Decentralization is the allocation of power between central and lower levels structures of the government. The dimensions and the extent to which powers are transferred from one level to another vary across countries depending on the goal a country wishes to achieve. But one of the common aspects included in the transfer of powers to the lower level structures is financial decentralization. The reason is clear. It makes no sense to transfer power to the lower level structures without finance to execute own decisions. Transfer of financial powers to lower level structures and creating an alignment that support efficient and effective operation of each structure, has often been one of the major challenges in the implementation of decentralization model of government. Tanzania has been one of the victims in this situation. In view of various government reports, since independent in 1961, the several attempt tried by the government to transfer powers to the lower level structures led to either little or no success. The adoption of Decentralization by Devolution (D by D) in 2000 could be considered as the government attempt to correct the existed bottlenecks that led to the failure in the previous initiatives to decentralise. This paper attempts to answer the question: ‘is financial decentralisation realised under the DbyD, and what are the factors that contribute or hamper the financial decentralisation? The paper is based on the research findings presented in Mbogela (2009). The report consisted of descriptive presentation on financial matters from four case councils namely: Mbozi District council, Mbeya City council, Mbeya District council and Morogoro Municipal council. The findings from the four cases are presented, examined and compared. Keywords: Decentralisation by devolution, financial management, Local government authorities.
The present paper seeks to effectively address the following question: What Bitcoin looks like? To do so, we regress Bitcoin price on different variables (potential Bitcoin fundamentals recorded in the literature) by applying an ARDL Bounds Testing approach for daily data covering the period from December 2010 to June 2014. Our findings highlight the speculative behavior of Bitcoin. This virtual currency may be also used for economic reasons. However, there is any sign of being a safe haven. By considering the Chinese trading bankruptcy, the contribution of speculation (proxied by investors’ attractiveness to Bitcoin) remains dominant, indicating the robustness of our results.
Florian Glaser, Martin Haferkorn, Moritz Weber, Kai Zimmermann
Digital currencies are gaining more and more attention against the backdrop of recent events triggered by the ongoing economic crisis. While digital currencies face increasing popularity, the currencies' prices are free floating and subject to high volatility as a result of lacking fundamental valuation methods. On the basis of an overview over the most prominent currency -- Bitcoin -- and an economic literature review we propose an econometric model that incorporates the basic components of the current price discovery process of a digital currency's exchange rate. On the basis of our empirical validation we further show that, in the case of Bitcoin, price volatility is significantly influenced by the media coverage and positive sentiment.
OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY:\n\nThis thesis has three objectives. First, the past development of monetary systems is studied to see how Bitcoin is positioned as the forerunner of a new category. Second, the attitudes and expecta-tions of Finnish stakeholders are studied to recognize the general perception and future outlook for Bitcoin. Third, bitcoins are examined as an investment instrument by studying price drivers and the degree of predictability of future returns.\n\nDATA AND METHODOLOGY:\n\nThe qualitative methods are based on a literature review and an interview study conducted with Finnish stakeholders from different financial institutions and Bitcoin start-ups. The quantitative methods consist of market sizing calculations, a regression analysis, and Granger tests. The regres-sions utilize novel variables network hashrate, network transactions, and bitcoin supply as explan-atory variables for bitcoin price. Also bitcoin price and Google Trends SVI are used as explanatory variables. The market sizing calculations are based on M2 monetary aggregates for USD, EUR, and JPY.\n\nFINDINGS OF THE STUDY:\n\nThe thesis develops a categorization for decentralized cpytocurrencies that takes into account the main developments of the past monetary systems. The interview study reveals optimism for the technology behind Bitcoin and other decentralized systems, while all interviewees accept the un-certainty of Bitcoin survival. The stakeholders perceive the main challenges of Bitcoin to be tech-nological weaknesses, trust, and reputational issues. In terms of market sizing, it is clear that Bitcoin is not currently a serious threat to fiat currencies. Price driver analysis revealed a momen-tum effect in price returns, as well as an inflationary effect caused by the increasing supply. Also the network hashrate was found to forecast future bitcoin returns. The results from the Granger tests challenge the causality assumed in the regressions.
The notion of Zero Knowledge introduced by Goldwasser, Micali and Rackoff in STOC 1985 is fundamental in Cryptography. Motivated by conceptual and practical reasons, this notion has been explored under stronger definitions. We will consider the following two main strengthened notions. Statistical Zero Knowledge: here the zero-knowledge property will last forever, even in case in future the adversary will have unlimited power. Concurrent Non-Malleable Zero Knowledge: here the zero-knowledge property is combined with non-transferability and the adversary fails in mounting a concurrent man-inthe-middle attack aiming at transferring zero-knowledge proofs/arguments. Besides the well-known importance of both notions, it is still unknown whether one can design a zero-knowledge protocol that satisfies both notions simultaneously. In this work we shed light on this question in a very strong sense. We show a statistical concurrent non-malleable zero-knowledge argument system for N P with a black-box simulatorextractor. 1
This thesis illustrates forensic research work on Bitcoin, an innovative Internet based global transaction system that attracts ascending popularity during the recent few years. As an open, public and scalable distributed payment system, Bitcoin brings forward significant economic and technological impact to our world. Meanwhile, a new notion of virtual currency, "Bitcoin" comes into existence such that Bitcoin currency can be "mined" from all over world complying with specific algorithms. Mined bit "coins" has practical monetary values that turn the Bitcoin system into a digital currency circulation system. Due to Bitcoin's decentralized semantics, Bitcoin transaction and currency are not subject to control and censorship from any single authority. Therefore, Bitcoin brings out various security concerns about its application as a long-term reliable system.\nThe research in the thesis focuses on forensic study on Bitcoin. It covers experimental study on the Bitcoin network as a peer-to-peer system and a graph-based forensic approach against Bitcoin's transaction data. Major contributions include network data evaluation and transaction history analysis. In case of forensic investigation is needed against criminal incidents such as fraud, false transactions and money theft, which are commonly seen in commonly used digital payment systems, the research provides a guidance of efficient information collection and framework of evidence data processing and extraction
The present study addresses one of the most problematic phenomena: Bitcoin price. We explore the Granger causality for two relationships (Bitcoin price and transactions; Bitcoin price and investors’ attractiveness) from a frequency domain perspective using Breitung and Candelon’s (2006) approach. Intuitively, this research gauges empirically the causal links between these variables unconditionally on the one hand and conditionally to the Chinese stock market and the processing power of Bitcoin network on the other hand. The observed outcomes reveal some differences with respect to the frequencies involved, highlighting the complexity of assessing what Bitcoin looks like and the difficulty to gain clearer insights into this nascent crypto-currency. Beyond the nuances of short-, medium- and long-run frequencies, this paper confirms the extremely speculative nature of Bitcoin without neglecting its usefulness in economic reasons (trade transactions). The consideration of the Chinese market index and the hash rate has led to solid and unambiguous findings connecting further Bitcoin to speculation.
Abstract. We construct a 3-move public coin special honest verifier zero-knowledge proof, a so-called Sigma-protocol, for a list of commitments having at least one commit-ment that opens to 0. It is not required for the prover to know openings of the other commitments. The proof system is efficient, in particular in terms of communication requiring only the transmission of a logarithmic number of commitments. We use our proof system to instantiate both ring signatures and zerocoin, a novel mech-anism for bitcoin privacy. We use our Sigma-protocol as a (linkable) ad-hoc group identi-fication scheme where the users have public keys that are commitments and demonstrate knowledge of an opening for one of the commitments to unlinkably identify themselves (once) as belonging to the group. Applying the Fiat-Shamir transform on the group identification scheme gives rise to ring signatures, applying it to the linkable group iden-tification scheme gives rise to zerocoin. Our ring signatures are very small compared to other ring signature schemes and we only assume the users ’ secret keys to be the discrete logarithms of single group elements so the setup is quite realistic. Similarly, compared with the original zerocoin protocol we rely on a weak cryptographic assumption and do not require a trusted setup. A third application of our Sigma protocol is an efficient proof of membership of a secret committed value u belonging to a public list L = {λ1,..., λN}.
This working paper presents a simple model for the macroeconomic behavior of bitcoin based on the economic equation of exchange. According to this model, the value of bitcoin is determined largely by the willingness of bitcoin holders to save bitcoin and not by its transactional use. This model therefore predicts that increased use of bitcoin will not cause its value to rise, but that the value of bitcoin in terms of fiat currency will be almost solely determined by the willingness of bitcoin holders to pull bitcoin out of circulation. This model suggests that bitcoin will not fall victim to a liquidity trap as suggested by some economists.
INTRODUCTION: This article reports the results and the lessons learned from implementing the decentralized approach to tuberculosis (TB) detection and treatment, embedded with Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) co-infection in health district. The objective was to increase the TB screening indicators in the district using the common ways for offering care to patients in health district. METHODS: Conducted from August 2006 to July 2007, this large-scale intervention using Non-experimental study Designs has implemented a decentralized approach for fighting against TB in Orodara Health District (OHD), Burkina Faso. Pretest-posttest design has been used for quantitative part using indicators in one hand, and postests-only design for the qualitative part in other hand. In the pretest-posttest design, the TB indicators from years before 2006 (from 2002 to 2005) were used as earlier measurement observations allowing examining changes over time. The decentralized approach was incorporated into the annual planning of the OHD. For the quantitative study design, indicators used were those from National TB Program in Burkina Faso: TB detection rate, incidence density of TB per 100,000 inhabitants per year, and HIV prevalence in incident TB cases with positive smears. Data entry and analysis employed Microsoft Access and Excel software. For the qualitative, in-depth interview was used in which a total of 16 persons have been interviewed. Discussions were tape-recorded and transcribed verbatim for analysis using the computer-based qualitative software program named QSR NVIVO. RESULTS: There were a total of 99,259 outpatient visits during the study period: the7,345 patients (7.43%) presented with cough. Of the 7,345 patient having cough, 503 cases (6.8%) were declared chronic coughing. These 503 patients were screened for TB, including 35.59% whose coughing had lasted 10 to 15 days. We observed an increase in a measured variable was observed. The TB detection rate and incidence-density rate based on positive smears were 16.11% (11.00% in 2005) and 10.42 per 100,000 inhabitants per year (6.88 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2005), respectively. There were 29 patients positive for TB: 41.37% of these had cough lasting 10 to 15 days, 10.34% were also positive for HIV, and 68.97% were from rural areas. Health workers and patients reported satisfaction with the intervention. It was found that implementing a decentralized approach to TB prevention in rural areas is plausible and effective under some conditions: considering that health district system is functional; carefully designing the intervention for TB case management; setting up and implementing of decentralized approach including strong monitoring; and taking into account the all financing, community and volunteer involvement, evaluation of the cost savings from integrating specific donor funding, and being supported by regional and central levels including National TB program. CONCLUSION: The study has shown that TB detection rate can be increased by implementing a decentralized approach to primary care. When carefully implemented, a decentralized approach is a suitable approach to TB and HIV prevention in rural and inaccessible settings.
When processing transactions in a block, a miner increases his reward but also decreases his probability to earn any reward because the time needed for his block to reach consensus depends on its size. We show that this leads to a game situation between miners. We analytically solve this game for two miners. Then, we show that miners do not play a Nash equilibrium in the current Bitcoin mining environment, instead, they should not process any transaction. Finally, we show that the situation where no transaction is ever processed would stop being a Nash equilibrium if the transaction fee was multiplied or, equivalently, the fixed reward divided by a factor of about 12.
The proliferation of technology emphasized new forms of payment. During the last years, current literature highlighted the role of virtual currency, the channels of payment through digital coins and the importance of assimilation of such platforms. Bitcoin or BTC is known as a digital coin, issued for the first time in 2009 and based on a peer to peer system. The difference from other forms of payment is that BTC is not controlled by any institution or central authority. BTC transactions have grown rapidly, ”asking" for regulation measures or legal approval of governments. Although BTC has become very popular, the market is poor and unfortunately of no confidence. There is a lack of regulation which can determine a number of risks associated with criminal financing activities. However, the legal status of Bitcoin is present in many European countries like Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Slovenia, Switzerland or Turkey. Also, this type of currency has experienced a rapid evolution among coffee shops and restaurants.
This article explores the state of virtual currencies and their regulation in and by the United States and the States. It offers thoughts on which models of regulation might suit virtual currencies best. It also surveys recent enforcement actions brought by the Departments of Treasury, Justice and Homeland Security against providers of virtual currencies or comparable electronic stored value. It concludes that issuers and users of virtual currencies are not being realistic if they think that the United States will not regulate virtual currencies for some purposes.