The Operational and Coordinated Strategies of the low carbon Supply Chain with a Loss-reluctance Under the electronic business platform Financing Service

Abstract

We investigate the operational and coordinated strategies of a low carbon supply chain in the carbon limit and exchange market, where the capital-constrained manufacturer exhibits loss-reluctance behavior due to the uncertainty of market demand. In this paper, we calculate the greatest loan interest rate for the electronic business platform, the greatest ordering amount for the manufacturer in the decentralized system, and the greatest ordering amount for the entire supply chain in the centralized system. We design a transfer payment contract to coordinate the emission-dependent supply under the electronic business platform financing service by comparing the manufacturer's greatest ordering amount in different systems. We conclude from theoretical analyses that when the critical value of the manufacturer's self-owned capital exceeds a certain point, the greatest ordering amount of the loss-reluctance manufacturer under the electronic business platform financing service is greater than that of the well-funded manufacturer. Furthermore, when the manufacturer's self-owned capital changes within a certain range, the electronic business platform financing service can cause both an electronic business platform and a loss-reluctant manufacturer to achieve Pareto improvement, even though the electronic business platform financing service does not coordinate the supply chain, which is regulated by a carbon limit and an exchange mechanism. Furthermore, when a certain condition is met by the transfer payment contract, the lack of capital and the low carbon supply chain can achieve complete coordination.