The Ambazonian conflict in Cameroonâs Anglophone regions has unfolded within an era defined by mobile connectivity, social media, and digitally mediated political contention. This article examines the role of mobile technology in shaping the conflictâs trajectory from early mobilization to prolonged armed stalemate. It argues that mobile technology functioned as both an enabling and destabilizing force: facilitating mass mobilization, diaspora coordination, documentation of abuses, and digital finance, while simultaneously accelerating fragmentation, disinformation, cybersecurity exposure, and state surveillance. Drawing on comparative cases including the Arab Spring, ISIS, Ukraine, Ethiopia, and Myanmar, the article situates Ambazonia within broader patterns of digital contention and digital authoritarian response. The analysis further demonstrates how ungoverned digital visibility and decentralized online fundraising undermined strategic coherence and legitimacy. The article concludes that while mobile technology can amplify resistance, it cannot substitute for political legitimacy, institutional coherence, or negotiated settlement. Durable peace requires a transition from networked resistance to normatively grounded frameworks such as the Alliance for Peace and Justice (APJ) Peace Plan.
Sixbert Sangwa, Emmanuel Ekosse, Isaac Museveni, Simeon Nsabiyumva
This study investigates how decentralized, industry-linked learning hubs can address Africaâs enduring higher education challenges of access, affordability, and employability. It proposes a scalable framework combining the African Leadership University (ALU)âs multi-city model with the Community Services Association (CSA) Rwandaâs district-based learning ecosystem. The study is guided by three research questions: RQ1: What systemic enablers support the diffusion of industry-linked university hubs in Africa? RQ2: What key barriers limit diffusion, and how do they vary across countries? RQ3: How can proven models (e.g., ALU, CSA) be adapted and costed for scale? (2)Methodology. A qualitative comparative analysis was conducted using 35 high-credibility secondary sources filtered via a PRISMA-adapted protocol from an initial 245 records (2010â2025). Four casesâALU, CSA, Ashesi University, and UNICAFâwere analyzed through the lenses of Diffusion of Innovation, Triple Helix, and Experiential Learning theory. Although the study relies exclusively on secondary sources, we applied light-touch text-mining in MAXQDA: policy documents were tokenised, stop-words removed, and coded with an unsupervised LDA algorithm (k = 6) to surface latent themes that triaged sources for qualitative comparative analysis; no clustering or association-rule modelling was undertaken. Visual toolsâincluding causal-loop diagrams, scorecards, and a Gantt-style scale-up roadmapâsupported synthesis. (3) Findings. Five core enablers emerged: policy alignment, institutional autonomy, Triple Helix linkages, diversified finance, and contextualized curricula. Barriers included regulatory rigidity, funding fragility, governance gaps, and digital divides. The proposed Pan-African Learning Hub Framework blends ALUâs experiential pedagogy with CSAâs grassroots model, enabling vertical progression from district-level cooperatives to regional research hubs. A three-year scale-up plan (USD 400â4,000 per student/year) suggests viability under flexible policy conditions. (4) Research Limitations / Implications. Secondary-data reliance constrains causal attribution and excludes francophone/North African contexts. Field validation and financial modeling are recommended for future work. (5) Practical Implications. Policymakers and institutions can use this framework to pilot scalable, employment-linked hubs without constructing new campuses. (6) Originality / Value. This is the first study to align Africa-wide policy ambitions with operational design and costing of university-linked hub models.
This research in Ethical Control of Unmanned Systems applies precepts of Network Optional Warfare (NOW) to develop a three-step Mission Execution Ontology (MEO) methodology for validating, simulating, and implementing mission orders for unmanned systems. First, mission orders are represented in ontologies that are understandable by humans and readable by machines. Next, the MEO is validated and tested for logical coherence using Semantic Web standards. The validated MEO is refined for implementation in simulation and visualization. This process is iterated until the MEO is ready for implementation. This methodology is applied to four Naval scenarios in order of increasing challenges that the operational environment and the adversary impose on the Human-Machine Team. The extent of challenge to Ethical Control in the scenarios is used to refine the MEO for the unmanned system. The research also considers Data-Centric Security and blockchain distributed ledger as enabling technologies for Ethical Control. Data-Centric Security is a combination of structured messaging, efficient compression, digital signature, and document encryption, in correct order, for round-trip messaging. Blockchain distributed ledger has potential to further add integrity measures for aggregated message sets, confirming receipt/response/sequencing without undetected message loss. When implemented, these technologies together form the end-to-end data security that ensures mutual trust and command authority in real-world operational environmentsâdespite the potential presence of interfering network conditions, intermittent gaps, or potential opponent intercept. A coherent Ethical Control approach to command and control of unmanned systems is thus feasible. Therefore, this research concludes that maintaining human control of unmanned systems at long ranges of time-duration and distance, in denied, degraded, and deceptive environments, is possible through well-defined mission orders and data security technologies. Finally, as the human role remains essential in Ethical Control of unmanned systems, this research recommends the development of an unmanned system qualification process for Naval operations, as well as additional research prioritized based on urgency and impact.
Even though "militancy" is frequently used in scientifi c literature and in the daily life of parties and social movements, there are few defi nitions of the term. Our goal is to convert the idea of militancy into a research problem. A Brazilian scientifi c literature review shows that the term is used either as an adjective, either as a noun. We conceptualize militancy as a methodology to produce collective action aiming to intervene, or to interfere, in current social norms. This methodology focuses on organizations such as parties and unions, characterized by strict discipline that aims to produce docility, commitment, and obeisance. Then, we show how New Social Movements (NSM) have created unconventional tactics and organizations, offering an alternative to the militant methodology. Organizing teams using horizontal arrangements, operating with decentralized and autonomous networks, recognizing the diversity of its participants, NSM are occupying the streets and reinventing the repertoires of collective action and protest. We suggest the use of the word "activism" to describe this methodology. By distinguishing militancy from activism we wish to re(frame) some problems in the Brazilian scene of political engagement and protest.
Focusing on German and EU support with assisting local police reform in the context of international peacebuilding in Afghanistan since 2001, this article scrutinizes whether the two organizations exhibit a strategic fit between their policy mandate and the design of management tasks. Comparison of two vastly different institutions - Germany, a nation state, and the EU, an international organization - sheds analytical light on the way different bodies manage a similar policy problem. By way of empirical research, the paper finds that incremental planning, decentralization and autonomous leadership enhance performance as they enable peacebuilders to respond flexibly to the dynamic challenges they face in the field. This was the case with Germany, however not with the EU. No strategic fit prevailed on evaluation. Strategy review either failed (Germany) or had unintended consequences (EU).
I INTRODUCTION The principle of subsidiarity has a logic of legitimacy that strives to allocate responsibility at the national level in order to bring decisionmaking closer to those affected by it. Legitimacy is not the only reason for allocating competence to the national level. In some cases, such as the United Nations Security Council's (UNSC) schemes to prevent terrorist financing and the proliferation of chemical, biological, and nuclear (CBN) weapons, decisions about where to allocate responsibility are made for reasons of effectiveness. Treating these security threats as weakest-link goods, (1) the UNSC has aimed to decenter the administration of collective security away from itself by harnessing individual nation-states so as to create a completely regulated international sphere in which terrorists and proliferators are starved of means and opportunities to perpetrate attacks. In pursuit of this goal, the UNSC has sought to create shared frameworks for action by carving out a new quasi-legislative power. In an attempt to quell criticism of this move, the UNSC reassured states that they will retain national control over the implementation of their obligations, thereby satisfying the principle of subsidiarity. In effect, however, subsidiarity has been sidelined by the UNSC's strategy of implementation. The UNSC's strategy employs disciplinary power to generate an infra-law at the level of technical detail and to normalize states according to it. (2) Discipline shares the UNSC's logic of effectiveness and subsidiarity's preference for national responsibility, but it operates below the surface of the formal law and out of the reach of subsidiarity. It offers a notion of national responsibility shorn of national control. The argument proceeds as follows. Subsidiarity's logic of legitimacy is briefly considered in part II, which concentrates on the logic of effectiveness underlying the UNSC's schemes. The disparity between the open-textured norms on the face of the UNSC's quasi-legislative resolutions and the disciplinary work of its subsidiary bodies is the focus of part III. The Financial Action Task Force's (FATF) recommendations on money laundering and terrorist financing are shown to constitute disciplinary infra-law of the legislative resolutions in part IV, which also offers an illustration of discipline's negative effect on national control. A. Logics of Effectiveness and Legitimacy Whereas the principle of subsidiarity has a logic of legitimacy, the UNSC's approach to the prevention of terrorist financing and CBN proliferation has a logic of effectiveness. These logics are incompatible. The UNSC's reasoning is totalizing; it treats the international realm as a bounded space that transnational threats cannot escape as they can the boundaries of nation-states. If this bounded space can be controlled, then, the logic continues, it may be possible to deprive terrorists and proliferators of the conditions they need to succeed, such as financial support, manpower, open borders, lax import-export controls, and corrupt or incompetent criminal-justice systems. The Council has framed the problem of preventing these threats as a weakest link good that makes every gap, deficiency, and malpractice a potential, however remote, impediment to achieving a totally regulated space and thereby preventing international terrorism and CBN proliferation. (3) Achieving this in practice is no easy task. The UNSC cannot regulate the international realm on its own, as it is dependent on UN member states to carry out its decisions. (4) Given this setup and the UNSC's unrepresentative post-World War II composition, it has adopted a strategy of using UN member states as nodes in a decentralized scheme of administering the entire international-- not global--space. Total regulation of aspects of this space is needed to deprive terrorists and proliferators of means of operation and opportunities to operate. âŠ
Will President Bashar al-Asad make it to 2013? Chances are he will. Despite his regime's rapid loss of legit-imacy, its growing isolation and tanking economy, no countervailing force has yet emerged that can take it down. Many opposition and foreign leaders are predicting that the regime will fall within months. Syrian Muslim Brotherhood leader Mohammed Riad al-Shaqfa stated that Bashar would fall âin the next few months.â1 The U.S. State Department has called President Asad a âdead man walking.â Israel's defense minister has insisted that Asad will fall in a matter of weeks. Certainly, the revolutionary process that began to sweep the Middle East a year ago is powerful; most Syrians want change, and many are willing to fight for freedom and dignity. One cannot envision the Asad family retaining power in the long run; all the same, predictions of its rapid demise may be wishful thinking. Four elements are important in assessing the regime's chances of surviving to 2013: its own strengths, the opposition's weaknesses, the chances of foreign intervention, and the impact of sanctions and economic decline. First, let's place the regime in regional perspective. The Asads stand atop the last minoritarian regime in the Levant and thus seem destined to fall in this age of popular revolt. When they do, the postcolonial era will draw to a final close. Following World War II, minorities took control in every Levant state, thanks to colonial divide-and-rule tactics and the fragmented national community that bedeviled the states of the region. It is estimated that, due to their over-recruitment by the French Mandate authorities, Alawis already by the mid-1950s constituted some 65 percent of all noncommissioned officers in the Syrian military.2 Within a decade, they took control of the military leadership and, with it, Syria itself.3 Unique among the Levant states was Palestine, where the Jewish minority was able to transform itself into the majority at the expense of Palestine's Muslims. Neither the Christians of Lebanon nor the Sunnis of Iraq were so lucky or ambitious. Nevertheless, both clung to power at the price of dragging their countries into lengthy civil wars. The Lebanese war lasted 15 years; the Iraqi struggle between Shiites and Sunnis, while shorter, has yet to be entirely resolved. The Alawis of Syria seem determined to repeat this violent plunge to the bottom. It is hard to determine whether this is due to the rapaciousness of a corrupt elite, to the bleak prospects that the Alawi community faces in a post-Asad Syria, or to the weak faith that many in the region place in democracy and power-sharing formulas. Whatever the reason, Syria's transition away from minority rule is likely to be lengthy and violent. Even though the Alawis make up a mere 12 percent of the total population, the regime continues to count on support from other minorities who fear Islamists coming to power and from important segments of the Sunni population who fear civil war. The Asads have been planning for this day of popular insurrection all their lives. Hafiz al-Asad did not make the mistake of Hosni Mubarak, allowing his sons to go into private business, while leaving the military in the hands of others, who ultimately turned against him. The Asads were less trusting, and for good reason. Syria's urban Sunnis looked at the Alawis as interloping aliens when they first took power âmuwafidiin, as they were called. It was not long before the Muslim Brotherhood took up arms against them, labeling them as non-Muslim and non-Arab (shuubiyun) â only to be crushed brutally after the notorious Hama uprising in 1982. The use of excessive force was then a clear sign of the regime's determination and sectarian nature; the forces sent to retake Hama were largely Alawi. The Asads tutored their children in the arts of war so they could take command of the military and police their population. They marshaled in-laws, cousins and coreligionists into the upper ranks of the security forces. Despite the rhetoric of Arab nationalism, the Asads were keenly aware that only the traditional loyalties of family, clan and sect could cement their rule. In essence, they upheld the notion that it takes a village to rule Syria, a formula that successfully brought an end to political instability. For over two decades following independence, Syria had been known as the banana republic of the Middle East because of its frequent coups and changes of government. Under the Asads, loyalty quickly became the ultimate qualification for advancement into the upper ranks of the security forces. They packed sensitive posts with loyal Alawis and Baathists. Some analysts estimated that as many 80 percent of Syria's officer corps is Alawi. This is undoubtedly an exaggeration, but it underscores the sectarian safety measures the regime has taken.4 The main strike forces, such as the Republican Guard led by Bashar's brother, are overwhelmingly Alawi. Many of the divisions made up of enlisted Sunnis have not been deployed to quell the uprising. Instead, the regime has built up special forces and irregulars, often called shabiha, which are heavily Alawi or Sunnis of known loyalty. Policing loyalty in order to coup-proof the regime has been a paramount concern. Alawis were placed in strategic ministries other than defense. The foreign ministry is a case in point. Recently a Syrian ambassador who has sought refuge in Turkey told Hurriyet, âThere are 360 diplomats within the Syrian Foreign Ministry. Of these, 60 percent are Nusayri [Alawi].â He added, âThe number of Sunni diplomats does not exceed 10 percent.â5 Even if these numbers are an exaggeration, there is little doubt that the regime has been careful to staff the upper ranks of important ministries with loyalists and coreligionists. This attention to staffing is a key reason that major defections have not occurred in the top ranks of government and why we have yet to see a repeat of the Libya example, where whole sections of the country fell out of central control and turned to the rebel cause within weeks of the uprising's debut. Ironically, the minoritarian character of the regime makes it more durable than its republican counterparts in North Africa, where the population is largely homogeneous. The sectarian nature of the regime may protect it from major desertions when economic difficulties make paying for the far-flung patronage networks impossible. Patronage serves as essential glue, binding the interests of disparate social groups to the regime. Just as important, patronage frustrates the emergence of corporate groups that might compete with the government. The regime has skillfully doled out jobs and benefits to fragment the opposition and buy off opponents.6 For this reason, opposition leaders hope that sanctions will promote the collapse of the regime. They reason that, once government money runs out, widespread defections will take place, a coup by top-ranking Alawi officers may occur, or a Tahrir Square moment will overwhelm security forces in the major cities. Such hopes have not been fulfilled in 10 months of growing violence and protest. There is little reason to think they will be in the coming months. Despite increasing defections among the military's rank and file, the elite units, special forces and intelligence agencies may have little choice but to rally around the Asad regime, given their bleak prospects in a post-Asad Syria. Heavily Alawite elite units with sizable numbers of loyal Sunnis will likely see no alternative. The broader Alawi community is also likely to remain loyal to the regime, even as the economy deteriorates.7 Almost all Alawi families have a least one member in the security forces as well as additional members working in civilian ministries, such as education or agriculture. Most fear collective punishment for the sins of the Baathist era. Not only do they assume that they will suffer from wide-scale purges once the opposition wins; many also suspect that they will face prison or worse. Opposition leaders have tried to calm Alawi anxieties provoked by hotheaded sheikhs. The most notorious is Adnan Arur, who threatened, âWe shall mince [the Alawis] in meat grinders and feed them to the dogs.â8 The head of the Muslim Brotherhood has assured ordinary Alawis that they will be protected. Those guilty of crimes will face proper courts and be tried according to the law.9 Such assurances only go so far in calming Alawi anxieties. Many do not expect an orderly transition of power, just as many remain convinced that a spirit of revenge may guide the opposition, which has been so badly abused. In short, because the Syrian military remains able and willing to stand by the president, whether out of loyalty, self-interest or fear, the regime is likely to endure for some time. The strength of Asad's rule is relative and can only be measured in relation to that of the opposition. Many analysts point out that his regime is brittle, narrow and ideologically bankrupt. All the same, the opposition is weaker. The regime has been able to count on the factionalism and bickering of its opponents to survive. Syria's feeble sense of political community has been the regime's greatest asset. The Free Syrian Army (FSA) being assembled in Turkey under the leadership of Colonel Riyadh al-Asaad is no match for the Syrian Army. Although armed opponents of the regime are an important development, their size, structural limitations and predominantly Sunni character make them a minimal threat. They have limited command and control, no dependable communications, and offensive capabilities that are restricted by their lack of heavy weapons. They do not yet present a real danger or alternative to the Syrian military. In fact, Western authorities have been pleading with the Syrian opposition not to militarize, for fear that the insurgency will actually weaken the opposition rather than strengthen it.10 The political leadership of the Syrian opposition remains divided. The SNC to for the opposition but has been to divisions within its own ranks as well as to with opposition The main political of the Syrian opposition, the Syrian to have control over the which in to have control over some and armed elements in Syria. This by most or the opposition in Syria The has been the to Most doubt that the has the number of it or is for many of the against the Syrian groups in Syria are on civilian as well as from the and do not take from Colonel or other they of the The has in disparate groups is to the regime and protect Syrian from the The SNC did not the leaders of the to its in a to the it has been to the The political leadership of the Syrian opposition remains divided. The SNC to for the opposition but has been to divisions within its own ranks as well as to with opposition The and the SNC as the leader of the opposition and have sought to up its and but they to their hands over its It is of main The Muslim the â members to from elite Syrian families â and members of the who are Syria and cannot their There are also many a of of the and a few of other Alawis seem to be of the SNC often that the Muslim Brotherhood is the real power the there is little for The is a Sunni who at the in Although he is and leadership is but When the SNC was first the could not on the were in a the more members as the because he is an in the but limited his as to months. He told The in only weeks before his was due to that he did not whether he would be given a was for a but the and process for its remain The SNC has to other opposition groups who have its In between the SNC and the for a of led by a of led the with in He stated that the two groups would forces on but his from the more and SNC Even some of in the of the Muslim Brotherhood for being a because he the to the SNC before quickly away from the it a and the SNC leadership against with the The SNC leadership the for being willing to with the regime, for to the Free Syrian and for against foreign number of SNC members and his of working for Asad's For its the the Syrian of Syrians by military that would in widespread a would the regime's which would to heavy civilian Even they that foreign will in an of Syria to the U.S. military in Iraq after the of regime in âThe SNC the to and protect them against this a member of the The and many and opposition members to that they may by the as Islamists as in and more opposition and groups are For example, a and member of the most the of a political the itself in in The are on the They do not which has been the nor do they who that for and are but a to an for The minorities remain of the of in the region. Many see the Arab to be a of the the most important among the opposition is not that between the and which but rather the between and on the who are the on the and armed groups are in Most use the in their but few They to Some of this is for are One of the main has been so is that the that their to were being by One opposition that their ranks had been with Opposition is to be The Asad regime and most of civil and for that Syrians it hard to All the same, is a the Syrian opposition can and could be and because their turned against their In Syria, the military is by the and at the All the same, the opposition is more more and armed with Syrians are of the Asad regime. Even many Alawis the in a as he remains convinced he will the uprising and continues to that Syria will be the for Many ordinary Syrians who are on their hands even as they government will not support the opposition they are assured it can a real alternative to the regime and order on the want to the of the uprising on in a opposition leaders are the of their capabilities and to foreign its in on the a to the community the of and In the and the Arab there is only limited support for in Syria. the could also have been in the to in weeks after of that, if had told two months that the U.S. military would be in he would have them they were Although of State has an of Syria and the Western and Arab against it, has the notion that the will Syria will be a to than In some it remains in the of to One U.S. military intelligence officer who in Iraq to that, if Iraq into civil war at the as Syria the region would face a of a is by its and President is his in U.S. from the Middle East as of his He will not want to on his own of by U.S. military and are from an for fear of their Turkey has little to from intervention, democracy and Bashar's is on the and Iraq is less does not a war with Syria. Most important, foreign are to if Syrians cannot and a military force of at the a of Syria on its Many ordinary Syrians who are on their hands even as they government will not support the opposition they are assured it can a real alternative to the regime and order on the want to the of Many that President was when he to on the of the of the Arab have a of percent to be national percent to be and at least 10 percent to be There are in which the might support Arab and to an might be convinced to from if Middle states to The of from Iraq has many the and of the in the of strategic with in Syria with the to regional to weaken or the leadership of one of its key and to the in the the of Syria away from the the Sunni leadership of and Turkey is as it might that it has into All the same, the Syrian opposition is likely to in the and the have stated in no that they will not in Syria. is and have in the to Syria. For these Syria's opposition may be for in at least for the Syria's opposition foreign remain in over the of to Syria is a case of the of the Arab Many have on the economic the Arab and their Syria. the and Arab whether or turned to measures to their rule. In for political and minimal education and The was a and government ministries of of and and a measures but at a They Arab states and them with and population as a that in an of This was Syria the to and more than most Middle Bashar to up the Syrian economy and the were than his the but by measures and All the same, he private and He with private and use of the in an to private and foreign even as Asad sought to private he its the emergence of a that would be largely Sunni and not to the regime, Asad turned to his who became of the Syrian He a majority in many major and and that the Asad family control over the at every rank of the this of by the of from the of major regime â called the of â has notorious for its and economic The has been an of and at the growing and of Syrian The of the last Syrian and an estimated one off the and into urban of which has to jobs or economic security to the has has been in of the The the have been This was the social that the of support for the but it is up in The have in Syria has been on the even as the upper has with from percent to percent between and to the between and the both the and have been on the has the of the Baathist regime and is a in the Syrian uprising. It also why the most of the Syrian have been in such as and Syria's growing is due to The first is the of the last which Syrian and an estimated one off the and into urban a some percent of Syria's is estimated to have been built and in with no or The is estimated to have Syrians in the of the country into according to a The is the price of have been The of Syrian in price by to percent in led by which by Syria's who over their on have been hard by which 15 percent in has been by government to price for In were in its price to percent between and the of the Syrian uprising in has This is a of main foreign the percent on all coming from the of the government to for and The is increasing The Syrian economy has been to jobs for the growing population. The of the Arab is well and Syria has been The last has an the population of the Arab is under the age of Syria is off than than the population is under the age of percent of the population is in the 15 to the one in Arab was with the in and being even Syria's have been the Arab Syrian placed at a In the minister of and social that in the country between and The of the have sent The Syrian has sent the economy but quickly real economic can to regime is the of the many of economic have to of the of Syria, the as in He the the economy is is are and government is In where there are there is no economic â so paying they they are not their â so the are in all this is the Syria's has by percent in the of â from to â as the Syrian has from to to a on the of a to percent fall in as and on all but the most essential has to a a loss of on by in and the in is Syria a have also their on the Syrian economy in with Iraq has been by 10 percent because of is to be to percent of the in This will it well the danger for estimated to be 10 percent of an at the of that next year will be less than of and will for only 60 percent of government He that the will be Syrian out of a total of to or percent of a of The government has no to in order to make up for its it to a it can no This will force the government to to foreign such as or Iraq or to Syria's Some are already that the government special on and President such in to for the war in The government has all ministries to by which have been estimated to the government to have been The government has most of to the and have and in most is off for on end a âThe whole has been â and One Syrian that no one in Syria is paying his are to make to on their or of expect will Many are to the is even more he is that some are to make to private they make For are as but the day of cannot be When it will the Syrian can it The on the government are the of the the government was already heavily in order to both the of its and no to the government will have to by remain and by it will on the Syrians of It will also which will to and the collapse of the Syrian one Syrian âThe will be with a of at both the corporate and as can no be The economy is not to collapse Even as it the Asad regime may for some if no alternative forces to and It may be able to off the of the for a It is in that regime did not fall due to the economic brought on by war and sanctions in the the of some according to of Syria is not It does not have its and its are in All the same, Syria continues to have Most of its are to its after the is so is Even to Some of are likely to as a for Syrian The Asad regime it will to other such as and for and will undoubtedly so long as its own economy can stand up to Western and the to into the hands of the opposition. The regime the and a of the and it can All the same, the Baathist regime will be a to Alawis and minorities the of the regime with do Sunni and who fear the is the opposition. lack of leadership was an the first months of the but it is a it, the opposition will have difficulties more Syrians to take the of and the of already there is no force that has the or leadership to the regime, at least that is yet One that the Asad regime will remain in power such a force