Since the 2021 military coup, Myanmar has been trapped in complex tri-polar power competition among the military junta, the National Unity Government (NUG) together with its People's Defense Force (PDF), and diverse ethnic-armed organizations. Existing literature frequently adopts binary deterministic forecasts, expecting either enduring military authoritarian rule or comprehensive national fragmentation. Such perspectives often overlook layered relationships between short-term battlefield capabilities and long-run political legitimacy, alongside pragmatic strategic logics held by major ethnic-armed groups. This paper argues that battlefield strength represents only a limited factor in regime transition, while popular mandate, nationwide governance ambition, and geopolitical constraints function as more structural determinants. Although the NUG-PDF bloc lacks immediate military capacity to seize central state authority, it constitutes the most plausible civilian successor, enjoying broad Bamar public support and institutional aspirations for national governance. Ethnic-armed organizations prioritize institutionalized regional autonomy rather than full secession. Under China's conditional geopolitical hedging strategy, Myanmar is likely to evolve toward a decentralized loose-federal equilibrium featuring weak central authority and highly autonomous ethnic regions. While large-scale infrastructure such as the China-Myanmar Railway faces substantial operational and fiscal uncertainties, strategically critical energy facilities including the Kyaukpyu Port and cross-border oil-gas pipelines may sustain stable operations via multi-stakeholder benefit-sharing arrangements.
Since the 1980s, ongoing reforms in China’s hukou system have drawn increasing attention from various parties, and a consensus generated during the reform period refers to decentralization practices. This research, with reference to new class and social class theories, investigates how social policies alongside decentralization of administration within the hukou system in Beijing and Shenzhen impact on educational opportunities for migrant students. Based on a total of 29 in-depth interviews conducted in these two cities, this research details the differentiation of decentralization practices and influences from two perspectives: 1) financing in private education; and 2) regulation in public education. In terms of financing, the paucity of subsidy policies and additional sponsorship expenses worsen the educational context and prospect for migrant students in Beijing. Comparatively, the Shenzhen government has made and implemented a set of welcomed subsidy policies for migrant students who receive private education, which financially dismantles separation between public and private education and equalizes educational opportunities for migrant students in the megacity. In terms of regulation, accessing public education through hukou conversion is more practicable for migrant students in Shenzhen than Beijing. Nonetheless, homeownership has emerged as an increasingly overweight reference metric in public education access in Shenzhen, which undermines egalitarian policy intentions and effects in hukou conversion practices. With reference to the analysis of the interview transcripts, this research concludes that migrant students are confronted with different inequality of educational opportunities in these two cities, despite the fact that both subnational governments have fully carried through hukou decentralization that has been deemed as an effectively administrative approach to equalize public services delivery, such as basic education.
We analyze the governance structure and the financing of Kyrgyz education, with special emphasis on the general secondary education system. General secondary schools are under the authority of oblasts and rayons. Our main findings are as follows: 1. The oblast and rayon authorities in Kyrgyzstan are in fact delegated offices of the central administration, with highly non-transparent reporting lines, very little budgetary independence, diffused political responsibility and politicized control over financial flows to lower levels of government. 2. The principle that funds from the central budget for specific functions should be transferred directly (without any intermediaries) to the level of government responsible for those functions is not observed in Kyrgyzstan. In particular, the categorical grants for education are determined and negotiated in a very non-transparent way. 3. The Kyrgyz education sector is fragmented, and the divided responsibilities for management and for finances make rationalization and reform very difficult to accomplish. Moreover, the situation is compounded by the fact that education decentralization has a formal character, and is not accompanied by real delegation of authority and responsibility. 4. The general secondary education system in Kyrgyzstan, although managed according to the rules and procedures common to other post Soviet republics, displays a remarkable degree of regional and ethnic differentiation. The financing levels also vary significantly among oblasts. 5. Parental contributions make up at least 30% of the school budgets in Bishkek. Their collection and use vary greatly among schools, but in all cases are beyond the effective control of either parents or the central and local authorities. Moreover, the emerging system of entrance fees for first grade students is unconstitutional and violates human rights and pedagogical principles. In order to deal with these issues, the Kyrgyz Republic needs to correct the present non-transparent and dysfunctional governance structure of Kyrgyz education, because otherwise any efforts to improve the delivery of educational services or their financing may remain ineffective. The Kyrgyz Republic also needs to define education standards that it will be able to enforce and finance in all schools. Finally, it needs to implement a regulatory system governing parental contributions, which would serve the schools and at the same time allow for transparent and well-monitored use of private funds in public schools.