Bangladesh has made significant progress in health indicators in recent years in spite of her low level of income. This is mainly due to the commitment of the state supported by donors in providing preventive care with respect to child health and family planning. However, there are serious problems related to both access and quality of curative care that hurt the poor most. Infrastructures for service delivery exist at local level in rural areas but they function inefficiently. This paper deals with the systemic weaknesses of decentralized service provision of primary healthcare in Bangladesh and focuses on accountability links between different actors and functions of delegation, finance, performance, information and enforcement. The study is based on facility- and household-based data collected during 2005 in Khulna Division. The main findings of the study are: the health system in rural areas represents deconcentration rather than decentralization of central government functions where inter-sectoral discipline works poorly; local health providers are not accountable to local government, and poor citizens/clients are neither aware of their rights nor are capable of expressing their needs as effective channels do not exist.
Development of the European integration through the European Union (EU) considers not only strengthening integration from the economic aspect (internal market). It also considers the political aspect of the integration i.e. strengthening political integration of member states and their citizens. Political segment of integration considers strengthening of the internal policies of the EU in which fiscal system, i.e. public finances have extremely important role. The EU fiscal system presents reflection of the extremely strong and often confronted interests between the economic and the political integration. These issues are closely related to the second component of the European politic and economic integration, that are the fiscal relations between the EU “central” level and the national “lower” levels which bring the all important decisions in the EU. According to the theory of public finance (fiscal federalism) and the criteria of economic efficiency, fiscal functions (allocation, redistribution, stabilization) and activities are assigned to the different levels of government, as well as certain resources for their financing. On the basis of fiscal functions carried out by national levels in the EU, and the manner of their financing, the EU is a prominently fiscally decentralized complex community. The traditional approach to the fiscal federalism that fiscal authorities are transferred from central to lover levels means that this is a process of decentralization, while in the case of the EU this means centralization of fiscal authorities from the level on national states to the EU as a supra-national level. The main goal of this paper is to analyze fiscal relations in the EU according to basic fiscal functions: allocation, redistribution and stabilization. Methodology would include analysis and comparison of positive EU aspect with normative aspect of public finances in multi-level community. Induction of gained results will confirm thesis that, because of political restraints, development of common (central) system of the EU public finances is based on alternative approaches of harmonization and cooperation.
Jean-Philippe Fontenelle, François Molle, Hugh Turral
The political changes which induced the technical and institutional evolution of the Red River Delta's (Vietnam) water control systems are described. The management framework and financial organization of the delta's water control systems are also described. The financing of the different operators, the amount and use of the water fees paid by farmers, and the process of water management decentralization and privatization in the delta, are analysed.
We present two universally composable and practical protocols by which a dealer can, verifiably and non-interactively, secret-share an integer among a set of players. Moreover, at small extra cost and using a distributed verifier proof, it can be shown in zero-knowledge that three shared integers a, b, c satisfy ab = c. This implies by known reductions non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs that a shared integer is in a given interval, or that one secret integer is larger than another. Such primitives are useful, e.g., for supplying inputs to a multiparty computation protocol, such as an auction or an election. The protocols use various set-up assumptions, but do not require the random oracle model.
Abstract. We show an efficient secure two-party protocol, based on Yao’s construction, which provides security against malicious adversaries. Yao’s original protocol is only secure in the presence of semi-honest adversaries. Security against malicious adversaries can be obtained by applying the compiler of Goldreich, Micali and Wigderson (the “GMW compiler”). However, this approach does not seem to be very practical as it requires using generic zero-knowledge proofs. Our construction is based on applying cut-and-choose techniques to the original circuit and inputs. Security is proved according to the ideal/real simulation paradigm, and the proof is in the standard model (with no random oracle model or common reference string assumptions). The resulting protocol is computationally efficient: the only usage of asymmetric cryptography is for running O(1) oblivious transfers for each input bit (or for each bit of a statistical security parameter, whichever is larger). Our protocol combines techniques from folklore (like cut-and-choose) along with new techniques for efficiently proving consistency of inputs. We remark that a naive implementation of the cut-and-choose technique with Yao’s protocol does not yield a secure protocol. This is the first paper to show how to properly implement these techniques, and to provide a full proof of security. Our protocol can also be interpreted as a constant-round black-box reduction of secure two-party com-putation to oblivious transfer and perfectly-hiding commitments, or a black-box reduction of secure two-party computation to oblivious transfer alone, with a number of rounds which is linear in a sta-tistical security parameter. These two reductions are comparable to Kilian’s reduction, which uses OT alone but incurs a number of rounds which is linear in the depth of the circuit [18]. 1
Computational grids enable the sharing, aggregation, and selection of (geographically distributed) computational resources and can be used for solving large scale and data intensive computing applications. Computational grids are an appealing target application for market-based resource allocation especially given the attention in recent years to “virtual organizations ” and policy requirements. In this paper, we present a framework for truthful, decentralized, dynamic auctions in computational grids. Rather than a fullyspecified auction, we propose an open, extensible framework that is sufficient to promote simple, truthful bidding by endusers while supporting distributed and autonomous control by resource owners. Our auction framework incorporates resource prediction in enabling an expressive language for end-users, and highlights the role of infrastructure in enforcing rules that balance the goal of simplicity for end users with autonomy for resource owners. The technical analysis leverages simplifying assumptions of “uniform failure” and “threshold-reliability” beliefs.
We introduce a new notion called `-isolated proofs of knowledge (`-IPoK). These are proofs of knowledge where a cheating prover is allowed to exchange up to ` bits of communication with some external adversarial environment during the run of the proof. Without any additional setup assumptions, no witness hiding protocol can be an `-IPoK for unbounded values of `. However, for any pre-defined threshold `, and any relation in NP and we construct an `-IPoK protocol for that relation. The resulting protocols are zero knowledge (ZK) in the standard sense, i.e., w.r.t. a verifier that communicates only with the prover during the proof. The cost of having a large threshold ` is a large communication complexity of the constructed protocol. We analyze these costs and present a solution that is asymptotically optimal. If a cheating verifier is allowed to communicate arbitrarily with an external environment, it is not possible to construct an `-IPoK that is also ZK with respect to such a verifier. As another new notion, we define `-isolated zero knowledge (`-IZK) where the verifier is `-isolated. For every relation in NP and every `, we construct an `-IPoK protocol that is also `-IZK. We describe several applications of `-IPoK protocols under the physical assumption that one can `isolate a prover for the duration of the proof phase. Firstly, we can use a witness indistinguishable (WI) `-IPoK to prevent “man-in-the-middle” attacks on identification schemes. Prior results for this scenario required all verifiers to register keys under a PKI, or the ability to fully isolate the prover. Secondly, a partially isolated prover can register a public key and use a WI `-IPoK to prove knowledge of the corresponding secret key to another party acting as a verifier. This allows us to set up a PKI where the key registrant does not need to trust the Certificate Authority. The PKI is not perfect since the proof is only witness indistinguishable and not zero knowledge. In a companion paper, we show how to set up such a PKI and use it to implement arbitrary multiparty computation securely in the UC framework without relying on any trusted third parties.
In this paper, we analyze a class of models in which there are interjurisdictional spillovers among heterogeneous jurisdictions, as illustrated for instance by CO2 emissions that affect the global environment. Each jurisdiction's emissions depend upon the local stock of private capital. Capital is interjurisdictionally - mobile and may be taxed to help finance local public expenditures. We show that decentralized policymaking leads to efficient resource allocations in important cases, even in the complete absence of corrective interventions by higher - level governments or coordination of policy through Coasian bargaining. In particular, even when the preferences and production technologies differ among the agents, the decentralized system can still result in globally efficient allocation.
Administrative Decentralization seeks to redistribute authority, responsibility and financial resources for providing public services among different levels of government. Administrative Decentralization is the transfer of responsibility for the planning, financing and managing of certain public functions from the central government and its agencies to field units of government agencies. This paper will search for a common theoretical framework of decentralization, then analyzes and assesses the initiatives for decentralization of administration that have been constructed after the emergence of Bangladesh. The major issues and problems of implementation of the decentralization policies in Bangladesh are also discussed suggesting policy measures. This paper is analytical in nature.
The aim of this work is to evaluate the results of the housing policy that was introduced as from the mid-1990s, during the government of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso.The main directives of this policy were the decentralization of actions, the flexibilization of service relating to demand, the formation of partnerships with civilian society, the creation of new sources of financing and the integration of the housing policy with urban policy.As from 1995 laws were changed and programs and sources of financing were created that were a response to the paralysis in which the Brazilian housing sector had found itself since the disbanding of the National Housing Bank (BNH), in 1986.However, old problems persisted: for example, the setting up of funds for financing housing units for low income classes was never put into practice.The use of non-onerous resources was minimal and as a consequence, the distribution of the constructions, both in terms of where and which income band, did not meet the real needs, a fact that has been clearly pointed out in studies on the Brazilian housing déficit.
Okay, kids, you can come back in; Uncle Mole is in a better mood now. If you're just joining us, you should know that I was in a very foul temper, because I'd only just found out that a prominent scientist, whose work I'd valued, had been exposed as a fake. His lovely work wasn't simply flawed, it was made up. My whole faith in science has been shaken, and I want to fix it. Instead, I've watched TV.I've just seen one of my favorite episodes of the old Twilight Zone. In `It's a Good Life' we meet a mind-reading, omnipotent monster who is terrorizing a small town. The monster is a six-year-old body played by Billy Muni, who would later gain quasi-immortality as the youngest member of the Robinson family on Lost in Space (as in, `Danger, Will Robinson!'). But in this Twilight Zone story by Jerome Bixby, he is a small boy who can do anything, and when he is displeased, he can transform townspeople into horrors, or make them disappear altogether, by `sending them to the cornfield'. So I imagined doing this to our scientific fraud, and I felt better. Maybe this wasn't the point of the story, but it made me feel better.The problem of scientific fraud isn't new, but it seems as though our efforts to eradicate it have not worked. We get tougher, but the fakers just get better at faking. Perhaps we need to further tighten security - remove your shoes and laptops prior to submission...There are two views of this problem, and the one we take will dictate what we should do. The `tip of the iceberg' position says that the fraud that has been exposed represents only the tiniest bit of a problem that is rotting science from the inside. Some have advocated a zero-tolerance policy, and have taken it on themselves to act, vigilante fashion, to publicize any discrepancies they find in publications, demanding satisfaction. The standard operating procedure here seems to be to contact the journal and the community, via emails for example, intimating that every questionable figure is evidence of fakery - mistakes cannot be tolerated. I know of one investigator who is being hounded to explain two identical images in a paper, which he asserts is a post-proof printing error (and was immediately corrected) but he can't prove it. But the vigilantes contend that zero tolerance demands that everyone subject themselves to a `trust no-one' process in the hope that we'll weed out the worst offenders.Don't get me wrong, I do think that there is a lot of fudging in the literature. My old Oxford English Dictionary defines fudge in this context as “to fit together or adjust in a clumsy, makeshift or dishonest manner”. (The most romantic etiology traces this to one Captain Fudge, c1664, a.k.a. Lying Fudge, who was probably a real person, although he may have made himself up.) In science, fudging data can be elimination of compelling results that don't fit the hypothesis (which may be for perfectly valid reasons or not) or adjusting the results, say, when molecular weight markers seem off. It occurs because researchers are under tremendous pressure to publish on a timetable - the need to publish any work that has used up time and resources, however questionable the conclusions. Journals promote this problem by demanding additional results that are conditions for publication, usually on even shorter timetables. Fudging seems inevitable. I am not forgiving it; I'm only saying why I think it happens. But when it goes too far it becomes fakery, and it is unforgivable. The tip of the iceberg view is that much of what we see is not simply fudged; it is faked.The alternative view, to which I subscribe, is that true fraud is exceedingly rare. Mistakes, misinter - pretations, and wishful thinking are more common - and problematic - but I think we can deal with them. But outright fabrication is rare enough to be news.Can I prove this second view? No. But I can demonstrate that it is a useful and profitable position to take. And the demonstration points to a route to the solution, not only for fraud, but also for errors and other problems.Unless you live in a cave and, for that matter, a cave without an internet connection, you know about eBay, the massively successful online auction system. Anyone can buy or sell anything on eBay (including, apparently, fabulously expensive grilled-cheese sandwiches) and can do so with a remarkable level of confidence. It is based on a seemingly naive, but ultimately profound, precept: most people are honest. This is backed up by a readily accessible rating system, where buyers and sellers provide feedback on their transactions, thereby exposing problems if and when they arise. The system is largely transparent: those who lie are quickly flamed, and anyone who gives inordinate numbers of negative comments is discredited. It is freewheeling, but for the most part it is wildly successful.Once, when science was conducted by an elite, feedback occurred in the literature and at meetings. This still happens, but in a manner that is difficult to assess unless one is in the center of the action (again, one of the elite). High-impact journals have no interest in publishing work that refutes other work, regardless of the rigor of the refutation, and the group psychology among researchers translates this into `high impact = true, low impact = less true'. Even when we think that everyone knows that a particular finding is flawed, one only has to take a stroll into a related but different venue, such as the department upstairs, to find that others who might be peripheral to the field can evince surprise at our suspicions. We need a feedback system that everyone can access.I propose that we take a cue from eBay. Link a system to PubMed, for example, by which we can identify a paper and offer feedback (“we repeated this finding, but couldn't reproduce that one” or “this result may be an artifact for the following reasons”). It must be transparent - commentators are registered and their identities known, and we can similarly access their other reviews. Vigilantes who only find fault will find their comments of less value than those from reviewers who are balanced in their views. And, of course, the authors will be able to respond to criticism if it is especially important. We will have a way to evaluate the experiences of the community, far beyond a paper's `impact', which is more likely to reflect the extent to which a finding is easy to mention. I think we'll gain confidence in the literature, we'll expose fudges, and we'll find very little fraud.For this to work, however, we need a fundamental change in the community of scientists. We need to realize that making mistakes is common and that honesty requires that errors be owned up to. We need to reward, not punish, those individuals who can say that they got it wrong. It happens all the time, and we pretend it doesn't, and, as a consequence, the fudging goes on. We can make it stop, but only if we take away the pressure not to admit to it.But what of the real monsters who are out there? The ones who simply make it up? Such allegations are serious and must be dealt with by informed investigation, as we do now, and evidence of genuine misconduct must come from close to home (fellow researchers with intimate knowledge of the lab and methods). We can deal with this, and only open such investigations when the evidence is overwhelming. But why do they do it, this outright fakery that is so antithetical to the entire process of scientific inquiry? I think I know, because I've just been watching the Twilight Zone.The monster in `It's a Good Life' can do anything, knows everything and, because he is only a child, has no goals but his own desires. He understands only that whatever he wants to happen, happens. When a bright, young, and very ambitious scientist begins his or her career, one of two things occur early on. They can chance on a set of ideas that happen to be correct, and their experiments flow effortlessly towards a happy conclusion. And if this is an important conclusion, rewards come quickly. Or, alternatively, they can be wrong, and they learn at this formative stage that no matter how wonderful an idea may be, and how much they need it to be true, it can still be wrong. This is an extremely important lesson that our first, lucky researcher may not learn, unless, of course, we teach them. The successful student guesses again, and again may be right - more rewards. By the time they come up against something that they cherish that turns out to be mistaken, they may have already become our monster-their idea, their need to be right, exceeds all other goals. It doesn't happen all at once - but someone who is always right begins to believe that they are special, and does not realize that luck is a major factor in all of this. So they make it right. They have made the leap to quasi-omnipotence. I once met a monster like this, and it was truly frightening.'It's a Good Life' was remade, years later, as a vignette in The Twilight Zone Movie. In the rewritten work, the ending was changed: a teacher takes on the task of educating the monster/child, who is desperate for guidance. And this, of course, is what we need to do with our most gifted, lucky young scientists. We have to teach them that ideas are frequently wrong, and this is fundamental to science. And we have to stop stressing that being right brings rewards, while being wrong brings despair. Let's stop giving awards for best poster, best thesis, best student. Science is a reward. We don't need more monsters. Let them be wrong sometimes.Otherwise, I'll want to send you to the cornfield.
Compared with most countries the Norwegian system of financing local governments is highly centralized. Grants make up a substantial part of revenues and local taxes are highly regulated by the center. The development of the system was motivated by a desire to equalize service provision throughout the country. The purpose of this paper is to analyze possible consequences of more decentralized financing with local tax discretion. Contrary to the conventional wisdom the analysis indicates that decentralized financing is likely to give more equal provision of local public services. In addition, substantial efficiency gains can be obtained.
<abstract language="eng">The constitution of Brazil directs that the country’s health system, the Unified Health System (Sistema Único de Saúde), be politically and administratively decentralized. Nevertheless, handing over competencies, responsibilities, and resources to subnational levels, especially to municipal governments, has been a slow process, lasting almost two decades. Advances have been brought about by the Unified Health System, which, from a analytical perspective, is a public and universal system. Despite that, the decentralization process needs to overcome norms that keep all levels of management dependent on Brazil’s federal Government. The subnational levels have consistently faced difficulties in performing their macromanagement functions with autonomy, especially when it comes to financing and to the establishment or organization of health care networks. Boldness and responsibility will be needed to prevent Brazil’s health decentralization process from leading to fragmentation. New political agreements between different levels of government, with a reassignment of responsibilities and the enhancement of a culture of technical cooperation, are fundamental requisites to making the Unified Health System have a health policy that is truly public and universal.
The constitution of Brazil directs that the country's health system, the Unified Health System (Sistema Unico de Saúde), be politically and administratively decentralized. Nevertheless, handing over competencies, responsibilities, and resources to subnational levels, especially to municipal governments, has been a slow process, lasting almost two decades. Advances have been brought about by the Unified Health System, which, from a analytical perspective, is a public and universal system. Despite that, the decentralization process needs to overcome norms that keep all levels of management dependent on Brazil's federal Government. The subnational levels have consistently faced difficulties in performing their macromanagement functions with autonomy, especially when it comes to financing and to the establishment or organization of health care networks. Boldness and responsibility will be needed to prevent Brazil's health decentralization process from leading to fragmentation. New political agreements between different levels of government, with a reassignment of responsibilities and the enhancement of a culture of technical cooperation, are fundamental requisites to making the Unified Health System have a health policy that is truly public and universal.
Este trabajo analiza la estructura de los servicios de salud pública en Estados Unidos. Pretende aportar la perspectiva de una organización federal de la salud pública con más de 200 años de historia, que puede ser de utilidad en el actual contexto español. La información se ha obtenido a partir de la realización de entrevistas con personas clave de los tres niveles de la administración pública (federal, estatal y local), así como con académicos (muchos de los cuales han sido directives del sistema de salud pública). Se presta especial atención a la organización, financiación y actividades de los departamentos de salud pública locales y de los estados, así como a los esquemas de relación entre ambos. Se comentan las implicaciones para un país como España, que ha pasado en poco tiempo de una estructura muy centralizada a una estructura descentralizada en 17 comunidades autónomas. The present article analyzes the structure of public health services in the USA. It aims to describe the perspective of 200 years of a federal organization of public health services, which could be useful in the current context in Spain. Information was obtained by interviews with key informants from the three levels of government (federal, state, and local) and with academics (many of whom had previous experience as public health officers). Special attention is paid to the organization, financing and activities of local and state health departments, as well as to the relationships between these departments. The implications for a country like Spain, which has evolved in a short period from a highly centralized system to a decentralized system based on 17 Autonomous Communities, is discussed.
Since South Africa held its first democratic elections in 1994, it has given significant attention to building an effective system of decentralization including provincial and local government. While provincial governments are responsible mainly for the implementation of social services such as health and education, the provision of much of the urban infrastructure is the responsibility of local government. Although many challenges remain, the country has made significant progress over the past decade in addressing urban service backlogs in poor areas. At the same time, it has greatly improved macroeconomic fundamentals. The system of financing local government seeks to place accountability firmly at the local level, with most revenues in the larger urban centers raised locally through a combination of local taxes and fees for services, while poorer regions are predominantly grant funded. The objective has been to encourage the financing of capital infrastructure through local borrowing based on sustainable, transparent local finances rather than national repayment guarantees, which are outlawed. There is some indirect subsidization of loans through the state-owned Development Bank of Southern Africa. But the emphasis is on achieving redistribution through transparent, formula-based grants paid directly from national to local governments. While further bedding down of the system is needed, the approach is proving largely successful. The paper concludes by recommending that the existing division between provinces as providers of social services and local governments as the key locus of responsibility for services related to the built environment should be strengthened, particularly through the devolution of more urban transport related functions. A number of key risks are also highlighted, including issues related to the reform of local business taxes.
Contracting is one of the tools increasingly being used to enhance the performance of health systems in both developed and developing countries; it takes different forms and cannot be limited to the mere purchase of services. Actors adopt contracting to formalize all kinds of relations established between them. A typology for this approach will demonstrate its diversity and provide a better understanding of the various issues raised by contracting. In recent years the way health systems are organized has changed significantly. To remedy the under-performance of their health systems, most countries have undertaken reforms that have resulted in major institutional overhaul, including decentralization of health and administrative services, autonomy for public service providers, separation of funding bodies and service providers, expansion of health financing options and the development of the profit or nonprofit private sector. These institutional reshuffles lead not only to multiplication and diversification of the actors involved, but also to greater separation of the service provision and administrative functions. Health systems are becoming more complex and can no longer operate in isolation. Actors are gradually realizing that they need to forge relations. The simplest way to do that is through dialogue, although some prefer a more formal commitment. Interaction between actors may take various forms and be on different scales. There are several types of contractual relations: some are based on the nature of the contract (public or private), others on the parties involved and yet others on the scope of the contract. Here they are classified into three categories according to the object of the contract: delegation of responsibility, act of purchase of services, or cooperation.
The paper deals with hybrid systems, where human actors and non-human agents meet and interact. Different from most of the literature on autonomous technology, which mainly deals with the question of agency of non-humans, the paper puts forward the assumption that the release of smart technology may lead to a deconstruction of order or even a regime change, thus raising the question of how order emerges in hybrid systems. Discussing different sociological concepts, the paper identifies two modes of governance: central control and decentralized selforganization. However, smart technology allows implementing different system's architectures, some of which may go beyond this traditional distinction. Referring to a case study on collision avoidance in aviation (and especially the mid-air collision at Ueberlingen in 2002), the paper shows that hybrid systems create new opportunities, but entail new risks as well. The release of smart technology seems to intensify well-known problems of automation, especially when systems get out of control. Aviation is one of the societal fields, where experiments with new modes of governance currently take place that combine features of central control and decentralized self-organization.
I am particularly honoured by your invitation to this Second Biennial Conference of the European Society of International Law. Indeed, I am both honoured and pleased, not only because I am in Paris, but above all because I support the ESIL project, one of the objectives of which is to develop a deeper understanding of trade law and to promote closer cooperation among all those working in the field of international law. Admittedly, I have only distant memories of the Hague Academy of International Law where I once worked on estoppel, but the general theme of this conference – International Law: Do We Need It? – convinced me that there was room, this evening, for a non-specialist. It is in that capacity that I will be speaking to you, in the hope that I can contribute the views of a practitioner on the role and place of WTO law within the international legal order. In doing so, I am seeking to establish a constructive dialogue between doctrine and practice with the aim of improving normative and institutional coherence within the international legal order. Trade is to be found at the origin of entire segments of public international law, and it accounts for one of its main sources: the treaty. Indeed, one of the first international legal instruments to leave a trace in history was the commercial treaty between Amenophis IV and the King of Alasia (Cyprus) in the 14th century BC. This treaty exempted Cypriot traders from customs duty in exchange for the importation of a certain quantity of copper and wood. Nothing has fundamentally changed since then: at the beginning of the 21st century we still have bilateral trade agreements. But they now have to be reported to the WTO, so that they may be checked for consistency with international trade rules. The international legal order, on the other hand, has evolved dramatically. The great empires have disappeared into the annals of history. Philippe le Bel and Jean Bodin’s jurists progressively conceptualized the notion of sovereignty; the treaties of Westphalia ushered in a society defined by the pre-eminence of sovereign states, the 1815 Congress of Vienna laid the foundations of multilateralism, and the 19th century saw the first international organizations come to light. With the creation of the League of Nations, followed by the United Nations system and, finally, with the disintegration of the Eastern Bloc, the 20th century witnessed the evolution from traditional international law between states towards a contemporary and universal international law open to new players, including international organizations and non-governmental organizations. Thus, the international legal order has experienced a number of upheavals. But its evolution has been neither linear nor homogeneous – which is why international society still bears the marks of several historical stages in the process. As a metaphorical illustration, let us take the three physical states of matter: gas, liquids and, finally, solids. Today’s international legal order is simultaneously composed of these three states. Gas is the coexistence of particles devoid of any hierarchical differentiation: the Westphalian order made up of sovereign states organized according to an essentially ‘horizontal’ logic with a decentralized responsibility mechanism. The solid state is reflected in the European Union, the perfect example of an international integration organization which produces rules that it interprets ‘autonomously’ and whose primacy and direct applicability is guaranteed through a system of judicial remedy. The judicialization of responsibility of Member States for violations of Community law is a cornerstone of this integrated legal order. Between the gaseous state and the solid state, there remains the liquid state. It is to this category that the World Trade Organization belongs. Neither entirely vertical nor entirely horizontal in essence, resembling an organization for intergovernmental cooperation in certain respects while being closer to an international integration organization in others, the WTO represents a unique legal order or system of law. At the risk of oversimplification, in fact, I will draw no distinction between a system of law, a legal system and a legal order. The reason why the international legal order exists in several physical states is that it is evolving; and the WTO is both a product and a vehicle of that evolution. Indeed, the WTO is an international organization that brings together two concepts of international law. 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WTO rules it is that the WTO and the WTO not have any general to the WTO to that to and in that they a of The system is no on the of a certain which the to the of that reflected the of the states The WTO not in the to the by public international law – it produces legal rules an integrated Indeed, the WTO integrated in a which an that is to be number of this fact, in which states that the trade of the the WTO and on all This is why they to the the In the – the which in the first that there was a between the of the WTO treaty since they of of or whose place in several the that with all of the WTO which be and and Thus, the WTO treaty is in a which has an legal WTO law a its In United States – the the of a legal order and to that this order was by its on by an place in a treaty the of which in on the of the may be a since the of have an on the of The of no only of WTO law, but is still Leaving that I that the WTO rules above all the of its since to is in the of the In other they a new legal order defined this integrated legal system is not there is a of in international law and the rules of its treaties therefore be in with the of international law. Thus, the WTO legal order the sovereign of states, international and the to not to the rules of of which the for The WTO respects general international law, while at the it to the of international In the international legal order, the WTO has its unique system of law. Leaving aside the on the of international law, it is that WTO law is a of international law in I this with two two of general international law which the WTO has to in its and on which it has a the sovereign of states and the to The sovereign of states between states of and This is at the international organizations have a the WTO is in that the of its a of law, in all of its – from the which at once two to the which the not to of the and of the according to the and by it is that this of is for a certain in the it all states, in international to views and to on an The of is reflected in the rules of the in the of the of it can be found in the and the It the of which is at the of the negotiating mechanism. Indeed, by the the in is a At the international all States – and and – a of which can be that will a trade to from the law of the to of States have an of and But these rules be – which is why the WTO and to establish can only between it to of the certain trade and to to by the can in and This from the for the was made in with the to the of and states that not for made by in trade to or and other to the trade of there is the which for the of a system of that the to to the an to the to among in no with the sovereign of states – on the in the of where is an to of and this of rules to the of states is a of will the of The WTO, on the of sovereign of states. But this not that it is of the of that the of trade in the of traditional international law. me with to the of states, in only sovereign states This is in the traditional international organizations made up of states It is that the WTO remains an once it has been to to the evolution of international society and the of new may be so that has been to the WTO, and has been to an Member its to the of the European Community a WTO Member is In the the in for the European Community to a With the creation of the WTO, this practice was The treaty that the number of of the European and Member States in no the number of Member is new is above all the of the Community its Member in this is the of – a which the WTO interprets in a of the the WTO that may for and cooperation with non-governmental organizations with to those of the has been no to but the in the and of between the WTO and the new rules have the for a of towards the This not that they into the negotiating the WTO remains an negotiating the to the they have been a role in the through since the of the in United States – It is in to the of the WTO while an open to the that This to that the WTO in the general in is in the state, while the – – that the WTO, in the role of is to within the international legal order. Thus, the WTO has a vehicle in the evolution of international law towards its contemporary and is a in the of international society into an international us to example of the WTO general international law while it to the of its legal the of the to by This is a that at the of general international law and is in the United Nations the the on the of which that international by in a that international and and not Thus, they the international the states that was to through and of international the In this the creation of a system was a of both through law and through The of the of the to by with to that is a of international the main of in traditional international law, is It has now been that states for any of but the of responsibility and, above its to the and of any legal of the is its I to it of an integration of the of the International Law on of States for which an to the WTO is a or the can general international law on the to WTO law – that its legal system in the of an of international still by its in the of it was of a the WTO system a new which the of and At the the to the of It is a that is to it according to the for is made by and is to of the where a has been the or a of which only of law. This the essentially legal of the WTO is for all WTO Member may the of a by In other that Member to WTO law. to may in other international for example the International of all WTO by the and of the for all to the WTO agreements. In order to of the that the the to the of the system the Thus, the of all to WTO rules has been the of a institutional the and is to a of rules and in the In other it is an integrated and in of this system is the of legal and in which the of a of WTO Member can WTO law or not it has a direct and – in the so to of the of states This which to the was by the in – it that the United States to the European in the not In other any state may on the of a that Member is not with its WTO law. is to that the it is is followed by the by the and the of WTO to and to up on the by the of the of the the not the that so may in the of trade can we from all of these of they the of a certain that is at the WTO, with an of international The is essentially to for the a of the of a society into a It is no the of the that but the Indeed, of the law that to the is in an of the of all of the Member states, which all to that they have been In other responsibility is by an it is the of the may But is the of international responsibility by the is that sovereign states a certain the of the of it to the of a we to law in its traditional since the in the state that has the to its to The by the state which is within the of the treaty and to to on the product of international law in its traditional the of state to take the law into its Thus, there is a of or a between the decentralized responsibility of traditional international law and the of the of The WTO is one of the to have in by the states by on the of In the I the of to all and the WTO is a since the that the is to remains The the to a the remains to the Thus, WTO law is a of legal rules up a system and a As the WTO an integrated and legal order. together traditional international law, which it and contemporary international law, which it is to the WTO has a of the international legal order a legal But WTO law to the legal of other international organizations within the international legal This me to the of which will the between the legal system of the WTO and the legal of other international organizations. The and of the WTO on it to of other legal and on the and of its with other international organizations. In order to the place and the role of the legal system in the international legal order, I will the and other legal including by other international organizations. I will first this from a normative of and from an institutional I will that the WTO, from being it is to its and the of other international organizations. In this the WTO in the of international coherence and the international legal order. The WTO, its treaty and the of any between WTO and those in other WTO not or other international In fact, the and now the WTO, that trade is not the only that can The WTO to objectives other the responsibility of other international organizations. has to these so to with the to they that in me a of system with and in other and will why I that the WTO has been in of international The WTO is of a it that trade and trade The of the WTO is that trade and to of and at the the and now the WTO, of to these The – but still in – of that a Member from aside a Member that other those of trade This can for a Member has made in other on an an may to The by WTO was to a new of the WTO that the place of trade in the of and the that to be between all is this within the WTO legal and the WTO treaty was and a In the first WTO an – the that the a of treaty in the Vienna on the Law of I am this to international legal The first that this general on treaty the of a of or general international law. It was to so may neither the nor the have the Vienna on the made its first now on the of the between the WTO and the international legal is not to be in from public international that to of the Vienna of treaties to be in and in the of the and the that the to take of the for of the This to a that in the and a in of In on the and of the Vienna the have since to the of the WTO treaty and to I have been that no other international system is so to the Vienna In this on the of the Vienna is a that the WTO to being integrated into the international legal order The between the WTO and other of international was the that in the WTO, – to and so – not to be be according to the of the of In this has that be and so that they have no or The the of WTO in the In the WTO, to we a a of a a is for any a new and is to be an will have to the by a – and the this the it will be to the the of the will the entire the of the to a – is it a or on it a it a and, finally, the trade of the a a or is there is an to the is in a to the of the has that a with a between WTO and a to other trade be has that the by the of of is in an of the general or an of the the I the of and the essentially the one of and a of between the of a Member to an and the of the other The of the of is not and the the and the of the at and the up But not or with between and the to of other legal the has a of or between of or between of and I hope it is now that WTO trade to will be to WTO so they not In other the WTO the of and other legal and to the of of its coherence within the international legal order. of the WTO is that can at the they and in the between and the European the importation of the that was to its since it was on and in other and no risk by the of the WTO that its integration into the international legal order, is the legal and it to international and in other the and states that on in the International of and the International to be with the while and not by any in the or the that they have a certain in a of WTO international The for states to or international the WTO to in other international which they will in the of the I but let me to the of the the WTO to that of the to an of the it is not has into a general of law, the to an that the of the WTO in of the and of a of and international In the – this was to that be in the and that it I and to the and of WTO It made to the to WTO – and the – in an into the of the of the WTO at the of the at the of in This the to contemporary treaties that and to that these be in the WTO so to international coherence with to I therefore with a of that in general of public international law in its of the WTO the has that the WTO is within the of the international legal order. The WTO take into other of international law. a WTO on will WTO on In so it coherence between of or legal order. I that in with the to the WTO the and of other international organizations. In the WTO is of the of other of and of the that it is not in the international between the WTO and other international organizations of coherence within the international legal order. that the WTO is an international organization with legal it has up an of and with other on the international The the coherence within the international legal order, the the international us at the between the WTO and other international organizations. for WTO on coherence with an to the exists a of cooperation on and with several international organizations. the of is to on we a new which brings together several organizations and to in the of trade We have cooperation with other international organizations. in the of we now have a – the and Trade – the WTO, World and Organization World Organization and the World Organization for international organizations have or in WTO The WTO an in international organizations. the of cooperation and coherence between the of the WTO and that of other international organizations to in a The WTO working with international organizations in from to As I in I am a of international I not to that is a general of international But I that international cooperation is one of the United in of the I that towards international coherence the only to the evolution of international and of international legal But international coherence is to the of the WTO and the of trade rules. The in of trade a role in and but it is not a for all the of neither is it to nor in can it be it is in a and and a Trade can only be and it is by which at the capacity or the of of the by the for a for public and so This is international legal of these with the other treaty of WTO international coherence will only in the of the WTO not or to any other states to all of these in a I that the WTO and But this is not and the I to I in the for I am a This brings me to States with – – of international treaties so the for with the and mechanism. me one example and will the in the coherence of international legal order. The – was with the In by and the of through the of new the of its for and to and that The those being to its WTO that the and for its on the in with the United Nations on the Law of the to the WTO by the of and the to the International on the Law of the The the WTO the of to from the of of on the of to The have or not was to and to of a In a it is that both have or and the with an that a WTO in its to or not may from the of the on the It that the two may on the or on the of the law. in that the an to both and the But in the of a the WTO have that of of any between the and in the of any international to these two may In of the of the and WTO it is that a WTO because – and – has been for a or both at the it is that the WTO any other process. This is where of the of international legal order the WTO, through its can that it take into the of other legal still the that it will be for the WTO to the the of between trade and of other legal Indeed, at a has an on the can be to the WTO system and The WTO will have to the trade can in the of the In the of WTO the WTO may in be on the hierarchical between two of Indeed, a WTO Member the to a trade to a in it is the WTO will and the to with an can a WTO for trade in support of its of the WTO for public a Member to an International Organization a state for of it is the WTO will on the legal and of an on international trade and its to trade rules. But I there is no reason to the WTO with the to the coherence between from legal The of coherence of international legal system is by the of the WTO and in its mechanism. This the between the and the traditional decentralized system of still in several legal I not that the in of the WTO to be but I that the WTO system The to the I have to I in the of other legal so to the of the WTO in the international legal order. This not all because we with several legal for which still be We to the of international law and the of international legal legal and legal will to and coherence will on on the and of the have been including a to the International of in of for order has been made by the the of and international law. The International Law has in that me now Today’s international legal order will be to only to the that the legal through is no to this and the WTO is of its The WTO has evolved from the States to the to the of the international system and it with a international the This international organization is now up and it produces of law The legal and of those by WTO for but the WTO normative including a forum for permanent and its but open the of its legal order. In the WTO of its international legal and is now with other international organizations. But there is In up a system in other to be the WTO not only to other legal but it in other and the coherence of legal order. In this the WTO is an a the international legal order. This in the place and role of the WTO and its legal order in the international legal a for international towards international coherence and for which I is we the we in to be that or
China has experienced more than 25 years of extraordinary economic growth. Underlying this growth has been a decentralized fiscal system, in which provinces and large cities are given the freedom to make infrastructure investments to stimulate local development, and are allowed to retain a large part of the fiscal revenues that are generated from economic activity. Although successful as a growth strategy, this policy created two problems for national fiscal management. First, it significantly reduced the central government's share of fiscal revenues, which fell from 34.8 percent in 1980 to 22 percent in 1992. Second, it widened economic and fiscal disparities between the rapidly growing urban coastal region and the rest of the country. Rapid growth in subnational debt (which rose 23-fold in a decade) and subnational nonperforming loans (estimated by the authors to range between US$100 billion and US$150 billion) has placed pressure on China's financial system. Traditionally, China has favored bank lending as a source of finance because the banking system has provided a vehicle for central political control over local debt. But as China's financial system matures, creditworthiness standards must become more important. The authors recommend greater use of the revenue streams from infrastructure assets as a financing source, and gradual relaxation of central political control over subnational debt. One step in this direction would permit leading cities to issue municipal bonds based on objective financial standards.
In recent years, decentralization and regional autonomy measures have figured prominently in negotiations designed to end some of the world's most important conflicts, including in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Sudan. Reforms that shift powers to subnational units deserve the attention of those who are trying to promote security via institutional design, but the risks associated with these territorial reforms are considerable. When political and economic resources are transferred to subnational governments in the attempt to create meaningful access to the political system for former combatants, the great risk is that these same resources can be used to finance a continuation of the armed struggle instead. In response to the popularity of territorial reforms in many post-conflict settings, this paper sounds a cautionary note by evaluating the negative impact of decentralization on security in Colombia, site of Latin America's longest and deadliest armed conflict. After analyzing the design decisions of reformers who hoped that decentralization would help end the conflict, I argue that decentralization in fact financed the expansion of armed clientelism by illegal groups on both the left and right. Thanks to the weakness of the police in much of the national territory, guerrillas and paramilitaries have been able to use decentralized resources to destabilize the state, limiting even further its monopoly over the use of force and creating what are in effect parallel states on the left and right.
Open access
History and Politics in Latin America
Political Conflict and Governance
Politics and Conflicts in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Middle East