With successive English governments extolling the virtues of greater choice and control within welfare services, there is growing debate about concepts such as direct payments and personal budgets (in the UK and in many developed countries). With the evidence base inevitably patchy and incomplete, there have been increasing criticisms of these approaches from the social care trade press and from academic policy commentators alike. Against this background, this paper reviews the concerns that are emerging and explores some of the limitations of current debates—many of which make an implicit appeal to ‘the evidence’ in order to justify increasingly polarised views. In particular, the paper argues that many current accounts are based on an imperfect understanding of the principles at stake; on a failure to apply the same burden of proof to the old system as well as the new; on prior attitudes to state services and to current social care; and on a potentially limited adherence to more traditional forms of evidence-based practice.
The Croatian “decentralization package” from mid-2001 has shown how multiple pressures for shifting power to the local level may actually result in relative failure. The central government has ceded the control in particular policy sectors by shifting responsibilities for certain educational, welfare and health services to the counties and municipalities. However, the decentralization initiative was excessively marked as very limited and strongly labeled by the vertical policy dimension, expressing the dominance of top-down incentives of the central government in comparison to bottom-up initiatives stemming from the local government units. The 2001 decentralized package did not substantially increase the portion of local governments finance in total public finance, showing a failure to provide local government units with stronger fiscal capacity. The central government bodies also did not take into account the alternative proposals made by various policy actors ranging from academic institutions, researchers in NGOs, and associations of local government organizations. All these things have contributed to a relatively negligible influence of the horizontal policy dimension on the decentralization outcome. The whole process can therefore be described as centrally controlled decentralization, or decentralization from above.
According to the World Bank, over 80 countries currently plan some form of fiscal decentralization. This group includes Japan, a highly centralized tax state, which in 1995 put in place a law and associated high-profile institutions to promote fiscal and administrative decentralization. But the process in Japan has quickly become bogged down. This dissertation asks why there are hurdles confronting fiscal decentralization in Japan. My research uses the fiscal sociology approach and highlights bureaucratic interests in Japan's intergovernmental tax regime, one that is especially interesting in comparison with other advanced industrial countries. Fully 70 percent of all government spending in Japan is done by subnational levels of government, and 51 percent of the central state's current operating expenditures are transfers downward that serve to support that high rate of local spending. And though Japan is a centralized state, over a third of its taxation is collected locallly. In consequence, Japan is quite anomalous when set alongside a representrative sample of federal and unitary states. No other country among the nine OECD nations used, for comparative purposes, in this dissertation combines such high fiscal transfers with heavy levels of subnational spending and taxation. And no other country gives close control over a large terrain of subnational taxation to a central-state agency (the Ministry of Home Affairs). The ministry's vast bureaucratic turf brings it into conflict with the Ministry of Finance, as both seek to maintain or expand their fiscal jurisdiction. They are thus not interested in fiscal decentralization in large part because they are busy fighting "trench wars" with each other on these tax fields. This dissertation hence undertakes a detailed analysis of intergovernmental fiscal history in Japan, focusing in particular on the Ministry of Home Affairs' ambiguous role in the Japanese state. The case studies of inter-bureaucratic fiscal politics include the Local Allocation Tax (a large general subsidy) as well as an array of taxes on the fields of income, assets and consumption.
What political factors influence the allocation of economic patronage in democracies? Answering this question is vital to improving our knowledge of how states and markets interact. In this paper, I argue that changing levels of party centralization can drive important changes in the allocation of state largess. When governing parties are centralized, national party leaders will control sources of patronage, targeting benefits to particularly influential regions and industries. By contrast, when governing parties are decentralized, influential sub-national party leaders will advocate for their constituents, allocating patronage evenly through a national logroll. I find evidence for these relationships by comparing India's distribution process for industrial licenses and government finance under a decentralized Congress Party (1954-61) to its distribution process under a centralized Congress Party (1969-75).
Even in the wake of the most sweeping campaign finance reform law to be enacted in three decades, further significant reform is inevitable. Special interest money continues to flow through loopholes in the Act, and the Presidential Election Campaign Fund is near collapse. The next reform should encourage broader participation in the political process by individual citizens, both to dilute the power of special interests and to serve independent democratic values that recent Supreme Court jurisprudence has identified as vital to meaningful reform. We propose adopting a refundable tax credit of $100/taxpayer for political contributions to federal candidates and national parties; the credit would be targeted to lowerand middle-income Americans. A refundable tax credit is equivalent to giving each eligible citizen up to $100 annually to use for political contributions. We also present data about the relative importance of political contributions by special interests (corporate, labor and other PACs) and individuals that undermine many of the assumptions on which past reform has been based and that have not been discussed in the legal literature. The data clearly show that small contributions by individuals are the dominant source of money in campaigns, and that the influence of special interest money is subtle, appearing to “purchase” benefits like access, a place on the agenda, and minor policy details. Working from an accurate picture of who really pays for politics, and drawing from the experience at the federal and state levels with similar tax refund programs, we present the tax credit as a reform that is simple, easy to administer, and likely to improve political participation by average Americans. Thus, our proposal, unlike the complicated voucher plan with anonymity put forward by Ackerman and Ayres, is likely to be adopted by Congress; moreover, it will appeal to a bipartisan consensus because it mixes public funding with a decentralized allocation mechanism using a tax subsidy.
Latin American social medicine (LASM) emerged as a movement in the 1970s and played an important role in the Brazilian health care reform of the 1980s, both of which focused on decentralization and on health care as a social right. The dominant health care reform model in Latin America has included a market-driven, private subsystem for the insured and a public subsystem for the uninsured and the poor. In contrast, the Mexico City government has launched a comprehensive policy based on social rights and redistribution of resources. A universal pension for senior citizens and free medical services are financed by grants, eliminating routine government corruption and waste. The Mexico City policy reflects the influence of Latin American social medicine. In this article, I outline the basic traits of LASM and those of the prevailing health care reform model in Latin America and describe the Mexico City social and health policy, emphasizing the influence of LASM in values, principles, and concrete programs.
Konstantin Sonin, Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
In a federal state, political leaders of constituent units might protect their enterprises from the federal center (e.g., allowing them not to pay federal taxes). The effectiveness of such protection depends crucially on the ability of local authorities to extract rents from enterprises. They can easily do so, if there are a small number of enterprises with large employment, and local monopolies can be effectively sustained. They cannot do it so easily if regional industry is competitive, political opposition is strong, and the federal center has enough means to enforce payment of taxes. We build a simple model to argue that it is the industrial structure of constituent units that determines political relations between them and the federal centre. The theory is supported by the recent experience of Russia, China, and Argentina.
Social assistance as the technique providing means-tested income guaranteed financed by general taxation in Spain is composed by different benefits. There is not a only one policy, but different measures oriented to different groups of population and organised by different public administrations. During the last two decades, the different levels of public administration have implemented a set of benefits, which observed together can considered as the Spanish ‘safety net’. The main lines of this development has been: a) fragmented in different protection systems (unemployment, pensions, social services), b) subsidiary of the development of these systems and c) decentralized in different levels of public administration (mainly in regional level, i.e. Autonomous Communities).
In the course of the present transition in Russian society, a new system of social security has been developed. The previous Soviet system has been replaced by a system of four more or less independent social funds, covering the main branches of social security. These funds are supposed to be run according to insurance principles and to be financed by contributions, mainly from employers. Given the difficult economic and social situation of the country, there have been increasing demands for effectiveness in the management of the different funds and also in the management of the whole social security system. The results of this study show that the social funds have developed different organizational structures with different degrees of centralization and decentralization. Only one of the funds seems to be relatively well‐functioning and effective, while the others have experienced more or less serious problems in fulfilling their main tasks and functions. The most serious problems, however, seem to stem from the structure of the social security system as a whole, which is perceived as fragmented and badly coordinated. In order to improve the coordination of the system, there have been proposals to merge two or more funds into a unified social security organization. This strategy is open to question, however, since it would increase the bureaucracy of the system. There are other ways in which the structure of the social security system might be advanced. Such developments should be based on an analysis of the system from the perspective of the individual client or patient.