Introduction: The Identity of a user in digital world is an important factor for an individual. Identity management has been handled by various models which, over the period of time have been prone various security breaches. The foremost integral part of any identity model is the centralized storage, access of data. Considering this, in recent years, there has been evolution from centralization to de-centralization of Identity management. With respect to this new aspect, this paper proposes a solution to the centralized management problems, as a decentralized Identity Management System. The said approach utilizes Ethereum blockchain, IPFS, both supporting distributed data accessibility and data storage respectively. This paper also sheds light on the W3C specification of DID (De-centralized Identifier) which supports the Self-Sovereign Identity principles of Identity Management and are vital for de-centralization of Identity Management
Artificial intelligence (AI) and distributed ledger technologies are increasingly integrated into public and private surveillance infrastructures—from city-wide camera networks to critical-infrastructure monitoring and access control. This integration promises higher integrity and accountability through immutable logs, faster incident response via on-device inference, and interoperable audit trails across organizations. Yet it also amplifies ethical risks: mass data collection, opacity in model decisions, function creep, demographic harms, cross-border data governance conflicts, and accountability gaps when immutable records meet “right to erasure” regimes. This manuscript proposes an ethics-by-design reference architecture for blockchain-powered surveillance that embeds privacy, proportionality, and fairness controls into each lifecycle stage (purpose definition → data capture → model training → inference → access → audit → decommissioning). Technically, it composes privacy-enhancing technologies (PETs)—including differential privacy, federated learning, zero-knowledge proofs, verifiable credentials (VCs), and content-provenance standards (C2PA)—with permissioned blockchain ledgers, model cards, and risk management aligned to the NIST AI RMF, ISO/IEC 23894, ISO/IEC 42001, UNESCO, and ACM guidance. A simulated evaluation illustrates how the architecture can reduce false-positive disparities and unauthorized access, while preserving evidentiary integrity. We discuss tensions with GDPR (e.g., Article 17 erasure; DPIA obligations), constraints introduced by the EU AI Act (e.g., prohibitions and high-risk biometric uses), and strategies to reconcile immutability with privacy (e.g., off-chain storage with revocation, redaction-friendly commitments). The paper closes with limitations and a future research agenda for measurable, auditable ethical guarantees in real-time surveillance.
In this article, we propose zero-knowledge named proof, a stateless replay attack prevention strategy that ensures the user’s anonymity against malicious administrators. We begin with adopting the zero-knowledge set-membership proof into an authentication setting in which users would delegate their requests to an agent that obstructs the user’s identity from the administrator. This anonymous agent carries the guarantee of authenticity, which the administrator through the set-membership proof can confirm. Next, we prevent replay attacks from other parties by binding the agent’s identity to the authentication proof verifiable by the administrators. By leveraging these properties, a scalable blockchain-based authentication scheme is then built. We quantitatively evaluate the security and measure the time and monetary cost of our scheme under both ideal and realistic environments. On top of it, we provide a third-party authorization scheme derived from our authentication framework to demonstrate its real-world applicability.
Guy Zyskind, Yonatan Erez, Tom Langer, Itzik Grossman · 5 authors
Blockchains ensure that all transactions, including those that execute deterministic programs known as smart contracts, are processed correctly and without interruption. However, blockchains inherently provide no confidentiality - all transaction data, including inputs sent to smart contracts, are public. This has led to a rise of confidential smart contract blockchains. These blockchains utilize privacy-preserving techniques to add privacy to smart contracts, but they usually rely on Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) (e.g., [14, 24]) that are susceptible to side-channel attacks and other security concerns ([7, 13, 33] to name a few).
Blockchain technology is a key technology in the current information field and has been widely used in various industries. Blockchain technology faces significant challenges in privacy protection while ensuring data immutability and transparency, so it is crucial to implement private computing in blockchain. To target the privacy issues in blockchain, we design a secure multi-party computation (SMPC) protocol DHSMPC based on homomorphic encryption in this paper. On the one hand, homomorphic encryption technology can directly operate on ciphertext, solving the privacy problem in the blockchain. On the other hand, this paper designs the directed decryption function of DHSMPC to resist malicious opponents in the CRS model, so that authorized users who do not participate in the calculation can also access the decryption results of secure multi-party computation. Analytical and experimental results show that DHSMPC has smaller ciphertext size and stronger performance than existing SMPC protocols. The protocol makes it possible to implement complex calculations in multi-party scenarios and is proven to be resistant to various semi-malicious attacks, ensuring data security and privacy. Finally, this article combines the designed DHSMPC protocol with blockchain and cloud computing, showing how to use this solution to achieve trusted data management in specific scenarios.
Data owners seeking to boost processing power, storage, or bandwidth can take advantage of cloud computing services. However, this shift poses new challenges related to privacy and data security. Searchable Encryption (SE), which combines encryption and search techniques, addresses these issues (violation of data users' privacy) by allowing user data to be encrypted, transmitted to a cloud server, and searched using keywords. Despite its benefits, several recent real-world attacks have raised concerns about the security of searchable encryption. Ensuring forward and backward privacy is likely to become a standard requirement in the development of new SE systems. To address these issues, we propose a scheme that exclusively uses symmetric cryptographic primitives, achieving high communication efficiency and forward and backward privacy. In addition, we emphasize improved I/O efficiency because only the results of subsequent updates are loaded when searching. The time required to retrieve results is so significantly reduced compared to existing SE methods that we have shown that our scheme achieves superior efficiency. Moreover, by integrating blockchain network services with cloud services, we have developed a searchable intelligent cryptosystem suitable for lightweight smart devices. In our study conducted on the Ethereum network, we found our method to be both efficient and secure, especially when compared to methods such as PPSE and Jiang. The results indicate that our system delivers results in terms of performance and privacy within dynamic cloud environments making it a solution for protecting confidential information.
Na Wang, Yao Zhao, Youyang Qu, Lei Cui · 6 authors
Decentralized Federated Learning (DFL) is extensively applied in various areas, e.g., healthcare, finance, and Internet of Things (loT), offering practical solutions for distributed intelligent applications and data collaboration. In DFL systems, participants, e.g., edge devices, organizations, or nodes, collaborate in the training of a shared global model by aggregating local models from various participants. During this process, participants need to communicate frequently with a central authority/node/server to share model parameters. Such communication is vulnerable to malicious attacks or tampering, posing a significant threat to the integrity of model training. The integrity verification method can provide an integrity guarantee for the global model of DFL. However, most of the existing integrity verification schemes are centralized and not suitable for resource-constrained DFL scenarios. Therefore, how to verify the integrity of the global model becomes an important issue in DFL. To address it, we devise a global model integrity verification method for DFL. Specifically, we generate a digital signature for each global model parameter as proof of integrity, while improving the efficiency of integrity verification by electing delegates to conduct the verification process. A series of experiments is conducted to validate the performance of the proposed method. The experimental results demonstrate that our approach not only effectively ensures the integrity of the global model but also functions well under limited resources.
The 15-puzzle is a puzzle game played with 15 square tiles numbered from 1 to 15 on a 4 × 4 board. It has been popular for generations because of its simplicity and challenge. The (w × h)-puzzle is a generalization of the 15-puzzle, which is played with wh − 1 square tiles numbered from 1 to wh − 1 on a w × h board. Solving the (w × h)-puzzle is NP-hard, and hence it is valuable to know its solution. In this paper, we apply the concept of zero-knowledge proof to the (w × h)-puzzle. We propose a physical zero-knowledge proof protocol, in which a prover who knows a solution to the (w × h)-puzzle can convince a verifier that the prover knows the solution without revealing any information about it. We also design physical zero-knowledge proof protocols of two token swapping problems closely related to the (w × h)-puzzle.
Anonymous credentials are cryptographic mechanisms enabling users to authenticate themselves with a fine-grained control on the information they leak in the process. They have been the topic of countless papers which have improved the performance of such mechanisms or proposed new schemes able to prove ever-more complex statements about the attributes certified by those credentials. However, although these papers have studied in depth the problem of the information leaked by the credential and/or the attributes, almost all of them have surprisingly overlooked the information one may infer from the knowledge of the credential issuer. In this paper we address this problem by showing how one can efficiently hide the actual issuer of a credential within a set of potential issuers. The novelty of our work is that we do not resort to zero-knowledge proofs but instead we show how one can tweak Pointcheval-Sanders signatures to achieve this issuer-hiding property in a compact way. This results in an efficient anonymous credential system that indeed provides a complete control of the information leaked in the authentication process. Our construction is moreover modular and can then fit a wide spectrum of applications, notably for Self-Sovereign Identity (SSI) systems.
Multi-scalar multiplication (MSM) is the most computation-intensive part in proof generation of Zero-knowledge proof (ZKP). In this paper, we propose MSMAC, an FPGA accelerator for large-scale MSM. MSMAC adopts a specially designed Instruction Set Architecture (ISA) for MSM and optimizes pipelined Point Addition Unit (PAU) with hybrid Karatsuba multiplier. Moreover, a runtime system is proposed to split MSM tasks with the optimal sub-task size and orchestrate execution of Processing Elements (PEs). Experimental results show that MSMAC achieves up to 328X and 1.96X speedups compared to the state-of-the-art implementation on CPU (one core) and GPU, respectively, outperforming the state-of-the-art ASIC accelerator by 1.79X. On 4 FPGAs, MSMAC performs 1,261X faster than a single CPU core.
El-hacen Diallo, Mohameden Dieye, Omar Dib, Pierre Valiorgue
As blockchain technology continues to evolve, it has fostered an extensive ecosystem of applications and platforms. This dynamic landscape is characterized by a myriad of innovative solutions, ranging from decentralized finance and supply chain management to digital identity and voting systems, each contributing to the ongoing advancement and adoption of blockchain technology across various sectors. Achieving interoperability among these applications and platforms poses a significant challenge due to their use of distinct protocols, and remains a bottleneck hindering the widespread adoption of blockchain technologies. Addressing this challenge requires designing a universal interoperability protocol while ensuring compliance with the security and privacy constraints specific to each blockchain, thus adding complexity. We propose an agnostic interoperability protocol designed for seamless asset movement across independent private blockchain networks, regardless of their individual protocols. This protocol leverages incentive-driven smart contract and Zero-Knowledge Proofs to establish a decentralized, secure, and privacy-focused framework for interoperability. We conduct a security analysis using game theory and provide both theoretical and empirical evaluations of the protocol end-to-end delay. Through a comprehensive use case, we demonstrate the secure deployment of the proposed protocol for asset movement between two private blockchains. We also discuss the trade-offs between cost and delay in cross-blockchain transactions. Furthermore, a comparative analysis with existing interoperability schemes showcases the proposed interoperability scheme superiority in terms of robustness, privacy preservation, and verifiability.
Matheus V. X. Ferreira, Aadityan Ganesh, Jack Hourigan, Hannah Huh · 6 authors
Cryptographic Self-Selection is a paradigm employed by modern Proof-of-Stake consensus protocols to select a block-proposing "leader." Algorand [Chen and Micali, 2019] proposes a canonical protocol, and Ferreira et al. [2022] establish bounds $f(α,β)$ on the maximum fraction of rounds a strategic player can lead as a function of their stake $α$ and a network connectivity parameter $β$. While both their lower and upper bounds are non-trivial, there is a substantial gap between them (for example, they establish $f(10\%,1) \in [10.08\%, 21.12\%]$), leaving open the question of how significant of a concern these manipulations are. We develop computational methods to provably nail $f(α,β)$ for any desired $(α,β)$ up to arbitrary precision, and implement our method on a wide range of parameters (for example, we confirm $f(10\%,1) \in [10.08\%, 10.15\%]$). Methodologically, estimating $f(α,β)$ can be phrased as estimating to high precision the value of a Markov Decision Process whose states are countably-long lists of real numbers. Our methodological contributions involve (a) reformulating the question instead as computing to high precision the expected value of a distribution that is a fixed-point of a non-linear sampling operator, and (b) provably bounding the error induced by various truncations and sampling estimations of this distribution (which appears intractable to solve in closed form). One technical challenge, for example, is that natural sampling-based estimates of the mean of our target distribution are \emph{not} unbiased estimators, and therefore our methods necessarily go beyond claiming sufficiently-many samples to be close to the mean.
The rapid growth of electronic health (eHealth) systems has led to serious security and privacy challenges, highlighting the critical importance of protecting sensitive healthcare data. Although researchers have employed blockchain to tackle data management and sharing within eHealth systems, substantial privacy concerns persist as a primary challenge. In this paper, we introduce TrustHealth, a secure data sharing system that leverages trusted execution environment (TEE) and blockchain technology. TrustHealth leverages blockchain to design smart contracts to offer robust hashing protection for patients’ healthcare data. We provide a secure execution environment for SQLCipher, isolating all sensitive operations of healthcare data from the untrusted environment to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of the data. Additionally, we design a TEE-empowered session key generation protocol that enables secure authentication and key sharing for both parties involved in data sharing. Finally, we implement TrustHealth using Hyperledger Fabric and ARM TrustZone. Through security and performance evaluation, TrustHealth is shown to securely process massive encrypted data flows at a rate of 5000 records per second, affirming the feasibility of our proposed scheme. We believe that TrustHealth offers valuable guidelines for the design and implementation of similar systems, providing a valuable contribution to ensuring the privacy and security of eHealth systems.
Dincy R. Arikkat, Mert Cihangiroglu, Mauro Conti, Rafidha Rehiman K. A. · 7 authors
The rise of IT-dependent operations in modern organizations has heightened their vulnerability to cyberattacks. Organizations are inadvertently enlarging their vulnerability to cyber threats by integrating more interconnected devices into their operations, which makes these threats both more sophisticated and more common. Consequently, organizations have been compelled to seek innovative approaches to mitigate the menaces inherent in their infrastructure. In response, considerable research efforts have been directed towards creating effective solutions for sharing Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI). Current information-sharing methods lack privacy safeguards, leaving organizations vulnerable to proprietary and confidential data leaks. To tackle this problem, we designed a novel framework called SeCTIS (Secure Cyber Threat Intelligence Sharing), integrating Swarm Learning and Blockchain technologies to enable businesses to collaborate, preserving the privacy of their CTI data. Moreover, our approach provides a way to assess the data and model quality and the trustworthiness of all the participants leveraging some validators through Zero Knowledge Proofs. Extensive experimentation has confirmed the accuracy and performance of our framework. Furthermore, our detailed attack model analyzes its resistance to attacks that could impact data and model quality. • Definition of a Swarm Learning approach for collaborative CTI. • Definition of a Blockchain-based solution for privacy preservation in CTI sharing. • Secure CTI validation using a consensus mechanism and Zero-Knowledge Proof.
Shalitha Wijethilaka, Awaneesh Kumar Yadav, An Braeken, Madhusanka Liyanage
The rapid evolution of heterogeneous applications signifies the requirement for network slicing to cater to diverse network requirements. Network Functions (NFs), which are the essential elements of network slices, are required to communicate with each other securely to facilitate network services. Certificates are the established method to authenticate each other. However, dynamic certificate management while allowing NFs to communicate in a multi-operator environment is arduous. Also, sharing NFs between network slices originates authorization-related security challenges such as unauthorized service utilization, deceptive Denial of Service attacks, and data leakages from network slices. In this paper, we develop a novel framework to address the security challenges related to authentication and authorization in 5G network slicing systems. A blockchain-based multi-party distributed certificate management framework with secure communication protocols is developed using elliptic curve cryptography to facilitate certificate services for multi-operator environments. Also, we propose a blockchain-based NF authorization framework to mitigate the security vulnerabilities in NF sharing between network slices. We implement the proposed framework using Hyperledger Fabric blockchain with Java chain codes and perform comprehensive experiments to show the significance of our framework.The Ability to mitigate the single point of failure with respect to state-of-the-art, including traditional certificate authorities and blockchain-based certificate authorities, time analysis for certificate generation, and the potential to eliminate the mentioned authorization attacks are some of the experiments conducted.Also, we have shown that our framework is secure using informal and formal (using Real-Or-Random (ROR) logic and Scyther Validation tool) security verification mechanisms.
Chris Natoli, Parinya Ekparinya, Guillaume Jourjon, Vincent Gramoli
Traditional blockchain systems offer a secure way of tracking the ownership of digital assets as long as the attacker does not control a large portion of the overall computational or mining power. They typically require participants to generate a proof-of-work before proposing a block at a given index of the chain. To choose one block among the candidate blocks at the same index, Nakamoto’s consensus, Ghost , and the original Ethereum’s consensus select, respectively, the longest branch, the heaviest subtree and the branch with the most difficult crypto-puzzles. This allows an attacker who can generate proofs-of-work faster than others to double spend by overwriting any given branch. In this article, we present a double spending attack, called the Balance attack, that simply needs to delay some messages. This result sheds new lights on an important, often implicit, assumption of the blockchain, synchrony , under which the transmission delay of any message should be within a known upper bound. We show that the attack succeeds with high probability on the protocols of the two largest blockchain systems in market capitalization, Bitcoin and Ethereum. To quantify the impact of our attack, we replicated the blockchain network run by 50 financial institutions and achieved double spending in less than 20 minutes. Finally, we demonstrate the success of the attack empirically by modifying the geth software and hijacking BGP in a controlled distributed system whose distribution of mining power is set to the distribution observed on the Ethereum main blockchain.
UTXO-based smart contract platforms face an efficiency bottleneck, in that any transaction sent to a contract must specify the entire updated contract state. This requirement becomes particularly burdensome when the contract state contains dynamic data structures, as needed in many use cases to track interactions between users and the contract. The problem is twofold: on the one hand, a large state in transactions implies a large transaction fee; on the other hand, a large centralized state is detrimental to the parallelization of transactions — a feature that is often cited as a key advantage of UTXO-based blockchains over account-based ones. We propose a novel UTXO-based blockchain model, named hybrid UTXO (hUTXO) , along with a technique to efficiently execute smart contracts on it. The key idea underlying hUTXO is the distribution of the contract state across multiple UTXOs, enabling transactions to access only the specific portions of the state they need, thereby reducing their size (and fees). Our hUTXO model also borrows features from account-based models (in particular, the handling of the contract balance), making it “hybrid” in nature. To simplify the development of smart contracts in hUTXO, we introduce a high-level smart contract language (named hURF), along with a compiler into hUTXO transactions. We show how to exploit our framework to parallelize the validation of transactions on multi-core CPUs. We implement our technique and provide an empirical validation of its effectiveness.
This research paper delves into the imperative domain of bolstering data confidentiality within smart contracts through the integration of advanced privacy-preserving methodologies. Smart contracts, pivotal components of blockchain technology, execute self-executing contracts with predefined conditions and are increasingly utilized across various sectors, necessitating stringent data protection measures. The paper addresses the pressing need for fortified data privacy within smart contracts and investigates cutting-edge approaches to mitigate privacy challenges. Two focal techniques under scrutiny are zero-knowledge proofs (SBÇs) and homomorphic encryption. SBÇs facilitate the validation of computations without revealing sensitive data, enabling parties to verify transaction authenticity without disclosing the underlying information. Meanwhile, homomorphic encryption permits computations on encrypted data, preserving confidentiality by allowing operations on encrypted information without the need for decryption. By analyzing these advanced privacy-preserving techniques, this study aims to address the vulnerabilities in data confidentiality present in smart contracts. Its findings hold significant promise in fortifying the security and confidentiality of transactions, thus contributing substantially to the evolution of secure blockchain technology. This research underscores the pivotal role of innovative privacy-enhancing mechanisms in safeguarding sensitive data within smart contracts, ensuring the trust and integrity essential for their widespread adoption.
The fundamental theorem of Goldreich, Micali, and Wigderson (J. ACM 1991) shows that the existence of a one-way function is sufficient for constructing computational zero knowledge (CZK) proofs for all languages in NP. We prove its converse, thereby establishing characterizations of one-way functions based on the worst-case complexities of zero knowledge. Specifically, we prove that the following are equivalent: - A one-way function exists. - NP ⊆ CZK and NP is hard in the worst case. - CZK is hard in the worst case and the problem GapMCSP of approximating circuit complexity is in CZK. The characterization above also holds for statistical and computational zero-knowledge argument systems. We further extend this characterization to a proof system with knowledge complexity O(logn). In particular, we show that the existence of a one-way function is characterized by the worst-case hardness of CZK if GapMCSP has a proof system with knowledge complexity O(logn). We complement this result by showing that NP admits an interactive proof system with knowledge complexity ω(logn) under the existence of an exponentially hard auxiliary-input one-way function (which is a weaker primitive than an exponentially hard one-way function). We also characterize the existence of a robustly-often nonuniformly computable one-way function by the nondeterministic hardness of CZK under the weak assumption that PSPACE ⊈AM. We present two applications of our results. First, we simplify the proof of the recent characterization of a one-way function by NP-hardness of a meta-computational problem and the worst-case hardness of NP given by Hirahara (STOC’23). Second, we show that if NP has a laconic zero-knowledge argument system, then there exists a public-key encryption scheme whose security can be based on the worst-case hardness of NP. This improves previous results which assume the existence of an indistinguishable obfuscation.
Nir Bitansky, Chethan Kamath, Omer Paneth, Ron D. Rothblum · 5 authors
Batch proofs are proof systems that convince a verifier that x1,…,xt ∈ L, for some NP language L, with communication that is much shorter than sending the t witnesses. In the case of statistical soundness (where the cheating prover is unbounded but the honest prover is efficient given the witnesses), interactive batch proofs are known for UP, the class of unique-witness NP languages. In the case of computational soundness (where both honest and dishonest provers are efficient), non-interactive solutions are now known for all of NP, assuming standard lattice or group assumptions. We exhibit the first negative results regarding the existence of batch proofs and arguments: - Statistically sound batch proofs for L imply that L has a statistically witness indistinguishable (SWI) proof, with inverse polynomial SWI error, and a non-uniform honest prover. The implication is unconditional for obtaining honest-verifier SWI or for obtaining full-fledged SWI from public-coin protocols, whereas for private-coin protocols full-fledged SWI is obtained assuming one-way functions. This poses a barrier for achieving batch proofs beyond UP (where witness indistinguishability is trivial). In particular, assuming that NP does not have SWI proofs, batch proofs for all of NP do not exist. - Computationally sound batch proofs (a.k.a batch arguments or BARGs) for NP, together with one-way functions, imply statistical zero-knowledge (SZK) arguments for NP with roughly the same number of rounds, an inverse polynomial zero-knowledge error, and non-uniform honest prover. Thus, constant-round interactive BARGs from one-way functions would yield constant-round SZK arguments from one-way functions. This would be surprising as SZK arguments are currently only known assuming constant-round statistically-hiding commitments. We further prove new positive implications of non-interactive batch arguments to non-interactive zero knowledge arguments (with explicit uniform prover and verifier): - Non-interactive BARGs for NP, together with one-way functions, imply non-interactive computational zero-knowledge arguments for NP. Assuming also dual-mode commitments, the zero knowledge can be made statistical. Both our negative and positive results stem from a new framework showing how to transform a batch protocol for a language L into an SWI protocol for L.
We put forward a new approach for achieving non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs (NIKZs) from the learning with errors (LWE) assumption (with subexponential modulus to noise ratio). We provide a LWE-based construction of a hidden bits generator that gives rise to a NIZK via the celebrated hidden bits paradigm. A notable feature of our construction is its simplicity. Our construction employs lattice trapdoors, but beyond that uses only simple operations. Unlike prior solutions, we do not rely on a correlation intractability argument nor do we utilize fully homomorphic encryption techniques. Our solution provides a new methodology that adds to the diversity of techniques for solving this fundamental problem.
This study examines the issues of privacy protection, data security, and query efficiency in blockchain-based electronic medical record (EMR) sharing. It proposes a secure storage and sharing scheme for EMR based on Hyperledger Fabric and the InterPlanetary File System (IPFS). To mitigate the privacy risks of data mining that could reveal patient identities, we establish an attribution channel in Hyperledger Fabric to store EMR ownership information and a data channel to store the storage location, digest, and usage records of medical data. Encrypted medical data are stored in the IPFS. To improve query efficiency in the blockchain, we integrate queryable medical data attributes into a composite key for conditional queries, avoiding complex data filtering processes. Additionally, we use a zero-knowledge proof combined with smart contracts for decentralized identity verification, eliminating reliance on third-party centralized verification services and enhancing system security. We also integrate AES and proxy re-encryption techniques to ensure data security during sharing. This scheme provides a more secure, efficient, and privacy-preserving approach for EMR systems, with significant practical implications and broad application potential.
William Boitier, Antonella Del Pozzo, Álvaro García-Pérez, Stéphane Gazut · 12 authors
Federated Learning is a decentralized framework that enables multiple clients to collaboratively train a machine learning model under the orchestration of a central server without sharing their local data. The centrality of this framework represents a point of failure which is addressed in literature by blockchain-based federated learning approaches. While ensuring a fully-decentralized solution with traceability, such approaches still face several challenges about integrity, confidentiality and scalability to be practically deployed. In this paper, we propose Fantastyc, a solution designed to address these challenges that have been never met together in the state of the art.