Prism Protocol: A Privacy-Native Authentication Architecture (Closed Triangle: Biometrics, Device Binding, NFC Presence), Confirmed via Zero-Knowledge Proofs, with Working Implementation

Abstract

The Prism Protocol is a privacy-native authentication and identity architecture in which a user can prove attributes or authentication state without directly revealing their identity to the server. It combines WebAuthn (W3C Level 3), Zero-Knowledge Proofs (Groth16 via circom/snarkjs), and NFC-based physical presence verification into a single coherent protocol stack. The core mechanism is a triangular key derivation model: biometric authentication (WebAuthn), a device-bound private key (FIDO2 Secure Enclave), and a time-limited NFC nonce via a passive tag (card, ring, sticker; NFC ISO 14443) jointly produce an ephemeral key. In v18, a working ZKP implementation is demonstrated: an age-threshold circuit proves that a user meets a criterion without the server ever receiving the attribute value. Verification is performed server-side via snarkjs.groth16.verify(). Within the demonstrated implementation flow, the server receives no name, no biometric data, no persistent identifier, and no direct attribute value. Sessions are designed to be unlinkable from the server perspective at the protocol level; timing and metadata correlation are addressed in the threat model as a separate concern. A working proof-of-concept was demonstrated on 25 April 2026 at prismpass.globalsecurity.nu. The broader ecosystem (PrismPass, PrismID, PrismShield, PrismAdd, PrismChat, PrismAir, PrismGuard, PrismHash, PrismWipe, PrismGate) is documented in this Invention Disclosure. The protocol introduces no novel cryptographic primitives; its novelty lies in the specific architectural combination, orchestration model, and protocol-class definition addressing thirteen authentication questions not simultaneously addressed by existing systems. Note: The post-quantum migration path (ML-KEM-768, ML-DSA-65) is documented as a formal architectural claim and forward-compatibility design decision. It describes the intended migration route, not a currently implemented feature. The working implementation uses ECDH, ECDSA, AES-256-GCM and Groth16. The protocol is designed for session unlinkability: the server receives only a cryptographic proof of validity, never a persistent identifier, name, or behavioural trace. This addresses the unlinkability gap identified in the W3C Digital Credentials API and the EUDI Wallet architecture as an unresolved open problem. Author: I. Smid-Woelders, independent inventor, Zwolle, Netherlands. First documented: 25 April 2026. Contact: [email protected]