation under Regulation and follow the enforcement logic and jurisdictional principles laid down in that Regulation. the of the of on trade between Member States and a cooperation between and the Commission under Article 22 is a of such the same principles of effective enforcement as established by the European and recently by the General in its ruling should to this such as the principle of loyal cooperation and mutual trust. In with the structure of these the EU have characterised the procedural rights of third a to to the This as a to in the administrative from the to as a of the of the The Commissionâs enforcement is but not to the administrative procedures to and as laid down under Regulation In merger parties to to the Commission for and may the Commissionâs and and the Commission may the procedural and of third parties in these procedures as in Regulation third parties have a in the to the Commissionâs by of to for to Article of the Merger Regulation, and provide and for the of a may third parties for to discuss and specific issues to Article Regulation third parties a to to Article of the Commissionâs Regulation third parties are or including and are to a such as the concentration or by and of the administrative or of the or the of Article that third parties may within a that has been by the to the by the third parties in the Commission may the to in a At the same as the has that procedural of third parties with that of the and of to in the first Article the by the concentration in the parties to the concentration for by the Commission, the specific laid down in those in to that rights of are in the of the administrative Article in to third since are to the of the the to by the Commission, that have so and have that have a for that the Commission in the of the in provide third parties that have a with a of the of in to to views on the Commissionâs of the the Commission in the such third parties are to the of a a to to this does not the that have been to third parties are to for the of the to Regulation procedural rights of third parties are not as extensive as the rights to the in to rights of it is the in so far as show a third parties have a under Article of Regulation to have so these procedural rights are in with the procedures laid down under and provide procedural and rights to third the 2021 largely these procedural rights to and to to the of the and down to the to the Commission or the authorities of the Member States, and of a concentration in a for a referral under Article this does not any on the authorities of the Member States or on the Commission to any a by a third any by third parties in the referral is in of the and such a fundamental of and parties are not competition authorities in the functioning of The of third parties is on this of as provide that to an of the that the to issue a decision in with the of the the by the concentration in the parties to the concentration for by the Commission, in the of third parties not to have an in its the affect not always in a are to the of the which in a procedural with to as third parties under Article of the Regulation, the General in that that those may in does not the of its to The Commission Article of Regulation in which the of that in to cases in which a merger has on a the of the of Article of Regulation as of the Commission the interests of the and The that Article which has the same as Article taken in and other EU and Article of the of of the European that EU a level of in administrative procedures is an of and that the of the and the as a to third parties are the to the decision of the competition or that to the of the These procedural have been by the Guidance in the referral making for third parties to a to the Commission in an is to so as one of the of Article 22 is that the concentration affect trade between Member This is an jurisdictional in the enforcement of the Merger Regulation, as other mechanisms on the in Article in of the a concentration the of on trade between Member States laid down in Article 22 it is to have on the of trade between Member this is in the to the Commissionâs on the on trade in and the referral mechanism on and between the Commission and the and cooperation and to the European for and under Regulation 1/2003, the and the Commission a of in under the Merger Regulation. At the same the referral mechanism of Article 22 on the of to The Commission Member States to to the Commission as the most authority to the but it to is the of the Member States to a to the This the Guidance cooperation between and the Commission, it a of to the to a to a to the Commission, third parties more than the Commission as a with the jurisdictional and enforcement cooperation of Regulation the question the same principles of effective enforcement as the underlying Regulation should to Article 22 referrals. those and in light of the enforcement of and and the principle of procedural and the to a of fundamental under EU Member States powers to the of and The principle of which is a of Regulation and Member States not to the of EU law in or that the rules which or not the effective of and The principle of a to in EU law competition and other authorities as in the competition to to that is by is an of political competition is Member States should from legislative or other that the of its The have on various the Member States have on the of the principle of which the of national enforcement so that Member States to the of EU law within the Second, of cooperation with the Commission and other which is on and and on the that Member States that enforcement but the of as a for The on the of mutual and in which other in making of and powers in to This has been by the General in competition law in its judgment the of law issues to taken a national competition authority is of competition law and third In its a principles of between the Commission and the the General that with the fundamental of Article to the competition law enforcement mechanisms under and In this the General for the first established a between in the of a Member State and the of its competition authority to and enforcement under EU law and a The General issues of of law as an of effective competition law enforcement and the principles between the Commission and under the enforcement of Regulation to its law in the of the European the General as in the of and the cooperation between the Commission, the competition authorities of the Member States, and the national for the of and is on the principles of mutual mutual and loyal of those of those authorities and that other authorities and law for more the fundamental rights by that to the General for the of which competition authority is the to a the Commission to with the of the of law as a to the the of the rights and the Commissionâs are this judgment the Commission to its decision to at of to by national authorities by of law The judgment that the Commission of the of of law on and in this the a new that the Commission, a for of EU to that the national authorities are of the rights of the The judgment is it a of and between the and the Commission and cooperation on mutual mutual and with these principles underlying enforcement and cooperation under Regulation and the General Courtâs judgment in and on the of the between the principles underlying Article 22 referrals and I argue that the Commission should of the of effective competition law enforcement and of law referrals are an to the Guidance in a way that referrals not on the and of to The of of with the of of authorities the the of cooperation between Member States and the Commission and that the should with by the This is more so the that the European Commission and have as the of as as rights to and in effective enforcement of competition law not is for competition within the but of effective as laid down in Article of the of to and in the competition This the a Member State from its merger control effective competition in the Member State and in the This is the same as in the years of the Merger Regulation, Member States no merger that the adoption of the This is the the and such the and of merger to control in a way that it does not in to competition in the and to effective of concentrations with a of on the structure of competition in the and to effective competition in the or in a of In in that of a merger control to gaps in the of against of competition in to that âa in has in recent years in the and under competition of of for in the of or this the Commission has its enforcement mechanism enshrined in Article 22 of the Merger Regulation. the Commission as an administrative to the of to with powers in to and and EU policy including competition are to and effective regulation and procedures with a of on the of the administrative as the and the European Commission in is policy these not but and administrative and and on of procedural and This article that third in administrative procedures is a of and that the of competition the procedural and procedural rights of third parties in the referral the powers of the Commission and of the This the Commissionâs referral with the of in the of a of and procedural rules that the of third parties to the referral to those to in the rights of the of that that may have on should by administrative law as a to control the of the adoption of the 2021 Guidance of encouraging referrals from Member States under Article 22, which of merger control the Commission has not to for procedural but and views of Member States and the EU institutions on which in national national or at the of national and the of effective the and development of Article 22 and its this article that the of Article 22 referrals the cooperation mechanisms and its procedural as it has under the enforcement of Regulation 1/2003, cooperation is a fundamental of effective competition law the Commission should not the in and the new it to administrative but on the in Member States that the effective of competition in the The General Courtâs recent judgment in is in the of effective referrals and and effective enforcement of competition between Member States and the The jurisdictional in merger control between the Commission and the Member States effective and Member States to the and and the and its such as an competition in the
This paper examines civil and commercial disputes involving Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs) and the complex questions of private international law that arise. The legal capacity of a DAO to be a plaintiff or defendant in court varies across jurisdictions, highlighting the need to determine the applicable law to a DAO. A distinction must be made between different types of DAOs. There are currently a few jurisdictions, notably in the United States, that have enacted DAO legislation defining a legal status for such entities. Those regulated DAOs are governed by both computer code and company law. In other jurisdictions, existing company structures can be used to offer a legal wrapper to DAOs. However, the vast majority of DAOs currently in existence are constituted and solely governed by code, posing challenges in bringing them before a state court. The paper explores recent case law and the difficulties in identifying the appropriate party to sue when pursuing a DAO. Using Swiss law as a basis, it examines the qualification of DAOs under private international law and the challenges of anchoring a global digital entity to a specific jurisdiction. The article illustrates these challenges through three types of disputes: governance, contractual, and tort-related. Determining jurisdiction over a DAO-related dispute requires applying private international law rules. Although the paper assumes Swiss courts for convenience, the reasoning can be applied to different legal systems due to the similarities in conflict of jurisdiction rules. However, challenges persist even if a court has jurisdiction and renders a decision, as enforcement may prove difficult, especially on-chain. Additionally, initiating legal proceedings against a DAO presents issues with serving court documents. DAOs offer opportunities for innovative electronic methods of document service, but specific requirements and restrictions exist for international service of documents. Practical difficulties may arise, making it impractical or unattainable to serve court documents on the defendant. The analysis concludes that state courts currently struggle to ensure reliable access to justice in disputes involving DAOs. As an alternative to state courts, opting for Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) mechanisms, such as Blockchain-based Dispute Resolution (BDR), can offer a simpler and more efficient solution depending on circumstances. In any case, entrusting dispute resolution to a BDR mechanism avoids the complexities associated with state court procedures.
In his new monograph, Informed Publics, Media, and International Law, Daniel Joyce sets out to explore the role of the media both as an object of international legal regulation and as an influence on international lawâs development and structure.1 Given the obvious connections between the media and international law, one might have expected the topic to have already garnered extensive interest within the existing literature. Yet, as Joyce observes at the outset, â[f]or all its ubiquity and power, the media has to date been the subject of surprisingly limited attention within international legal scholarshipâ.2 In this context, the publication of Joyceâs text may be viewed as part of a recent wave of literature that signals growing interest in the subject amongst international legal scholars, whether due to rising concerns over the use of international law in public debates,3 or as a result of the exponential growth of new channels of communication, most notably digital media platforms.4 In tackling the multi-dimensional relationship between the media and international law, Joyceâs approach is historical and critical, illustrating both âthe resilience of existing international law frameworks, but also their significant silencesâ.5 The historical perspective is particularly valuable in surfacing interesting continuities between present-day controversies and earlier eras. For example, Joyce reveals how contemporary concerns about the relationship between international law, populism, and social media,6 find echoes in a range of formative debates about the relationship between international law, public opinion, and the press in the early twentieth century.7 The drawing of historical parallels is particularly important given the fast pace of developments in the sphere of communication in the digital age. In particular, as the notion of Web 3.0 (or Web3)âthe much-hyped third generation of the Internet premised on âdecentralisedâ technologies, touted to follow static webpages (Web 1.0) and social media and user-generated content (Web 2.0)âbegins to enter the public consciousness, adopting a historical perspective may help nurture what Elizabeth Renieris recently termed an outlook of âinformed skepticismâ.8 As Renieris explains, similar to its predecessors, âWeb3 is imagined as being apolitical, open, decentralized and inclusiveâ, seemingly oblivious to the fact that â[t]his ethosâcharacterised by free speech absolutism and free market idealsâhas enabled all manner of online harms, including rampant mis- and disinformation, racism, discrimination, hate speech and harassment, concentrations of power, toxic business models and limited accountabilityâ.9 In this context, Joyceâs text is particularly useful in situating the shifting contemporary communication sphere along a broader historical trajectory, tracing the neoliberalisation of public communication across different time-periods and settings, and shining a spotlight on the role performed by international law in the process. Beyond its critical and historical orientation, at the centre of Joyceâs text is the concept of âinformed publicsâ, characterised as âa more inclusive and messier picture of the social and connective tissue of international lawâ than the notion of âinternational communityâ.10 If claims made in the name of the latter are often merely âattempts to translate the particular into a language of self-serving universalismâ,11 Joyce advances the notion of âinformed publicsâ as âa model of international civil society which allows for greater variety of forms of associationâ, both by âcontest[ing] the state-centrism of international law and better reflect[ing] a system which involves not a single participatory democracy but a range of regional, domestic and local politiesâ.12 For Joyce, âinternational law depends on informed global publics to function and to address the complex global problems which we faceâ.13 In this way, the concept of âinformed publicsâ emerges as a ânormative goalâ for international law, one which âremains critical to any future conception and realisation of a multilateral system of global governanceâ.14 It is the concept of âinformed publicsâ that draws into view the dual inquiry at the centre of Joyceâs research:15 first, the role of international law in regulating the media, including new forms of digital media; and second, the reliance of international law on the media in communicating its objectives and norms as well as in its functioning as a system. In reflecting on Joyceâs work, this review follows the bookâs structure, with a particular focus on the textâs discussion of the relationship between digital media and international law. In the first half of the book, Joyce examines a range of international law frameworks applicable to the media which adhere to different regulatory modelsâeach recognising and foregrounding certain values and interests to the marginalisation and exclusion of others. In Chapter 2, Joyce examines the regulatory vision of free publics, encompassing the ways in which human rights law (particularly freedom of expression) has sought to protect media freedom from State intervention, as well as how international trade law has sought to ensure free markets for the global media economy.16 Both areas of law emphasise media freedomâwith human rights law focused on protecting the mediaâs societal watchdog function, and trade law focused on deregulation and market access.17 Yet, as Joyce explains, this emphasis comes at the expense of addressing âthe power of the media itself and its own connections with violence and the abuse of rightsâ.18 In Chapter 3, Joyce turns to the regulatory model of endangered publics, encompassing the ways in which human rights law (concerning incitement, hate speech, and propaganda), international criminal law (concerning atrocity speech), and international humanitarian law (concerning media activities in armed conflict) address the connections between the media and violence.19 While these areas of law counter the reductively positive image of the media that underpins the regulatory vision of free publics, Joyce observes that they nonetheless âconfigure the dangers of media power as being exceptional rather than structuralâ and thereby contribute to âa failure to connect media violence with its economic and political powerâ.20 Finally, in Chapter 4, Joyce discusses the regulatory model of digital publics, encompassing forms of Internet, data, and platform governance, which are characterised by âan absence of international lawâ and an investment of faith in the promise of âself-regulation, market-driven innovation and techno-libertarianismâ.21 Joyce suggests that while international law and the media are often depicted as being âexistentially threatened by technological disruptionâ, at least part of this âcrisisâ concerns âthe ongoing failure of international legal frameworks to address the rise of information capitalism in the form of digital media monopolyâ.22 Across these chapters, Joyce offers a compelling analysis of the international regulatory landscape applicable to the media, traversing a diversity of contexts to critically surface both the blind spots and biases identifiable within a range of fields of international law. In an era of specialisation, where scholarship is becoming increasingly siloed, Joyceâs ability to bring diverse fields of international law into conversation with one another is particularly valuable. At the same time, by adopting such a broad perspective some level of detail and nuance is inevitably sacrificed. In exploring the relationship between international law and new forms of digital media in particular, Joyceâs text unveils many of the challenges that have arisen in attempting to reign in the power of todayâs leading digital media companies. However, to some extent, I would argue, Joyce understates the significance of both the state and the law in both enabling the neoliberalisation of the contemporary digital communication sphere and in continuing to legitimate various repressive practices undertaken within it. Whilst acknowledging that the Internet âevolved in collaborations between governments, the military and academic institutionsâ,23 the role of both the state and legal frameworks in the Internetâs historical trajectory remains somewhat marginalised in Joyceâs account. The influence of the state on the shape of the contemporary online environment is well documented. Monika Zalnieriute, for example, discusses the dominance of the âUS Information-Industrial-Complexâ, which âcatalysed the rapid growth of information and communication technologies within the global economy, while firmly embedding US strategic interests and companies at the heart of the current neoliberal regimeâ.24 Support from the US government took at least two forms. First, the US government provided significant amounts of funding and awarded a range of procurement contracts to US technology companiesâa fact that not only undercuts the neoliberal myth that private wealth accumulates because free markets are kept distinct from public expenditure, but also provides important context for the Edward Snowden disclosures which revealed close ties between the US National Security Agency and a number of US technology giants.25 Second, the US government also supported its largest US technology companies by promoting an âInternet Freedomâ agenda abroad, premised on âglobally ânormalisedâ strong legal protections for intellectual property rights, advertising-based consumerism and the commodification of information and personal dataâ.26 And it is here that both domestic and international law become part of the story of the neoliberalisation of the contemporary online environment. As the works of Julie Cohen and Amy Kapczynski, amongst others, have demonstrated, ârising platform power, monopoly power, and the power that technology can give capital over workers and governments over the governed ⊠are mediated at every moment by lawâ.27 At the domestic level, fields such as contract, trade-secrecy, intermediary immunities, privacy, and the First Amendment helped anchor the rising power of online platforms, while at the international level, trade agreements have prohibited the restriction of cross-border online information flows and forbidden data localization rules.28 As Kapczynski argues, âa wave has rippled through our law ⊠[which], intertwined with the architecture of digital networks, has enabled the creation of the vast new firms that wield new forms of surveillance and algorithmic power, ⊠[and] delivered us a form of neoliberal capitalism that is inclined toward monopoly, concentrated power, and inequalityâ.29 By placing emphasis on the absence of international law in the digital domain,30 Joyceâs account understates some of the ways in which both domestic and international law have helped shape the neoliberal communication sphere that characterises the contemporary online environment. Beyond shaping todayâs online environment, international law also performs a role in legitimating certain repressive practices within it. Joyceâs account is alive to lawâs legitimation function, particularly in the context of discussing the co-option of the vocabulary of human rights law by social media companies ânot as binding legal norms, but as available ingredients to enable corporate self-regulation and marketingâ, as well as âto minimise the damage to their reputationsâ.31 Yet, the legitimation function of international law extends beyond this corporate context. Consider, for example, the recent majority judgment of the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights in the bulk surveillance case of Big Brother Watch and Others v UK.32 The judgment endorsed the legality of bulk surveillance operations as in principle âvaluableâ and of âvital importanceâ for states seeking to identify threats to their national security,33 provided such programmes contain sufficient âguarantees against abuseâ and are subject to a set of âend-to-end safeguardsâ.34 By adopting this approach, the majority judgment adhered to a form of âprocedural fetishismâ,35 which has been characterised as nothing less than âa grand, definitive normalization of mass surveillance[,] by a virtually unanimous Grand Chamber[,] for decades to comeâ.36 In his concluding remarks, Joyce suggests that âit is important to reconsider the value and resilience of existing international media law frameworks including, most significantly, the human rights model, but also to be realistic about the failures and problems associated with that systemâ.37 Yet, while Joyce acknowledges the limits of the vocabulary of human rights law in general termsâincluding how the human rights system âstruggles with controlling private power, individuates and simplifies collective and highly complex issues, and often underplays their structural dimensionâ38âa more detailed exploration of the ways in which human rights law has legitimated and struggled to reign in particular forms of private and state power in the digital domain would have helped prepare the ground for assessing the extent to which it is equipped to address the accountability deficits associated with the contemporary online environment.39 In the second half of the book, Joyce turns to examine how the media is coming to shape various dimensions of international law. In Chapter 5, Joyce explores publicity as a technique utilised by international courts and actors to claim legitimacy and signal their authority. Joyce focuses in particular on the fields of international criminal law and human rights law, observing how âmediatized trials have public relations benefits, but also present the now familiar dangers of media spectacleâ, whilst âhuman rights witnessing promises connection but can also deliver commodification and simplificationâ.40 Reflecting on these tensions, Joyce concludes that while adopting media forms and engaging in public relations may be understood as âthe international legal system ⊠responding to demands for greater transparency, accountability and participationâ, ultimately âpublicity cannot act as a substitute for informed publics who are so often kept at a distance from the levers of institutional power and influenceâ.41 In Chapter 6, Joyce considers the broader critique of the communicative capitalism that underpins international lawâs reliance on the media and its increasingly digitalised form. To this end, Joyce examines ânot only the mediaâs role in bringing issues to public consciousness, but also its implication in the preservation of silences and the maintenance of obsessions and anxietiesâ,42 and reveals the ways in which the growing reliance of international actors on digital media platforms âfurther entangles the field with neoliberal ideologies embedded within the infrastructure of Silicon Valleyâ.43 The result, Joyce concludes, is that âpublicity promises participation, but delivers digital media monopoly, corporate âvaluesâ as structuring norms and increasing private power on the international planeâ.44 Joyceâs analysis in these chapters is again impressive, drawing on a diversity of disciplinary perspectives ranging from political theory to communications studies to reveal how the turn by international actors to mediated techniques of publicity has produced âeffects of both visibility (for one or a group of victims or a theme) and invisibility (for other forgotten victims, contextual analysis and different or competing claims and causes)â,45 whilst masking and facilitating âthe broader privatisation of the public sphereâ.46 Where the text might have delved deeper, however, is in surfacing the ways in which the contemporary online environment enables the reproduction of inequalities, for example along gender and racial lines. In discussing mass atrocities in Myanmar, for example, Joyce points to the failure of Facebook to prevent its platform being used as a tool to incite violence against the Rohingya community.47 However, what is omitted from Joyceâs account is any exploration of the reasons behind Facebookâs passivity in this context.48 Reflecting on the contrast between Facebookâs de-platforming of Donald Trump following the US Capitol riots and its general passivity in Myanmar, Rebecca Hamilton has reflected upon âthe role that economic and political powerâcoupled with cultural affinity, and distributed unevenly across and within Statesâplays in the decisions of major [social media companies] about what content stays on their platformsâ.49 According to Hamilton, global inequities behind how content is moderated on digital platforms are partially a reflection of capitalism, calculated in the advertiser revenue that a platform derives from an American user compared to a user in Myanmar, and partially a reflection of unevenly distributed political power, with âyears of local activism, coupled with international reporting and a United Nations Commission of Inquiry [being required] to finally get Facebook to take the kind of de-platforming action [in Myanmar that] it did in the United Statesâ.50 But another part of the story concerns systemic racial bias. As Hamilton notes, major social media companies âcontinue to default to the cultural assumptions and political and economic incentives held by their predominantly white American male foundersâ.51 This ongoing âdiversity crisisâ in the digital technology sector is significant since, as UN Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, E Tendayi Achiume, recently observed, âtechnology ⊠that disproportionately excludes women, racial, ethnic and other minorities is likely to reproduce these inequalities when it is deployedâ.52 Joyce also critically discusses âplatform humanitarianismâ, encompassing the turn within the human rights movement towards âcommodified forms of advocacy, fundraising and competition for attention and power between NGOsâ, initially drawing on the emergence of global media, but today increasingly reliant on digital media platforms âto communicate its messages, seek publicity and engage in digital witnessing in the attempt to capture audiences motivated by humanitarian concernsâ.53 One example that Joyce explores in this context is the notorious Kony 2012 campaign, in which an organisation called Invisible Children distributed a video across various digital media platforms calling for the capture and arrest of the leader of the Lordâs Resistance Army, Joseph Kony, by the end of 2012.54 As Joyce notes, the aim of the video was âto engage the American people to place on their government to the of military in to the in its to capture In this way, the video sought to a by the International Court into a in to his Joyce the Kony 2012 for the of the political in and to its whilst also to the broader that the focus of such may attention from social in the Yet, as the of has recently a to this story is how the a example of by as âthe of social and economic value from the racial of another only is the Kony 2012 video with racial but by the US of the may also be within a broader historical in which international law has performed a role in the of value from the in international such as the or and military as For the of this form of global is the of and the of form of between the wealth and the of While Joyce acknowledges the that media may audiences and publics from for the of the racial dimensions of digital are at but not In Informed Publics, Daniel Joyce has made a valuable towards the complex and diverse connections between international law and the the end of the book, Joyce observes its âthe media is not given the significance or in international legal which it has in other such as international political and social It is that with the publication of Joyceâs book, this to at a when international actors are to on the future regulation and use of digital media platforms, they would well to on the critical and historical in this The is to the and in the of International discussion on Daniel Joyceâs Informed Publics, and International Law, as well as the for their are the
Abstract The intrinsic complex nature of Contracts in the Energy sector leads to frequent international disputes. The complexity is generated by (i) the involvement of multiple stakeholders with potentially conflicting interests (Multinational Companies, State-Owned Companies, Host States and their citizens); (ii) transnational jurisdictions divergence (local laws, investorâs country laws, international practices and regulations); and (iii) changes in the laws and regulations over time (long-term nature of Energy contracts). Therefore, not surprisingly, traditional litigation in the Energy sector is often replaced with Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) through the recurrent application of Arbitration clauses. This article aims to improve dispute management in the Energy sector by encouraging best ADR practices. Modelling and Conceptual research approaches are adopted to encourage the introduction of the smart contract. The analyses triggered the drafting of a model for contractual automation. Recurring top clauses are mapped and associated with Equity solutions. Moreover, a comprehensive, efficient and feasible âElectronic ADRâ framework is shaped to prevent (or automatically settle) disputes in the Energy sector.
For the past twenty years, the use of the Internet has facilitated international commercial relations between people who do not know each other and who are geographically distant. Disputes resulting from e-commerce have undermined the supremacy of state courts, which have proved unable to provide an appropriate response to small claims arising in an international context and raising delicate questions as to jurisdiction and applicable law. The length, cost and complexity of the procedure, as well as the risk associated with the international enforcement of the judgment are deterrent factors that led e-commerce platforms to develop online dispute resolution (ODR). Thanks in part to the removal of intermediaries, the transfer of cryptocurrencies and other crypto assets using blockchain technology has further facilitated international commercial relations. The decentralised and distributed characteristics of blockchain technology and the pseudonymity of its transactions has led to a new economy growing independently from nation states. This technology has brought an additional degree of complication in the application of Private International Law (PIL) rules by removing the illusion that online transactions can be linked to the territory of a state. Smart contracts also allow the creation of digital entities that can enter into commercial relations. The first Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) was the source of a resounding dispute between parties with diverging interests, which had to be urgently resolved without any access to state courts or a dispute resolution mechanism. This case revealed the risk of disputes in the blockchain environment and the resulting legal uncertainty, and led to the emergence of various models of blockchain dispute resolution (BDR) mechanisms inspired by the solutions developed in e-commerce. This chapter deals with the application of PIL rules to the resolution of disputes involving DAOs. The authors first analyse what is a DAO and whether DAOs legally qualify as companies. What is at stake is the legal personality of DAOs and their capacity to conduct legal proceedings. The authors then examine whether disputes involving DAOs may be brought before state courts. This analysis highlights the problems related to the location, pseudonymity, and uncertainty regarding the legal personality of the participants of the blockchain environment, which challenge the jurisdiction of state courts in case of a dispute. The authors then draw on the experience acquired in the field of e-commerce to examine the advisability of setting up alternative dispute resolution mechanisms available to the actors of the blockchain environment. Based on an analysis of existing BDR mechanisms, the authors examine whether and how BDRs are likely to avoid a denial of justice and bring legal certainty to disputes related to contractual relationships with DAOs formalised through smart contracts as well as disputes related to the governance of DAOs. The authors find that a BDR decision which can be directly enforced through smart contracts confers effective justice to the actors of the blockchain environment. Finally, the authors address the more delicate issue of the enforcement of a BDR decision on non-crypto assets. This approach shows that a type of justice based on crypto-economic incentives challenges the concept of fair justice. This could be an impediment to obtaining the assistance of state authorities for the enforcement of a BDR decision outside of the blockchain environment as this type of decision could be considered contrary to public policy. The analysis is mostly based on Swiss PIL and major PIL conventions. In this chapter, the authors outline the contours of a new private justice system designed to provide decentralised autonomous justice to the actors of the crypto economy.
The article is devoted to the scientific and theoretical substantiation of the position on the formation of international municipal law as a field of modern international public law. In domestic jurisprudence, the topic is being studied for the first time. The authors connect the emergence of international municipal law with the processes of constitutionalization of international public law and the internationalization of the constitutional legal order of states. These processes were accompanied by the growth of international recognition of the institution of local self-government. First of all, through its international legal regulation and contextualization of topical aspects of the activities of local governments, taking into account their international activities. In particular, through the development and adoption of a number of international multilateral treaties and the preparation at the United Nations level of the draft World Charter of Local Self-Government. In the context of the internationalization of the constitutional legal order of countries in the field of urban law, significant processes of borrowing international legal standards of local selfgovernment by state constitutional law are indicated. Based on the analysis of international practice, a conclusion is made about the compliance of Ukrainian legislation with international standards. At the same time, recommendations are given for its improvement, in particular, for financing local governments, budgetary decentralization, limiting the competence of local state administrations, etc. The formation and development of the architecture of modern public international law, its institutional and structural system is usually associated with its sectoral construction, which is based on the definition of the subject of legal regulation and method of legal regulation. The emergence of a new subject of legal regulation in public international law, as an independent and autonomous legal system, is based on the actualization, emergence, activation, contextualization of cooperation in a new field of interstate cooperation, which in practice is determined by the emergence of a new object of international law. In this case, the methods of international legal regulation in public international law remain constant â either imperative or dispositive. However, today in the formation of new branches of public international law plays an important role trend that emerged during the formation of a new form of globalization â legal, which has such a nomenclature â the constitutionalization of public international law and the internationalization of constitutional order. In general, the national legislation of Ukraine meets world standards, but some legislative norms should be improved. First of all, this concerns the financing of the local state administrations, limiting the competence of local state administrations to the level of control functions and mediation between the local governments, the executive branch and the President. In addition, it makes sense to provide a mechanism for the implementation of the international legal standards for the subjects of Ukrainian local self-government.