Using a comprehensive dataset from Deribit, we show that Bitcoin options trading activity is concentrated around two distinct intraday periods: 8:00–9:00 GMT and 14:00–15:00 GMT, relative to other hours of the day. The latter peak coincides with the opening of the New York Stock Exchange and is largely absent on weekends, suggesting spillovers from traditional equity markets to the Bitcoin options market. In contrast, the concentration of trading activity around the 8:00–9:00 GMT period appears to be driven by investors rolling over and re-establishing expiring options around the 8:00 GMT settlement, as this effect persists on both weekdays and weekends, and is stronger on days with more expiring contracts and for contracts with shorter maturities. These findings highlight how institutional trading conventions shape intraday activity in cryptocurrency derivatives and provide the first systematic evidence of intraday patterns in Bitcoin options trading.
The emergence of decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) represents a significant shift in organizational design driven by blockchain technology. Unlike traditional hierarchical structures, DAOs operate through decentralized governance, algorithmic rules, and collective coordination embedded within distributed systems. Despite growing scholarly attention, existing research remains fragmented, with limited integration across technological, governance, and organizational dimensions. This paper addresses this gap by developing a multidimensional theoretical framework that explains the organizational logic of DAOs through the interaction of blockchain architecture, governance mechanisms, and coordination processes. Drawing on an integrative review of the literature, DAOs are conceptualized as socio-technical systems in which technological infrastructure enables decentralized governance, governance mechanisms shape participation and decision-making, and coordination processes support collective action and value creation. The framework highlights the interdependencies among these dimensions and advances a set of theoretical propositions to guide future research. By offering a more integrated perspective, this study contributes to DAO scholarship and extends organizational theory to better account for decentralized and algorithmic forms of organizing. The findings also provide insights for designing and governing DAOs in the evolving digital economy.
Accurate, transparent, and scalable Measurement, Reporting, and Verification (MRV) of greenhouse-gas emissions is foundational to credible climate governance, yet prevailing systems remain fragmented, low-frequency, and vulnerable to manipulation. This paper proposes a hybrid IoT–Hadoop–blockchain architecture that reconceptualizes carbon data as a continuously governed digital asset rather than a static compliance artifact. High-frequency operational data are collected through IoT infrastructures, stored and pre-processed in Hadoop for scalability and data sovereignty, and anchored on a Hyperledger Fabric consortium blockchain using Merkle-tree commitments to ensure immutability and traceability. A Carbon Data Interface Standard (CDIS) harmonizes heterogeneous data sources, while Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO)-based governance distributes authority across individual and institutional stakeholders. A Dynamic Authority Selection Mechanism (DASM) aligns participation in the consensus process with verifiable performance, institutionalizing a coopetitive model of data stewardship. The architecture further integrates with a public-chain value layer, enabling tokenization pathways and interoperability with emerging Web3 and Real-World Asset (RWA) climate-finance mechanisms. The results demonstrate how decentralized infrastructure, cryptographic verification, and polycentric governance can jointly improve data integrity, transparency, and market relevance in MRV systems. The paper concludes by outlining empirical pilot pathways and future research directions in AI-assisted verification, dynamic standardization, and climate-linked digital finance.
Este artigo apresenta um esboço estruturado sobre “Dinâmica de Arbitragem entre DEXs e CEXs: Velocidade e Lucratibilidade.”. O objetivo é analisar os fundamentos técnicos e econômicos da arbitragem entre <i>centralized exchanges</i> (CEXs) e <i>decentralized exchanges</i> (DEXs), com foco em como velocidade, latência e estrutura de taxas condicionam a lucratividade dessas estratégias no ecossistema Web3 contemporâneo. Estudos empíricos recentes medem, em detalhe, a economia por trás da arbitragem CEX‑DEX e do MEV associado, mostrando que a maioria dos lucros é capturada por poucos <i>searchers</i> profissionais e que as oportunidades de arbitragem desaparecem em janelas de tempo de frações de segundo. Análises de mercado indicam que, em média, operações bem‑sucedidas de arbitragem CEX‑DEX podem exibir margens brutas em torno de 30–40% sobre o capital efetivamente arriscado por trade, mas que a competição e os pagamentos a <i>block builders</i> comprimem esses retornos ao longo do tempo, caracterizando um mercado altamente monopolizado. Pesquisas teóricas sobre <i>latency arbitrage</i> e sobre o <i>timing</i> ótimo de arbitragem entre CEXs e DEXs modelam explicitamente o efeito da latência de blockchain, da ordem “first‑come, first‑served” e da vantagem de co‑location em data centers, demonstrando que a maior parte do <i>excess return</i> se concentra em janelas de 0,5 a 2 segundos após o surgimento de um desvio de preço entre venues. Trabalhos que estudam a dinâmica de preços em AMMs mostram, ainda, que taxas de swap introduzem uma banda de não‑arbitragem em torno do preço de referência em CEXs, restringindo as oportunidades de arbitragem a desvios acima de um certo limiar e conectando diretamente estrutura de taxas, liquidez e frequência de arbitragem. Conclui‑se que a arbitragem CEX‑DEX é hoje um jogo de alta frequência e forte competição, em que velocidade de execução, acesso a canais privados (MEV‑Boost) e otimização de custos determinam quem captura a maior parte das oportunidades de lucro.<br>
O presente artigo analisa a dicotomia entre descentralização teórica e descentralização real em redes blockchain, com foco nas métricas de distribuição de nós validadores e de poder de voto. O objetivo é investigar em que medida os fundamentos técnicos e econômicos dos mecanismos de consenso refletem, de fato, uma distribuição ampla de controle, ou se concentram poder em poucos agentes, contrariando as promessas de infraestrutura verdadeiramente distribuída. A metodologia adotada baseia-se em revisão bibliográfica de trabalhos recentes sobre descentralização em consenso Prova de Participação (Proof-of-Stake – PoS) e Prova de Trabalho (Proof-of-Work – PoW), em estudos de caso empíricos que medem coeficiente de Nakamoto, índices de Gini e Herfindahl-Hirschman (HHI), além de relatórios sobre distribuição geográfica e por provedores de validadores em redes como a Solana. Os resultados obtidos indicam que métricas superficiais, a exemplo da simples contagem de nós, podem mascarar riscos sistêmicos: em diversas redes PoS, um conjunto relativamente pequeno de validadores, países e provedores de infraestrutura controla fração substancial do stake, de forma que poucas entidades seriam suficientes para censurar transações ou comprometer a liveness da rede. Estudos recentes sobre consenso PoS mostram ainda que modelos de ponderação de stake alternativos – como Square Root Stake Weight (SRSW) e Logarithmic Stake Weight (LSW) – podem melhorar, em média, 51% e 132% as métricas de descentralização (Nakamoto, Gini, HHI), sugerindo caminhos concretos para tornar a distribuição de poder mais equitativa. Conclui-se que a descentralização real exige métricas multidimensionais que incorporem stake, geografia, infraestrutura e diversidade de clientes, e que o desenho de protocolos e políticas de governança precisa considerar explicitamente esses indicadores para alinhar a prática ao ideal normativo de descentralização da Web3.
Abstract: This paper examines how national cryptocurrency regulations affect cross-country Bitcoin price segmentation, local prices, and traded volumes. Using daily data for 22 countries since 2013, we apply a dynamic fixed effects framework to deviations from the law of one price (LOP), controlling for country-specific barriers and global shocks. We distinguish between regulatory frameworks that enhance market functioning (e.g., securities laws, payment system integration, regulatory sandboxes), pro-innovation policies, restrictive measures (e.g., banking bans), and anti-money laundering/countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) rules. Our results show that comprehensive and pro-innovation frameworks reduce price deviations from the USD benchmark, lower local prices, and increase traded volumes, while banking bans fragment markets, depress prices, and reduce volumes. AML/CFT laws exert a consistent downward effect on prices regardless of global conditions. Threshold Auto-Regressive (TAR) models further reveal that highly regulated countries—whether supportive or restrictive—are more sensitive to macro-financial factors such as capital account openness, inflation, relative traded volumes, and remittances, indicating tighter links to the broader financial system. These findings suggest that regulation not only shapes domestic market conditions but also alters the transmission of global and macro-financial shocks into cryptocurrency markets.
Yield-Aggregatoren automatisieren den Prozess des Yield-Farming im Bereich des Decentralized Finance (DeFi), indem sie Nutzerkapital bündeln und über verschiedene Protokolle hinweg einsetzen, um Renditen zu optimieren. Aufgrund ihrer hohen Komplexität sind ihre Funktionsweisen jedoch schwer nachzuvollziehen, und die Forschung zu ihren internen Mechanismen sowie den Interaktionen mit anderen Protokollen ist bislang begrenzt. Diese Arbeit adressiert diese Forschungslücke durch die Analyse zweier Ethereum-basierter Yield-Aggregatoren: Yearn Finance und Cian Yield Layer. Hierzu wurden Blockchain-Daten über einen Zeitraum von einem Jahr (4. Mai 2024 bis 3. Mai 2025) erhoben und ausgewertet, bestehend aus 2.459 Yearn-Transaktionen mit 5.575 Token-Transfers sowie 921 Cian-Transaktionen mit 1.963 Token-Transfers. Die Arbeit kombiniert eine operative Analyse, eine Netzwerkanalyse der Kapitalflüsse und einen Vergleich der Plattformmerkmale. Die Ergebnisse zeigen unterschiedliche Strategien: Yearn investiert Kapital überwiegend in Lending-Protokolle, indem es Liquidität zur Verfügung stellt, während Cian auf gehebeltes, rekursives Staking unter Einsatz von Flash-Loans setzt, um Restaking-Erträge zu erhöhen. Yearn hat eine breite Nutzerbasis mit vergleichsweise kleinen Einzeltransaktionen, während Cian eine kleinere Nutzerbasis besitzt, die von einem höheren Anteil großer Einzahlungen geprägt ist. Auf Grundlage der Analyse wurde ein konzeptionelles Modell entwickelt, das aus zwei miteinander verbundenen Lebenszyklen besteht: dem User-Lifecycle (Einzahlungen, Halteperiode, Auszahlungen) und dem Strategy-Management-Lifecycle (Kapitalallokation, Strategieausführung, Umschichtung). Dieses Modell erfasst die grundlegenden ökonomischen Funktionen von Yield-Aggregatoren unabhängig von ihrer technischen Implementierung. Die Arbeit liefert empirische Einblicke in die Funktionsweise von Yield-Aggregatoren, identifiziert DeFi-Protokolle als Investitionsziele und stellt ein konzeptionelles Modell zum Verständnis der Mechanismen von Yield-Aggregatoren vor.
Samar Alsulaimani, Yasmin Alamoudi, Ming Zhao, Farookh Hussain
Abstract With blockchain technology, digital asset ownership and governance paradigms have undergone profound changes. Decentralised Autonomous Organisations (DAOs) and fractional non-fungible tokens (F-NFTs) have emerged as pivotal mechanisms for managing shared digital assets that are secure, transparent, and participatory. In many existing F-NFT implementations, initial fractionalisation and trading are emphasised. However, subsequent lifecycle governance, including metadata evolution, share redistribution, and retirement, is handled off-chain or via ad-hoc arrangements, which creates operational and accountability gaps. Therefore, a governance framework based on DAO is proposed for F-NFT management in this paper. A fractionalized asset is governed by rules, quorum thresholds, and life-cycle transitions embedded in smart contracts on the blockchain. These contracts automatically execute token-weighted, proposal-driven outcomes without human intervention. In this paper, ‘intelligence’ refers to rule-based automation and verifiable state transitions encoded in smart contracts, rather than machine-learning-based decision-making. Digital assets are managed through a proposal-driven governance mechanism that decentralises authority, automates decision-making, and maintains transparency. There are three primary categories of proposals embedded in the system: (i) updating metadata to adapt to the underlying digital assets, (ii) redistributing fractional ownership in accordance with evolving stakeholder agreements, and (iii) retiring assets to dissolve ownership and legally distribute value. The DAO enforces ownership rules securely and verifiably through smart contracts and token-based governance, mitigating centralisation and fraud. The study provides empirical insights into the viability of the framework for co-owned digital asset ecosystems by evaluating its operational performance and scalability and discussing the implications for governance effectiveness. Based on our findings, DAO-enabled F-NFTs present an innovative mechanism for collaborative ownership in a transparent, democratic, and tamper-proof blockchain environment. As a result of the paper, a contribution is made to the governance and management of F-NFTs in digital asset ecosystems through presenting the framework conceptually and practically.
State payment systems today play a central role in accelerating economic transactions, ensuring transparency in budget fund movements, and digitizing financial services provided to citizens. From this perspective, DeFi – decentralized finance—emerged as a new architecture compared to traditional banking infrastructure and belongs to the category of technological solutions applicable in state payment systems. The core idea of DeFi is to replace intermediaries with code, automate transactions through smart contracts, and operate on open blockchain infrastructure.[1]..
In this study, we propose a structured valuation framework for non-fungible tokens (NFTs), a distinct class of digital assets whose pricing mechanisms remain insufficiently understood. Based on previous empirical studies and illustrative case analyses of three major NFT collections, we synthesize insights from non-cash-flow asset theory, market microstructure, and behavioral finance to construct a four-layer valuation framework consisting of the Asset, Market, Technology, and Ecosystem layers. We identify three NFT-specific mechanisms—verified digital scarcity, pseudonymous signaling, and on-chain herding—that modify or extend traditional valuation paradigms. Empirical evidence from the literature suggests that rarity-driven asset features and social-influence dynamics are dominant price determinants, while wash trading, fragmented liquidity, and platform incentive structures generate persistent distortions in price discovery. Case analyses of CryptoPunks, Bored Ape Yacht Club, and Pudgy Penguins demonstrate how differing risk exposures across the four layers translate into distinct valuation trajectories. With this framework, we obtain a basis for improved risk assessment, regulatory oversight, and business model design in NFT markets.
Decentralized finance introduces new business models and use cases as part of digital finance. Restaking has recently emerged as a transformative mechanism in DeFi, promising extra yields but introducing complex and interconnected risks. The paper monitors the current restaking landscape, empirically analyzes the revenue drivers of a liquid restaking protocol, and conducts a technical investigation on the emitted risk arising from the interconnection between liquid restaking and other protocols. The revenue dynamics of Renzo Protocol are analyzed by employing an OLS regression model, Granger-causality and random forest feature importance tests. Our results identify that revenue is primarily predicted by the value locked in the underlying EigenLayer ecosystem, the yield of Renzo protocol's liquid restaking token and the multi-blockchain expansion of that token. The multi-blockchain expansion of the liquid restaking token presents a double-edged sword: bridging to other networks is crucial for user adoption, but it adds the bridge risks to the existing risks of restaking. We investigate the cross-contamination risk between different DeFi services and the liquid restaking protocol. By mapping the asset flow across the decentralized finance ecosystem, it is detected that the bridge risk of the current size of Renzo's liquid-restaking assets does not impose a systemic risk on the current restaking and staking ecosystem. To address the potential consequences of the emphasized interconnection risks, we introduce two hypothetical scenarios and a stress test, assuming a large number of compromised liquid restaking tokens and a smart contract logic failure in a DeFi protocol. Considering the overall liquid-restaking protocols and the growing interconnection, this analysis requires further work to explore the growing complexities.
Mbonigaba Celestin, Jerryson Ameworgbe Gidisu, M. Vasuki & A. Dinesh Kumar
We examine how legal governance structures influence the reliability of blockchain based commercial transactions within emerging digital markets. We develop and empirically evaluate the Blockchain Legal Transaction Integrity Model using the Global Blockchain Regulation and Smart Contract Adoption Dataset covering the period 2020 to 2025 across major blockchain adopting jurisdictions including the United States, the United Kingdom, Singapore, Estonia, and Ghana. The model links regulatory clarity, compliance enforcement mechanisms, and legal recognition of smart contracts with commercial transaction integrity while accounting for institutional legal capacity as a conditioning factor. Quantitative analysis shows that stronger regulatory clarity, active enforcement supervision, and legally recognized smart contracts significantly improve transaction transparency, contract execution reliability, fraud reduction, and business trust in blockchain systems. Institutional legal capacity amplifies these effects by strengthening regulatory interpretation and dispute resolution capability. The results demonstrate that blockchain markets achieve reliable digital commerce not only through technological design but through coordinated legal governance structures. The findings advance institutional governance theory and provide policy guidance for regulators seeking to strengthen digital financial ecosystems and cross border blockchain commerce.
The modern financial ecosystem is characterized by a "liquidity paradox": while digitization has accelerated transaction speeds, liquidity remains siloed across disparate asset classes such as equities, cryptocurrencies, and loyalty points. This fragmentation forces consumers to manually liquidate assets into fiat currency prior to transaction, creating friction, latency, and opportunity costs. This paper proposes the "Just-In-Time Liquidity Protocol" (JIT-LP), a novel neuro-symbolic architecture that decouples "value" from "currency" at the point of sale. By utilizing autonomous AI agents acting as fiduciaries for both payer and payee, the protocol negotiates the optimal composition of a payment in real-time, executing atomic swaps across ISO 20022 payment rails. I present the architectural design of the JIT-LP, detailing the interaction between edge-hosted Portfolio Agents and Treasury Agents. Furthermore, I introduce a Zero-Knowledge Proof (ZKP) mechanism for verifying solvency without compromising user asset privacy. Theoretical modeling suggests that JIT-LP can reduce consumer overdraft incidents by utilizing idle asset liquidity while offering merchants dynamic inventory-based discounting. This paradigm shift from static message exchange to agentic negotiation redefines the payment network as a real-time value optimization layer.
The global financial landscape is experiencing significant transformation driven by technological advancements and evolving market dynamics. Moreover, blockchain technology has become a pivotal platform with widespread applications, especially in finance. Cross-border payments have emerged as a key area of interest, with blockchain offering inherent benefits such as enhanced security, transparency, and efficiency compared to traditional banking systems. This paper presents a novel framework leveraging blockchain technology and smart contracts to emulate cross-border payments, ensuring interoperability and compliance with international standards such as ISO20022. Key contributions of this paper include a novel prototype framework for implementing smart contracts and web clients for streamlined transactions and a mechanism to translate ISO20022 standard messages. Our framework can provide a practical solution for secure, efficient, and transparent cross-border transactions, contributing to the ongoing evolution of global finance and the emerging landscape of decentralized finance.
Autonomous platforms for fintech, decentralized finance, and digital civil infrastructures are at the research frontier. Delivering on their promise requires a foundational approach. Future research and development directions are organised by core architectural principles, enabling technologies, major challenges and risks, methods for development and evaluation, and governance models. Autonomous economic interaction and decision-making are principally guided by policy goals. Independence from human involvement cannot be guaranteed, especially when external agents fulfil custodial roles, but risk can be mitigated by solidifying the foundations. The term “autonomous platform” constitutes a composite of economic theory and systems design. Platforms support economic interactions enabled by information and communication technology—in particular, the Internet. Their distinctive feature is an architecture composed of services provided by multiple stakeholders. Platform engineering is a design discipline that seeks to deliver the hoped-for benefits, including lower costs, greater selection, and novel business models, while mitigating risks such as fraud and the abuse of market power. The promise of autonomy stems from the deployment of becoming-type, human-compliant purpose design in an effective oversized-modular architecture and begins with the fulfilment of core architectural principles—an autonomous, modular, and composable layer for economic interaction and decision-making.
This working paper introduces the Blockchain First-Principles Analysis (BFPA) framework, a novel methodology for evaluating distributed ledger systems by constructing explicit derivation chains from physical laws and cryptographic assumptions through a praxeological action axiom to concrete protocol design decisions. The framework features a four-level axiom hierarchy (physics, cryptography, praxeology, social consensus), a Nash equilibrium gate for social layer stability, a four-stage stability profile, a lock-in typology distinguishing design-emergent, ecosystem-emergent, corporate-imposed, and regulatory-granted lock-in, and a network effect genesis model identifying five necessary conditions for spontaneous adoption. Systematic application to eight major blockchain systems (Bitcoin, Ethereum, Solana, Monero, XRP, Polkadot, Tezos, BNB Chain) reveals that epistemic design quality correlates weakly with market outcomes, while lock-in type and network effect genesis conditions are substantially stronger predictors. The analysis provides principled explanations for the Tezos Paradox and the Monero Paradox. Comments welcome.
Essais sur le crédit, la découverte des taux et les facteurs déterminants du prix des jetons en finance décentralisée Cette thèse explore les fondements économiques et comportementaux de la finance décentralisée (DeFi), un champ en pleine expansion où les fonctions de prêt, d'emprunt et de fixation des taux d'intérêt sont assurées par des contrats intelligents plutôt que par des institutions financières. À travers trois essais complémentaires, ce travail analyse la conception des protocoles de crédit décentralisés, la formation des taux d'intérêt dans des marchés automatisés et les déterminants fondamentaux et comportementaux de la valorisation des tokens DeFi.Le premier essai examine l'architecture du protocole Atlendis, qui permet des prêts non ou partiellement collatéralisés grâce à l'articulation entre souscription off-chain et exécution on-chain. Le deuxième propose un modèle théorique de découverte de taux basé sur une approche de jeu multi-unités, identifiant les conditions d'efficience et les frictions propres aux marchés décentralisés. Le troisième évalue empiriquement les facteurs économiques et comportementaux influençant les rendements des tokens, révélant le rôle central du sentiment des investisseurs et de la liquidité on-chain dans la dynamique des prix. En combinant ingénierie financière, modélisation théorique et analyse empirique, cette recherche met en lumière les mécanismes par lesquels la DeFi redéfinit l'intermédiation, la formation des prix et la gouvernance financière dans un environnement transparent et programmable.
DELTA is a project funded by the Valencian Institute for Business Competitiveness (IVACE) and the European Union through the European Regional Development Fund (FEDER). DELTA project is aimed at bringing companies closer to the use of different disruptive technologies such as Blockchain / Distributed Ledger Technologies (DLT). To achieve its goal, DELTA will provide: A software tool for automating the deployment of DLT networks, regardless of the number of required nodes, or the process of joining an existing network. A modular mechanism that allows the synchronization of DLTs with databases. The goal of this mechanism is to ease and improve the way data is retrieved from a DLT ledger. An accountability tool for shared environments for the exchange of services that brings in some of the most important characteristics of blockchain/DLTs: facilitating auditing and accountability by each participant, use of tokens, etc.
Paul van Vulpen, Sub Software Production, Slinger Jansen, Sjaak Brinkkemper
The rise of Big Tech has created unprecedented concentrations of power. The scaling potential of the modern IT industry is leading to widespread monopolies. For technologies that serve society, a monopoly brings structural dependence, and gives their owners an almost unchallengeable power. To counteract this societal dependence, academia, industry, and society at large proposed various countermeasures to limit the power of technology providers. In this thesis, Paul van Vulpen compares these approaches. The goal is to maintain the benefits of technology while reducing societal dependence on a few powerful actors. This book investigates three approaches. First, software ecosystems outline the collaboration between various interrelated software actors. Second, blockchain and decentralized autonomous organizations offer radical approaches to rethink and decentralize IT governance structures. Finally, digital platform regulations address urgent societal issues that arise from concentrated platform power. The final section concludes that a delicate and organic approach is needed to IT governance. Excessive centralization creates structural risks, but full decentralization is neither practical nor beneficial. The thesis proposes a middle road: Federated Technology Governance (FTG). In FTG, central authority defines architecture, interoperability standards, and maintains the long-term vision. A wide variety of actors handle user interaction, implementation, and collaboration. This framework helps technology providers to create software ecosystems and safeguard the provision of societal benefit for public digital infrastructure. FTG supports the creation of sovereign cloud services, secure operating systems, and public large language models. Could it also be a road to enable technology to serve society and the common good?
Several works in the literature have focused on the analysis of key stylized facts of financial and cryptocurrency returns linked to fundamental problems of efficiency and predictability of financial and cryptocurrency markets, including heavy tails, absence of linear autocorrelations and volatility clustering. This paper provides a study of the above properties of Bitcoin and Ethereum markets using recently proposed robust, valid and statistically justified definitions of and methods for inference on market (in)efficiency, volatility clustering, and nonlinear dependence in return time series. In contrast to existing approaches, the inference methods used in the analysis are robust to heavy-tailedness, dependence and nonlinear dynamics of returns. The results of the study indicate that Bitcoin and Ethereum returns exhibit heavy tails, uncorrelatedness over time and volatility clustering largely similar to those in developed financial markets. The analysis has important implications for cryptocurrency pricing, market efficiency, econometric modeling, risk management, market participants and regulators.
Araz Zirar, Abdul Jabbar, Hannan Amoozad Mahdiraji
Smart contracts (SCs), appended to a blockchain, protect digital environments and their resources, processes, and structures, reducing mismatches between legal and actual rights and ownership. They enhance digital resilience by improving transparency, traceability, and trust in digital transactions. Utilising SCs requires businesses to adapt their models, revenue streams, and customer relationships. For small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), SCs present challenges, requiring proactive decision-making for their effective utilisation and the trade-offs involved. By employing the integrated multi-layer ISM-MICMAC-SWARA framework (Interpretive Structural Modelling, Cross-Impact Matrix Multiplication Applied to Classification, and Stepwise Weight Assessment Ratio Analysis), we explain the complex interrelationships among the challenges and propose mitigating risk management strategies. We identify technical limitations and human errors as key drivers, confidentiality and manipulation as linkage challenges, and fraud and hacking as dependence challenges. These findings highlight the interconnected nature of the challenges and their impact on SMEs, and we emphasise the need for targeted resilience strategies. Our research highlights the global dimension of SC adoption. When deploying SCs, SMEs must navigate international regulations, cross-border transactions, and cultural diversity. This global perspective informs smart contracts’ strategic, business, and organisational aspects. Our findings offer insights for academics, industry leaders, managers, and policymakers seeking to understand the potential and risks of adopting SCs in SMEs.
AbstractContemporary blockchain architectures face a critical impasse defined herein as the "Tetra-Lemma"—a four-dimensional optimization problem comprising decentralization, security, scalability, and thermodynamic sustainability. Proof-of-Work networks confront diminishing security budgets due to the exhaustion of block subsidies, while Proof-of-Stake systems risk validator centralization. This paper establishes a Unified Monetary-Supply Framework that resolves these structural conflicts by synthesizing the deterministic "Customized Halving" schedule with the probabilistic regeneration logic of the Proof of Rinne (PoR). We demonstrate that by enforcing a "Thermodynamic Statute of Limitations" on dormant assets, the protocol functions as a Non-Equilibrium Thermodynamic Engine. This architecture transforms entropic asset attrition—traditionally viewed as systemic loss—into a regenerative security budget. Using Rincoin as a case study, the model proves that a high-frequency blockchain can maintain a deflationary supply curve while anchoring the effective circulation at a permanent target equilibrium, offering a rigorous blueprint for a closed-loop, regenerative digital economy over a secular horizon. Key Quantitative Findings Asymptotic Convergence: While the effective circulating supply may experience a temporary peak (approx. 27 million RIN), the Dual-Layer Temporal Architecture ensures stabilization below the 21 million threshold (specifically converging to 20.88 million RIN). Perpetual Stability: Beyond the initial mining and transition phases (spanning 443–703 years), the PoR mechanism ensures the indefinite maintenance of the effective circulating supply. This transcends the finite lifecycle of traditional PoW assets by establishing a permanent, self-sustaining regenerative cycle. Thermodynamic Equilibrium: Mathematical verification of the "Golden Ratio" between Reserve, Unrecovered Loss, and Actual Circulation (approx. 77 : 70 : 21). Publication StatusThis manuscript (v1.6.1) serves as the foundational theoretical framework for the Rincoin protocol. Future iterations will formalize the consensus mechanisms required to govern these algorithmic parameters. Integrity & Provenance ArchitectureThe scientific integrity and existence of this document are secured by a Triple-Verification Layer: 1. Academic Provenance: Indexed via Zenodo (DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17141922). 2. Thermodynamic Timestamping: Anchored to the Bitcoin blockchain via OpenTimestamps. 3. Identity Assurance: Digitally signed by the author via a third-party certification authority (GMO Sign). Note: Verification data and the "Certificate of Authenticity" are available in the supplementary files. CorrespondencePrimary Author: Michiru Tokino (also known as Aevust in the decentralized infrastructure community). Academic Inquiries: edu@aevust.org Community Governance: @aevustus (Discord) / @aevust (X/Telegram) Keywords: Rincoin, Proof of Rinne (PoR), non-equilibrium thermodynamic engine, phase transition of value, dual-layer architecture, customized halving, thermodynamic statute of limitations, regenerative crypto-economics, blockchain tetra-lemma.
The delisting of Binance USD (BUSD) constitutes a major regulatory intervention in the stablecoin market and provides a unique opportunity to examine how targeted regulation affects liquidity allocation, market concentration, and short-run systemic risk in crypto-asset markets. Using daily data for 2023 and a linear and nonlinear Local Projections event-study framework, this paper analyzes the dynamic market responses to the BUSD delisting across major stablecoins and cryptocurrencies. The results show that liquidity displaced from BUSD is reallocated primarily toward USDT and USDC, leading to a measurable increase in stablecoin market concentration, while decentralized and algorithmic stablecoins absorb only a limited share of the shock. At the same time, Bitcoin and Ethereum experience temporary liquidity contractions followed by a relatively rapid recovery, suggesting conditional resilience of core crypto-assets. Overall, the findings document how a regulatory-induced exit of a major stablecoin reshapes short-run market dynamics and concentration patterns, highlighting potential trade-offs between regulatory enforcement and market structure. The paper contributes to the literature by providing the first empirical analysis of the BUSD delisting and by illustrating the usefulness of Local Projections for studying regulatory shocks in cryptocurrency markets.