We investigate the operational and coordinated strategies of a low carbon supply chain in the carbon limit and exchange market, where the capital-constrained manufacturer exhibits loss-reluctance behavior due to the uncertainty of market demand. In this paper, we calculate the greatest loan interest rate for the electronic business platform, the greatest ordering amount for the manufacturer in the decentralized system, and the greatest ordering amount for the entire supply chain in the centralized system. We design a transfer payment contract to coordinate the emission-dependent supply under the electronic business platform financing service by comparing the manufacturer's greatest ordering amount in different systems. We conclude from theoretical analyses that when the critical value of the manufacturer's self-owned capital exceeds a certain point, the greatest ordering amount of the loss-reluctance manufacturer under the electronic business platform financing service is greater than that of the well-funded manufacturer. Furthermore, when the manufacturer's self-owned capital changes within a certain range, the electronic business platform financing service can cause both an electronic business platform and a loss-reluctant manufacturer to achieve Pareto improvement, even though the electronic business platform financing service does not coordinate the supply chain, which is regulated by a carbon limit and an exchange mechanism. Furthermore, when a certain condition is met by the transfer payment contract, the lack of capital and the low carbon supply chain can achieve complete coordination.
In November 2019 the European Parliament (2019/2930(RSP)) declared a climate and environmental emergency, calling for urgent and concrete action. The year 2019 was Europe's hottest year on record (Copernicus Climate Change Service, 2019), and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2018, p. v) reported that âemissions of greenhouse gases due to human activities, the root cause of global warming, continue to increase, year after yearâ. Swedish teenage climate activist Greta Thunberg inspired and led a worldwide school strike movement, and mass protests dominated by young women took place around the world (Wahlström et al., 2019). The European Parliament resolution of 14 March 2019 (2019/2582(RSP)) âwelcomes the fact that people across Europe, in particular younger generations, are becoming increasingly active in demonstrating for climate justiceâ. At the institutional level 2019 was a year of renewal, with the European Parliament elections in May, the adoption of a new Council strategy in June and the appointment of a new Commission in December. Climate change was a priority for all these institutional actors. The Council strategy 2019â24, for example, insists on the urgent need to build a âclimate-neutral, green, fair and social Europeâ. The new President of the Commission Ursula von der Leyen announced her intention to see Europe become the first climate-neutral continent by 2050. Climate change arrived on the EU agenda in the 1980s, emerging out of environmental policy, which was already established as an area that required transnational action. Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s the climate ambition of the EU exceeded its ability to agree on, and implement, effective actions (Dupont and OberthĂŒr, 2015). When the USA withdrew from the Kyoto protocol in 2001 the EU took on a global leadership role and has continued to construct an identity as a global actor around the issue of climate change (Jordan et al., 2010). This had economic motivations (to avoid being undercut by exporters with lower environmental standards) but was also part of the post-Maastricht efforts to increase the EU's global actorness. The past decade has seen climate change gain prominence and take centre stage. In 2009 the landmark climate and energy framework (COM(2014)15 final) introduced targets for greenhouse gas emissions, energy efficiency and renewable energy. Within the European Commission climate action gained its own Directorate General, DG CLIMA. This was an important part of the process of institutionalizing climate change. The issue of climate change continued to rise up the EU and the global agenda, and there was a strong dynamic between the two. The Lisbon Treaty (2007) gave the EU competence to conclude international environmental agreements. The EU, along with its member states, is a party to the United Nations Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and plays a key role in trying to reach agreement on global targets (Biedenkopf and Dupont, 2013; OberthĂŒr and Groen, 2018). It is in this context that the EU emerged as an influential player in the 2015 Paris Agreement, the first climate agreement to be universal and legally binding. International targets and monitoring and reporting have acted as an impetus for action on the part of the EU and many, although not all, its member states (Dupont, 2019). The European Green Deal (2019), drafted against the background of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2018) report on the predicted impact of a global temperature rise of 1.5°C, further highlights the way that the issue of climate change has become part of the institutional fabric of the EU. Reinforcing the EU's commitments under the Paris agreement, as well as the UN's 2030 Agenda, with its Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (2015), it provides a framework in which the EU can try to assert leadership and mould its own efforts towards a sustainability that âleaves no-one behindâ. The Council's conclusions on climate diplomacy of 18 February 2019 describe 2019 as the year of pushing further convergence between the SDGs and the climate agenda. The initial focus of EU climate policy was climate change mitigation. This refers to strategies for reducing climate change, largely through the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. Key policy frameworks are the Climate and energy package and the Environmental Action Programme, which provides an overarching framework for all environmental and climate policy. The European Green Deal (COM(2019)640 final), proposed by the new Commission in 2019, sets out a strategy to achieve net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 while sustaining economic growth, and promises to enshrine this in legislation, with the first climate laws due to be proposed in 2020. Since 2013, internal EU climate policy has also included an adaptation strategy, in recognition of the fact that climate change is having an impact within the EU, as well as, more obviously, elsewhere. While climate change mitigation is more readily framed as an issue to be dealt with at the EU level, adaptation to the effects of climate change appeared, until recently, to require local responses or to be of concern only in the countries that are most severely hit by the impact of climate change, and are concentrated in the global south. The floods and heat waves of the early 2000s raised awareness of the impact of climate change within the EU and of its cross-border nature (Rayner and Jordan, 2010), prompting the adoption of an EU adaptation strategy (COM(2013)216). Member states are encouraged to produce national adaptation strategies, setting out, for example, how they will climate-proof their transport, energy and agriculture sectors, and protect their populations from flooding, droughts and heat waves. Adaptation has a longer history as part of EU external relations. The visible impact of climate change in developing countries, and the use of development aid for adaptation purposes, mean that climate change has been prominent in EU development policy. A Commission communication in 2003 (COM(2003)85 final) declared that climate change was a problem for development, as well as an environmental problem. Since the Lisbon treaty (2007), however, climate change has been substantially reframed on the external agenda, replacing a development frame with one much more closely related to migration and security (Youngs, 2014). Development policy is expected to align with the Union's strategic priorities, set out in the Global Strategy (2016), which is the overarching statement of EU foreign policy and that frames climate change as a security threat and a root cause of migration (Global Strategy, 2016, p. 27). This article will focus on two aspects of recent EU climate policy. The first is not new, but is important. It is the recognition that climate change, like other cross-cutting issues, cannot be addressed in isolation. It is inextricably connected to key areas of EU activity, including energy, transport and agriculture. Climate objectives need to be integrated into all areas of policymaking. This is referred to as climate mainstreaming and has been embraced by EU policymakers as a desirable practice. It has obvious parallels with gender mainstreaming, but, as this article shows, is itself gender blind, and this is problematic. The second aspect of recent EU climate policy on which this article focuses is new. It is the growing presence of statements about the need for a âjust transitionâ to a climate-neutral economy, one which âputs people firstâ and ensures that âno-one is left behindâ. I argue that embedding a gender lens in these two aspects of EU climate policy makes a valuable contribution to efforts to create a sustainable and just future. On the surface, it may seem that climate change affects everyone equally. As British Conservative MEP and member of the European Parliament Committee on Women's Rights and Gender Equality, Marina Yannakoudakis, said, âThe climate is the same for males and females, so far as I know. When it rains we all get wetâ (BBC News, 2012). However, gender, development and environment scholars have produced a large volume of literature demonstrating that climate change is, indeed, gendered. The early contributions to this literature argued that structural inequalities in the global political economy and within societies increase women's vulnerability to the impact of climate change (Agrawala and Crick, 2009; Alston, 2013; Brody et al., 2008; Skinner, 2011). They argued that climate change has a particularly detrimental effect on the poorest countries and, within them, on the poorest parts of the population. As women constitute a large proportion of the poorest in society, they will be amongst the hardest hit and the least well positioned socially, legally and economically, to respond (Morrow, 2017). There is evidence to support the argument that women's vulnerability to the effects of climate change is increased in relation to men's by their relative disadvantage in terms of access to resources, land ownership, education and caring responsibilities (Dankelman, 2010). However, there is also a crucial insistence in the literature that women cannot be perceived as helpless victims of climate change (MacGregor, 2017). A second strand of the early gender and climate change literature emphasized women's agency and specific skills and knowledge which, it was argued, made them potentially useful actors in climate change adaptation. As food producers, for example, they were well placed to adapt agricultural techniques to changing environmental conditions. It was also argued that, as energy users in the home, they could play a role in climate change mitigation by adopting new forms of cooking stoves, for example. The gendered impact of climate change and women's role as climate actors are not confined to the global south, and researchers have demonstrated these links in rich industrialized countries, including EU member states (Tschakert and Machado, p. They have that there are gendered in the of climate change, including transport and energy They have gendered in vulnerability to the effects of climate as heat waves and and they have gendered in towards climate change and towards the need to mitigation and adaptation on and gender is to between women and and between and of women and not to between of and which can be by and women and Gender inequalities with other structural inequalities including and and Gender is one of of that have an impact on the of and as a of and makes it of in its with other structural lens has been by scholars to important contributions to of the impact of climate change and responses to it et al., and and Machado, 2012). can and in relation to climate change. women as victims of climate change, an that social on as gender, and place the vulnerability and of and example, on and the EU and 2013; and that there are gendered in energy and but that gender is not the only more women are not a and there are within the global and the global south. and p. for example, argue that, climate most have in with women across Europe with their at the Commission and this to their climate impact as well as climate to which inequalities in and p. and have out that women's presence in climate is and have for this to be and Development 2018). There is evidence that women in climate a example, and that emissions are lower in countries women have political support the argument that women be included in climate they knowledge and which to policy However, not all agree that there is a between the presence of women in climate and policy In a and that a mass of women policymakers not in climate policy. that, in the most European countries, gender in and in towards climate were and from climate policy were largely of the of gender and how to them in relation to climate of the gender of the climate policy is made p. This is not to that women and not be in all of but this be on of and policy change. This is part of a much on the to which women in a to gendered et al., 2012). In climate change is as a of the gender inequalities that in all that gender inequalities or international to to the gender p. This not mean at It which women which a need to and gender inequalities in relation to climate change that can women more to its impact that this vulnerability is or the same for all a gender lens to climate change to and how gender This is a first to gender in relation to climate change. There is a and recognition in EU that objectives cannot be by them as but that they need to be into all and at all of Gender mainstreaming and environmental policy are two of this and are This that gender and environmental objectives be or into all areas of EU including they are not In the of gender for example, this foreign and agriculture or also that the cross-cutting issue or be at all of the from of the issue and problem to monitoring and for climate mainstreaming are increasingly in EU policy (Dupont, There is an of literature on gender mainstreaming, and much of it focuses on mainstreaming has to its 2013; and et al., to the between gender mainstreaming as a with and gender mainstreaming as an policy and and p. and In its gender mainstreaming is as a policy into and that in this of gender mainstreaming the it in and gender in particular its of and inequalities 2010). it refers to of and and is for at women or is an to The of a set of and along with for their and for the of their and the that gender mainstreaming has become a of et al., 2016, The in has its in of gender and was proposed as a way of policy to gender of gender as a policy gender mainstreaming a to gender in all policy including perceived to be gender It to gender at all of so that be with the of gender already within them, action being they had already been or of gender mainstreaming and other forms of policy including climate mainstreaming, have to their et al., 2018). and (2007) of climate change mainstreaming, for example, that were not for and on There are Commission of the Council of and the the European Parliament and the The European and in particular its on the development and gender have been increasingly active in the mainstreaming of these all European Parliament but the Parliament can be out of forms of dominated by and this to most of the Union's climate change and it for as environmental to on up by economic as and agriculture. and der institutional on economic as the to mainstreaming climate change. mainstreaming this cross-cutting issue is seen as the and the of and the energy is policy or for will these and to mainstreaming may particularly in of economic is embraced in EU policy and has to a of new from climate change to migration and There are also for these cross-cutting to be in and not just EU policy increasingly use the to describe the between two or more policy areas 2013; et al., and and Climate change is placed in a of including climate security and climate The Council conclusions on climate diplomacy of February to further the between climate change and security in political development and action and While this statement is an important recognition that policy are and cannot be addressed in from it about how gender can be other cross-cutting only are climate change, migration and other cross-cutting to be but so be the between This about the of of issues, of them are priority It also a context in which the mainstreaming of gender more 2019). The literature on policy and policy that policy a that as a strategic and focus on the and not on the and The literature that, commitments by EU gender mainstreaming is from key policy areas and is as and 2011). the literature on and policy environmental policy and gender mainstreaming, we that institutional and the more actors can that mainstreaming or policy in their between the to policy economic or As policymakers increasingly to cross-cutting and to policy we need a way to and how they a gender lens to EU climate policy that much of it gender The European Green Deal (COM(2019)640 final) makes of it states that the SDGs will be at the of the EU's the climate and energy framework (COM(2014)15 final) makes of A for final) makes of the Environmental Action makes one of women as a This is the fact that gender mainstreaming is a treaty that a framework for EU gender policy and gender mainstreaming is set out in the Gender Strategy final) and a framework for gender into all external action is set out in the Gender Action and that the EU is to the SDGs and to the Gender Action are a to the impact of proposed actions and are a key of the EU's gender mainstreaming The impact the social and environmental of the proposed are addressed under social to the on social impact the have to be the have a impact on women and the between women and 2017). However, impact are not out, and they are gender is example, the impact the Environmental Action not a to gender, the (2018) the Commission communication for or the impact final) the climate and energy framework of gender awareness in relation to climate change in of EU policy, but they The Gender Strategy has a on climate change that out of the in which climate change is gendered and states that, the gender can have a key role in the of these but it about how this will be refers to climate in relation to women's in climate However, the by women to in and on climate and environmental is the one least included in the to the European Commission by the EU member and the European external action EU to frame gender as between and the of these two the as well as them, and the of other structural inequalities with There are institutional in which a more gender The Gender Strategy makes from a focus on between women and It states that the Gender Strategy will to achieve Europe women and and in all their are The Commission will gender mainstreaming by including a gender in all of policy in all EU policy internal and The Strategy will be as a cross-cutting there is about how this will be the recognition of is an important from gender with a The only EU that has to the relation between gender and climate change is the European which has produced a of and focus on women and adaptation in the global but gender of climate and responses example, the European Parliament resolution of on a report by the Green states that will not be climate gender This is a of the nature of gender and climate It the but with them the insistence that a sustainable inequalities to be addressed in The resolution not for the presence of women in climate but for the at all of of and gender objectives in action and other for gender and for the of gender at all of climate change The European Parliament for a resolution on the European Green Deal by on of the the of gender actions and in the European Green Deal and the European Commission to gender mainstreaming and climate and environmental action at all on the Commission to on the made by President von der Leyen to gender in all policy and on the made by to a on gender and climate and to gender and climate into all aspects of European development It also on the European Commission to gender impact and specific for gender in climate actions and of the European Green The that was by the European Parliament as its resolution of on the European Green Deal of this but the need for a gender on actions and in the Green including gender mainstreaming and The also included the from the on the Commission in its efforts to the EU as of international climate and to a concrete action to on the commitments of the Gender Action at to gender in the and to a EU gender and climate change with resources, to and climate action in the EU and and der argument that gender is it the EU. In there is evidence of gender mainstreaming of EU climate change policy. Climate change is framed as a and or as one that is with foreign and security strategic frames not obvious links to which could a gendered p. The European efforts to gender into climate change an important contribution to policy but climate has largely within the of the which a to climate change only on the a or Swedish is to important to the mainstreaming of gender climate policy is that climate change is as a cross-cutting issue in itself and is in a of with strategic priorities, as migration and This to the of gender from climate policy. The gender mainstreaming and policy literature that this on the of gender the process of gender mainstreaming, and that the of gender and climate are EU have the of a âjust transitionâ which âleaves no-one behindâ. The European Green Deal states that the to a climate-neutral be just and It people The of a just from with in and environmental to a to the just in the Paris Agreement, which of a just of the and the of and in with The European Parliament resolution on a climate and environmental states that be by strong social and to a fair and to a just not about this however, and in EU climate policy the refers to for example, between areas that produce and that with the of no-one the of a just is being by actors and by the European Parliament to build an to the of a sustainable future. This a change from the to climate action which on and to one that also of the social of climate change and of climate action. EU policy for climate change to be all EU The European Parliament resolution of 14 March 2019 the need to climate ambition into all EU including The Council conclusions of 2019 the nature of Europe's climate and environmental and need to actions for the that is just and is environment and climate aspects into the of the EU's and This growing for climate mainstreaming to the increase in to cross-cutting issues, and policy and in EU policy is at the of the which the important between policy and 2030 states that gender is a for sustainable The SDGs have an overarching to the mainstreaming of a gender in the of the However, at the same the SDGs gender and climate change EU on this with the on on gender The for the of climate change and gender has not been can a gender to the of EU climate The effects of climate change are not the same for inequalities the impact of climate change and the ability to respond to introduced to climate change or to adapt to it also have effects on to their gender, ability and other structural There are gender in the of climate change, in towards and in access to climate of gender mainstreaming have the between and They have how gender it the and have argued that a to gender is more In a gender are to the of the agenda et al., gender and more cannot be left until after the is It is not an or an but to a sustainable for all and EU climate policy is from an focus on towards a recognition that climate change affects and that people are part of the However, and into the of climate change and proposed responses to it is a to gender and efforts to climate change continue to in being integrated into Gender is not integrated into all aspects of and at all it is on or in and in et p. to as a of set of of in and around gender mainstreaming The Council conclusions on climate diplomacy describe 2019 as the year of pushing further convergence between the SDGs and climate A of these two a contribution to a but this strong political will and effective policy
Notwithstanding the apparent lack of success of international emission trading under the Kyoto Protocol, numerous jurisdictions are implementing mitigation mechanisms that put a price on carbon, whether by taxing activities that cause release of carbon to the atmosphere, or by creating markets through which the cost of atmospheric release of carbon is internalised to the relevant activities by way of emission trading schemes. Carbon pricing is integral as a tool of global climate policy for achieving greenhouse gas emission mitigation. The Paris Agreement and related decisions recognise and embrace the diversity of approaches taken by jurisdictions, moving away from the previous approach under the Kyoto Protocol. All the same, these diverse and heterogeneous mechanisms â in particular emission trading schemes â might achieve greater efficiency, larger scale and stimulate essential private sector engagement and other benefits, were they to be connected. There is a body of academic literature on the subject of linking emissions trading schemes, but surprisingly few examples. Linking entails jurisdictions achieving a certain level of convergence and homogeneity, which means parties negotiating out their differences. An alternative model is networking of emission trading schemes, which recognises and places a value on those differences, while maintaining the autonomy of the individual schemes. This thesis proposes a conceptual model of networking built on a distributed ledger technology (DLT) platform. DLT is one of a suite of new, so-called disruptive technologies impacting how services, especially financial services, will be provided into the future. As the carbon market network model is essentially a supra-jurisdictional financial market, the impact of these disruptive technologies must be taken into account. Even more so, DLT introduces features potentially making networking more feasible and effective within the policy framework of the Paris Agreement. New technologies come with their own issues, not least the fact that existing regulatory regimes may not be able to account for the changes they bring. Implementation of applications should be managed so that, on the one hand, they do not simply become means for circumventing current laws, but on the other, are not regulated in such a manner as to stifle innovation. In proposing an institutional and regulatory framework to enable the operation of the conceptual model proposed, this thesis analyses the literature and existing regulation of DLT applications in the financial markets. In so doing, the analysis draws together the applicable elements of climate change law, financial regulation and developing regulation of the technology. It aims to arrive at a position on the extent to which the proposal can overcome delays, inefficiencies and other problems that currently beset the carbon market, so as to maximise the opportunities for emissions trading to make a difference in achieving the objectives of climate policy. The thesis contributes to the extant academic literature in a number of respects, for instance, arguing that it is applications of new distributed ledger technology that should be the focus of regulation, not the technology itself; and by a novel application of theory concerning fragmentation of international environmental law and climate law to illustrate why it is postulated international emissions trading under the Kyoto Protocol was less effective than hoped. Equally importantly, the thesis contributes by examining networking as a means for connecting carbon markets, in contrast to the current linking approach; and by proposing a model for such networking, then analysing a governance structure for such connected markets, both areas that have received little previous academic attention. Key implications for policymakers arising from the thesis include issues such as the need for an assessment methodology to value diverse mitigation outcomes; and how to connect heterogeneous carbon pricing mechanisms to enhance mitigation policy.
Rafael LealâArcas, Michalis Kanakakis, George Thanos, Gemma Kate Fearnley
Achieving greater renewable energy usage, energy efficiency, and energy security are practically universal goals today. This Article introduces business models to illustrate the roles of multiple actors in a decentralized smart grid system. It identifies interactions between the various players, the tools they will manage, the added value in using the functionalities of such a system, and ways to maximize profits for those involved. The Article also examines the United Kingdom (UK) as a case study. It explores where the UK stands in terms of introducing tools and technologies for decentralization, including electric vehicles, smart grids, and demand response mechanisms. It also examines regulation in the UK to assess how conducive it is for decentralized energy. In addition, the Article identifies specific concerns related to data protection stemming from smart metering and analyses relevant regulation in this regard.
Changli Lu, Zhao Ming, Imran Ahmad Khan, Peerapong Uthansakul
Cap-and-trade regulation provides incentives for manufacturers to reduce carbon emissions, but manufacturersâ insufficient capital can disrupt the implementation of low-carbon emission reduction technologies. To alleviate capital constraints, manufacturers can adopt external financing for low-carbon emission reduction investments. This paper studies the independent financing and financing cooperation behavior in a supply chain in which the manufacturer and retailer first implement low-carbon emission reduction technologies and then organize production and sales in accordance with wholesale price contracts. Through comparing the optimal profits and low-carbon emission reduction levels under the independent financing and financing cooperation mode, we come to the following conclusions: (1) Although financing interest increases the cost of the supply chain, manufacturers prefer to invest in reducing carbon emissions rather than buying carbon quotas. (2) When financing independently, a decentralized decision-making mode (MD) is the best choice for manufacturers. (3) In cooperative financing, when the supply chain adopts a decentralized decision-making mode (SD) in which the retailer determines the financing cost-sharing ratio according to their optimal profit, the profits of the supply chain and its members are significantly improved. (4) When manufacturers and retailers adopt a centralized decision-making model (SC) in cooperative financing, they jointly determine the financing cost-sharing ratio and the level of low-carbon emission reduction. If the financing cost-sharing ratio meets a certain threshold range, the profits of manufacturers and retailers achieve Pareto improvement, indicating that this cooperative financing model is effective.
The issue of whether contracts promote innovation and sustainability is an important but overlooked aspect for achieving energy and environmental targets, as well as for creating smart and sustainable cities. In this article, based on the principle/agent problem and Holmström and Milgromâs work on optimal contracts it is argued that the current general conditions of architectural and engineering consulting agreements in Sweden (ABK 09)âa standard type of contract often used in developer/consultant relationsâmay not incentivize choices that support the long-term goals of society. Furthermore, although this exploratory study specifically analyses a Swedish standard contract, the question of how contractual incentive structures can optimize real-world performance is a general one, and thus the articleâs findings have general applicability. This exploratory study also points to further research into how contractual structures impact climate-neutral buildings. In this way, Swedish consultants who use ABK 09 are incentivized to include low-risk, well-proven, and widely used technologies in order to minimize risks for themselves. This study contributes to resolving this dilemma by suggesting how ABK 09 could be restructured to change the balance between incentives and risk and incentivize innovation and sustainability. As mentioned above, the current study operates at a theoretical level. It discusses six possible changes that would better align the contract with the societal goals of innovation and sustainability.
Forecasting and assessing the risk of heat waves is a crucial public policy stake. Evaluate the probability of heat waves and their severity can be possible by knowing the temperature in continuous time. However, daily extremes (maxima and minima) might be the only available data. The Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process is commonly used to model temperature dynamic. An estimation of the process parameters using only daily observed suprema of temperatures is proposed here. This new approach is based on a least square minimization using the cumulative distribution function of the supremum. Risk measures related to heat waves are then obtained numerically. In order to calculate explicitly those risk measures, it can be useful to have the joint law of the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process and its supremum. The study is _rst limited to the joint density / distribution of the endpoint and supremum of the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process. This probability admits a density, solution of the Fokker-Planck equation and explicitly obtained as an expansion involving parabolic cylinder functions. The proof of the density expression relies on a decomposition on a Hilbert basis of the space via a spectral method. We also study the oscillating Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process, which drift parameter is piecewise constant depending on the sign of the process. The Laplace transform of this process hitting time is determined and we also calculate the probability for the process to be positive on a fixed time.
Geoengineering is a proposed response to anthropogenic global warming (AGW). Conventionally it consists of two strands: Solar Radiation Management (SRM), which is fast-acting, incomplete but inexpensive, and Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR), which is slower acting, more expensive, and comprehensive. Pairing SRM and CDR offers a contractually complete solution for future emissions if effectively-scaled and coordinated. SRM offsets warming, while CDR takes effect.We suggest coordination using a blockchain, i.e. smart contracts and a distributed ledger. Specifically, we integrate CDR futures with time and volume-matched SRM orders, to address emissions contractually before release. This provides an economically and environmentally proportionate solution to CO2 emissions at the wellhead, with robust contractual transparency, and minimal overhead cost. Our proposal offers a âpolluter paysâ implementation of Long & Shepherds SRM âbridgeâ concept. This âpolluter geoengineersâ approach mandates and verifies emissions-linked payments with minimal friction, delay, or cost. Finally, we compare alternative market designs against this proposal, finding that this proposal offers several advantages. We conclude that blockchain implementation of the âpolluter geoengineersâ approach is attractive and feasible for larger wellhead contracts. We also identify a handful of advantages and disadvantages that merit further study.
Capital constraints exist in many supply chains. We examine a low carbon distribution channel that consists of a manufacturer and a retailer, in which the retailer is constrained by capital. The retailer can be financed by bank credit from a competitive bank market. A Stackelberg model is developed to analyze the integrated decision-making process of ordering, financing, and emission reduction. By comparing the decentralized and centralized channels, we obtain that the manufacturerâs green technology investment should be linearly proportional to the retailerâs order quantity in both channels. Thus, a large order quantity leads to increased efforts to reduce emissions. Results further show that the centralized channel in some cases has fewer emissions and can generate more profits for the whole supply chain compared with the decentralized channel. We therefore propose a revenue sharing contract with a function form to coordinate the distribution channel. When the government allocates appropriate quotas to the supply chain, high carbon price can benefit the environment and supply chain efficiency.
In spite of the apparent lack of success of international emission trading under the Kyoto Protocol, numerous jurisdictions are implementing mitigation mechanisms that put a price on carbon, whether by taxing activities that cause release of carbon to the atmosphere, or by creating markets through which the cost of atmospheric release of carbon is internalised to the relevant activities by way of emission trading schemes. These diverse and heterogeneous mechanisms â in particular the emission trading schemes â might achieve greater efficiency, larger scale, and other benefits, were they to be connected. Against this background, this paper sets out a proposal for a conceptual model for the networking of emission trading schemes, built on the architecture of distributed ledger technology. In this way, it is argued, the interconnection of these emission trading schemes might be achieved flexibly, cost effectively and efficiently, while taking account of the requirements for cooperative approaches, evidenced in the Paris Agreement. The purpose of the paper is to stimulate, and provide a starting point for, more detailed, intensive discussion of what the technical requirements might be of some such scheme.
To discuss the decision making problem of optimal production in supply chain enterprises, by taking a two-stage supply chain with one supplier and one retailer as the research objective and considering emissions trading, the profit models of both centralized and decentralized supply chains were proposed with logical proof. The conclusions show that given finance demand for products, carbon-trading policy enables members of the supply chain to make more money from investing carbon emissions. In addition, in concentration decision, emission reduction effort best that in decentralized supply chain and all members' profit will grow up if the retailer provide the supplier with appropriate subsidies. Furthermore, customs' low-carbon awareness provides a boost for emission reduction efforts and leads to more benefits to the enterprises
In climate change, as in other areas, recent years have produced a âCambrian explosionâ of transnational institutions, standards, financing arrangements, and programs. As a result, climate governance has become complex, fragmented, and decentralized, operating without central coordination. Most studies of climate governance focus on inter state institutions. In contrast, I map a different realm of climate change governance: the diverse array of transnational schemes. I analyze this emerging system in terms of two theoretical frameworks developed to describe, explain, and evaluate complex governance arrangementsâregime complex theory and polycentric governance theoryârevealing fruitful avenues for positive and normative research. I conclude by arguing that the benefits of institutional complexity could be increased, and the costs reduced, through nonhierarchical âorchestrationâ of climate change governance, in which international organizations or other appropriate authorities support and steer transnational schemes that further global public interests.
The paper deals with the equivalence between taxation and emission permits according to different viewpoints: the first one sets prices, the second one quantities. But equivalence is more formal than substantial: taxation is the generating fact, the market of permits does not exist spontaneously. Its price is unstable because supply is not independent from demand. It is manipulatable either ex ante when free allowances are allocated or ex post during the period of compliance through Walrasian tatonnement. A real economic determination of prices exists only when there are unit taxes or penalties on emissions exceeding the quotas. In order to avoid these drawbacks, pay-as-bid auctions must be used and free allowances avoided. Taxation or the price of emission permits are the real option value of changing techniques. An assignment rule is proposed : taxes are assigned to reduce average emissions and permits to reduce marginal emissions. In order to transform the cost into a real change of techniques, it is necessary to finance the sector of research and development of an amount greater than the taxes levied on pollution, which serve at paying the rent of innovation. These extra subsidies are used to move factors of production as capital from industry towards the innovation sector. The tax equivalence is ternary and concerns the taxes on pollution, capital and energy, because extracting fossil fuels is similar as innovation. Decentralization through market schemes induces that depollution has a marketable cost.
This thesis consists of a summary and four papers. The first two papers address political economy and indus-trial organization aspects of agricultural policy, and the last two international aspects of environmental policy. Paper [I] explains Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) subsidies to farmers by the influence of farmer interest-groups with an EU-wide membership. The analysis is based on panel-data for fifteen commodities over the period 1986-2003. Because the CAP is set as an overall EU policy, effective lobbying presents a collective ac-tion problem to the farmers in the EU as a whole. Indicators of lobbying, which are based on this perception, are found to explain part of the variation in agricultural support. In Paper [II], the Bresnahan-Lau framework is used to analyze whether policy reforms, i.e. the two-price sys-tem (an input quota, 1986-1991) and a general deregulation of dairy policy (1991-1994) had any market power effects on the Swedish butter market. The results show that the null hypothesis of no market power cannot be rejected, for any of the specific policy reforms, at any reasonable significance level. Paper [III] concerns the welfare consequences of environmental policy cooperation. It is assumed that coun-tries finance their public expenditures by using distortionary taxes, and that they differ with respect to compe-tition in the labor market. It is shown how the welfare effect of an increase in the expenditures on abatement depends on changes in the environmental damage, employment and work hours. The welfare effect is also related to the strategic interaction among the countries in the prereform equilibrium. In Paper [IV] environmental policy in an economic federation, where each national government faces a mixed tax problem, is addressed. It is assumed that the federal government sets emission targets, which are imple-mented at the national level. It is also assumed that the economic federation is decentralized. The results high-light a strategic role of income and commodity taxation, i.e. each country uses its policy instruments, at least in part, to influence the emission target.
David S. McCauley, Robert Bruce Anderson, Richard L. Bowen, Ibrahim Elassiouty · 6 authors
Egypt seems to be on the brink of a new era in water management. The country suppose to follow a different operational mode that is âwater conservation oriented, decentralized, environmentally sensitive, private sector oriented, equitable and operationally efficientâ The focus of this study was on market-based instruments (MBIâs) as complements to traditional command and control measures for managing water quantity and quality. Prior to evaluating potential water MBIs, it was necessary to identify the water management problems and challenges that need to be addressed through policy adjustments. \nThese challenges were threat of water shortages, service delivery in municipal water supply, lake Nasser pollution, Irrigation service delivery challenges, Nile River pollution above Cairo, Insufficient irrigation system upkeep, water pollution in the Nile Delta, Pollution of lakes , low user contribution to irrigation system upkeep, groundwater contamination, and Weak attention to in-stream flows. \nSuch challenges have impacts on: (1) Nonrenewable groundwater management, (2) Adverse effects on human health, (3) Subsidies affecting water use efficiency, (4) Reduced agricultural productivity, (5) Rainfall capture and flash flood protection. The impacts generated some Threats to aquatic ecosystems, particularly, Negative consequences of rising water tables and Negative impacts on aesthetics (incl. tourism) \nA two-step screening process was developed and utilized to evaluate the likely success of alternative market-based policy instruments in response to one or more of water management challenges. The instruments were screened based on economic efficiency and equity and other economic factors relating to the nature of the instrument itself. They also were evaluated based on criteria that considered the specific social, cultural, political, and institutional context in which the instrument will be applied. \nThereon, the study explored the applicability of economic instruments to help address Egyptâs current water management challenges. It resulted in an initial evaluation of twenty instruments that seemed most promising. Screening criteria were developed and applied to assess the merits of each, and direction also was received from nearly 60 participants who attended the studyâs concluding Workshop on Economic Incentives for Water. The most promising policy instruments that concluded from the study were: \nWoith respect to the water quantity management deemed of highest priority for follow-up analysis and possible policy action were: Groundwater Extraction Charges, Tariff Reductions for Imported Water Meters and Water Conserving Equipment, Several other measures were identified as warranting careful further analysis. These include area-based irrigation service charges; volumetric water delivery charges for large agricultural enterprises; and increased user fees for the supply of urban and industrial water services. \nLikewise, the most promising policy measures identified to address water quality \nproblems were: Increased User Fees for Wastewater Treatment, Increased Subsidies to Finance Wastewater Treatment Facilities, Subsidized Rural Sanitation, and Subsidized Pollution Control Equipment \nTo achieve such model four approaches to positive change have been identified. These include Creating incentives and disincentives for water management to protect its quality. In addition to Institutionalizing the role private participation; environmental protection and identifying mechanisms to ensure appropriate benefits for participating private sector partners, decentralizing decision making, institutionalizing environmental protection, changing the role of government and improving personnel policies at macro-level decision making regarding uses of the Nile River, and improving awareness of water resources and associated environmental issues.
The international character of todayâs most pressing environmental problems has become a key challenge for environmental policy making. As regulation by a supranational authority is not a realistic option at present, policymakers have to rely on decentralized approaches to the management of international environmental resources. This study combines two core dimensions of international environmental policy: the traditional search for cost-effective policy instruments and the creation of incentives for voluntary cooperation among sovereign nations. The analysis offers some clear-cut policy recommendations for the design of environmental treaties and for the further development of existing international institutions to protect the global environment.