Xiaotong Sun, Xi Chen, Charalampos Stasinakis, Georgios Sermpinis
Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) provides a decentralized governance solution through blockchain, where decision-making process relies on on-chain voting and follows majority rule. This paper focuses on MakerDAO, and we find three voter coalitions after applying clustering algorithm to voting history. The emergence of a dominant voter coalition is a signal of governance centralization in DAO, and voter coalitions have complicated influence on Maker protocol, which is governed by MakerDAO. This paper presents empirical evidence of multicoalition democracy in DAO and further contributes to the contemporary debate on whether decentralized governance is possible.
Price movement prediction has always been one of the traders' concerns in financial market trading. In order to increase their profit, they can analyze the historical data and predict the price movement. The large size of the data and complex relations between them lead us to use algorithmic trading and artificial intelligence. This paper aims to offer an approach using Twin-Delayed DDPG (TD3) and the daily close price in order to achieve a trading strategy in the stock and cryptocurrency markets. Unlike previous studies using a discrete action space reinforcement learning algorithm, the TD3 is continuous, offering both position and the number of trading shares. Both the stock (Amazon) and cryptocurrency (Bitcoin) markets are addressed in this research to evaluate the performance of the proposed algorithm. The achieved strategy using the TD3 is compared with some algorithms using technical analysis, reinforcement learning, stochastic, and deterministic strategies through two standard metrics, Return and Sharpe ratio. The results indicate that employing both position and the number of trading shares can improve the performance of a trading system based on the mentioned metrics.
Within this work we consider an axiomatic framework for Automated Market Makers (AMMs). AMMs are smart contracts that set prices for swaps on a pool of assets. By imposing reasonable axioms on the underlying utility function, we are able to characterize the properties of the swap size of the assets and of the resulting pricing oracle. In providing these general axioms, we define a novel measure of price impacts that can be used to quantify those costs between different AMM constructions. We have analyzed many existing AMMs and shown that the vast majority of them satisfy our axioms. We have also considered the question of fees and divergence loss. In doing so, we have proposed a new fee structure so as to make the AMM indifferent to transaction splitting. Finally, we have proposed a novel AMM that has nice analytical properties and provides a large range over which there is no divergence loss.
Trading on decentralized exchanges has been one of the primary use cases for permissionless blockchains with daily trading volume exceeding billions of U.S.~dollars. In the status quo, users broadcast transactions and miners are responsible for composing a block of transactions and picking an execution ordering -- the order in which transactions execute in the exchange. Due to the lack of a regulatory framework, it is common to observe miners exploiting their privileged position by front-running transactions and obtaining risk-fee profits. In this work, we propose to modify the interaction between miners and users and initiate the study of {\em verifiable sequencing rules}. As in the status quo, miners can determine the content of a block; however, they commit to respecting a sequencing rule that constrains the execution ordering and is verifiable (there is a polynomial time algorithm that can verify if the execution ordering satisfies such constraints). Thus in the event a miner deviates from the sequencing rule, anyone can generate a proof of non-compliance. We ask if there are sequencing rules that limit price manipulation from miners in a two-token liquidity pool exchange. Our first result is an impossibility theorem: for any sequencing rule, there is an instance of user transactions where the miner can obtain non-zero risk-free profits. In light of this impossibility result, our main result is a verifiable sequencing rule that provides execution price guarantees for users. In particular, for any user transaction A, it ensures that either (1) the execution price of A is at least as good as if A was the only transaction in the block, or (2) the execution price of A is worse than this ``standalone'' price and the miner does not gain (or lose) when including A in the block.
The study proposes a quote-driven predictive automated market maker (AMM) platform with on-chain custody and settlement functions, alongside off-chain predictive reinforcement learning capabilities to improve liquidity provision of real-world AMMs. The proposed AMM architecture is an augmentation to the Uniswap V3, a cryptocurrency AMM protocol, by utilizing a novel market equilibrium pricing for reduced divergence and slippage loss. Further, the proposed architecture involves a predictive AMM capability, utilizing a deep hybrid Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) and Q-learning reinforcement learning framework that looks to improve market efficiency through better forecasts of liquidity concentration ranges, so liquidity starts moving to expected concentration ranges, prior to asset price movement, so that liquidity utilization is improved. The augmented protocol framework is expected have practical real-world implications, by (i) reducing divergence loss for liquidity providers, (ii) reducing slippage for crypto-asset traders, while (iii) improving capital efficiency for liquidity provision for the AMM protocol. To our best knowledge, there are no known protocol or literature that are proposing similar deep learning-augmented AMM that achieves similar capital efficiency and loss minimization objectives for practical real-world applications.
Recent financial bubbles such as the emergence of cryptocurrencies and "meme stocks" have gained increasing attention from both retail and institutional investors. In this paper, we propose a game-theoretic model on optimal liquidation in the presence of an asset bubble. Our setup allows the influx of players to fuel the price of the asset. Moreover, traders will enter the market at possibly different times and take advantage of the uptrend at the risk of an inevitable crash. In particular, we consider two types of crashes: an endogenous burst which results from excessive selling, and an exogenous burst which cannot be anticipated and is independent from the actions of the traders. The popularity of asset bubbles suggests a large-population setting, which naturally leads to a mean field game (MFG) formulation. We introduce a class of MFGs with varying entry times. In particular, an equilibrium will depend on the entry-weighted average of conditional optimal strategies. To incorporate the exogenous burst time, we adopt the method of progressive enlargement of filtrations. We prove existence of MFG equilibria using the weak formulation in a generalized setup, and we show that the equilibrium strategy can be decomposed into before-and-after-burst segments, each part containing only the market information. We also perform numerical simulations of the solution, which allow us to provide some intriguing results on the relationship between the bubble burst and equilibrium strategies.
Cross-sectional strategies are a classical and popular trading style, with recent high performing variants incorporating sophisticated neural architectures. While these strategies have been applied successfully to data-rich settings involving mature assets with long histories, deploying them on instruments with limited samples generally produce over-fitted models with degraded performance. In this paper, we introduce Fused Encoder Networks -- a novel and hybrid parameter-sharing transfer ranking model. The model fuses information extracted using an encoder-attention module operated on a source dataset with a similar but separate module focused on a smaller target dataset of interest. This mitigates the issue of models with poor generalisability that are a consequence of training on scarce target data. Additionally, the self-attention mechanism enables interactions among instruments to be accounted for, not just at the loss level during model training, but also at inference time. Focusing on momentum applied to the top ten cryptocurrencies by market capitalisation as a demonstrative use-case, the Fused Encoder Networks outperforms the reference benchmarks on most performance measures, delivering a three-fold boost in the Sharpe ratio over classical momentum as well as an improvement of approximately 50% against the best benchmark model without transaction costs. It continues outperforming baselines even after accounting for the high transaction costs associated with trading cryptocurrencies.
In the Decentralized Finance (DeFi) setting, we present a new parametrized family of Constant Function Market Makers (CFMMs) which we call the Generalized Mean Market Makers (G3Ms), based on the generalized means. The G3Ms are intermediate between the Arithmetic Mean and Geometric Mean CFMM models, which G3Ms incorporate as special cases. We also present an extension of the G3Ms, based on the so-called Generalized f-Means, called Generalized f-Mean Market Makers (Gf3Ms). We show in addition that the G3Ms possess certain properties preferable to those exhibited by either the Arithmetic Mean CFMM or the Geometric Mean CFMM alone.
Tomas Scagliarini, Giuseppe Pappalardo, Alessio Emanuele Biondo, Alessandro Pluchino · 6 authors
In this paper we analyse the effects of information flows in cryptocurrency markets. We first define a cryptocurrency trading network, i.e. the network made using cryptocurrencies as nodes and the Granger causality among their weekly log returns as links, later we analyse its evolution over time. In particular, with reference to years 2020 and 2021, we study the logarithmic US dollar price returns of the cryptocurrency trading network using both pairwise and high-order statistical dependencies, quantified by Granger causality and O-information, respectively. With reference to the former, we find that it shows peaks in correspondence of important events, like e.g., Covid-19 pandemic turbulence or occasional sudden prices rise. The corresponding network structure is rather stable, across weekly time windows in the period considered and the coins are the most influential nodes in the network. In the pairwise description of the network, stable coins seem to play a marginal role whereas, turning high-order dependencies, they appear in the highest number of synergistic information circuits, thus proving that they play a major role for high order effects. With reference to redundancy and synergy with the time evolution of the total transactions in US dollars, we find that their large volume in the first semester of 2021 seems to have triggered a transition in the cryptocurrency network toward a more complex dynamical landscape. Our results show that pairwise and high-order descriptions of complex financial systems provide complementary information for cryptocurrency analysis.
Tether Limited has the sole authority to create (mint) and destroy (burn) Tether stablecoins (USDT). This paper investigates Bitcoin's response to USDT supply change events between 2014 and 2021 and identifies an interesting asymmetry between Bitcoin's responses to USDT minting and burning events. Bitcoin responds positively to USDT minting events over 5- to 30-minute event windows, but this response begins declining after 60 minutes. State-dependence is also demonstrated, with Bitcoin prices exhibiting a greater increase when the corresponding USDT minting event coincides with positive investor sentiment and is announced to the public by data service provider, Whale Alert, on Twitter.
This study examines the weak form of the efficient market hypothesis for Bitcoin using a feedforward neural network. Due to the increasing popularity of cryptocurrencies in recent years, the question has arisen, as to whether market inefficiencies could be exploited in Bitcoin. Several studies we refer to here discuss this topic in the context of Bitcoin using either statistical tests or machine learning methods, mostly relying exclusively on data from Bitcoin itself. Results regarding market efficiency vary from study to study. In this study, however, the focus is on applying various asset-related input features in a neural network. The aim is to investigate whether the prediction accuracy improves when adding equity stock indices (S&P 500, Russell 2000), currencies (EURUSD), 10 Year US Treasury Note Yield as well as Gold&Silver producers index (XAU), in addition to using Bitcoin returns as input feature. As expected, the results show that more features lead to higher training performance from 54.6% prediction accuracy with one feature to 61% with six features. On the test set, we observe that with our neural network methodology, adding additional asset classes, no increase in prediction accuracy is achieved. One feature set is able to partially outperform a buy-and-hold strategy, but the performance drops again as soon as another feature is added. This leads us to the partial conclusion that weak market inefficiencies for Bitcoin cannot be detected using neural networks and the given asset classes as input. Therefore, based on this study, we find evidence that the Bitcoin market is efficient in the sense of the efficient market hypothesis during the sample period. We encourage further research in this area, as much depends on the sample period chosen, the input features, the model architecture, and the hyperparameters.
Lending Protocols (LPs), as blockchain-based lending systems, allow any agents to borrow and lend cryptocurrencies. However, liquidity risks could occur, especially when salient loans are initiated by a particular group of borrowers. This paper proposes measurements of liquidity risks, focusing on both available liquidity and market concentration in LPs. By using Aave as a case study, we find that liquidity risks are highly volatile and show complex effects on Aave, and liquidity in Aave may affect across on-chain lending market. Compared to new users, regular users that repeatedly borrow cryptocurrencies may negatively affect Aave protocol, implying that user loyalty is a double-edged sword for LPs.
Bitcoin, with its ever-growing popularity, has demonstrated extreme price volatility since its origin. This volatility, together with its decentralised nature, make Bitcoin highly subjective to speculative trading as compared to more traditional assets. In this paper, we propose a multimodal model for predicting extreme price fluctuations. This model takes as input a variety of correlated assets, technical indicators, as well as Twitter content. In an in-depth study, we explore whether social media discussions from the general public on Bitcoin have predictive power for extreme price movements. A dataset of 5,000 tweets per day containing the keyword `Bitcoin' was collected from 2015 to 2021. This dataset, called PreBit, is made available online. In our hybrid model, we use sentence-level FinBERT embeddings, pretrained on financial lexicons, so as to capture the full contents of the tweets and feed it to the model in an understandable way. By combining these embeddings with a Convolutional Neural Network, we built a predictive model for significant market movements. The final multimodal ensemble model includes this NLP model together with a model based on candlestick data, technical indicators and correlated asset prices. In an ablation study, we explore the contribution of the individual modalities. Finally, we propose and backtest a trading strategy based on the predictions of our models with varying prediction threshold and show that it can used to build a profitable trading strategy with a reduced risk over a `hold' or moving average strategy.
Stablecoins, digital assets pegged to a specific currency or commodity value, are heavily involved in transactions of major cryptocurrencies. The effects of deviations from their desired fixed values (depeggings) on the cryptocurrencies for which they are frequently used in transactions are therefore of interest to study. We propose a model for this phenomenon using a multivariate mutually-exciting Hawkes process, and present a numerical example applying this model to Tether (USDT) and Bitcoin (BTC).
Michael Darlin, Georgios Palaiokrassas, Leandros Tassiulas
The rise of Decentralized Finance (“DeFi”) on the Ethereum blockchain has enabled the creation of lending platforms, which serve as marketplaces to lend and borrow digital currencies. Initially, we categorize the activity of lending platforms within a standard regulatory framework. We then propose an Ethereum address grouping algorithm using activity over DeFi protocols and employ a novel classification algorithm to calculate the percentage of fund flows into DeFi lending platforms that can be attributed to debt created elsewhere in the system (“debt-financed collateral”). Based on our results, we conclude that the wide-spread use of stablecoins as debt-financed collateral increases financial stability risks in the DeFi ecosystem.
Jan Arvid Berg, Robin Fritsch, Lioba Heimbach, Roger Wattenhofer
Decentralized exchanges are revolutionizing finance. With their ever-growing increase in popularity, a natural question that begs to be asked is: how efficient are these new markets? We find that nearly 30% of analyzed trades are executed at an unfavorable rate. Additionally, we observe that, especially during the DeFi summer in 2020, price inaccuracies across the market plagued DEXes. Uniswap and SushiSwap, however, quickly adapt to their increased volumes. We see an increase in market efficiency with time during the observation period. Nonetheless, the DEXes still struggle to track the reference market when cryptocurrency prices are highly volatile. During such periods of high volatility, we observe the market becoming less efficient - manifested by an increased prevalence in cyclic arbitrage opportunities.
Federico Cornalba, Constantin Disselkamp, Davide Scassola, Christopher Helf
We investigate the potential of Multi-Objective, Deep Reinforcement Learning for stock and cryptocurrency single-asset trading: in particular, we consider a Multi-Objective algorithm which generalizes the reward functions and discount factor (i.e., these components are not specified a priori, but incorporated in the learning process). Firstly, using several important assets (cryptocurrency pairs BTCUSD, ETHUSDT, XRPUSDT, and stock indexes AAPL, SPY, NIFTY50), we verify the reward generalization property of the proposed Multi-Objective algorithm, and provide preliminary statistical evidence showing increased predictive stability over the corresponding Single-Objective strategy. Secondly, we show that the Multi-Objective algorithm has a clear edge over the corresponding Single-Objective strategy when the reward mechanism is sparse (i.e., when non-null feedback is infrequent over time). Finally, we discuss the generalization properties with respect to the discount factor. The entirety of our code is provided in open source format.
We propose two novel frameworks to study the price formation of an asset negotiated in an order book. Specifically, we develop a game-theoretic model in many-person games and mean-field games, considering costs stemming from limited liquidity. We derive analytical formulas for the formed price in terms of the realized order flow. We also identify appropriate conditions that ensure the convergence of the price we find in the finite population game to that of its mean-field counterpart. We numerically assess our results with a large experiment using high-frequency data from ten stocks listed in the NASDAQ, a stock listed in B3 in Brazil, and a cryptocurrency listed in Binance.
Deep Reinforcement Learning solutions have been applied to different control problems with outperforming and promising results. In this research work we have applied Proximal Policy Optimization, Soft Actor-Critic and Generative Adversarial Imitation Learning to strategy design problem of three cryptocurrency markets. Our input data includes price data and technical indicators. We have implemented a Gym environment based on cryptocurrency markets to be used with the algorithms. Our test results on unseen data shows a great potential for this approach in helping investors with an expert system to exploit the market and gain profit. Our highest gain for an unseen 66 day span is 4850 US dollars per 10000 US dollars investment. We also discuss on how a specific hyperparameter in the environment design can be used to adjust risk in the generated strategies.
We demonstrate a novel application of online transfer learning for a digital assets trading agent. This agent uses a powerful feature space representation in the form of an echo state network, the output of which is made available to a direct, recurrent reinforcement learning agent. The agent learns to trade the XBTUSD (Bitcoin versus US Dollars) perpetual swap derivatives contract on BitMEX on an intraday basis. By learning from the multiple sources of impact on the quadratic risk-adjusted utility that it seeks to maximise, the agent avoids excessive over-trading, captures a funding profit, and can predict the market's direction. Overall, our crypto agent realises a total return of 350\%, net of transaction costs, over roughly five years, 71\% of which is down to funding profit. The annualised information ratio that it achieves is 1.46.
The cryptocurrency market is highly volatile compared to traditional financial markets. Hence, forecasting its volatility is crucial for risk management. In this paper, we investigate CryptoQuant data (e.g. on-chain analytics, exchange and miner data) and whale-alert tweets, and explore their relationship to Bitcoin's next-day volatility, with a focus on extreme volatility spikes. We propose a deep learning Synthesizer Transformer model for forecasting volatility. Our results show that the model outperforms existing state-of-the-art models when forecasting extreme volatility spikes for Bitcoin using CryptoQuant data as well as whale-alert tweets. We analysed our model with the Captum XAI library to investigate which features are most important. We also backtested our prediction results with different baseline trading strategies and the results show that we are able to minimize drawdown while keeping steady profits. Our findings underscore that the proposed method is a useful tool for forecasting extreme volatility movements in the Bitcoin market.
Brett Hemenway, Bin Gu, Gerry Tsoukalas, Niuniu Zhang
Non-Fungible Tokens (NFTs) are transforming how content creators, such as artists, price and sell their work. A key feature of NFTs is the inclusion of royalties, which grant creators a share of all future resale proceeds. Although widely used, critics argue that sophisticated speculators, who dominate NFT markets, simply price in royalties upfront, neutralizing their impact. We show this intuition holds only under perfect, frictionless markets. Under more realistic market conditions, royalties enable creators to capitalize on the presence of speculators in at least three ways: They can enable risk sharing (under risk aversion), mitigate information asymmetry (when speculators are better informed), and unlock price discrimination benefits (in multi-unit settings). Moreover, in all three cases, royalties meaningfully expand trade, implying increased transaction volume for platforms. These results offer testable predictions that can guide both empirical research and platform design.
On September 15, 2022, the Ethereum network adopted a proof-of-stake (PoS) consensus mechanism. We study the impact on the network and competing platforms in a two month event window around the Beacon chain merge. We find that the transition to PoS has reduced energy consumption by 99.98%. Miners have not transformed into validators, and total block reward income (in USD) has fallen by 97%, though transaction fees (in ETH) for Ether have increased nearly 10%. The Herfindahl index for the top 10 is 1,009; the network is 19% less concentrated after the merge. Ethereum supply growth has been deflationary since the merge. The time between consecutive blocks is now steady at 12 seconds and transactions per day are up 7.0%. On Polygon, Matic fees rose but token fees fell. Polygon also slows, processing 3.3% fewer transactions per day. Solana's fees fall by $0.0003, and transactions per day are down 48%. Stablecoin transfer volumes fall on Ethereum and Polygon, but rise on Solana.
The problem of investing into a cryptocurrency market requires good understanding of the processes that regulate the price of the currency. In this paper we offer a view of a cryptocurrency market as an environment for realization of a self-organized speculative scheme that results in a formation of a characteristic price bubble as a transient phenomenon. We use microscale, agent-based models to simulate the system behavior and derive macroscale ODE models to estimate such parameters as the return rate and the market value of investments. We provide the formula for the total risk of the system as a sum of two independent components, one being characteristic of the price bubble and the other of the investor behavior.