The proliferation of sophisticated AI and bot networks necessitates robust methods for verifying human uniqueness and liveness in digital ecosystems. Existing Proof-of-Personhood (PoP) solutions rely on centralized authorities, invasive static biometrics, or socially-correlatable data, creating vulnerabilities in privacy, security, and accessibility. We introduce the Entros Protocol, a decentralized framework for PoP and Self-Sovereign Identity built on Solana. The core innovation is temporal consistency: the assertion that human identity is best proven not by a static secret, but by the bounded, chaotic drift of biological and behavioral patterns over time. The framework captures multi-modal behavioral data (voice prosody, hand tremor, touch dynamics) during a configurable behavioral challenge, extracts a 308-dimensional feature vector, and produces a 256-bit locality-sensitive hash via SimHash. A Groth16 zero-knowledge proof verifies that consecutive fingerprints fall within a bounded Hamming distance without revealing either value. Attestations are anchored to non-transferable identity tokens (SPL Token-2022) with progressive Trust Scores. We provide formal security definitions, analyze the protocol against replay, synthesis, and Sybil attacks, introduce a graduated trust model distinguishing first-time liveness checks from sustained temporal consistency, and present benchmarks from a working implementation deployed on Solana devnet.
The Prism Protocol is a privacy-native authentication and identity architecture in which a user can prove attributes or authentication state without directly revealing their identity to the server. It combines WebAuthn (W3C Level 3), Zero-Knowledge Proofs (Groth16 via circom/snarkjs), and NFC-based physical presence verification into a single coherent protocol stack. The core mechanism is a triangular key derivation model: biometric authentication (WebAuthn), a device-bound private key (FIDO2 Secure Enclave), and a time-limited NFC nonce via a passive tag (card, ring, sticker; NFC ISO 14443) jointly produce an ephemeral key. In v18, a working ZKP implementation is demonstrated: an age-threshold circuit proves that a user meets a criterion without the server ever receiving the attribute value. Verification is performed server-side via snarkjs.groth16.verify(). Within the demonstrated implementation flow, the server receives no name, no biometric data, no persistent identifier, and no direct attribute value. Sessions are designed to be unlinkable from the server perspective at the protocol level; timing and metadata correlation are addressed in the threat model as a separate concern. A working proof-of-concept was demonstrated on 25 April 2026 at prismpass.globalsecurity.nu. The broader ecosystem (PrismPass, PrismID, PrismShield, PrismAdd, PrismChat, PrismAir, PrismGuard, PrismHash, PrismWipe, PrismGate) is documented in this Invention Disclosure. The protocol introduces no novel cryptographic primitives; its novelty lies in the specific architectural combination, orchestration model, and protocol-class definition addressing thirteen authentication questions not simultaneously addressed by existing systems. Note: The post-quantum migration path (ML-KEM-768, ML-DSA-65) is documented as a formal architectural claim and forward-compatibility design decision. It describes the intended migration route, not a currently implemented feature. The working implementation uses ECDH, ECDSA, AES-256-GCM and Groth16. The protocol is designed for session unlinkability: the server receives only a cryptographic proof of validity, never a persistent identifier, name, or behavioural trace. This addresses the unlinkability gap identified in the W3C Digital Credentials API and the EUDI Wallet architecture as an unresolved open problem. Author: I. Smid-Woelders, independent inventor, Zwolle, Netherlands. First documented: 25 April 2026. Contact: contact@globalsecurity.nu
The Prism Protocol is a privacy-native authentication and identity architecture in which a user can prove attributes or authentication state without directly revealing their identity to the server. It combines WebAuthn (W3C Level 3), Zero-Knowledge Proofs (Groth16 via circom/snarkjs), and NFC-based physical presence verification into a single coherent protocol stack. The core mechanism is a triangular key derivation model: biometric authentication (WebAuthn), a device-bound private key (FIDO2 Secure Enclave), and a time-limited NFC nonce via a passive tag (card, ring, sticker; NFC ISO 14443) jointly produce an ephemeral key. In v18, a working ZKP implementation is demonstrated: an age-threshold circuit proves that a user meets a criterion without the server ever receiving the attribute value. Verification is performed server-side via snarkjs.groth16.verify(). Within the demonstrated implementation flow, the server receives no name, no biometric data, no persistent identifier, and no direct attribute value. Sessions are designed to be unlinkable from the server perspective at the protocol level; timing and metadata correlation are addressed in the threat model as a separate concern. A working proof-of-concept was demonstrated on 25 April 2026 at prismpass.globalsecurity.nu. The broader ecosystem (PrismPass, PrismID, PrismShield, PrismAdd, PrismChat, PrismAir, PrismGuard, PrismHash, PrismWipe, PrismGate) is documented in this Invention Disclosure. The protocol introduces no novel cryptographic primitives; its novelty lies in the specific architectural combination, orchestration model, and protocol-class definition addressing thirteen authentication questions not simultaneously addressed by existing systems. Note: The post-quantum migration path (ML-KEM-768, ML-DSA-65) is documented as a formal architectural claim and forward-compatibility design decision. It describes the intended migration route, not a currently implemented feature. The working implementation uses ECDH, ECDSA, AES-256-GCM and Groth16. The protocol is designed for session unlinkability: the server receives only a cryptographic proof of validity, never a persistent identifier, name, or behavioural trace. This addresses the unlinkability gap identified in the W3C Digital Credentials API and the EUDI Wallet architecture as an unresolved open problem. Author: I. Smid-Woelders, independent inventor, Zwolle, Netherlands. First documented: 25 April 2026. Contact: contact@globalsecurity.nu
As unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) become increasingly integral in domains such as agriculture, logistics, and military operations, secure cross-domain authentication mechanisms are essential. Existing centralized protocols are prone to single points of failure, privacy vulnerabilities, and physical capture risks. This paper presents a novel blockchain-based, privacy-preserving authentication protocol for UAVs operating across multiple domains. By combining zero-Knowledge succinct non-interactive arguments of knowledge (zk-SNARKs) and physical unclonable functions (PUFs), the proposed protocol ensures secure identity verification without disclosing sensitive information. The blockchain platform offers a decentralized, tamper-resistant environment for UAV authentication, addressing the challenges of scalability, privacy, and security in cross-domain operations. We demonstrate the security and effectiveness of the protocol through formal and informal security proofs and performance evaluations. The results indicate that the proposed protocol outperforms traditional methods, achieving significant reductions in both computational and communication costs while maintaining high security standards.
Industrial operational technology systems are becoming more intelligent and interconnected, requiring remote maintenance and multiparty collaboration. While traditional approaches improve efficiency, they introduce risks like data leakage and unauthorized operations. Existing access control schemes struggle with compliance verification and auditing while ensuring privacy. A novel access control scheme was proposed that combines zero-knowledge proof with the publicly verifiable covert security model. The scheme features a dual-layer verification mechanism: a basic layer using zero-knowledge proof to protect identities and permissions during remote maintenance and an enhanced layer for high-risk operations that uses oblivious transfer and digital signatures to detect malicious behavior and generate cheating certificates. Security analysis showed the scheme ensures privacy, access legitimacy, and non-repudiation. Experiments demonstrated the scheme had faster proof generation and verification compared to existing methods with effective malicious behavior detection and accountability.
In the classic model, data integrity assumes a simple sender-receiver channel where threats are limited and verifications are straightforward. However, the modern Internet has reshaped this paradigm. In an era of viral misinformation, encrypted messaging, and decentralized finance, integrity is no longer about just who sent the data, but what it really means and whether it can be trusted. For instance, can we verify the authenticity of a direct message screenshot? Is Signal's end-to-end encryption truly end-to-end when a central server distributes users' keys? Can decentralized protocols, which have attracted four trillions in capital, sustain trust under attacks that wipe out millions?In response, we present a modern perspective on data integrity across diverse systems, arguing for the need of comprehensive innovations from theory to practice along three axes: cryptographic foundation in which we borrow ideas from theoretical research and develop interesting cryptographic tools, protocol design in which we find and achieve novel application goals, and empirical security analysis in which we critically evaluate deployed systems to understand their strengths and exploit their blind spots.To ground these ideas, we discuss three cases: Cauchyproofs as a batch-updatable vector commitment, an analysis of proxying in TLS oracles revealing subtleties in AEAD context unforgeability, and attacks and improvements on the Tor directory protocol. These case studies illustrate both the fragility and opportunity in today's integrity landscape, and how an integrated approach can help guide us forward.
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Massimo Bartoletti, Angelo Ferrando, E. Lipparini, Vadim Malvone
Smart contracts deployed on blockchains such as Ethereum routinely manage large amounts of assets, making their security critical. Empirical studies show that real-world attacks often exploit flaws in the business logic of contracts that unfold across multiple transactions, such as liquidity or front-running attacks. Detecting these attacks requires reasoning about expressive temporal properties beyond the capabilities of existing analysis tools. In this paper, we present an automated approach to the formal verification of smart contracts, enabling the specification and verification of complex temporal properties. Our approach provides a fully automated encoding into Lustre -- the specification language supported by the Kind 2 model checker -- of an expressive subset of Solidity contracts and temporal specifications based on first-order Hennessy-Milner Logic. This encoding allows us to leverage Kind 2 to determine whether the contract respects the specification or not. We implement our approach in a toolchain that integrates the translation and verification steps, and we evaluate its effectiveness and performance on a benchmark of smart contracts and temporal properties capturing complex attack scenarios. Our results show that the proposed approach can effectively verify non-trivial temporal properties of smart contracts and detect violations that are beyond the reach of existing analysis tools.
We present DSKAG-IT-SIG, a family of information-theoretic transaction signature schemes that achieve unconditional existential unforgeability under adaptive chosen-message attack by computationally unbounded adversaries. The construction derives per-transaction MAC keys through DSKAG, a deterministic symmetric key agreement protocol requiring no key transmission, no handshake, and no public key infrastructure. We prove (Theorem 1) that the forgery advantage of any unbounded adversary making q queries is at most q * 2^{-128} in standard mode, reducing to the statistical uniformity of DSKAG-derived keys and the pairwise independence of HMAC-SHA256 under a uniform key. We prove (Theorem 2) that cross-domain forgery advantage is at most 2^{-128} + negl(lambda), reducing to the statistical key isolation of DSKAG across policy domains. Both bounds are unconditional and independent of any computational hardness assumption. Standard-mode signatures are 30 bytes, a 97.8% reduction versus Falcon-512 (666 bytes) and compatible with ISO 20022 SWIFT message fields without re-engineering. The NexusKey composite policy digest binds asset class, jurisdiction, KYC level, and chain identity into the key derivation path; policy bypass is cryptographically equivalent to key forgery. A four-layer UltraHonk zero-knowledge proof system (143,802 gates, no trusted setup, 16 KB proof) enables permissionless on-chain compliance verification, deployed on Ethereum Sepolia and Arbitrum Sepolia. Version 2.2. 17 pages, 7 tables. Three independent academic institutions validated the construction: no structural attacks found.
Marc Dordal Carreras, Gloria Christina Heesen, Kohei Kawaguchi
Proof-of-stake deters attacks by keeping validator stake exposed to slashing and depreciation losses. Liquid staking lets operators obtain voting power using pooled stake while reducing their own exposure by selling liquid staking tokens (LSTs) and shifting uncovered slashing losses onto token holders. We study the security implications of this control-exposure wedge and the protocol design problem it creates. Competitive LST pricing can partly deter attack by lowering the resale value of claims when risk rises, but it cannot fully restore deterrence because liquid staking participants do not internalize ETH-wide depreciation losses. A fee-charging protocol prefers the no-attack regime because it maximizes total stake, yet collateral requirements alone do not generally make that outcome unique. Robust security may therefore require additional tools, including permissioned participation, screening or reserve capacity.
This paper describes a zero-knowledge proof system that enables verification of password policy compliance within an asymmetric password-authenticated key exchange (aPAKE) protocol specifically OPAQUE (RFC 9807) without revealing the password to the server. The system is built on a composable sub-circuit architecture: independent verification gadgets are combined into a single zero-knowledge proof, each gadget accepting portions of the private witness and producing public instance values, enabling the server to verify multiple password properties in one proof verification. Four gadgets are disclosed: (1) a Policy Engine for character class verification via lookup tables, (2) a History Nullifier for password inequality proof via squared-difference accumulation, (3) an OPAQUE Binder for cryptographic binding to the aPAKE registration element via hash-to-curve and elliptic curve scalar multiplication, and (4) a Breach Detector for offline breached-password detection via Bloom filter non-membership proof using algebraic hashing. The composable architecture permits addition of further gadgets without modifying existing ones, each extending the public instance vector.
Threshold transactions in Bitcoin is an effective solution for vulnerability of wallets to the loss or compromise of secret keys. It also enhances the applicability of Bitcoin to include use-cases that require partitioning the trust among a set of parties. Currently, the threshold transactions on Bitcoin expose the actual signers within the group of participants. This poses a threat of wallet hacks or theft targeting these signers. To address this issue of privacy, we propose a novel protocol to create threshold transaction using a combination of on-chain locking and off-chain proof of knowledge. As Bitcoin currently does not support verification of zero-knowledge schemes, the proposed protocol uses a Trusted Third Party ( TTP ) to verify the proofs off-chain. The trust on the third party is only limited to its service of signing on behalf of the users. The main contribution is the development and applicability of a m-out-of-N proof of partial knowledge that maintains the privacy of the signers both on-chain from the transaction verifiers and off-chain from the TTP and other signers as well. The protocol leverages Taproot’s spending path flexibility to incorporate dual spending capabilities and employs off-chain zero knowledge Σ-protocols to prove knowledge of private keys without disclosing their associated public keys. Experimental analysis demonstrates improved scalability and privacy than the mainstream threshold signature schemes for Bitcoin. A formal analysis demonstrates and establishes the security goals of the proposed mechanism.
Abstract With the increasing reliance on cloud services, establishing secure and reliable authentication for terminal devices to remotely access and control data has become a critical challenge. Existing solutions often suffer from limitations such as concentrated computational load, privacy infringements, and dependence on centralized architectures that introduce single points of failure (SPOF). To address these issues, this paper proposes DTAP, a blockchain-based dual-terminal collaborative anonymous authentication protocol. DTAP introduces a novel architecture that splits the user terminal into a U-Shield and a smartphone: the U-Shield securely hosts the master key offline, providing a robust security anchor, while the smartphone leverages BBS+ signatures and zero-knowledge proofs to achieve privacy-preserving authentication and Fine-Grained Access Control (FGAC). Furthermore, the protocol employs blockchain technology to eliminate SPOF, with smart contracts ensuring tamper-proof logging and transactional transparency. Security analysis confirms that the protocol meets the required security properties. Performance evaluation shows that DTAP maintains competitive computational and communication efficiency despite its enhanced functionality, and its deployment on the Ethereum testnet demonstrates practical feasibility.
Muhammad Ahmed, Adnan Ahmad, Furkh Zeshan, Sheeraz Akram
Blockchain-based systems increasingly require authentication mechanisms that simultaneously preserve user privacy, support accountability, and enable efficient credential revocation. However, most existing anonymous authentication schemes rely on pairing-based cryptography which introduce high computational overhead and limit deploy ability on widely adopted blockchain platforms such as Ethereum. This paper presents BAAR, a Blockchain-based Anonymous and Revocable authentication framework designed entirely within the discrete logarithm setting over the secp256k1 elliptic curve. BAAR integrates Pedersen vector commitments, Schnorr-based zero-knowledge proofs, and a Merkle-tree-based dynamic accumulator to support anonymous and unlinkable authentication with selective attribute disclosure and public, auditable revocation. Authentication and proof verification are performed off-chain, while the blockchain maintains only a compact revocation state, significantly reducing on-chain computation and gas costs. A formal security analysis demonstrates unforgeability, unlinkability, attribute privacy, and revocation soundness under standard cryptographic assumptions in the random oracle model. A prototype implementation on Ethereum confirms that BAAR achieves low gas consumption, logarithmic-time revocation, and scalable performance with respect to both the number of users and attributes. These results indicate that BAAR provides a practical balance between strong privacy guarantees and deploy ability, making it suitable for real-world blockchain-based identity and access-control systems.
The growing adoption of the Electronic Health Records (EHR) has revolutionized healthcare information management. However, seamless and secure interoperability between different healthcare organizations continues to be a hard challenge. Data silos, centralized trust model, and lack of scalability are common impairments of traditional systems in care delivery which limit ‘patient centric’ way of care delivery. While blockchain technology offers decentralized trust and immutability, current solutions tend to be closed on a single blockchain platform, and thus not able to provide cross network interoperability and accessing data. To address this gap, this research introduces a Cross Chain EHR Sharing Framework that may be leveraged for the secure, bi-directional synchronization of EHR between Hyperledger Fabric (private blockchain) and Ethereum Sepolia Testnet (public blockchain) via decentralized storage by IPFS with AES 256 encryption. To facilitate interoperability the research introduces a smart middleware layer that autonomously monitors the blockchain events, processes encrypted Content Identifier (CID)s, enforces real time cross chain consistency and smart contract-based access control. The experimental evaluation shows that proposed framework achieves low synchronization times (< 195 ms), efficient blockchain operations with low gas and latency costs, small encryption overhead (< 4–5 KB), robust file storage and retrieval through IPFS. It also provides scalability, security and real-world applicability for the cross-chain healthcare interoperability.
Wireless medical sensor networks (WMSNs) enable continuous patient monitoring by transmitting sensitive physiological data over open wireless links. Given the resource-constrained nature and large-scale deployment of such networks, authentication mechanisms must be both lightweight and privacy-preserving. Moreover, due to the frequent turnover of patients and devices in hospital environments, timely member revocation is crucial to prevent discharged or compromised entities from injecting forged reports that could mislead medical diagnosis. Although existing pairing-free certificateless aggregate authentication schemes are efficient, they often suffer from critical security and privacy vulnerabilities. Recently, an efficient certificateless authentication scheme with revocation has been proposed. However, our analysis reveals that the scheme presents the following security vulnerabilities: (i) member witnesses can be recovered from public information, (ii) revocation checks can be bypassed via identity grafting attack, and (iii) user identities can be linked due to the long-term use of static pseudonyms. To address these issues, we propose a security-enhanced certificateless aggregate authentication protocol with revocation for WMSNs. Our design enforces strong identity-membership binding to resist grafting attacks, employs a non-interactive zero-knowledge membership proof to preserve witness secrecy, and adopts dynamic pseudonym rotation to achieve unlinkability. We provide formal security proofs and comprehensive performance comparisons. The results indicate that, at the same security level, our protocol achieves more efficient signature verification while maintaining communication overhead comparable to existing schemes. In addition, the overhead introduced by our revocation mechanism remains constant, making it well suited for large-scale WMSNs deployments with frequent membership changes.
The proliferation of sophisticated AI and bot networks necessitates robust methods for verifying human uniqueness and liveness in digital ecosystems. Existing Proof-of-Humanity (PoH) solutions rely on centralized authorities, invasive static biometrics, or socially-correlatable data, creating vulnerabilities in privacy, security, and accessibility. We introduce the IAM Protocol, a decentralized framework for PoH and Self-Sovereign Identity built on Solana. The core innovation is temporal consistency: the assertion that human identity is best proven not by a static secret, but by the bounded, chaotic drift of biological and behavioral patterns over time. The framework captures multi-modal behavioral data (voice prosody, hand tremor, touch dynamics) during a configurable behavioral challenge, extracts a 134-dimensional feature vector, and produces a 256-bit locality-sensitive hash via SimHash. A Groth16 zero-knowledge proof verifies that consecutive fingerprints fall within a bounded Hamming distance without revealing either value. Attestations are anchored to non-transferable identity tokens (SPL Token-2022) with progressive Trust Scores. We provide formal security definitions, analyze the protocol against replay, synthesis, and Sybil attacks, introduce a graduated trust model distinguishing first-time liveness checks from sustained temporal consistency, and present benchmarks from a working implementation deployed on Solana devnet.
Web3 authentication stacks largely inherit ECDSA centric single-signature workflows that limit security and efficiency, while custody of identity data often remains application controlled rather than self-sovereign. We present S-Auth, an authentication layer that combines BIP340 Schnorr signatures with Decentralized Identifiers (DID), Verifiable Credentials (VC), and Content addressing (CID). The proposed solution utilizes Schnorr digital signatures, which have demonstrated improved security and efficiency over traditional schemes. The contributions of this work are as follows. Firstly, we apply the BIP340 standard to Schnorr digital signatures, bolstering security against various attacks including strong unforgeability under chosen message attack (SUF-CMA), non-malleability, linearity, related-key at tacks, hash collision, fault injection, nonce exfiltration, resource exhaustion, and domain separation. Secondly, we leverage the linearity property of Schnorr signatures to enable multi-signature aggregation and batch verification, addressing the inefficiency of existing schemes that rely on single signatures and thereby also enhancing privacy. Third, we combine the blockchain with DID, VC, and IPFS to provide a secure and self-sovereign identity that can be authenticated. Experiments comparing ECDSA, Ed25519, Schnorr, and BIP340 show that S-Auth reduces signature artifacts via aggregation, improves verifier throughput with batching, and decreases anchoring overhead while preserving user-controlled identity. S-Auth provides a self-sovereign, efficient, and secure authentication mechanism suitable for Web3 environments.
Password-based authentication systems remain the most widely used method for user verification despite being highly susceptible to offline dictionary attacks. To mitigate such attacks, server-aided password-based authentication schemes utilize an independent server, which helps to harden the credentials to be stored on the website database. Existing server-aided password-based authentication schemes rely on number-theoretic assumptions that are vulnerable to quantum-enabled adversaries and incorporate complex computations such as bilinear pairings, exponentiation, and Zero-Knowledge Proofs. In this work, we introduce a novel post-quantum secure server-aided password-based authentication scheme based on the Module Learning With Errors (M-LWE) problem. A defining feature of our protocol is its complete operational transparency as it integrates with existing web interfaces without requiring users to modify their login behaviour or perform additional computation. To ensure long-term resilience, our scheme includes a transparent key rotation mechanism that allows service providers to update the entire credential database with a fresh secret key without user intervention. We provide a formal security analysis in the Real-or-Random (RoR) framework. This analysis demonstrates that our protocol's resistance to offline dictionary attacks reduces to the underlying hardness of the M-LWE problem, and the system achieves forward secrecy through a key rotation mechanism. Through an optimized Number Theoretic Transformation (NTT)-based implementation for faster polynomial multiplications, our empirical analysis demonstrates high computational efficiency, with average registration and authentication latencies of 0.88 ms and 0.96 ms, respectively.
Mr. Utsav Pandey, Ms. Sania Parkar, Mr. Anant Sarode, Prof. Amit Chakrawarti
Traditional banking systems rely on passwords, PINs, and centralized biometric storage, exposing users to phishing, SIM-swap attacks, and credential reuse vulnerabilities. This paper presents the ZKP Banking Interface, a pinless, context-aware financial authentication system built on Zero-Knowledge Proof (ZKP) technology. A unified ZK-SNARK circuit (Groth16), implemented in Circom, encodes three simultaneous security factors: identity commitment, trusted network context, and transaction threshold logic using Poseidon hashing. Conditional biometric and puzzle challenges are enforced cryptographically for higher-risk scenarios. Proof generation and verification are fully automated within the browser using snarkJS and WebAssembly artifacts, eliminating manual proof handling. The system supports two verification modes: local (device-only privacy) and on-chain (public auditability via a Solidity smart contract on a Hardhat network). Experimental evaluation across five test scenarios confirms correct contextual policy enforcement, successful proof validation in both modes, and a smooth, practical banking user experience. The proposed system demonstrates that ZKP-based authentication can replace traditional credentials while maintaining strong privacy guarantees.
This paper explores the potential of using modern smartwatches, particularly the Apple Watch, as an additional device for signing transactions and interacting with the blockchain. Modern crypto applications on smart-watches are limited to a read-only paradigm. The reason is a lack of security, specifically the absence of biometric verification for each transaction. When creating a classic Externally Owned Account wallet on the smartwatch side, these vulnerabilities carry a high risk of losing all of the user's funds. To solve this problem, an architecture based on the ERC-4337 standard was proposed. The proposed solution includes creating a wallet based on the kernel architecture, which allows setting access for additional keys to use funds, but within specific limitations. Consequently, one account can have several keys that can access funds. One key is the root key and has no restrictions. The established keys are called delegated and may have different restrictions. The root key can install a new delegated key or delete a previously established delegated key at any time. These delegated keys are used on the smartwatch to enable signing transactions according to the allowed rules. The main novelty of the proposed solution lies in its architecture, which enables smartwatches to be used as autonomous Web3 clients without compromising the root key, while strictly adhering to restrictions on executable operations and prioritizing security.